This article has been initially published in the Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre
Vol. 2 N.° 1 (2023): Enero – Marzo
DOI: https://doi.org/10.56221/spt.v2i1.20

Weaponization of U.S.-China Chip Interdependence^[1]

Abstract

This paper examines the challenges that the United States (US) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will face following the implementation of new sanctions by the US on the Chinese chip sector to prevent the acquisition of technology necessary for the PRC to manufacture state-of-the-art chips. With these actions, Washington intends to freeze Chinese technological development at a certain level to maintain the advantage it possesses. However, such measures encourage Beijing to develop an industry that is less and less dependent on the outside world and threaten to damage US relations with both the PRC and its allies because of its dependence on the latter to effectively implement these restrictions.

Keywords: Interdependence, Dependence, Chips, Networks, Weaponization.

Introduction

The technological competition between the United States (US) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is at the core of their current bilateral relationship. For some years now, the PRC had already expressed its desire to achieve a higher level of technological development through a series of state initiatives, but without neglecting interdependence with the U.S. Although this relationship has allowed the PRC to close the technological gap with the U.S., there are still serious limitations.^[2] However, since 2018, Washington has been preventing Chinese companies from accessing the U.S. technology they need to achieve further technological development, as these can be used in the manufacture of new weapons systems, as is the case with chips. But what is a chip and how important is it for modern life?

A chip is an electronic device of tiny dimensions, composed of a small silicon wafer (or other semiconductor material) on which millions of interconnected electronic components (such as diodes, transistors, capacitors, among others) are placed.^[3] The chips are used to transmit and process large volumes of information simultaneously, allowing the interface and performance of all the devices in which they are incorporated to be improved. In the case of smart cars, for example, several high-performance chips enable them to operate autonomously.^[4]

For these chips to be more advanced, more transistors must be placed on them, and this can only be achieved by making the chips as small as possible, which indicates the generation (or node) to which it belongs. For example, 7 nanometers (nm)^[5] chip will be more advanced than a 14 nm one, as it will have several million more transistors incorporated, achieving higher speed and information processing power.^[6] As such, chips are indispensable for the economic, scientific, technological, and military development of countries. Chips also play a central role in defense systems of any kind, as they enable platforms to achieve greater precision and lethality. Consequently, the more modern these systems become, the more modern chips they will incorporate.^[7]

Interdependence between the PRC and the U.S.

For years, the PRC and the U.S. maintained a closely interdependent economic and technological relationship.^[8] While China obtained technology to modernize and industrialize its country, the US obtained cheap labor, reduced costs and capital for its growth and development. Therefore, what defines an interdependent relationship is that reciprocal effects occur because of it.^[9] This means that the parties involved can affect each other’s actions. However, in the last decade, the increasing modernization of the PRC has generated great concern in the US, as interdependence has allowed China to gain (almost) unrestricted access to advanced chip technology to increase its military, technological and economic power.

Washington has therefore implemented greater restrictions on the export of equipment and technologies with U.S.-origin intellectual property in order to freeze the Chinese chip sector at a certain level.^[10] Currently, the U.S. is curtailing the acquisition of more advanced equipment so that the PRC will not be able to manufacture high-end chips (less than 7 nm), used in fields such as artificial intelligence.^[11] Currently, the U.S. only allows the purchase of equipment required to manufacture older chips (from 28 nm upwards).^[12]

Global Network of Chips Manufacturing

The term “global network” refers to the fact that chip manufacture involves several countries, companies and agents in its production and marketing. Although no country is completely self-sufficient in chip manufacturing, the main countries involved have a monopoly on part of the entire process. Broadly speaking, chip production consists of four steps.^[13]

The first step in the process is chip design, which is based on so-called chip “architectures”. These architectures rely on intellectual property that is the monopoly of U.S.-based companies such as Intel and AMD.^[14] Second step are the so-called EDA (electronic design automation tools) which include a market segment consisting of software, hardware and other services to assist in the definition, planning, design, implementation, verification and subsequent manufacturing of chips.^[15] In this regard, John Lee and Jan-Peter Kleinhans point out that companies involved in EDA should work closely with chipmakers to facilitate the collaboration of all parts of the network.^[16] According to these authors, the U.S. maintains a monopoly on EDAs, with only three companies (Synopsis, Cadence and Mentor) controlling 70% of the market.^[17]

Third step -important and technologically complex- is manufacturing. The machines and processes used for chip manufacturing are highly specialized and only the Netherlands (and to a lesser extent Japan) has the technology to produce the photolithography machines used to etch the patterns on which the transistors will be placed.^[18] The aim is to make (etch) as many patterns as possible to cover the wafer with as many transistors as the technology used allows.^[19] Various techniques are used, from EUV (Extreme Ultraviolet) systems for the latest generation of nodes, to the older DUV (Deep Ultraviolet) systems for the larger nodes. Both types of machines are produced by the Dutch company ASML, which has a quasi-monopoly,^[20] and by other Japanese companies selling DUV machines, such as Nikon and Canon.^[21]

On the one hand, EUV requires an extremely expensive machine that was created in the U.S. and whose intellectual property belongs to them. On the other hand, the PRC does not have the technology to build EUV or DUV machines, although it is reported to have purchased several dozen DUV machines to continue its operations despite the restrictions imposed on it.^[22] However, the PRC is investing heavily in EUV and other alternative techniques to produce more advanced chips. Another of the main countries involved in this chain is Taiwan, as it has the most advanced chip factories in the world, owned by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC). TSMC has been investing huge sums of money to reach manufacturing levels that will enable it to put 2 nm chips on the market in the next few years.^[23]

The final step is testing and packaging. This requires specialized machinery that is difficult to operate due to the delicacy of the chips. In this step, the RPC has major advantages and independence.^[24] Some Chinese experts believe that investing more in this sector would be a way to cope with U.S. sanctions.^[25]

In this context, the PRC has a significant economic advantage as it represents an important market for many of these companies involved in chip manufacturing. For example, some U.S. companies, such as Qualcomm and Texas Instruments, depend on the Chinese market for more than 50% of their sales.^[26] In the case of companies such as Synopsys, these profits are invested in research and development programs that allow them to maintain an important advantage over their Chinese counterparts.^[27] However, the U.S. aims to reduce this dependence through initiatives such as the CHIPs Act of August 2022.^[28] Through this action, the Biden administration intends to relocate the supply chains that make up the global chip production network (mainly from Taiwan), reducing costs, creating jobs and -in essence- Americanizing chip manufacturing as much as possible to minimize dependence on foreign countries.

Weaponization of Interdependence

Figure 1 shows the high degree of interdependence that existed prior to US sanctions in 2018. Although this network still exists, the interdependence is much lower. The first US sanctions were imposed to limit the growth of the Chinese company Huawei in the global market by depriving it of obtaining advanced US chips. In this context, a sort of hierarchy in technological terms takes shape, defined by the importance of the technology produced by countries.^[29] Intellectual property control allows the US to stop the Chinese companies acquiring these technologies on the international market.^[30]

Figure 1: Full interdependence before 2018. Prepared by the author.

Apparently, the October 2022 U.S. sanctions would have been prompted by the revelation (from August 2022) that the Chinese company SMIC could produce 7nm chips, despite the imposed restrictions.^[31] Which shows that the U.S. – citing security reasons – is willing to further tighten its stance towards China, leaving the economic aspect on the back burner.^[32] Washington is currently seeking to weaponize the PRC’s remaining dependence on the outside world for semiconductor manufacturing. As Figure 2 illustrates, bottlenecks (restrictions) are virtually ubiquitous. The new restrictions are intended to block all possible avenues associated with the most advanced technology from flowing into the PRC, while keeping only a few other avenues open.

These new sanctions, first and foremost, are intended to slow the PRC’s progress in high-end computing with potential military applications (such as in Artificial Intelligence, autonomous combat systems and quantum computing, among others). To this end, the U.S. seeks to prevent high-performance chips (along with the associated software and technology to produce them) from reaching China.^[33] Second, they intend to freeze China’s semiconductor industry, taking advantage of bottlenecks in semiconductor design and manufacturing equipment. This means that the PRC will not be able to purchase any items (machines, tools and software, among others) that are used to manufacture 14 nm or smaller logic chips, 128-layer memory chips and 18 nm or smaller NAND chips.^[34] Sanctions further block access to these technologies for Chinese companies (SMIC, YMTC and CXMT) that produce the aforementioned types of chips. However, these companies are already manufacturing more advanced chips than those stipulated under the restrictions.^[35]

Figure 2: Weaponization after the October 2022 sanctions. Prepared by the author.

Consequently, companies such as the Dutch company ASML (which produces the photolithography machines) have withdrawn their maintenance personnel from the PRC for fear that their presence would be a violation of U.S. sanctions.^[36] These measures affect Chinese companies such as YMTC, which will only be able to continue operating for approximately three more months without Dutch assistance.^[37] ASML continues to restrict the sale of EUV machines to the PRC that could allow it to more easily produce various types of 7 nm chips.^[38] Japanese companies for their part will stop selling photolithography (DUV) machines to the PRC, limiting the production of 14 nm chips.^[39]

However, at the end of 2022, the U.S. granted a license to Taiwan’s TSMC to import U.S. equipment to allow it to continue manufacturing chips for the PRC at its Nanjing plant.^[40] The reason for this permit is that the chips’ manufacturing capacity is now required for the time being (cost reasons mainly).^[41] Such efforts by the U.S. are not just about blocking PRC access to technology from other countries. For example, TSMC is going to build several advanced plants in the U.S. and Japan, where it expects to produce 5 nm chips by 2024 and 3 nm chips by 2026, seeking to relocate production lines to U.S. territory or that of its allies.^[42]

The most recent measures, dated December 2022, concern the inclusion of 36 Chinese companies (including SMIC and YMTC) on the so-called “entity list,” making it difficult for them to access software, hardware, and other products.^[43] These Chinese companies will be affected by the Foreign Direct Product Act, which prevents them from gaining worldwide access to any product that includes U.S. technology or software.^[44] Likewise, other Chinese companies such as Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), which is capable of manufacturing photolithography machines, but of older generations and on a small scale, have also been included in this list,^[45] as well as Cambricon Technologies, through which the PRC expects to develop high-performance chips (based on IP-free architectures).^[46] In addition, no Chinese company will be able to have U.S. personnel involved in the production of the chips or in the maintenance of the equipment needed to produce them, which is a particularly harmful measure as this equipment needs constant maintenance.^[47] No doubt, the relationship between the U.S. and the PRC is on the verge of uncoupling, the consequences of which remain to be seen.^[48]

PRC Capabilities, Options and Advancements

In general terms, the PRC’s capabilities have been severely limited due to inadequate industrial policy and insufficient investment in basic research, as well as a lack of qualified personnel (engineers).^[49] In response to the restrictions noted above, the PRC has purchased and stockpiled large quantities of chips and photolithography machines.^[50] However, the big disadvantage is that as the chips run out and the machines cannot be maintained, they will necessarily have to resort to older, less competitive technology.^[51]

To better understand the limits of the PRC’s capabilities, we need to briefly analyze its chip production ecosystem,^[52] which is made up of public and private companies, with the participation of agencies and levels of government in charge of designing and implementing technological and industrial policies for chip development.^[53] In this regard, Douglas Fuller points out that this sector has presented the following problems in terms of industrial policy: a severe asymmetry of information among firms (disconnection between the information and technology they can share), an excessive favoring of state-owned companies when allocating financing and establishing policies, as well as an inadequate use of public funds.^[54] Likewise, Yin Li and Kaidong Feng mention that while the PRC was closely interconnected to the global microchip production network, there was constant pressure from the Chinese government to ensure that companies like SMIC did not fall behind their foreign competitors (such as TSMC, for example).^[55]

Such pressure resulted in a situation that encouraged the company to acquire new technology from outside instead of developing it itself, thus hindering in-house development within SMIC.^[56] In other words, interdependence served as a sort of brake on desires to accelerate self-sufficiency in the microchip sector. However, the Chinese ecosystem appears to be making the necessary improvements. One of these new measures contemplates adjustments to the traditional model of state support for the science and technology sector called the National System.^[57] Traditionally, in the case of chips, this system has promoted a series of tax and financial incentives, as well as subsidies for research and development.^[58] Thus, state support is expected to continue, but with an important modification, since now the market and the companies will have more space to determine which technologies are developed.^[59]

Another important change is occurring within the ecosystem itself. For example, Huawei is building an in-house supply chain with local companies.^[60] Similarly, other companies producing chip manufacturing equipment are seeing their demand increase and others such as SMIC are setting up U.S. technology-free production lines, although for now they are only capable of producing chips in the 40 nm range.^[61] It is worth mentioning that SMIC already has the capacity to manufacture 28 and 14 nm chips, but not on external technology-free lines.^[62] Despite this, even the machines that produce these nodes require external maintenance and it is unclear how much longer they can continue running if they no longer receive support from companies such as ASML or Canon.^[63]

As part of these efforts, the PRC is also looking to exploit its current advantages in chip packaging. For example, Huawei is exploring ways to use packaging techniques, in addition to other so-called stacking techniques, whereby it is possible to assemble a set of chips from past generations that together can generate the performance of a more advanced (e.g., 4 nm or more powerful) chip.^[64]

Furthermore, by the end of the year 2022, the PRC has reported important advances. For example, in the chip architecture sector, China has been developing designs based on free intellectual property software, known as RISC-V. According to Paul Triolo, there are consortiums dedicated to the promotion of this technology, which is used to design chips without resorting to designs from the vetoed architecture containing U.S. intellectual property.^[65] RISC-V-based designs have been used in sectors such as household appliances, telecommunications, aerospace, and defense, but their presence is still fragmented. Despite some promising advances, these designs are not yet able to compete with designs based on U.S.-based architectures.^[66]

At the moment, there is only one functional chip based entirely on RISC-V, the XiangShan, which is being developed by the Institute of Computing Technology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.^[67] The chip pertains to the 28 nm node and its technical specifications seem to be promising, but it is not yet ready for commercial production, whereby its developers hope to improve it to make it a competitive product in the market.^[68] Once again, the problem is the lack of capacity to manufacture them on a large scale, which limits the advantages of these projects.^[69]

There are three alternative technologies to EUV that China is developing: Nano-Imprint Lithography (NIL), Direct Self-Assembly (DSA) Lithography and Electron Beam Lithography (EBL) which are an additional segment in which the PRC is looking to achieve greater independence from the EUV market.^[70] In this regard, the Chinese Academy of Sciences has issued 128 patents in the three aforementioned technologies.^[71] In the coming years, one of these technologies is expected to prove to be a viable cost-effective alternative. In November 2022, Huawei confirmed that it had issued a patent to build EUV machines needed to manufacture sub-7nm chips, which would be destined for smartphone production.^[72] If this information is confirmed, it would be the first step towards achieving a real manufacturing capacity for machines of this type.

U.S. Allied Positions and Unintended Effects

Amid the tense relationship between the U.S. and the PRC, Japan and the Netherlands have come out in favor of restrictions on China, but with important caveats.^[73] The governments of both countries are known to implement import bans on photolithography machinery used in 14 nm nodes, produced by Tokyo Electron Ltd. and ASML.^[74] But without greater participation, sanctions are not expected to be as effective.

Similarly, Taiwan has shown an interesting response to the new dynamics currently defining the chip trade. On the one hand, as mentioned above, TSMC has opted to build advanced factories in Arizona and other U.S. states. But, on the other hand, it has been unwilling to share its cutting-edge technology even with the U.S., sending a special team to protect the company’s technological and trade secrets to plants on U.S. soil.^[75] Recently, TSMC reportedly will open a factory in Japan in which it hopes to produce logic chips for Sony, helping it build its own supply chains to compete with Samsung.^[76]

As a result of such actions, it is expected that chip prices will increase considerably in the near future.^[77] Should these sharp increases occur, they would generate frequent cuts in supply chains, further increasing prices.^[78] In the medium and long term, companies are expected -eventually- to design products free of U.S. intellectual property in order to continue operating in the Chinese market.^[79] Likewise, these sanctions would be boosting the black market for chips.

Conclusions

The major characteristic of the network described in this article is interconnection, which allows the most powerful actors in the network to structure it as they see fit.^[80] When the network had a greater number of interdependencies, especially with the PRC, Beijing had less incentive to develop qualitative improvements. With the recent sanctions, the PRC, an important member of this network, has been marginalized. This has occurred because the technological advantages of the U.S. have allowed it to reconnect parts of the network to the detriment of the PRC.^[81] Put more bluntly, the power to disconnect technology chains from China and then reconnect them to other countries gives the US a significant margin of control.^[82]

While these actions may generate the desired effects in the short term (slowing the development of the PRC), they may also generate other undesired effects in the medium and long term, such as the formation of greater interconnections that reinforce the Chinese ecosystem, as well as exacerbating tensions between the two powers.^[83] In this context, the PRC will spare no effort to achieve a chip production ecosystem that is as less dependent on the outside world as possible. Moreover, the Biden administration seems to minimize the repercussions that these actions may have on its security relations with Beijing, especially when Taiwan is a key player in the technological and defense interdependencies of both countries.

Clearly, these actions would also have encouraged its allies to obtain greater autonomy. For example, following the U.S. refusal to share technology for its sixth-generation aircraft, Japan has opted to join the sixth-generation fighter project being developed jointly by the United Kingdom and Italy, which will require their own advanced chip production capacity.^[84] As Alessio Patalano points out, this initiative (thanks to the greater chip autonomy it is developing with TSMC) will allow Japan to play a much more active and important role in its region, giving it a greater voice in tensions between the PRC and the US, thus laying the foundations for a mini-lateralism, but not necessarily helping to ease tensions with China.^[85] In that context, perhaps the most dangerous thing is that the U.S. is encouraging a future crisis with the PRC. Without access to Taiwan’s most advanced factories and the technology it previously used from the U.S., the PRC would have fewer qualms about trying to take over TSMC’s factories by force if it fails to develop its chip sector.^[86]

Finally, regarding Peru, why should attention be paid to an issue as abstract and distant as chips? Precisely because Peru depends on these electronic devices for its economy, industry, the productivity of its citizens and for its defense. In this regard, the main defense systems (airplanes, missiles, telecommunication equipment, among others) depend -ultimately- on chips. If these components become more expensive or take longer to produce, the national response capacity will also be negatively affected. This issue must be considered when deciding which factories or countries will provide the necessary material for the urgent modernization of the Peruvian Armed Forces, as it will be defining a relationship of several decades of dependence.

Endnotes:

1. This paper is an update of the third chapter of the books Tiempos Violentos: Rusia, Ucrania, China, Estados Unidos y el Nuevo Desorden Mundial, titled “Chips, Interdependencia y Poder: Cómo China responde a las restricciones estadounidenses” (Perú: Editorial Critica, 2022). ↑
2. Elsa B. Kania and Lorand Laskai, “Myths and Realities of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy”, China National Accreditation Service (January 28, 2021), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/myths-and-realities-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy (accessed December 16, 2022). ↑
3. Leandro Alegsa, “Definición de Chip (informática),” Portal Alegsa (2016), https://www.alegsa.com.ar/Dic/chip.php (accessed December 6, 2022). ↑
4. Ibid. ↑
5. A nanometer is one billionth of a meter. ↑
6. Mukesh Khare, “How to squeeze billions of transistors onto a computer chip,” International Business Machines IBM (2022), https://www.ibm.com/thought-leadership/innovation-explanations/mukesh-khare-on-smaller-transistors-analytics ↑
7. Sujai Shivakumar and Charles Wessner, “Semiconductors and National Defense: What Are the Stakes?”, Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS (June 8, 2022), https://www.csis.org/analysis/semiconductors-and-national-defense-what-are-stakes ↑
8. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power, and Interdependence (Londres: Pearson Publishing, 2011), 7. ↑
9. Ibid. ↑
10. Phil Mattingly, “Biden administration issues rules to curtail China’s access to microchip technology”, CNN International (October 7, 2022), https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/07/politics/china-us-semi-conductor-chips/index.html ↑
11. Gregory C. Allen, “Choking Off China’s Access to the Future of AI. New U.S. Export Controls on AI and Semiconductors Mark a Transformation of U.S. Technology Competition with China”, Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS (October 11, 2022), https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai ↑
12. Hosuk Lee-Makiyama y Robin Baker, “US chips war hits allies but likely misses long term Chinese strategic target”, East Asia Forum (December 11, 2022), https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/12/11/us-chips-war-hits-allies-but-likely-misses-long-term-chinese-strategic-target/ ↑
13. Further explanation can be found in: Clemente Rodriguez, “Chips, interdependencia y poder: cómo China responde a las restricciones estadounidenses,” on Tiempos violentos: Rusia, Ucrania, China, Estados Unidos y el nuevo desorden mundial, Editorial Critica (November 4, 2022),144-148, https://planetadelibrospe0.cdnstatics.com/libros_contenido_extra/52/51253_1_Fragmento_Tiempos_violentos.pdf ↑
14. John Lee and Jan-Peter Kleinhans, “Mapping China’s semiconductor ecosystem in global context: Strategic dimensions and conclusions”, Mercator Institute for China Studies MERICS (June 30, 2021), 30, https://merics.org/en/report/mapping-chinas-semiconductor-ecosystem-global-context-strategic-dimensions-and-conclusions ↑
15. Mike Gianfagna, “What is Electronic Design Automation?” Synopsis (2022), https://www.synopsys.com/glossary/what-is-electronic-design-automation.html ↑
16. Lee and Kleinhans, “Mapping China’s semiconductor ecosystem in global context…,” 25. ↑
17. Ibid., 30. ↑
18. Asml and Xataka, “¿Qué es la Fotolitografía?,” Mkfetlabs (May 25, 2021), https://mkfetlabs.com/que-es-la-fotolitografia/ ↑
19. Ibid. ↑
20. Ibid. ↑
21. Jeff Pao, “US pressing Japan to follow its China chip ban”, Asia Times (November 4, 2022), https://asiatimes.com/2022/11/us-pressing-japan-to-follow-its-china-chip-ban/ ↑
22. Justin Feng, “Lithography: The Achilles’ Heel of China’s Semiconductor Industry?” The Diplomat (August 1, 2022), https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/lithography-the-achilles-heel-of-chinas-semiconductor-industry/ ↑
23. Anton Shilov, “TSMC Reveals 2nm Node: 30% More Performance by 2025”, Tom’s Hardware (June 16, 2022), https://www.tomshardware.com/news/tsmc-reveals-2nm-fabrication-process ↑
24. Lee and Kleinhans, “Mapping China’s semiconductor ecosystem in global context…,” 54. ↑
25. Ibid. ↑
26. Eliot Chen, “Semiconductor Shakeup”, The Wire China (September 11, 2022), 3, https://www.thewirechina.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Semiconductor-Shakeup.pdf ↑
27. Business, “After a turbocharged boom, are chipmakers in for a supersized bust?,” The Economist (July 10, 2022), https://econ.st/3qjmYoe ↑
28. Statements and Releases, “FACT SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China”, The White House (August 9, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/ ↑
29. Paul Triolo, “Memory test: The U.S.-China chip war escalates” The China Project, (November 11, 2022), https://thechinaproject.com/2022/11/11/memory-test-the-u-s-china-chip-war-escalates/ ↑
30. Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, on The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence, eds. Drezner, Farrell, and Newman. (Estados Unidos: Brookings Institution Press, 2021), 21 y 44. ↑
31. Ana Swanson and Edward Wong, “With New Crackdown, Biden Wages Global Campaign on Chinese Technology” The New York Times, (October 13, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/13/us/politics/biden-china-technology-semiconductors.html?smid=tw-share ↑
32. Paul Triolo, “Your phones and cars aren’t going to work the same after new U.S. rules on selling chips to China”, The China Project (October 25, 2022) https://thechinaproject.com/2022/10/25/your-phones-and-cars-arent-going-to-work-the-same-after-new-u-s-rules-on-selling-chips-to-china/ ↑
33. Reva Goujon, Lauren Dudley, Jan-Peter Kleinhans and Agatha Kratz, “Freeze-in-Place: The Impact of US Tech Controls on China”, Rhodium Group (October 21, 2022), https://rhg.com/research/freeze-in-place/ ↑
34. Ibid. ↑
35. Triolo, “Your phones and cars aren’t going to work the same …” ↑
36. Cagan Koc, “Chip Gear-Maker ASML Tells US Employees to Stop Working With Customers in China” Bloomberg (October 12, 2022) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-12/asml-orders-us-employees-to-stop-servicing-customers-in-china ↑
37. Triolo, “Your phones and cars aren’t going to work the same …” ↑
38. BN, “Biden’s Chip Curbs Outdo Trump in Forcing World to Align on China”, Bloomberg (November 13, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-13/biden-s-chip-curbs-outdo-trump-in-forcing-world-to-align-on-china ↑
39. Takashi Mochizuki, Cagan Koc and Peter Elstrom, “Japan to Join US Effort to Tighten Chip Exports to China”, Bloomberg (December 12, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-12/japan-is-said-to-join-us-effort-to-tighten-chip-exports-to-china?leadSource=uverify%20wall ↑
40. Cheng Ting-Fang, “TSMC gets 1-year US license for China chip expansion”, Financial Times (October 18, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/2e38805c-d446-45ec-94eb-40b229d4cc97 ↑
41. Rishi Iyengar, “Biden Short-Circuits China”, Foreign Policy (October 28, 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/28/biden-china-semiconductors-chips/ ↑
42. TSMC, “TSMC Announces Updates for TSMC Arizona,” Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (2022), https://pr.tsmc.com/english/news/2977 ↑
43. Ana Swanson, “U.S. Cracks Down on Chinese Companies for Security Concerns” The New York Times (December 15, 2022) https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/15/business/economy/us-china-biden-security.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare ↑
44. Ibid. ↑
45. Qianer Liu and Kathrin Hille, “US targets China’s potential chip stars with new restrictions”, Financial Times (December 20, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/0693edbb-d3d5-4e15-9c33-08f82e6460bc ↑
46. Ibid. ↑
47. Swanson, “U.S. Cracks Down on Chinese Companies for Security Concerns.” ↑
48. Jon Bateman, “Biden Is Now All-In on Taking Out China” Foreign Policy (October 12, 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/12/biden-china-semiconductor-chips-exports-decouple/ ↑
49. Keyu Jin, “How China Is Fighting the Chip War With America”, The New York Times (October 27, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/27/opinion/china-america-chip-tech-war.html ↑
50. Matt Sheehan, “Biden’s Unprecedented Semiconductor Bet”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2022) https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/27/biden-s-unprecedented-semiconductor-bet-pub-88270 ↑
51. Ibid. ↑
52. Lee y Kleinhans, “Mapping China’s semiconductor ecosystem in global context…,” 19. ↑
53. Ibid. ↑
54. Doug Fuller, “As the Fog Lifts: Reflections on the Chip War’s Impact after One Month–Chip Fabrication,” China Tech Tales (November 6, 2022). https://chinatechtales.wordpress.com/2022/11/06/as-the-fog-lifts-reflections-on-the-chip-wars-impact-after-one-month-chip-fabrication/ ↑
55. Yin Li y Kaidong Feng, “China’s Innovative Enterprises at the Frontiers: Lessons from Indigenous Innovation in Telecom-Equipment and Semiconductor Industries,” The China Review vol. 22, n. º 1 (2022), 11-37, ↑
56. Ibid. ↑
57. Jin, “How China Is Fighting the Chip War With America.” ↑
58. Ibid. ↑
59. Ibid. ↑
60. Cheng Ting-Fang and Shunsuke Tabeta, “China’s chip industry fights to survive U.S. tech crackdown”, Nikkei Asia Review (November 30, 2022), https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/China-s-chip-industry-fights-to-survive-U.S.-tech-crackdown ↑
61. Ibid. ↑
62. Ibid. ↑
63. Ibid. ↑
64. Ibid. ↑
65. Paul Triolo @pstAsiatech, “As China continue to come under pressure from US export controls…”, twitter (December 4, 2022), https://twitter.com/pstAsiatech/status/1599554520534876160 ↑
66. Ibid. ↑
67. Gareth Halfacree, “Chinese chip designers hope to topple Arm’s Cortex-A76 with XiangShan RISC-V design”, The Register (July 6, 2021), https://www.theregister.com/2021/07/06/xiangshan_risc_v/ ↑
68. Triolo @pstAsiatech, “As China continue to come under pressure from US export controls….” ↑
69. Ibid. ↑
70. eBook, “Litography: Gatekeeper to Technological Independence and Advancement”, Tech Insights (2022), 11, https://www.techinsights.com/blog/ebook-lithography-gatekeeper-technological-independence-and-advancement ↑
71. Ibid. ↑
72. Lee-Makiyama @leemakiyama, “Congrats @Huawei for your EUV patent for < 7nm chips…”, tweet (December 20, 2022), https://twitter.com/leemakiyama/status/1605202457281589251 ↑
73. Takashi Mochizuki, Cagan Koc and Peter Elstrom, “Japan to Join US Effort to Tighten Chip Exports to China” Nikkei Asia Review (December 12, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-12/japan-is-said-to-join-us-effort-to-tighten-chip-exports-to-china ↑
74. Ibid. ↑
75. Anton Shilov, “Taiwan Government Looks to Protect TSMC Tech from US — Report”, Tom’s Hardware (November 2022), https://www.tomshardware.com/news/taiwan-to-help-tsmc-protect-its-secrets ↑
76. Keiichi Furukawa, Kosuke Kondo and Ryosuke Eguchi, “TSMC fab in Japan at center of Sony’s image sensor kingdom”, Nikkei Asia Review (December 17, 2022), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/TSMC-fab-in-Japan-at-center-of-Sony-s-image-sensor-kingdom ↑
77. Ibid. ↑
78. Ibid. ↑
79. Triolo, “Your phones and cars aren’t going to work the same …” ↑
80. Farrell and Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic…,” 21 y 44. ↑
81. Manuel Castells, The Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, (Cheltenham UK Northampton, MA USA: Edward Elgar pub, 2004), 32. ↑
82. Ibid. ↑
83. Triolo, “Your phones and cars aren’t going to work the same …” ↑
84. Gabriel Dominguez, “Japan, U.K. and Italy to jointly develop next-gen fighter aircraft by 2035”, The Japan Times (December 9, 2022). https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/12/09/national/japan-italy-uk-joint-fighter-development/ ↑
85. Alessio Patalano, “Japan-U.K.-Italy fighter highlights advantages of ‘minilateralism’”, Nikkei Asia Review (December 9, 2022), https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Japan-U.K.-Italy-fighter-highlights-advantages-of-minilateralism ↑
86. Káiser Kuo, “U.S. Policy on China Tech and Chips”, The China Project (July 15, 2022) https://thechinaproject.com/2022/07/15/u-s-policy-on-china-tech-and-chips/ ↑