This article is part of the book Ambiente Estratégico 2022: Seguridad, Desarrollo y Defensa Nacional.
Summary
Peru is the country that has received the second largest number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees in recent years, generating various challenges for the Peruvian State. In fact, the National Multisectoral Policy on National Security and Defense to 2030 considers foreign migration a national security concern because it conveys a view of an unfavorable situation that hinders national development. In this context, this paper analyzes whether Venezuelan migration should be considered a national security concern or, on the contrary, should be perceived as an opportunity for national development. To this end, we have reviewed the current migration regulations, the profile of Venezuelan migrants in Peru, and their impact on development and national security.
Keywords: Venezuelan Migration, Concern, National Security, National Development.
Introduction
In recent years, the massive migration of Venezuelans abroad has generated challenges and opportunities for most South American countries. Colombia and Peru, in that order, are the main recipients of Venezuelan migrants and refugees in the region.[1] Faced with this situation, the Peruvian Government has implemented various multisectoral policies to manage this migratory flow. In this regard, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) maintain that “most Venezuelans migrated to Peru in search of opportunities for development and integration in the receiving country,” being “necessary to know the opportunities, gaps and dynamics of insertion of these migrants in the labor market, in order to have effective information for the generation of appropriate policies.”[2] In other words, most Venezuelan citizens immigrated with the intention of looking for a job to satisfy their basic needs.
Consequently, at the national level, there is a significant number of Venezuelan citizens working in various sectors. However, the National Multisectoral Policy for National Security and Defense to 2030 (PNMSDN-2030) considers external migration as a national security concern that hinders national development.[3] In this sense, the purpose of this article is to corroborate or discard this statement, considering normative and statistical evidence, which will allow us to know the behavior of this social phenomenon, and thus understand whether migration is presented as a concern for national security or, on the contrary, as an opportunity for national development.
International Migration Regulations
Displacement and migration are inherent human rights, as stated in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “everyone has the right to freedom of movement both within his country of residence and to leave for other countries”.[4] Likewise, the IOM states that migration is a right linked to the development of a State.[5] For a better understanding or conceptualization of the forms of regular and irregular migration, the IOM states that regular migration “is the movement of a person across an international border with the authorization of the receiving country,” and that irregular migration is “the movement of a person across an international border without the authorization of the receiving country.[6] Therefore, it is necessary to know these two forms of migration status since the migration of Venezuelan citizens in Peru addresses both modalities, being the migration authorities responsible for enforcing the current regulations.
In the national context, Legislative Decree No. 1350 on Migration establishes migration principles that recognize the contribution of international migrants to various stages of national development and promotes the necessary actions to formalize irregular migration.[7] It establishes migration policies based on respect for and the contribution of foreign migrants to national development, and states that foreign migrants are protected by national and international institutions.
Profile of Venezuelan Migrants and their Impact on Peru’s Development
Since 2017, Venezuelans have been migrating massively to countries such as Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile, and Brazil. Peru is the second country that has received the most Venezuelan migrants and refugees, registering approximately 1.2 million Venezuelans,[8] which represents about 4% of the population. Consequently, this migratory displacement must be addressed and prioritized in governmental bodies, to know the impact of this social phenomenon and take the necessary actions.
Undoubtedly, Venezuelan migrants give rise to a new sociodemographic order and have an impact on the economy and national development. In this regard, the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics indicates that: (1) 52.3 % of Venezuelan migrants are male and 47.7 per cent are female; (2) 97.8 % of Venezuelan migrants registered their entry regularly and 2.2 % entered irregularly; (3) 99.5 % entered with an identity document (passport, identity card, birth certificate or birth certificate) and 0.5 % entered without a document; (4) 94.7 per cent stated that they wished to remain in Peru; (5) 57.9 % have higher education; (6) 91.5 % are economically active; (7) 69.4 % work more than eight hours a day; (8) 78.3 % of Venezuelan migrants work more than eight hours a day; (9) 78.3 % of Venezuelan migrants work more than eight hours a day; (10) 10.3 % of Venezuelan migrants work more than eight hours a day.(9) 75.5% of Venezuelan migrants who work do so in small businesses; and (10) 56.7 % of Venezuelan migrants who work do so in the service sector.[9] In this sense, it is observed that the majority of Venezuelan migrants represent a valuable human capital, whose labor activity impacts the economy and the development of Peruvian society. However, many of them are vulnerable to labor exploitation because they work in small businesses, and others work independently.
In addition, the World Bank indicates that most of the Venezuelan refugees and migrants who have arrived in Peru are between 16 and 35 years old, that 67 % have some kind of higher education (technical or university) and, of these, approximately half have completed their studies. However, due to legal problems and deficient migratory policies, they cannot formally pursue the professional career they studied, having to accept informal jobs, for which they are overqualified.[10] Therefore, a large number of Venezuelan refugees and migrants constitute a valuable human capital that increases Peru’s economically active population.
Similarly, the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion (MTPE) of Peru, with the support of the IOM, the ILO, the Labor Development Program, and the Antonio Ruiz de Montoya University, conducted a survey of 1,601 Venezuelan immigrants to determine their employment status. The results show that 92 % are employed, 4% are unemployed and 4 % are inactive. Likewise, of the citizens surveyed, it was determined that 60 % work as dependents (either as employees or workers), 38 % work independently, 1 % work as employers, and 1 % are unidentified.[11] Therefore, it is evident that a high percentage of Venezuelan citizens work in some type of job, particularly as a dependent.
The high rate of labor informality in Peru has made it easier for Venezuelan migrants to quickly enter the labor market. However, many of them have done so in precarious conditions, being susceptible to abuse and exploitation.[12] Consequently, the formalization of labor in Peru, including that of Venezuelans, constitutes an important challenge for national development.[13] Likewise, the fact that Venezuelan refugees and migrants do some kind of work to support their families means that they contribute to the labor market and, therefore, to the Peruvian economy.
Foreign Migration and its Impact on National Security
The PNMSDN-2030 establishes that external migration is a national security concern, defining it as an “unfavorable situation that hinders national development.”[14] Similarly, a sector of the population perceives Venezuelan migration as a problem to the internal security and development of the country, stating that they have come to commit crimes, to take away jobs and to cheapen the labor force. However, there are studies that elucidate such perceptions, such as the one conducted under the supervision of the MTPE, which states that “it is false that Venezuelan citizens have displaced Peruvian workers in formal and informal salaried jobs, it is false that the entry of Venezuelan migrants into the labor market has generated a decrease in wages in formal and informal economic activities, and it is false that local employers prefer to hire Venezuelan workers”.[15] Consequently, Peruvian society has a mistaken perception of the Venezuelan migrant, due to external factors, which should be the subject of investigation.
Additionally, a study on the effects of the migratory flow on security in Metropolitan Lima, carried out between 2013 and the first semester of 2020, indicates that almost 90 % of the population believes that they will be victims of some criminal act in the next 12 months; that is, nine out of every 10 inhabitants live with a constant feeling of insecurity.”[16] This statistic shows that the perception of public insecurity in society is very high since 2013, a date when Venezuelan migration did not reach a considerable flow of migration to Peru. Similarly, this study concludes “that the percentage of Venezuelan citizens held in Peruvian prisons is extremely low compared to the total number of Venezuelans in Peru and with respect to the total prison population.”[17] Actually, Venezuelan citizens commit fewer crimes than Peruvians, as reflected in prison statistics.
Another study, with data up to 2019, shows that Venezuelans in Peru commit fewer crimes than the Peruvian population.[18] Therefore, this study confirms that the participation of Venezuelan migrants in criminal acts is low and that the increase in public insecurity is due to other factors. Likewise, the IOM and the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Peru, as a result of an investigation carried out in Lima, conclude that “complaints against Venezuelan refugees and migrants represent a minimal percentage of the police record, but there is a high perception of insecurity due to their presence.”[19] The numbers of complaints against Venezuelan citizens to the National Police of Peru have represented 0.6% in 2019 and 0.7 % in 2020. These results show that there is no significant relationship between the perception of insecurity and the incidence of crime among the Venezuelan population.
The same research states that “the greater the proximity and knowledge of the Venezuelan population, the lower the perception of perceived insecurity,” and that “the people surveyed say they feel more insecure when they receive information about the Venezuelan population through the national and local media”.[20] In the case of the first statement, it is evident that the perception of insecurity is related to the scarce socialization between the Venezuelan and Peruvian populations, while in the case of the second statement, it is observed that the media -in order to attract attention- publish news of criminal acts involving Venezuelan citizens, causing a bad perception of them.
Conclusions
The migration of Venezuelan citizens does not constitute a national security concern, nor is it an unfavorable situation that hinders national development. In this regard, international migration regulations establish that displacement and migration are human rights and can be related to both personal and collective development of a society. In this regard, national migration regulations must be respectful of international agreements on migration.
According to the data presented in this article, it is evident that a sizable percentage of Venezuelan citizens in Peru contribute to the economy and, therefore, to national development. This statement is contrary to what is established in the PNMSDN to 2030, which indicates that external migration is a concern for national security because it is viewed as an unfavorable situation that hinders national development. In the security aspect, no objective results have been found in any research that could affirm that Venezuelan migration is substantially affecting the security of Peruvian society, since these are statements based on the perceptions of some segments of society. Finally, throughout Peru’s history, there has not been an external migratory flow that has hindered national development, nor has it destroyed or damaged the State as such. On the contrary, the inclusion of foreign citizens has historically made it possible to contribute to the development of Peruvian society.
Endnotes:
- Diego Chaves-González, Jordi Amaral, and María J. Mora, “Integración socioeconómica de los migrantes y refugiados venezolanos: Los casos de Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú”, International Organization for Migration (July 2021), 7, https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/press_release/file/mpi-oim_integracion-socioeconomica-venezolanos_2021_final.pdf (accessed May 16, 2022). ↑
- José Koechlin, Ximena Solórzano, Giovanna Larco and Enrique Fernández- Maldonado, “Impacto de la Inmigración venezolana en el mercado laboral de tres ciudades: Lima, Arequipa y Piura”, International Organization for Migration (Lima: August 2019), 6, https://peru.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl951/files/Documentos/IMPACTOINM2019OIM.pdf
(accessed May 17, 2022). ↑
- Ministry of Defence, “Decreto Supremo n.° 005-2021-DE, ‘Política Nacional Multisectorial de Seguridad y Defensa Nacional al 2030’”, Unique Digital Platform of the Peruvian State (Lima: July 23, 2021), 30, https://cdn.www.gob.pe/uploads/document/file/2063277/DS%20005-21-DE.pdf.pdf (accessed May 10, 2022). ↑
- United Nations, “Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos”, United Nations (2015), 28, https://www.un.org/es/documents/udhr/UDHR_booklet_SP_web.pdf (accessed May 19, 2022). ↑
- IOM, “Quienes somos,” International Organization for Migration (2022), https://peru.iom.int/es/quienes-somos (accessed May 23, 2022). ↑
- Ministry of Interior, “Decreto Legislativo n.° 1350, Migraciones”, Unique Digital Platform of the Peruvian State (Lima: January 7, 2017), 56-57, https://busquedas.elperuano.pe/download/url/decreto-legislativo-de-migraciones-decreto-legislativo-n-1350-1471551-2 (accessed May 30, 2022). ↑
- IOM, “Glosario de la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones”, in International Migration Law, International Organization for Migration (2020), 134, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml-34-glossary-es.pdf (accessed June 2, 2022). ↑
- R4V, “Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela”, Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela (2022), https://www.r4v.info/es/refugiadosymigrantes (accessed April 11, 2022). ↑
- INEI, “Resultados de la Encuesta Dirigida a la Población Venezolana que reside en el País- ENPOVE”, National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (Lima: June 27, 2019), 1-3, https://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/noticias/np116_2019.pdf (accessed May 30, 2022). ↑
- Banco Mundial, “Una oportunidad para todos: Los migrantes y refugiados venezolanos y el desarrollo del Perú”, World Bank Group (Lima: November 2019), 23, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/107621574372585665/pdf/Una-Oportunidad-para-Todos-Los-Migrantes-y-Refugiados-Venezolanos-y-el-Desarrollo-del-Per%C3%BA.pdf (accessed May 30, 2022). ↑
- Koechlin, et al., “Impacto de la Inmigración venezolana en el mercado laboral…”, 30-31. ↑
- Banco Mundial, “Una oportunidad para todos. Los migrantes y refugiados…”,169. ↑
- Ibid., 55. ↑
- Ministry of Defence, “DS n.° 005-2021-DE, ‘Política Nacional Multisectorial de Seguridad…”, 30. ↑
- Koechlin, et al., “Impacto de la Inmigración venezolana en el mercado laboral…”, 66-68. ↑
- Marta Castro and Xenia Mejía, Una mirada a la migración venezolana y seguridad ciudadana en Perú”, Studocu (Lima: October 2020), 16-17, https://www.studocu.com/pe/document/universidad-nacional-de-trujillo/investigacion-iv/migracion-seguridad-final/15191833 (accessed April 13, 2022). ↑
- Ibid., 34. ↑
- Dany Bahar, Meagan Dooley, and Andrew Selee, “Inmigrantes venezolanos, crimen y percepciones falsa. Un análisis de los datos en Colombia, Perú y Chile”, Migration Policy Institute (September 2020), 21, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/migration-crime-latam-esp-final.pdf (accessed June 1, 2022). ↑
- International Organization for Migration and Public Ministry of Peru, “El fenómeno migratorio venezolano y la percepción de inseguridad en Lima Metropolitana”, International Organization for Migration (March 2022), 43, https://peru.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl951/files/documents/oim_peru_interagc_dp.2218_estudio-migracionypercepcion-de-inseguridad_26abr.pdf (accessed September 18, 2022). ↑
- Ibid., 44. ↑