Summary

Within the panorama of international security governance, classical theories of geopolitics have been revitalized, and others have been incorporated, including territorial encroachment and the security dilemma. The lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine accentuate the Westphalian foundations of states and the importance of geostrategic assessment for determining strategic objectives that support national interests and the foundations of collective security. At the regional geo-economic level, the importance of socio-economic factors in the democratic development of countries, as well as the necessary participation of the armed forces in the prevention of political conflicts and crises stand out. Finally, the correlation of security and political conflict is demonstrated throughout their evolution, from deterrence to stability operations, in order to achieve resilience and resolve conflict in an environment of order and social peace.

Keywords: Governance, Territorialization, Conflict, Crisis, Deterrence.

Introduction: Restructuring the Community of Nations

The world is engrossed in President Putin’s decision to conduct a “special military operation,” planned and cloaked in a cover of deception to conceal an invasion that violates international law. The economic-financial sanctions, including the cutting of access to the Swift system for Russia’s commercial transactions with the world and the suspension of the certification of the North Stream2 gas pipeline, did not limit the aggressiveness of Russia’s invasion on Ukraine, mainly because of the boomerang effect that characterizes this type of deterrence mechanisms. However, the political objectives set by Putin, in the face of NATO’s eastward expansion, were to achieve the security which did not materialize at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, when Georgia and Ukraine wanted to join NATO.

After participating in the Summit, Putin saw the need to form a buffer region along its borders with NATO and influence the countries of the former USSR. In that sense, Russia aspires to form a front, from the North Sea to the Caspian Sea, including the Black Sea, following the border limits not only of the Baltic countries, but also of Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, to which its military bases of Kaliningrad in the Baltic and Transnistria in Moldova are incorporated, connecting the Sevastopol base of Crimea with that of Tartus in Syria. Another of Putin’s political objectives was the liberation of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, in addition to the demilitarization and “denazification” of Ukraine, based on ethnic, cultural, and historical arguments, and on the Treaty of Minsk of 2015, in which decentralization and autonomy were granted to the Donbas region. The third objective relates to Crimea, illegally annexed in 2014 through a Russian-led referendum. However, the UN, through a binding resolution, declared the annexation illegal, as well as invalidating the referendum, for not having had the authorization of Ukraine, thus categorically supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

As can be seen, war is the result of an international crisis that is still active, since a crisis, according to Michael Dobry, is not reduced to an event or a system of automatic causality.^[1] In this sense, the present crisis will only be overcome through a political negotiation that makes it possible to overcome the breakdown of the existing strategic rivalries between the powers, where Ukraine is but a simple element in the framework of the disorder of the international system. In this regard, Yves Lacoste points out that geopolitics, in the current era, is interpreted as the power rivalry between States and other actors in each space.^[2] Therefore, the war between Russia and Ukraine involves not only these two countries, but also the major world powers, amid a crisis over the redistribution of global power.

The strategic panorama is a cumulative consequence of the dynamic shift in the world’s center of gravity from West to East, in the face of the poor performance of the United States as a superpower since 1990.^[3] Seen in this light, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not been a surprise; the emergence of a new power and the friction that is generated with the dominant power, known as the Thucydides Trap, has been studied by the Harvard University School of Government referring to the current situation between China and the United States,^[4] but metaphorically also applicable to the case of Russia and NATO. Another related theory is that of the security dilemma, according to which the development of capabilities of one State can be interpreted as a threat to another, depending on the interests and problems between them.

The pragmatism of both theories, typical of realpolitik, deserves to be discussed based on the original approach of the vision of Woodrow Wilson who, after the devastation of the First World War, sought the construction of new institutions that would allow the peaceful resolution of international conflicts: “The members of the League of Nations must implement not a balance of power, but a community of power, not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.”^[5] This Kantian-inspired approach warns that if a country violates the principles of the organization and uses force, it should be considered an aggressor, and the members of the organization should unite to resist and confront the aggressor. In this fashion, collective security functions, as in the case of NATO, to act when the rules of international peace have been violated, opposing all offensive behavior. Obviously, however, Article 5 of the NATO Charter limits intervention in the current war because Ukraine is not a member of the organization.

When this war ends, it will be convenient to return to Wilson’s proposal for a new approach to world order that will ensure peace and reduce its fragility. In this context, it will be necessary to reorganize the UN Security Council to achieve better representativeness and ensure that the pre-eminence of UN decisions is guaranteed, rather than the supremacy of the veto of its permanent members (China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia). For the moment, the UN has achieved a reform that requires explaining the reasons for the veto issued, representing a breakthrough in peace and security issues.

The governance of international security also requires the development and sharing of the rules and standards of relations in the international system. Part of this process is being fulfilled by Finland and Sweden to join NATO,^[6] while Switzerland reviews its historical neutrality as part of its renewed strategic vision. It also requires confidence in both cooperative security and open diplomacy that encourages international law and human rights for the solution of problems and the preservation of peace. All these adjustments in strategic vision correspond to the advisory role of defense ministries to heads of state, as is the case of Germany, which will invest 100 billion euros to strengthen its armed forces, raising defense spending to more than 2 % of its GDP.^[7]

The war in Ukraine has imparted an important lesson in morale, unity, and determination in the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity. It has also recovered the essence of the role of the State created with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, since it has highlighted that sovereignty and territorial integrity are an essential part of national security, and that the State must have the capacity to defend its interests and exercise control over its territory. Although borders are fundamental geographical spaces in terms of trade, effective control of the territory must avoid processes of territorialization in which actors gradually seek to occupy geographical spaces to achieve a certain legitimacy, and subsequently demand the recognition of sovereignty over these territories,^[8] as has happened in both the case of Georgia and Crimea, and in the Donbas in Ukraine.

Within this context, a function of defense management is the determination of defense policy, expressed in White Papers.^[9] This process, based on an evaluation of the geostrategic environment, is carried out every four years to identify changes in the international environment, and define the strategic objectives of national defense. This policy should be periodically readjusted to guide the functioning of the defense system and the direction of national defense policy by the Minister of Defense.^[10]

Latin American geostrategic and geoeconomic context

Historically, Latin America has been recognized as a stable hemisphere since the likelihood of interstate conflict is minimal. In this region, although there are some territorial differences, the priority is focused on addressing the strategic interests that destabilize the countries that make it up. Therefore, governments seek political formulas to achieve greater economic and social development that ensures the well-being of the population.^[11] Nonetheless, the disregard of Latin American by the United States has caused for powers such as Russia and China to find opportunities to intervene and obtain benefits through commercial, financial, and military exchange, with manifest geopolitical interest and influence in the region.

Latin America’s geographical position, resources, markets, and infrastructure deficit offer great geostrategic and geoeconomic opportunities to powers such as Russia and China, which, through a skillful soft power diplomacy developed during international confrontation and instability, have been positioning themselves in this region. Russia, for instance, wants the Caribbean to become a “geostrategic pivot” on which it would swing north, if necessary. The overflights of the TU-160 bombers and the presence of warships in Nicaragua and Venezuela, as was the case during the anniversary of the Nicaraguan Naval Force,^[12] are clear examples of this posture, to which we can add various economic, military, and technological cooperation agreements of Russia with Cuba, Nicaragua,^[13] and Venezuela.

In the case of China, its geoeconomic ambition is broader, more pragmatic, and forceful, achieved through a strategy of investment in infrastructure (soft power) in Latin American countries. This strategy provides great development opportunities for Chinese companies, ensuring them access to the region’s oil and raw materials. All this pursued within the framework of Chinese foreign policy, as established in its 2016 White Paper toward Latin America, and in its One Belt One Road initiative. China’s investments in Latin America have reached 13.8 %, ranking second in the world, after its investments in Asia.^[14] However, these investments have generated certain obligations for countries. Venezuela for example, received 62 billion dollars, of which 5 % is charged in oil at a rate of 437 thousand barrels/day. Ecuador, which, to date, owes 5 billion dollars of the 20 billion received, had to deliver 120 million barrels of oil until 2024 for the payment of such debt.

In addition, China has signed 47 commercial, financial and transportation agreements with Panama,^[15] has installed a radar in Neuquén (Argentina) for the purpose of interplanetary exploration, a satellite control and data collection (possibly for military use), and has been building the mega deep-water port of Chancay, in Peru, with an investment of 3 billion dollars. Likewise, China is planning the construction of a 1,400-kilometer bi-oceanic railway to connect Brazil with Peru, with an investment of 11 billion dollars, as well as the construction of a bi-oceanic river land canal in Nicaragua for 50 billion dollars. With all these projects of financial investment and infrastructure construction, China tries to cover the deficit of South American infrastructure, generating dependence and reducing the sovereignty of States, by being subject to credits and investments without technology transfer and subject to Chinese contractual regulations.

In a globalized world, States must also focus on geoeconomic aspects, since it is up to them to defend the interests of the national economy, mainly its resources. To this end, States must be integrated into blocs to capture segments of the international market. “All in all, geoeconomics is today a planetary phenomenon, representing a new space of competition between developed mercantile nations.” In this context, the Ministries of Defense contribute to the strategic vision and presidential decisions, by integrating into the periodic geostrategic assessment of the national territory the various resources available, and the projects of national scope essential to achieve economic growth and distribution of wealth in the different sectors of society.^[16] Therefore, the Ministries of Defense, together with other ministries, contribute to the creation of opportunities through public and private ventures to carry out projects of national interest.

The current era is characterized by regional governance that links security with the region’s geoeconomic projects. Countries are interdependent, with economic flows and networks that make each region a place of interconnection with respect to capital, technology, resources, and wealth. The Pacific Alliance^[17] is the best example of how nature, including marine and industrial resources, thanks to the geographical location of the Pacific, offers opportunities for the formation of a bloc of countries that benefits from the regionalization of trade and the campaign for the conquest of international markets.

To make viable and strengthen this trade bloc, the capabilities of the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces are needed, in order to carry out oceanographic research and ensure maritime transport, ports, and communication lines. In this way, fishing fleets, maritime industries, container ships, and all activities necessary for export and import will be protected from transnational organized crime and piracy. Therefore, the opportunities offered by geoeconomic dynamics in the region must be guaranteed and secured through international cooperation and partnership, for the benefit of trade and the preservation of national sovereignty.

Risk factors for conflict and political crisis

Latin America is “a region of great contrasts, where wealth and prosperity coexist with vulnerability and extreme poverty.”^[18] Additionally, it is an inequitable region, with political crises and a declining democracy, and where transnational threats and criminal violence increasingly involve the armed forces in the field of internal security. However, it is important to consider that in the region there has been a militarization of the police, or a policing of the military, which is a superficial assessment since this will depend on the way in which the new threats are faced within the country.

In this regard, Ruth Diamint, referring to a press conference of the president of Ecuador (accompanied by the Military High Command) for the crisis experienced in October 2019, mentions that although coups d’état seem banished, new forms of military power have been emerging in the continent, including a new militarism that is seen as a “politicization of the military.”^[19] Francisco Sánchez, referring to the same press conference, states that the presence of the military in accompanying the President of the Republic can have two interpretations: negatively, it can be said that civilian power is subject to military power; positively, it can be seen that the armed forces are under civilian control.^[20]

In both situations, comparisons can be made between powers, without considering the primacy of the Constitution. However, laws and political situations provide room for interpretation during the handling of crisis situations. For example, in 2019, the head of the Bolivian Armed Forces, General William Kaliman, faced with the internal political crisis derived from a referendum held by President Morales to remain in power for a fourth consecutive term, suggested that Morales resign, in accordance with the Law of the Armed Forces, “to allow pacification and the maintenance of stability.”^[21]

To understand the turbulence in the functioning of democracy, one must appreciate the structure and functioning of defense and security institutions in the region. In terms of structure, some countries do not have armed forces; others have armed forces and police, including various types of police; meanwhile, a third type has an intermediate force (carabineros, gendarmeries and national guards), which implies different laws for the operation and fulfillment of their missions. Mexico, for example, has a national guard that performs missions as national police for public security, combating organized crime in the country, while Argentina has, in addition to the national police, a gendarmerie for border control and strategic objectives, and a naval prefecture as a security force for the prevention of public order, environmental protection, judicial police, among others. In general, these institutions fulfill various functions since, in addition to the law, they obey government decisions to fulfill internal security missions, as is the case of Brazil, whose armed forces were eventually put in charge of public security in Rio de Janeiro.

In some Central American countries, there is inter-agency and intelligence collaboration for the coordinated use of the armed forces and the police, while in others the support of the armed forces to the police is sporadic and in specific matters. There are cases such as in El Salvador, where the president, by decree, gave special powers to the military to control gangs, or cases such as Kazakhstan where the president ordered demonstrators to “shoot to kill without warning” in a revolt over the increase in fuel prices, causing 165 deaths.^[22] Similarly, in Sri Lanka, the Ministry of Defense said that “security forces were ordered to shoot without warning against anyone who damages public property or threatens life” during protests over the country’s severe economic crisis, in May 2022, causing 8 deaths and 219 injuries.^[23] Therefore, the management of conflicts and political crises is one of the main challenges of the Ministries of Defense since they must guarantee the stability of the country with absolute consideration for professional military management and the defense and security law, and respect for human rights.

The solution to such problems discussed here ultimately lies in the State. For Max Weber, the human community, politically organized, is the one that claims the monopoly of the use of force in a given territory, considering that for its direction and administration, it has a set of institutions with authority and power to apply the laws, at the same time that it has the capacity to elaborate public policies that give attention to the demands and social needs, orienting itself towards the common welfare.^[24] Therefore, a proportional ratio of democratic functioning can be established between law based on morality and power based on the political power of the State: Morality / Law = Power.

In that sense, morality is the set of norms, traditions and culture that seeks to ensure the behavior of people in a community for their survival and well-being. The State converts these into laws and public policies to exercise political control. As a consequence, the exercise of political power in determining public policies for the solution of demands in an effective and timely manner is the foundation of governance. However, this political process will be subject to the availability of resources.^[25] Therefore, it is important to maintain an undistorted policy environment, including macroeconomic stability, in order to invest in infrastructure and basic services, protecting the most vulnerable and avoiding lagging behind in their growth and development. Failure to do so generates political and social unrest that threatens the stability of the State.

The high rates of corruption and the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in Latin America have contributed to the distrust in democracy. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “the extreme poverty rate in Latin America would have increased from 13.1 % in 2020 to 13.8 % in 2021, which means an increase of 5 million people in extreme poverty and a setback of 27 years.^[26]

On the other hand, the level and escalation of violence in the streets depends on the circumstances in which social unrest occurs and how it is controlled. While it is true that the population has the right to mobilize and protest, it does not have the right to extreme violence, the destruction of property and strategic installations, or the blocking of roads, among others. Unfortunately, in Latin America, the volume of social demands is high, while the capacity of States to meet these demands is low. However, what are the factors that produce this imbalance that affects the region?

One of these factors is the macroeconomic imbalance (external debt, inflation, unemployment, etc.) that affects the population, mainly the poorest. Undoubtedly, another factor is the corruption existing at different levels of government and branches of government, to which we must add the uncontrollable action of transnational organized crime, especially drug trafficking. However, there is a new factor, the regional trend towards populism. Although this political style can be right or left, when populism is radical left, it has as its strategy the refoundation of the State.^[27] In every region of the world, democracy is under attack by populist leaders and groups who reject pluralism and demand unchecked power to advance the interests of their supporters, usually at the expense of minorities and other perceived enemies.”^[28]

The authoritarian root of radical populism, which denies democratic institutions and promotes a dialectic of peoples and social classes as a product of social division, is reflected in the posture, “We are the people, and they are the dominant oligarchy.” However, greater social political participation is not necessarily achieved through the refoundation of the State and political instability. In Ecuador, for example, the proposed economic reforms (which included the renegotiation of the debt with IMF assistance and the elimination of fuel price subsidies) were the arguments for the instability that occurred in October 2019,^[29] which began with a national strike, and escalated into violent acts against the National Assembly and the presidential palace. During these events, an important measure was to support the government authority, evacuating the president and ministers from Quito (the capital of the country) to Guayaquil, based on an Executive Decree that provided for the change of the seat of government. These actions not only demonstrated the subordination of the armed forces to the political power constituted in the country, but also allowed the continuity of the political handling of the crisis by the national government.

Subsequently, violent protests began in Chile over the increase in transport fares, leading to the declaration of a state of emergency and curfew. President Piñera apologized “for the lack of vision” and announced a broad social agenda of reforms, including the approval of a proposal to change the Constitution. Colombia continued in this wave of instability due to the dissatisfaction of trade unionists and student and indigenous organizations with the new tax and pension reforms. The political crisis in Peru, on the other hand, occurred because of the declaration of presidential vacancy due to moral incapacity of President Martin Vizcarra, in November 2020. When relieved by the president of the Congress, Manuel Merino, there were several detrimental items that came to light that led to his resignation, being replaced by the new president of the Congress, Francisco Sagasti. All this occurred in just over a week.

After a long professional training and clarity in the civic thinking of the armed forces in Latin America, it is hoped that there will be no militarism that will seize power through a coup d’état. However, there is a risk of a political instrumentalization of the armed forces by the political actors in conflict. In other words, when the police, armed forces and intelligence services engage and take part in infighting, efforts to improve democratic civilian control are weakened.^[30]

Military competencies in the correlation of security and conflict

Considering that security is the absence of danger or risk in which the State is free of threats,^[31] the armed forces in Latin America are increasingly immersed in this field, particularly in support of the police, in states of emergency, to restore and maintain legal order and social peace. However, in the case of border security, the armed forces often do not have the legal power, training, and equipment to combat crimes in these areas, nor to differentiate their actions in managing citizen security in urban and rural areas.^[32]

According to Ralf Dahrendorf, conflict will always be present in a post-capitalist society due to the established state and government structures and should not constitute a dangerous situation since it is up to politics to handle conflicts. Likewise, Michael Lind believes that conflicts are shaped by the current economic structure, including the laws, nature, and operation of businesses, as well as the rights of workers with populist influence who are trying to overthrow liberal democracy.^[33] Based on these discrepancies, hostile attempts are made to maintain or achieve a right.^[34] In this context, the State is interested in the transformation of the conflict.

This dynamic of contradictions is characteristic of the human relationship and of the political forces that seek to satisfy aspirations to stimulate economic growth and obtain new opportunities and constructive changes in favor of the common good. Although resources are always considered scarce, political skill must be deployed to achieve consensus and seek alternatives for conflict resolution. Throughout this process, the Ministries of Defense are responsible for supporting government bodies, ministries and political actors, through stability operations,^[35] which consist of protecting the population, maintaining border security and the functioning of basic public services, unblocking roads, ensuring the supply of the population, guaranteeing administrative functioning, supporting the police in public security, and imposing social order to create the conditions that allow the resolution of the conflict.

These stability operations accompany, in a progressive and proportionate manner, the evolution of the conflict, through cooperation and support to the police and local authorities to achieve positive governance. The cooperation of the Ministry of Defense with other ministries and with local authorities in remote regions is essential to create effective spaces for State participation, avoiding the creation of grey areas where illegal non-State groups try to replace State institutions, taking advantage of social discontent in the absence of State presence.^[36] These illegal groups not only build stadiums and health centers, but also provide employment, obtaining in exchange legitimacy to exercise control of the territory and the frightened population. For example, Colombian drug trafficker Pablo Escobar “tried to win the people’s vote in multiple ways, whether it was building more than 100 soccer fields… or building a neighborhood for the lower classes in the region that was known as ‘Medellín sin tugurios’ [Medellin without Shanty Towns], all paid for with cocaine money.”^[37]

On the other hand, when negative or weak governance undermines the principle of sovereignty and the primacy of the law on which the functioning of the State is based, governance escalates to a crisis. In this context, cooperation measures are reinforced by dissuasive actions of a preventive nature,^[38] which involve discouraging the adversary by demonstrating that it legally possesses all the capacity and political will to act to defeat it or, at least, to warn that any aggression will be very costly compared to the benefits it intends to obtain.

In Brazil, the largest criminal gangs (the Red Command and the First Capital Command)^[39] can control detention centers, organize protests, structure criminal networks, and manipulate violence in the streets. Similarly, in Ecuador, disputes between organized crime networks have led to riots in detention centers, killing hundreds of inmates. The connections of these groups involved in organized crime are due to three nuclei of networks in Latin America: (1) in Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), (2) in the Pacific (Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru), and (3) the Atlantic Axis (Bolivia, Venezuela, and Brazil).

Regarding actions against the different forms of transnational organized crime, the police and justice officials are responsible for intelligence, prevention, prosecution, combat, detention, and rehabilitation. However, in case of need, and having declared a state of emergency, the armed forces act in support of the police, providing logistics, transport, and communications, among others. In this situation, without merging military and police units, “international law requires military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe and secure environment.”^[40]

In this regard, contingency and stability operations that take place in crisis and insurgency situations^[41] involve joint and interministerial actions to achieve unity of effort, maintain legitimacy, improve governance, address the causes of the insurgency, and recover constitutional order and peace. For the execution of military operations, it is essential to precisely determine both the norms of behavior in relation to the population and other institutions, and the rules of engagement, as stipulated by the United Nations^[42] and the International Committee of the Red Cross.^[43]

Conclusions

Political instability constitutes a threat to the international system, collective security, and States. Therefore, its analysis is fundamental to understand the new competencies of the Ministries of Defense in Latin America. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the fragility of collective security systems in the face of the danger of redistribution of powers, based on classical geopolitical theories and strategies such as containment, deterrence, and the security dilemma, to which others, such as territorialization and preventive attack, are added. Latin America continues to be one of the most inequitable and violent regions in the world, with frequent social mobilizations and political conflicts. Unfortunately, the existing political instability serves as a platform for the emergence of grey areas in which negative governance is established, taking advantage of weak institutions and the limited presence of the State.

The ministries of Defense of Latin America, with the renewal of their competences, must periodically update their joint strategic capabilities, as they are fundamental components for the stability of the countries and the consolidation of positive governance. To this end, the execution of deterrence and stability operations is a fundamental part of the correlation between security and conflict, avoiding escalation and facilitating the resolution of conflicts. In this regard, the Ministries of Defense are key collaborators of governmental and non-governmental bodies for the development of geoeconomic projects that integrate security and the economy.

Endnotes:

1. Michael Dobry, Sociologie des crisis politiques, (Paris: Presses de Sciences, 2009). ↑
2. Ives Lacoste, “Pour une histoire critique des idees geopolitiques”, in Les Grands theoriciens de la geopolitique, by Florian Louis, (Paris: Press Univesitaires, 2006), 20. ↑
3. Zbigniev Brzezinski, Strategic Vision, (New York: Basic Books, 2013). ↑
4. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?(New York: First Mariner Books, 2017). ↑
5. Henry Kissinger, World Order, (New York: Penguin, 2015), 262. ↑
6. Vitoria Wilson, “Finlandia y Suecia se integrarán en la OTAN en junio, según ‘The Times’“, The World News (April 11, 2022), https://theworldnews.net/es-news/finlandia-y-suecia-se-integraran-en-la-otan-en-junio-segun-the-times ↑
7. EP International, “Alemania destinará 100.000 millones de euros a fortalecer sus Fuerzas Armadas”, Europapress (Berlin: February 27, 2022), https://www.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-alemania-destinara-100000-millones-euros-fortalecer-fuerzas-armadas-20220227123706.html (Accessed April 20, 2022.) ↑
8. Alezander C. Diener and Josua Hagen, Borders: A Very Short Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). ↑
9. In Anglo-Saxon countries, the Defense Policy is known as NSS; in other countries, it is called White Papers, Livre Blanc, or Livro Branco, ↑
10. See: Raúl Oswaldo Jarrín Román, “Gobernanza de la Política de la Defensa y Seguridad: Ecuador 2017-2021,” at Perry Center Occasional Paper, William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (Washington DC: January 2022), https://www.williamjperrycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication_associated_files/Gobernanza%20de%20la%20Politica%20de%20Defensa%20y%20Seguridad.pdf ↑
11. Macarena Vidal Liy, “China y Venezuela una relacion basada en deuda”, The Country (Beijing: January 29, 2019), https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/01/25/actualidad/1548438622_696886.html ↑
12. Elizabeth Romero, “Ortega recorre buque ruso anclado en Nicaragua”, The Press (Nicaragua: August 15, 2013), https://www.laprensani.com/2013/08/15/politica/158706-ortega-recorre-buque-ruso-anclado-en-nicaragua (Accessed April 16, 2022.) ↑
13. Nicaragua withdrew from the OAS, citing the disqualification of its elections. It is the second country along with Venezuela to withdraw from the OAS. ↑
14. Frank Tetart, Grand Atlas,( Paris: Radio France Internationale, 2015), 18. ↑
15. Agreements between China and Panama, signed on December 3, 2018, which aim to connect the Silk Road project with Panama, in view of the great usefulness of the expansion of the port and its connection with the Atlantic ports of North America, Latin America and Europe. ↑
16. Pascal Lorot, Introduction to Geoenomie, (Paris: Institut Eurpeen de Geoeconomie, 1999), 20. ↑
17. Ecuador, for several years, has been applying to join the organization and has the support of several countries. Currently, it is managing a trade agreement with Mexico, to be one of the requirements for admission as a full member. ↑
18. UNDP, “Atrapados alta desigualdad y bajo crecimiento en America Latina. Informe Regional de desarrollo Humano 2021”, United Nations Development Programme (June 22, 2021), https://www.undp.org/es/press-releases/atrapados-alta-desigualdad-y-bajo-crecimiento-en-america-latina-y-el-caribe ↑
19. Angelo Atanassio, “Protestas en America Latina: cómo los militares volvieron al primer plano de la politica en la región,” BBC News World (2 December 2019), https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50586948 (Accessed April 20, 2022.) ↑
20. When the Chief of state determines the state of emergency or emergency and there are doubts about the decision taken, the Constitutional Court or, where appropriate, Congress evaluates the decision to use the Armed Forces. ↑
21. Kevin Parthenay, Crises at Amerique Latine, (Paris: Armand Colin, 2020). ↑
22. Ana Buil Demur, “Preocupación internacional tras el “disparar a matar sin previo aviso” del presidente de Kazajistán”, Euronews (January 7, 2022), https://es.euronews.com/2022/01/07/preocupacion-internacional-tras-el-disparar-a-matar-sin-previo-aviso-del-presidente-de-kaz (Accessed April 30, 2022). ↑
23. DW World, “Sri Lanka ordena disparar sin aviso previo para atajar disturtbios”, Deutsche Welle (May 10, 2022), https://www.dw.com/es/sri-lanka-ordena-disparar-sin-aviso-previo-para-atajar-disturbios/a-61751442 (Accessed May 10, 2022). ↑
24. Francis Fukuyama, State Building, Governance and world ordr in the 21st century, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 92-103. ↑
25. Open knowledge repositor, “World development report 1997: The State in a changing world” World Bank (1997), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5980 (Accessed April 20, 2022.) ↑
26. United Nations, “Pobreza extrema en la región sube a 86 millones en 2021 como consecuencia de la profundización de la crisis social y sanitaria derivada de la pandemia de COVID-19”, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ECLAC (January 25, 2022), https://www.cepal.org/es/comunicados/pobreza-extrema-la-region-sube-86-millones-2021-como-consecuencia-la-profundizacion-la (Accessed April 20, 2022) ↑
27. Ernesto Laclau, “Populismo y transformacion del imaginario politico en America Latina”, in Bulletin of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Centrum voor Studie en Documentatie van Latijns Amerika CEDLA (June 1987), http://www.jstor.org/stable/25675327 (Accessed April 27, 2022). ↑
28. Freedom House, “Democracy in Decline,” Freedomhouse (2022), https://freedomhouse.org/issues/democracies-decline (Accessed April 25, 2022.) ↑
29. Ecuador sought a way out of the immense external debt that reached 450 billion dollars carried over from previous governments and that had increased by 3,400 million in the last year due to the effect of the fall in the price of crude oil and the strengthening of the dollar. ↑
30. Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, “Control parlamentario del sector seguridad”, Inter-Parliamentary Union and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Geneva: 2003). https://dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/ipu_hb_spanish.pdf ↑
31. Ole Waever, “Securitization and dessecuritization”, in On Security, by Lipschutz Ronnie, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 52-59. ↑
32. Ecuador’s Regional Security Working Group, “Los militares en la seguridad interna: realidad y desafios para Ecuador,” Friederich Ebert Stiftung (May 2013), 6, https://www.resdal.org/caeef-resdal/assets/ecuador—-“the-military-in-the-internal-security–reality-and-challenges-for-ecuador”.-(gtsr)-ecuador.-fes-ildis.-may-2013%2C-p.5.. .pdf ↑
33. Michael Lind, The New class war, (New York: Penguin, 2020). ↑
34. Fernando A. Milia, El Conflicto analisis estructural, (Buenos Aires: Instituto de publicaciones navales, 1985), 70. ↑
35. Department of the Army, Stability, Army Doctrine Publication 3-07. (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2019). ↑
36. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Harold Trinkunas and Shadi Hamid, Militants, Criminals and War Lords: the challenge of local governance in an Age of disorder, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2018). ↑
37. Manuel P. Villatorio, “La verdaderza historia de Pablo Escobar, el narcotraficante que asesinó a 10.000 personas,” Abcplay (November 16, 2014), https://www.abc.es/play/cine/noticias/abci-verdadera-historia-pablo-escobar-narcotraficante-asesino-10000-personas-202005071729_noticia.html (Accessed May 5, 2022). ↑
38. Antulio Echevarria, Military Strategy, (London: Ashford Colour Press, Osford, 2017), 49. ↑
39. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Harold Trinkunas and Shadi Hamid Militants, Criminals and War Lords: …, 104. ↑
40. Army FM 3-07, Stability Operations, (Washington DC: Headquarters Army, 2008). ↑
41. David Petraus, Ounterinsurgency: FM 3-24, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2007). ↑
42. UN, “Principios Básicos sobre el empleo de la fuerza y de armas de fuego por los funcionarios encargados de hacer cumplir la ley”, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (August 27, 1990), https://www.ohchr.org/es/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-use-force-and-firearms-law-enforcement ↑
43. ICRC, “Manual de Normas Internacionales que rigen las operaciones militares”, International Committee of the Red Cross (March 7, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/es/publication/manual-de-normas-internacionales-que-rigen-las-operaciones-militares ↑