This article was initially published in the Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre
Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024): April to June
DOI: https://doi.org/10.56221/spt.v3i2.57

Summary

The purpose of this article is to investigate and analyze the process of securitization from the United States (US) to China and the dangers it poses to regional security in the Asia Pacific. It is argued that securitization, understood as a process in which a danger is identified and designated as an existential threat to an object of reference that justifies the adoption of extreme measures to protect it, is driving the bilateral relationship between Washington and Beijing towards a direct confrontation. The key to understanding this phenomenon lies in identifying how U.S. security visions (which define the interpretive framework through which perceived dangers are identified and reacted to) shape policies toward China (seen as a threat to the international order) and how these measures are worsening the security dynamics between the two powers. Therefore, the text examines why this attitude is capable of generating an armed conflict with the Asian country: the desire to show firmness reduces the options available to China in response to the growing diplomatic rapprochement of the US with Taiwan, as evidenced by its recent behavior towards the island in 2022 and 2023.

Keywords: U.S.-China Bilateral Relationship, Chinese Actions. Keywords: US-China Bilateral Relationship, Chinese Actions in the Asia Pacific, Securitization, International Order.

Introduction

In the Asia Pacific region, the U.S.-China bilateral relationship in the last decade has experienced a considerable decline. This phenomenon is attributed to both Beijing’s behavior and the policies adopted by Washington in response to those actions. This has led more than one analyst to regard it, increasingly, as a zero-sum relationship.

^[1] What is the reason for this deterioration? Washington is concerned about China’s attitude toward Taiwan in recent years, seeing it as a possible prelude to a military operation to invade and capture the island in the near future. This concern is exacerbated by Beijing’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, which directly involves Taiwanese security. In addition, the US is concerned that China is ignoring international law, an essential component of the existing international order.

Such a system is defined as a set of rules and expectations established between states to regulate the survival objectives of international society and its independence, ensuring peace while sustaining it.^[2] An additional apprehension revolves around the attitudes adopted by the Chinese government in recent years, such as the disregard of the arbitral ruling of the International Court of Justice in the maritime dispute with the Philippines in 2016, openly declaring that it does not intend to abide by it.^[3] Additionally, China’s position that it considers the entire South Sea as part of its internal territorial waters, a position that conflicts with international law,^[4] has been made official. Even more troubling is the fact that these claims are backed by an increase in the activity of its navy.

As part of this change in foreign policy towards the Sea, since 2009 the Chinese authorities have begun constructing artificial islands, such as atolls and islets, and then building military facilities on them to enable them to project their air and naval power, in addition to giving them the ability to interfere with access to other countries with which they have territorial disputes in the region, such as the Philippines.^[5] Should China further consolidate its position and expand its claims, this would also allow it to control the territorial waters adjacent to the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and be able to restrict the free transit of ships that are essential for regional maritime trade, on which the economies of the region, including the island of Taiwan, depend. With respect to Taiwan,^[6] they have increased military activities around the island and have continued to make statements expressing their desire to re-incorporate it, as they consider it to be a rogue province.^[7] In this sense, analysts such as David Santoro consider that the aforementioned Chinese attitudes (both towards the island and in the South Sea) may serve Beijing to isolate Taiwan, severely restricting its oceanic lines of communication, through which this nation trades and connects with the rest of the world.^[8]

Consequently, the U.S. sees China’s rapid growth in economic and military power in recent years as the main reason for its “assertive” behavior (and behind a plan to challenge Washington in the region, disputing its strategic control of the region).^[9] Consequently, according to various specialists, the most logical thing for the US government would be to “adopt a more robust deterrent posture”, thus demonstrating that the country stands firm on its principles and that it will prevent China from “undermining the international order”.^[10] This need to deter it is embodied in documents and statements such as the May 2022 speech by Secretary of State Antony Blinken.^[11]

However, unlike the challenges associated with the South Sea, in relation to Taiwan, there is a pact with China that has guaranteed peace in the strait for the past half century. However, this agreement is gradually being eroded by Washington through visits by high-ranking officials to the island, such as the one made by then U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in 2022.^[12]

Indeed, in light of the concerns expressed and considering the statements and actions taken by the Biden administration, it can be concluded that a process of securitization is currently underway in relation to China, with the aim of classifying it as an existential threat. From the US perspective, this designation justifies the adoption of all necessary measures to deal with this alleged threat. In this sense, it is important to analyze in detail the process of securitization and how it has been constructed within the US, as this determines the perception of dangers, establishing their origin and how to respond to them in relation to a power that is perceived as increasingly threatening.

It is argued that U.S. securitization is influenced by China’s actions because the ideas behind it form an interpretive framework of reality that finds validation (and justification) in China’s more “assertive” behavior. In addition, the above process will be contrasted with the manner (and logic) in which China has been using military force in its territorial disputes in order to gain a more objective understanding of the real danger posed by Chinese actions (and which do not necessarily correspond to the excessive concern from the US). To study this, it is necessary to understand what is involved in securitization, a term that will be defined below.

The Process of Securitization

To address the questions posed, we must begin with the concept of securitization, as defined by internationalists Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde in their work “Security: A Framework for Analysis”. From a constructivist perspective, the authors argue that the responses of actors, including countries, to security challenges are not completely objective, but are profoundly influenced by the ideas and preconceptions of those who articulate them.^[13]

Securitization involves presenting an issue of public interest as an existential threat to a referent object that requires protection,^[14] leading to the implementation of emergency measures that go beyond the conventional political process.^[15] A wide variety of concerns can be included in this category, such as crime, climate change or, in this particular case, the conduct of a country.

In the process of securitization, risks are conceptualized on the basis of the ideas of the officials promoting this notion, which form the basis of their interpretative frameworks.^[16] According to Farid Kahhat, the latter play a crucial role in the securitization process, since no single event represents a security threat; hazards can only be identified when contrasted with the interpretative frameworks. These contain a conceptual logic that allows interpretation of global events, making it easier for officials to organize, classify, recognize and identify possible countermeasures or solutions.^[17]

All this also determines the responses that are selected to deal with them, leading to the consideration of only those that are considered to be the most appropriate for this purpose.^[18] According to Colin Hay, the behavior of actors reflects their understanding of the context in which they find themselves. In other words, material reality influences the adoption of such ideas and ends up strengthening them; however, for these visions and frameworks to continue to be useful in guiding their behavior, they must be in tune with their direct or indirect experiences.^[19] Thus, the process of securitization begins with the enunciation of a danger by elites or high-level officials, who declare that something represents an existential threat to a referent object.^[20] Their access to the mass media gives them the ability to set the agenda and disseminate their message, which allows them to influence the adoption and formulation of public policies.^[21]

Another relevant part of the process involves the creation of an intersubjective understanding within a political community. For securitization to be viable, such a community must accept a narrative that identifies something as a threat to the referent object. This requires the construction of an intersubjective understanding within the political community, encompassing the citizenry at the domestic level, so that they accept the enunciation of the danger and endorse the measures proposed to address it.^[22]

As Thomas Jamieson points out, it is not enough simply to make a verbal public statement for there to be a securitization; it must lead to political action that produces tangible effects on the threatening reality it seeks to confront.^[23] Therefore, once the audience is convinced of the need to confront a danger, it empowers those who have formulated the securitization to take measures to respond to the dangers identified and pointed out. This will allow them to implement those policies they deem appropriate to address it and once these decisions have been taken, they should generate political effects on the threat (in the sense of allowing them to better confront the situation through their execution or by reducing the hazard).^[24] However, given that an actor (in this case China) is being acted upon, the measures may also generate undesired effects, as will be seen below. Broadly speaking, the process described can be illustrated according to the following scheme:

Figure 1: Idealized Securitization Process

U.S. securitization towards China

To understand the changing posture of the US toward China, it is necessary to understand that the gradual evolution in its attitude has both internal and external determinants. Internally, there is a growing concern towards this nation, evident during the Obama administration with the initiative known as the “Pivot to Asia” in 2011.^[25] During his second term, then Vice President Joseph Biden expressed to The New York Times that as long as China respected the rules of the international order, there would be no problems, but if it tried to alter it, conflicts would arise, showing that China was beginning to be viewed with some mistrust.^[26] This attitude went from optimistic to critical, reflected in statements highlighting the inability to change an authoritarian political system and economic practices that undermine free competition.^[27] The same thing happened in the Republican Party.^[28]

For example, during the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump focused part of his speech on China, accusing it of taking advantage of the US and “vexing” the country.^[29] Once in office, his administration intensified efforts to portray China as a danger in ideological, economic and military arenas.^[30] As Ryan Hass points out, the Trump administration began to view the Asian Giant’s actions as a strategy to “distort” the current international order toward its authoritarian preferences.^[31] In the course of the 2020 election campaign, Joe Biden adopted a similarly tough stance toward China as his Republican challenger, demonstrating a normalization of confrontational discourse toward that country.^[32] When analyzing the official statements, responses and approaches from the US, it is possible to observe a deepening and consolidation of the process that would have started during Obama’s second term.

Currently, the Biden administration has not only maintained, but also expanded the measures adopted during the previous administration. It considers the danger associated with China in political, economic, technological and military terms, but with much more restrictive and tougher policies towards Beijing. The most recent U.S. national security document mentions that the Asian country has the intention and ability to transform the international order in its favor, eroding U.S. alliances and increasing its global influence.

The most recent US government security document, entitled “National Security Strategy” dated October 2022, notes that the People’s Republic of China intends, and increasingly has the ability, to transform the current international order in its favor. Despite this, the US is committed to managing competition between countries in a responsible manner.^[33]

In detail, the document specifies that “Beijing has the ambition to create a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the leading global power”. To achieve this goal, it is “investing in the rapid modernization of its increasingly capable armed forces in the Indo-Pacific, increasing its strength and global reach while eroding US alliances in the region and the world”.^[34]

The same ideas were expressed by the current Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, in a public speech in May 2022, which probably inspired the security strategy of the same year. In this dissertation, China’s “intention” to reform that order, relying on growing military, diplomatic, economic and technological power, was mentioned.^[35] In addition, it was pointed out that Beijing could “take the world back to the past”, in which respect for international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes were often not respected.^[36]

Evidence of this would be China’s “aggressive and illegal” practices, such as those it has been developing in the South Sea, by which it prevents the free navigation of ships from other countries, or ignoring the aforementioned ruling on the dispute with the Philippines, stressing that such actions or claims “have no basis in international law”.^[37] Despite this, the Biden administration’s position is that they “do not want a new cold war” and that there is nothing in their approach to China to suggest that they want a conflict.^[38] However, this securitization is not only a process whose main determinants are international. It is also validated by the American public.

There are two main indications that would suggest that this securitization has been accepted by the U.S. public. The first is related to the increased presentation of China as a threat in the 2016 and 2020 presidential campaigns by candidates of both parties explicitly, as mentioned above.^[39] The second is associated with the progressive decline in the U.S. public’s favorable opinion of China, which coincides with the criticism of China expressed by candidates in the 2016 and 2020 elections. According to the survey conducted by the Pew Research Institute in 2023, entitled “Americans Are Critical of China’s Global Role – as Well as Its Relationship with Russia”, a significant shift in U.S. public opinion of China from mostly positive to mostly negative by 2017 is observed as of 2016.^[40]

According to another study conducted by the same institution, the Pew Research Institute, 76 % of US citizens believe that China does not have US interests in mind in its foreign policy.^[41] In addition, 70 % of respondents share the opinion that this nation does not contribute to international peace, while 77 % believe that Beijing interferes in the politics of other countries.^[42]

An additional survey conducted by the Chicago Council of Global Affairs in 2023 shows that 58% of all U.S. adults view China’s growth as a power as a critical danger.^[43] In the same analysis, a majority of respondents believe that their government has not taken all necessary steps to address territorial claims in Asia (42%) or to counter its military might (41%).^[44] In addition, a plurality of respondents (46%) think that their country’s leaders are not paying enough attention to the danger posed by China.^[45] This demonstrates an intersubjective understanding between the public and government elites that is necessary for politicians to have the required approval when taking action in the face of the danger attributed to China. However, internal factors only explain part of the success of securitization, as external reality also influences the formation of these perceptions.

It is therefore important to recall, once again, that during this period, China began the construction of artificial islands in the South Sea and announced that it would not abide by the court ruling on the dispute with Manila,^[46] which helped to reinforce this image and explains its continuity in the U.S. government. In addition, China’s growing power, reflected in a 7.2% increase in its military spending over the previous year and in the notable modernization of its armed forces, are factors that contribute to consolidate the perception of danger.^[47] It should come as no surprise, then, that these actions have convinced the U.S. public and the most recent administrations of the seriousness of the danger from China.

For their part, the most recent and most notorious measures to address the risk posed by China’s intentions, actions and capabilities -according to U.S. perceptions- include an increase in military spending, strengthening ties with its allies and showing determination in the face of an adversary like China has not had since the Cold War. These imply a change in attitude towards tensions regarding the political situation in Taiwan, even if this erodes the agreement that has kept the peace so far.^[48] For example, President Biden expressed his intention to “defend Taiwan” in 2022 in the event of a Chinese invasion.^[49] In addition, during his administration, a large amount of armaments were sold to the island for its defense in case of an armed action by Beijing.^[50] These measures and declarations would have been made in response to the respective Chinese declarations in recent years emphasizing the need to “prevent Taiwanese independence”, according to the current Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in 2021, considering that such attitudes would be of a “secessionist” nature and intolerable for his country. ^[51] A sense of urgency is thus fostered, which is reinforced when, from various sectors of the U.S. intelligence community, it is considered that – as of 2027 – Chinese forces “would be ready to attack the island”, as mandated by President Xi. ^[52]

Amid these concerns, during 2022 and 2023, there were high-level U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic visits and approaches that aligned with this logic, as a way of demonstrating assertiveness toward China. In August 2022, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Democratic Senator Nancy Pelosi, made a trip to the island to communicate to Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing Wen her country’s commitment to “not abandon them” and to mention that part of her visit would be focused on collaborating with Taiwanese authorities on security issues. ^[53] The second meeting took place in 2023, when President Wen traveled to the state of California to meet with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, a Republican, as part of her attempt to forge closer ties with her U.S. partner.^[54] The process can be graphed using the following diagram:

Figure 2. U.S. Securitization of China (2021/2 onwards)

Consequences

U.S. securitization towards China is not simply a declarative statement, but has effects in reality, through decisions and actions aimed at the identified dangers. This is related to the estimates China makes and the actions it executes according to those estimates. For example, after Pelosi’s visit in 2022, this country carried out a series of air and naval exercises over the island as a way to “send a warning” to those “seeking Taiwan independence”.^[55] The same occurred after the Taiwanese president’s visit in 2023, with three days of large-scale exercises in Taiwanese territorial waters and airspace.^[56] Since then, according to Ben Lewis, China has taken advantage of Pelosi’s visit to “permanently change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait” by “normalizing violations of the Median Line” (once the de facto air boundary between China and Taiwan).^[57] As Lewis mentions, “if an operation over Taiwan were to occur now, China would have cover for the movement of large quantities of air assets as a result of such changes”.^[58]

The extent to which these fears are justified remains to be determined. Undoubtedly, China has strengthened its military capability, which has allowed it to take a more belligerent stance on international law, backing up its territorial claims, which have no legal basis, through the direct or indirect use of armed force. Although China is acting illegally in disputes in the South Sea, where it has failed to reach an agreement with other countries, mainly due to its refusal to recognize their claims. As far as Taiwan is concerned, the U.S. is violating that understanding with China. However, securitization prevents Washington from recognizing that its attitude is encouraging Beijing to demonstrate even greater assertiveness.

The use of force in the Taiwanese case fits with what M. Taylor Fravel on its use by China as an instrument of its foreign policy: it uses it when it seeks to rebut perceived challenges to its sovereignty claims in territorial and maritime disputes.^[59] Its employment stems from a primarily political logic, as Michael Swaine points out, since Beijing can directly attack the island if it believes that the US is about to abandon the tacit understanding that exists between the two powers regarding Taiwan.^[60] According to Swaine, such a US move would corner Beijing, forcing it to use force, either to force Washington to change course or to try to resolve the Taiwan problem once and for all.^[61]

Conclusions

This article has sought to study U.S. securitization without ignoring the responsibility of Chinese actions that reinforce it. In the case of the US, the main risk lies in exaggerating the challenge posed by China, discarding diplomatic options in order to show firmness in the face of a powerful rival, which could trigger the conflict it seeks to avoid. Washington is right to want to maintain international order and prevent China from using force to assert itself in the aforementioned territorial disputes and with its support for Taiwan.

Another danger lies in the reciprocal securitization that increasingly characterizes this bilateral relationship, which could lead to a “securitization dilemma” between the two countries. ^[62] This would be the preliminary step to the formation of the cycles of action and reaction, typical of security crossroads, identified as one of the main causal processes leading to wars, according to the academic literature.^[63] Agreeing with Hay, the main risk lies in the constraint that U.S. securitization imposes on the options that China considers viable vis-à-vis Washington’s posture. Faced with this situation, China is forced to show a similar attitude, as it did with the exercises following the visits described above. Therefore, such an interactive cycle may end up reinforcing negative attitudes and perceptions, characterized by the constant search to show firmness towards the other.^[64]

In this regard, recent statements such as Biden’s “not recognizing Taiwanese independence”^[65] or the lack of a large-scale Chinese response similar to the one following Pelosi’s visit after the Taiwanese elections in 2024, could help to reduce tensions.^[66] However, if the underlying causes of the current US-China conflict, which are related to the erosion of the original understanding regarding Taiwan, are not addressed, the situation will continue to deteriorate.^[67] All of the above is increasingly reducing the possibility of reaching an acceptable diplomatic solution that avoids direct armed confrontation between the two powers.

Endnotes:

1. Nguyen, Thi Mai Anh. “US-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia Need Not Be a Zero-Sum Game” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, Australia, (September 9, 2022), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/us-china-rivalry-southeast-asia-need-not-be-zero-sum-game ↑
2. García García, Antonio. “El orden internacional del siglo XXI: nuevos temas y nuevos protagonistas. Breves apuntes para el debate en Teorías de Relaciones Internacionales”. Revista de Relaciones Internacionales de la UNAM 130 (January – April 2018): 192-205. ↑
3. Tim Daiss. “International Court Rejects China’s Claims to South China Sea”. Forbes, (June 12, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/07/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china-court-issues-harsh-verdict/?sh=7c0e77e87765 ↑
4. Embajada de los EE.UU. en Indonesia. “Study on the People’s Republic of China’s South China Sea Maritime Claims”. Jakarta, 14 de enero de 2022, https://id.usembassy.gov/study-on-the-peoples-republic-of-chinas-south-china-sea-maritime-claims/ ↑
5. Santoro, David. “Beijing’s South China Sea Aggression Is a Warning to Taiwan”. Foreign Policy, (September 16, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/16/beijings-south-china-sea-aggression-is-a-warning-to-taiwan/ ↑
6. China Power Team. “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?” CSIS, (January 21, 2021), https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/ ↑
7. Santoro, David. “Beijing’s South China Sea Aggression Is a Warning to Taiwan.” Foreign Policy, (September 16, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/16/beijings-south-china-sea-aggression-is-a-warning-to-taiwan/ ↑
8. Santoro, 2019. ↑
9. Alastair I. Johnston. “How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness”, International Security 37, no. 2 (2013): 7. https://direct.mit.edu/isec ↑
10. Geoffrey Hartman and Amy Searight, “The South China Sea – Some Fundamental Strategic Principles”, CSIS (EE.UU., January 25, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-china-sea-some-fundamental-strategic-principles ↑
11. Departamento de Estado, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China”, (May 26, 2022), https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ ↑
12. Yifan Xu, “US’ one-China policy eroded by Pelosi visit”, China Daily, (August 8, 2022), https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202208/08/WS62f04ad8a310fd2b29e70c66.html ↑
13. Buzan et al., Security: A Framework for Analysis, (Boulder y Londres: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1998 [2022]), 26. ↑
14. El objeto referente hace referencia a aquello que ha de ser protegido. Puede virtualmente ser cualquier objeto, persona o lugar. Su importancia radica en el valor que le atribuyen los políticos quienes presentan su existencia como una indispensable para los intereses o continuidad de la comunidad a la cual representan. (Buzan et al., 1998, 11-36). ↑
15. Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, y Jaap de Wilde. Security: A Framework for Analysis. Boulder y Londres: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1998, 23-24. ↑
16. Kahhat, Farid. “Constructivismo y Seguridad Internacional.” En Seguridad internacional: Una introducción crítica, 97. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2019. ↑
17. Colin Hay, “The Discursive and the Ideational in Contemporary Political Analysis”. in Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (United Kingdom: Palgrave, 2002), 211. ↑
18. Ibid. ↑
19. Colin Hay, “The Discursive and the Ideational in Contemporary Political Analysis”. in Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (United Kingdom: Palgrave, 2002), 211-212. ↑
20. Thomas Jamieson, “Securitization Theory: Toward a Replicable Framework for Analysis”, in Constructivism Reconsidered Past, Present, and Future (U.S.A.: University of Michigan Presis, 2018), 165. ↑
21. Ibid, 166. ↑
22. Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. Title of Book/Article (City: Publisher, Year), 25. ↑
23. Jamieson, 2018, 167-169. ↑
24. Ibid, 169. ↑
25. Thomas Fingar y David M. Lampton, China’s America Policy: Back to the Future, The Washington Quarterly, (2024), 54. ↑
26. Edward Wong, Michael Crowley y Ana Swanson, “Joe Biden’s China Journey”, (September 6, 2020), The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/06/us/politics/biden-china.html ↑
27. Ibid. ↑
28. Ibid. ↑
29. BBC News. “Trump accuses China of ‘raping’ US with unfair trade policy.” BBC News, (May 2, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36185012 ↑
30. Tim Hepher, “Trump’s security adviser says: China is the threat of the century”, (October 21, 2020), Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN2770EC/ ↑
31. Ryan Hass, Lessons from the Trump administration’s policy experiment on China, Brookings Institution, (2020), 9. ↑
32. Edward Wong, Michael Crowley y Ana Swanson, “Joe Biden’s China Journey”, (September 6, 2020), The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/06/us/politics/biden-china.html ↑
33. Casa Blanca. “National Security Strategy”. (October 12, 2022), 3. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf ↑
34. Ibid., 23-24. ↑
35. Antony Blinken. “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China”. (May 26, 2022). Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos. https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ ↑
36. Ibid. ↑
37. Ibid. ↑
38. Ibid. ↑
39. Ryan Haas, “Why has China become such a big political issue?”, Brookings Institution, (November 15, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-has-china-become-such-a-big-political-issue/ ↑
40. Laura Silver, Christine Huang y Laura Clancy, Americans Are Critical of China’s Global Role – as Well as Its Relationship With Russia, (April 12, 2023), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/04/12/americans-are-critical-of-chinas-global-role-as-well-as-its-relationship-with-russia/pg_2023-04-12_u-s-views-china_0-05/ El mecanismo exacto de cómo calan dichas ideas va más allá del propósito de este artículo. Sin embargo, es muy probable que tenga que haya tenido que ver con la idea que China se fortaleció a costa de los EE.UU., idea utilizada por Trump en su campaña presidencial de 2016. ↑
41. Laura Silver, Christine Huang y Laura Clancy, “China’s Approach to Foreign Policy Gets Largely Negative Reviews in 24-Country Survey”, Pew Research Center, (July 27, 2023), 2, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/chinas-international-behavior/ ↑
42. Ibid. ↑
43. Kafura, Craig. “Americans Feel More Threat from China Now Than in Past Three Decades.” The Chicago Global Council Global Affairs, (November 2023), https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/americans-feel-more-threat-china-now-past-three-decades ↑
44. Ibid. ↑
45. Ibid. ↑
46. Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR), “Why China Won’t Accept or Participate in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Philippines”, (April 29, 2016), http://mo.ocmfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxw/gsxw/201604/t20160429_8138293.htm ↑
47. Wong, Chun Han, y James T. Areddy. “China Budgets 7.2% Rise in Military Spending.” The Wall Street Journal, (March 5, 2024), sec. World, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-budgets-7-2-rise-in-military-spending-990a455f ↑
48. Kahhat, Farid. Tiempos Violentos. Lima: 2022, 106-107. El arreglo diplomático que ha permitido mantener la paz en el estrecho por décadas contempla una aceptación de los EE.UU. de la posición China (que alega que solo hay “una sola China”), reconociéndola a nivel diplomático mientras mantiene relaciones no oficiales con Taipéi. En paralelo, Washington sostiene una política de “ambigüedad estratégica” con el objetivo de impedir que se produzca una declaratoria de independencia unilateral desde Taiwán que podría desencadenar un ataque chino. No obstante, señala que cualquier intento por cambiar unilateralmente (por la fuerza) el statu quo imperante será considerado como un asunto de “grave preocupación” por EE.UU., dando a entender con ello que existe la posibilidad de intervenir en la defensa de la isla. ↑
49. Brunnstrom, David, y Trevor Hunnicutt. “Biden says U.S. forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion.” Reuters, (September 19, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-event-chinese-invasion-2022-09-18/ ↑
50. Wingfield-Hayes, Rupert. “The US is quietly arming Taiwan to the teeth.” BBC News, (November 5, 2023), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67282107 ↑
51. Qingqing, Chen. “China Won’t Tolerate ‘Taiwan Independence,’ Will Take Resolute Measures on Secessionism: Foreign Minister.” Global Times, (November 21, 2021), https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202111/1239456.shtml ↑
52. Tiron, Roxana. “China on Track to Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, US Says.” Bloomberg News, (March 20, 2024), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-20/china-on-track-to-be-ready-for-taiwan-invasion-by-2027-us-says?embedded-checkout=true ↑
53. Bonet Bailén, Inma. “Pelosi deja Taiwán tras confirmar el respaldo de EE UU a la isla: ‘No os abandonaremos’.” El País (España), (August 3, 2022), https://elpais.com/internacional/2022-08-03/nancy-pelosi-en-taiwan-la-determinacion-de-estados-unidos-de-preservar-la-democracia-se-mantiene-inalterable.html ↑
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55. Kuo, Lily. “China’s military extends drills near Taiwan after Pelosi trip.” The Washington Post, (August 8, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/08/taiwan-china-military-exercises-pelosi/ ↑
56. Wu, Huizhong. “Tsai condemns China’s military drills in the Taiwan Strait.” Associated Press News, (April 11, 2023), https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-china-military-drills-us-f228cd28a79652894ba9243483396b94 ↑
57. Lewis, 2023. ↑
58. Ibid. ↑
59. Cited in Chen-Weiss, Jessica. “Don’t Panic About Taiwan”. Foreign Affairs, (March 2023), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-chinese-invasion-dont-panic ↑
60. Swaine, Michael D. “The Worrisome Erosion of the One China Policy”. The National Interest, (February 27, 2023), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/worrisome-erosion-one-china-policy-206253 ↑
61. Ibid. ↑
62. Lynch, Daniel. “La securitización de China del diferendo del Mar de China Meridional”. En Manual de Routledge sobre la seguridad china, editado por Lowell Dittmer y Maochun Yu, 245-254. Reino Unido: Routledge, 2015. ↑
63. Levy, Jack S., y William R. Thompson. “System Level Theories”. En Causes of War, 30. Reino Unido: Willey-Blackwell, 2010. ↑
64. Michael D. Swaine, “Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis: New Messaging and Understandings Are Urgently Needed”, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, (Mach 2024), accessed April 10, 2024, https://quincyinst.org/research/stabilizing-the-growing-taiwan-crisis-new-messaging-and-understandings-are-urgently-needed/ ↑
65. Steve Holland, Nandita Bose y Trevor Hunnicutt, “U.S. does not support Taiwan independence, Biden says”, Reuters, (January 13, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-us-does-not-support-taiwan-independence-2024-01-13/#:~:text=WASHINGTON%2C%20Jan%2013%20(Reuters),party%20a%20third%20presidential%20term ↑
66. Jennifer Staats, “After Taiwan’s Election, China Is Now Ratcheting Up the Pressure”, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), (March 5, 2024), https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/after-taiwans-election-china-now-ratcheting-pressure ↑
67. Swaine, Stabilizing the Growing Taiwan Crisis (2024), 5. ↑