This article was initially published in the Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre
Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024): April to June

Summary

Shocking images recorded on Friday, March 22, 2024 at the Crocus City Hall concert palace near Moscow revealed the presence of jihadist terrorism in Russia, evoking the Chechen wars of the late 20th century and the Kremlin’s continued preoccupation with the region. Chechnya’s history has been shaped by the struggle against religious fundamentalism, with Dudayev and Basayev being prominent protagonists. Despite the efforts of Putin and Kadyrov, fundamentalism has spread both internally and externally, giving rise to the emergence of groups such as the Islamic State of Greater Khorasan, known by its acronym ISIS-K, and generating uncertainty in the post-Soviet space due to persistent conflicts. The evolution of Islamic extremism from Al Qaeda to DAESH and ISIS-K highlights the complexity of these global threats.

Keywords: Jihadist Terrorism in the Russian Federation, Conflict in Chechnya, Deportation of Peoples from the Caucasus, Islamic Integralism, Global Fundamentalism.

Introduction

Jihadist terrorism in the Russian Federation has had a long history, with the conflict in Chechnya as one of the most prominent episodes. The region has been a constant concern for the Kremlin for over 300 years and, the deportation of peoples from the Caucasus ordered by Stalin in the 1940s, created an all-out hostility of ethnic Chechens towards the Soviet leadership and subsequently towards the Russian Federation. Chechnya’s de facto independence between 1996 and 1999 attracted militant groups from around the world, transforming the region into a new focus of global fundamentalism.

The Roots of Terror: The Shadow of Jihadism in the Post-Soviet Space

The terrible images of Friday, March 22, 2024 at the Crocus City Hall concert palace, 40 kilometers from Moscow, demonstrated a reality that seemed non-existent in the Russian Federation: the presence of jihadist terrorism on its territory. But since when has Moscow been fighting fundamentalism both at its closest borders and within its borders? To understand this, it is necessary to go back mainly to the two Chechen wars that took place at the end of the 20th century (1994 – 1996 and 1999 – 2000). This region or rebel republic has been a constant concern for the Kremlin for more than 300 years.^[1]

Although Stalin ordered the deportation of the peoples of the Caucasus eight decades ago, accusing them of collaborating with the Nazis, without proof, this generated a total rejection of the Soviet leadership and later of the Russian Federation. In 1991, former Soviet general Yojar Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the small region from the new Russian state, which provoked a confrontation that lasted three years. In 1994, the Kremlin ordered an invasion of the area under the pretext of “restoring constitutional order,” a euphemism similar to that used in February 2022 when launching the invasion of Ukraine under the slogan of “special military operation”.^[2]

The Kremlin, forced to sign a shameful peace agreement with the rebels led by former Colonel Aslan Maskhadov, and Dudayev, killed in an air strike in April 1996, did not achieve their goals. On the contrary, the region, predominantly of Islamic faith, was overrun by fundamentalists from Afghanistan, Bosnia, Algeria and Egypt (the main hotbeds of fundamentalism in the 1990s). United around the Saudi commander Ibn al-Khattab, they transformed the devastated Chechen society into a new focus of global fundamentalism. Chechnya’s de facto independence between 1996 and 1999 attracted militant groups such as the Egyptian Gama’a Islamiyya, the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and various Afghan factions linked to the Taliban movement.^[3]

Likewise, native fighting groups linked to the Chechen leader Shamil Basayev (1965 – 2006) emerged, such as the Special Islamic Regiment of Arbi Barayev or the Dzhenet (“Paradise”) of the Dagestani Rasul Makasharipov. The invasion of Dagestan in August 1999, with the aim of establishing an emirate in the North Caucasus, resulted in the breakdown of the Khasav-Yurt peace accords and the reintroduction of the federal army on Chechen territory, this time under a new leadership: that of Prime Minister and former head of the Russian Internal Security Service (FSB), Vladimir Putin.^[4]

Then, acting as interim president (from December 1999 to March 2000) and later elected (from May 2000), Putin initiated a policy of counterinsurgency and elimination of guerrilla leaders, mainly secularists, which resulted in the rise of the fundamentalist movement in Chechnya and the neighboring republics of Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan, among others. Strategies such as the “Chechenization” of the conflict (attempting to transfer operations against “illegal armed formations” from the federal army to pro-Moscow natives) or the appointment of Akhmat Kadyrov as the new local leader, without the consent of the designated and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) validated leader, Aslan Maskhadov, proved unsuccessful.

Kadyrov was assassinated on May 9, 2004 for changing sides and his successor, almost chosen by Moscow, his son Ramzan, although he managed to “pacify” the area with draconian methods, could not stop the growth of fundamentalism in the North Caucasus. This expands beyond Russian borders (towards Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria…) and manifests itself internally both in Russia (with attacks in Volgograd and Moscow between 2014 and 2017) and in the rest of Europe (Madrid, Paris, Brussels, Istanbul, Barcelona, Manchester…). It is at this point that a new actor, ISIS-K, enters the scene.

This militant group, a segmented faction of the Afghan Taliban movement that swore allegiance to the first “Caliph” of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, is known for its extreme brutality and for having directly threatened Russia in its first communiqué, due to the defense of apostate (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Egypt) or hypocritical regimes (the Shiite theocracy of Iran, a traditional ally of Moscow since the beginning of the 21st century). President Putin’s continued support for Bashar Al Assad, the Syrian autocrat, is one of the reasons why ISIS-K keeps its attention on Russia.^[5]

It should be remembered that for ISIS-K, borders do not exist and they consider Islamic territory wherever there is a Muslim. The question then arises: how does one explain that the Crocus attackers were originally from the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan, given the acts of Chechen guerrillas since 1995 and the subsequent formation of the self-proclaimed Caucasus Emirate? Like Chechnya, Tajikistan, despite being an independent country, is under the influence of Moscow, having gone through a civil war between 1992 and 1997 that resulted in a total of 125,000 casualties, mainly civilians. The “leader of the nation”, Emomali Rajmon, remains in power thanks to the backing of the Kremlin, which fears that his area of influence (Central Asia) will become a hotbed of fundamentalism, especially in the Fergana Valley.^[6]

This has not prevented the controversial practices of the Russian and Tajik police from leading to increased action in the recruitment of young people by fundamentalist groups such as ISIS-K. The fall of Kabul in August 2021, once again in the hands of the Taliban, despite being considered declared enemies by ISIS-K, raises the possibility of a new influx of North Caucasians, Central Asians and other ethnicities of Islamic creed into ISIS- K, using Afghanistan as a base of operations.

Unfortunately, this is likely to happen, as safe havens in the Caucasus were completely eliminated in 2018 and Russian-speaking mujahideen groups in Syria dispersed to other regions following the COVID-19 pandemic. Could a new “Fundamentalist International” then form similar to what was seen in the mid-1990s around the Al Qaeda organization led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri? Despite the differences in the scenarios, both geographically and geopolitically, there are common patterns. ^[7]

The post-Soviet space in relation to conflicts remains unstable and unpredictable. The current war in Ukraine, the “frozen conflicts” in Transnistria, Uzbekistan and the Fergana Valley, or the internal opposition in Kazakhstan, show that the new clashes will not be between “Army A” vs. “Army B”, but low-intensity guerrillas, asymmetric clashes or terrorist groupings, whose ideology perversely seeks the establishment of a flawed current of thought. It is complex to analyze the Moscow attack from a perspective solely linked to fundamentalism. What is known today as DAESH/ISIS has been present since 1999.

In the area of Iraqi Kurdistan, fundamentalist groups such as Jama’at Tawhid Wal Jihad took advantage of the civil war between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, seeking to install a mini caliphate in towns such as Biyara. These fundamentalists were expelled in 2003, after the Anglo-American invasion, and moved to the south of the country. Not a few former members of the Baath party security apparatus joined a group that would become known as Al Qaeda in Iraq, led by a former gangster, Abu Mus’ab Al Zarqawi. Subsequent events are widely known. DAESH was able to be defeated between 2007 and 2011 by the tribes of Anbar, known as “The Dawn/Salwah Brigades.” After the Coalition withdrawal, these were violently suppressed by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki and the so-called “Wolf Brigade”.^[8]

With the spillover of the war in Syria, DAESH resurfaced. The problem, which in 1999 was a minority one, has become a global threat, similar to the World Wide Web. Unfortunately, this situation has given rise to what is known as “Jihad 2.0.” Some argue that DAESH represents an ideology, but many specialists disagree, considering that it emerged as a response to the decree of Paul Bremmer in May 2003, who ordered the dissolution of the Iraqi army, the security services of the previous regime, as well as the Ministries of Defense and Information, all of which were composed mostly of Sunni personnel.

Citizens affected by the loss of jobs, pensions and access to the new Iraq did not necessarily adopt the ideals of the group led by Al Baghdadi. Rather, they found in it a source of security from a government they perceived as controlled from Tehran. In an earlier context, in 1992, the people of Kabul celebrated the fall of Mohammed Najibullah, whom they accused of being a puppet of the USSR and its successor, the Russian Federation.

They also celebrated the arrival of the Taliban in 1996, tired of the infighting of the former anti-Soviet heroes (the mujahedin commanders, from G. Hekmatyar to A. S. Massoud or B. Rabbani). Security and justice may come in various circumstances, but their effective administration is another matter. This was evident in Kabul in 1996, and later in Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif. Unfortunately, Raqqa and Mosul witnessed the devastating aftermath of the events that unfolded since 1979. The Taliban Movement, in contrast, did and does have an ideology based on ethnic codes (Pashtunwali) combined with radical Islamism, albeit without expansionist ambitions. On the other hand, DAESH and ISIS-K are millenarian movements that, unfortunately, have become the jihadist “trademark”, relegating Al Qaeda as a “white brand”.^[9]

Conclusion

Jihadist terrorism, far from being an isolated problem, has become a global threat that requires a coordinated international response. The war in Ukraine, the “frozen conflicts” in Central Asia and the internal opposition in Kazakhstan are examples of the volatility of the post-Soviet space. Combating religious extremism requires a thorough analysis that understands the causes and factors that fuel it, as well as the implementation of effective strategies to prevent its spread.

Endnotes:

1. Taibo, Carlos. 2007. “El conflicto de Chechenia.” Ayer 73, no. 1: 131-151. ↑
2. Galeotti, Mark. 2022. Las guerras de Putin: De Chechenia a Ucrania. Desperta Ferro Ediciones. ↑
3. Rustler, Adam. 2021. “The Fluidity of Chechnya’s Conflicts: From Nationalism to Jihad to Supra-Regional Jihad”. Ethnopolitics 20 (5): 545-569. ↑
4. Souleimanov, Emile. 2005. “Chechnya, Wahhabism and the invasion of Dagestan.” Middle East 9 (4): 48-71. ↑
5. Lushchenko, Petro, Lars Van Auken, y Gregory Stebbins. 2019. “ISIS-K: deadly nuisance or strategic threat?” Small Wars & Insurgencies 30 (2): 265-278. ↑
6. Torres Carmona, José Ignacio. 2022. “La conectividad del Asia Central: entre la Ruta de la Seda y la conexión interna.” Cuadernos de Estrategia 216: 29-54. ↑
7. Güney, Beyza Gülin. 2019. “Explaining Foreign Fighter Mobilization from the North Caucasus to Syria: Historical Legacy, Existing Networks, and Radicalized Identity”. Üsküdar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 9 (1): 241-274. ↑
8. Kuehl, Dale C. 2010. Unfinished Business: The Sons of Iraq and Political Reconciliation. US Army War College, 40. ↑
9. De la Corte Ibáñez, L. (2017). “Cuando el Estado Islámico perdió su Estado. Un análisis estimativo sobre los efectos más probables del fin del poder territorial del Estado Islámico”. bie3: Boletín IEEE, (8), 576-593. ↑