This article was initially published in the Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre
Vol. 3 No. 3 (2024): July to September
https://doi.org/10.56221/spt.v3i3.67
Summary
The research examines the challenges faced by military intelligence in combating the terrorist organization operating in the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro river valleys (VRAEM). First, it describes the evolution of this organization over the last 30 years. Subsequently, a detailed evaluation of the transformation and development of military intelligence in this region is carried out. Furthermore, an exhaustive diagnosis and identification of key variables is carried out by means of the MICMAC Method (Multiplied Cross Impacts Matrix for Classification). In addition, the problems inherent to the military field intelligence system are addressed by providing information to the Commander of the VRAEM Special Command for strategic decision making. This work is crucial for the execution of military operations and actions aimed at combating the terrorist threat, which is aggravated by the presence of other challenges such as Illicit Drug Trafficking (ITD) in the area. The importance of overcoming these challenges to guarantee security and stability in the region is highlighted. In order to face this problem, a qualitative approach was used through an interpretative hermeneutic method, documentary analysis, as well as the contributions and experience of those who have been part of the military intelligence system in the VRAEM. Among the most significant conclusions, we highlight the need for a more dynamic intelligence theory and model such as the one proposed, called “military intelligence with a convergent approach”, which will allow the adoption of effective strategies for the production of valuable and operationally useful information.
Keywords: Intelligence System, Military Intelligence, Terrorism, VRAEM, Military Operations.
Introducción
The Military Field Intelligence System (SICAM) includes all those bodies that are part of the Armed Forces (FF. AA.) and that interact holistically to produce information on the military field and all threats affecting national security. In this system, military intelligence operates in an environment defined by the traditional activity of establishing facts and then developing hypotheses, estimates, conclusions or predictions as accurate as possible, which are reliable and valid for use in decision making. The operational environment is composed of all the actors that can influence the intelligence organization and seeks to satisfy the intelligence needs for the commander’s decision making, allowing to conduct military operations and actions. The value environment, such as the organizational culture of the intelligence units of each of the armed institutions and the interaction between the organization and its environment(s), can be interpreted in terms of how to see things and how to analyze information. It also understands the principles and models with which intelligence interacts in the VRAEM to then elucidate what challenges military intelligence faces in the coming years to combat the threat of terrorism and other related threats. It is important to point out that, according to the analysis of the literature and experiences studied, the relevance and usefulness of this research lies in the creation of new knowledge on military intelligence and in the proposal of its own theory and model for the fight against terrorism in the VRAEM. In addition, the current problems of military intelligence are examined, proposing solutions to face the challenges of SICAM in the fight against terrorism.
Evolution of the Militarized Communist Party of Peru, Marxist-Leninist, Maoist, mainly Xiist (MPCP-MLMX-PX) Evolution and Historical Perspective
The Terrorist Organization (TO), self-styled Militarized Communist Party of Peru, Marxist-Leninist, Maoist, Xiist, mainly Xiist (MPCP – MLMX – PX) that operates in the VRAEM has its origins in the decade of the 60’s with the “Red Fraction”, created by the terrorist criminal Abimael Guzmán Reynoso (ABIGUR) and the “José Carlos Mariátegui” Regional Committee of Ayacucho of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) Red Flag. It arose as a consequence of the split in the Peruvian communist movement after Mao Tse Tung’s “denunciation” of the “restoration of capitalism” in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), originating a Sino-Soviet polemic and, consequently, the division of the PCP into PCP-Unity, with the pro-Soviets, and PCP-Red Flag, with the pro-Chinese.
In 1975, ABIGUR organized the Regional Committee Convention in Lima, where it stated that the party operations in the city should be adapted to the work in the countryside in order to initiate the people’s war. Two years later, the Central Committee (CC) of the Shining Path (SP), during the “II National Meeting of Generated Organisms”, agreed on the construction of the Party under the slogan of “Building the Armed Struggle”, approving the elaboration of a National Construction Plan. On June 7, 1979, the “Act of the Flag” was organized where ABIGUR imposed his position of initiating the armed struggle in the short term, proclaiming himself the architect of the reconstruction of the Party and being recognized as the Chief of the Party and of the Revolution. Between March 17 and 28, 1980, during the 2nd Plenary Session of the CC of SL, the “Plan for the Beginning of the Armed Struggle” was approved under the slogan of “Developing the Party Militancy through Actions”. Between April 2 and 19, 1980, the First Military School of SL was held in the locality of Chuschi. On May 17, 1980, a column of the WO-SL entered Chuschi and burned eleven ballot boxes, thus initiating the Armed Struggle (ILA) and the execution of the political and military plans of that WO, on the eve of the presidential elections of that year.
After the capture of the terrorist leader ABIGUR, in September 1992, the TO SP took a strategic turn, with controversies and changes in certain leaders, moving away from ABIGUR’s leadership. They assumed their so-called “people’s war” from different perspectives and ideological interpretations, splitting into three factions: “New Red Faction” (NFR), the MPCP and Proseguir. The Criminal Terrorist (CT) alias “José”, Víctor Quispe Palomino, from July 14, 1999, took command of “the line of armed struggle”, organized a “Political Commission” and called himself the PCP-MLM. It merged the “Main Regional Committee” and the “Central Regional Committee” as the initial project of the armed struggle and the Maoist doctrine. These DTs began their actions with approximately seventy DD. TT., focused on the VRAEM, with presence in thirteen districts of the provinces of Satipo (Junín), Huanta, La Mar (Ayacucho) and Tayacaja (Huancavelica).
Evolution of the MPCP-MLMX-PX Strategy and Plans
The CT, known as “José”, assumed the leadership of a politically and militarily weakened organization rejected by the population. This forced him to retreat to the interior of the VRAEM to try to “save” what was left of his structure. He carried out an analysis of the progress made and concluded that ABIGUR conducted the people’s war badly.
Although he recognized ABIGUR as the initiator of the armed struggle, he blamed it for its lack of success and for putting at risk the continuity and existence of the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR), due to the indiscriminate terrorism it practiced against the population, provoking its rejection and, consequently, the loss of the “support of the popular masses”, leaving them isolated. For this reason, it rethought its strategy as of December 20, 1999 and initiated an intense political debate within the organization (two-line struggle) to “correct” errors. It intensified the form of struggle known as “taking of towns” to get closer to the population, openly expressing its disagreement with the leadership of ABIGUR, “expelling” it from the Party and asking for forgiveness for its “terrorist” actions with the aim of “reversing the adverse situation”. They began to support communal tasks (cultivation and harvesting of crops, construction of small works) with the objective of, in a first stage, neutralizing the existing rejection and, later, to win their adhesion, through the “political work of the masses”.
During 2003, 2004 and 2005, the TO focused mainly on the “political mobilization of the popular masses”. In the military field, they planned an action against the gas pipeline in Las Malvinas that failed due to the lack of a safe route for the withdrawal of the force. On June 9, 2003 they carried out the seizure of Toccate, in La Mar, Ayacucho, kidnapping approximately 60 workers of the Techint company. This action had two objectives: a political one, to demonstrate their validity before the national and international community, and a military one, with the terrorist action carried out on July 13, 2003 against a patrol of the Forces of Order (FFO) in the vicinity of the town of Matucana Alta, Huanta, Ayacucho.
Subsequently, the TO adopted the strategy of “guerrilla warfare” against the Peruvian National Police (PNP) in order to steal weapons. Faced with this situation, on March 11, 2008, the Joint Command of the Armed Forces (CCFFAA) established the Special Command of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers (CEVRAEM), based on the VRAE Detachment existing since the previous year, to carry out joint and integrated operations involving the participation of several military patrols, called by the TO as “Encirclement and Annihilation Campaigns”. To counteract these actions, the TO executed the “counter-campaigns”, developing in its first phase (Strategic Defensive of the TO) two moments: the “strategic retreat”, with the objective of “breaking the encirclement” and deactivating the FFO patrols, and the “strategic counter-offensive”, through “guerrilla warfare” or “war of movements”, applying “mine warfare” and/or “war of annihilation”, in order to cause the highest number of casualties and steal armament from the FFO.
The actions of the OT SL provoked a change in the strategy of the FFO, which abandoned the “encirclement operations” to carry out operations of short duration, with Special Forces (FFEE) and punctual intelligence, known by the OT as “counterrevolutionary operations”, within the Strategic Defense of the FFO. They managed to cause important casualties such as the downing of the DDTT “Guillermo” (2012) and “Alipio” (second member of the CC and Chief of the so-called EPR), and “Gabriel” (fourth member of the CC) on August 11, 2013, which caused severe damage to the TO. This situation led to the creation of a Military Commission in charge of DT “Raul” to ensure the continuity of the actions of its military apparatus and evidenced the lack of leadership cadres. Therefore, the DT “José” decided, as of 2013, to carry out an intense political-ideological work within its ranks to form new “batches” of cadres capable of developing in the political, military and logistical fields, thus guaranteeing the continuity of the revolutionary war. They designed the “revolutionary counter-operatives” to confront the new form of operation of the FFO.
Between December 2018 and January 2019, at the end of this stage, the new organization of the CC was formed in a meeting held in the Ccaccas ravine, Canayre, Ayacucho, consisting of a Central Directorate headed by the DDTTs “José” and “Raúl”, 13 regular members and 18 substitutes. During this period, DT Julio Chapo was captured and DT Miguel Bomba was killed (both full members). In the political sphere, the TO intensified “mass political work” in the district of Vizcatán del Ene to “expand” towards that sector, carrying out “political-military and support campaigns” to form and consolidate Revolutionary Support Bases (BAR) with the aim of involving the population in the people’s war, achieving a certain level of consolidation that made the action of the special operators difficult, acting as security rings for the TO.
The strategy adopted by the TO to “win” the adhesion of the population in this sector was centered on the defense of the coca leaf and the “solution to the land problem”, exploiting the existing contradiction where “few have much” (few inhabitants in these CCPP were owners of large extensions of land) and “many had little” (inhabitants who were dedicated to pulling coca leaf, mostly employees and not landowners). They began to “distribute” land, arguing that it was property of the Party, and consequently, the settlers had to “submit” to its dispositions.[1]
One year after the death of TD Raúl, second member of the CC, which occurred on January 27, 2021, TD José called a meeting where a new CC was constituted, similar to that of the Communist Party of China. In this restructuring, TD José was appointed Secretary General of the Party, forming a Permanent Commission composed of six DDTT (José Jr., Gabriel, Antonio, Fernando, Chato Mendoza and Víctor), and a Political Bureau composed of nine DDTT, mostly women. The CC was formed by 12 titular members and eight substitute members, of which five DDTT were killed and/or captured by the FFO (José hijo, Gabriel, Carlos, Andrés and Elva).
Figure 1 shows the three stages that the terrorist organization considers part of its self-styled democratic people’s war. The first stage began on May 17, 1980 with the “beginning of the armed struggle” and was called “Agrarian Unitary Prolonged Democratic People’s War”, which lasted until May 26, 2008. The second, called “Unitary Prolonged Prolonged Democratic People’s War of National Anti-Superimperialist Resistance, mainly Yankee”, began on May 26, 2008 and remains in force to date. In perspective, the organization plans a third stage called “Unitary Democratic People’s War of National Liberation”, which they foresee will occur when favorable conditions (“strategic balance”) are present.
Figure 1
Stages of the People’s Democratic War of the Terrorist Organization
Fuente: Elaboración propia
Why is the Terrorist Organization Approaching China’s International Policy and the So-Called Xiism?
The terrorist organization until the year 2021 called itself “Militarized Communist Party of Peru, Marxist, Leninist, Maoist, mainly Maoist”; however, a change in the strategic conception after an analysis of the world situation of its leader, the terrorist criminal (DT) Victor Quispe Palomino alias “Jose”, originated the change to the term “mainly Xiist” (MPCP – MLMX – PX).
The CT Jose argues that China’s President Xi Jinping is pursuing the strategy of using capitalism in the service of socialism and, in parallel, for the “complete overthrow” of capitalism, with the ultimate goal of communism. He considers that Xi’s thought is the continuation and development of the ideology of the international proletariat of Marx, Engels, Stalin, Lenin and Mao towards a fourth higher stage of Marxism, so he considers it the “fourth sword” of the ideology of the proletariat.
For CT “Jose”, Xiism began to be applied since September 9, 1976, using the socialist style as the main way to “build and consolidate” socialism in China and in the countries of the world, while applying the capitalist style as a complement to “undermine from its foundations world super-imperialist capitalism”, represented by the United States (US) and the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This concept is evidenced by the economic development achieved by China in recent years, displacing U.S. investments in several countries, including Peru, as part of a strategy to “defeat” world capitalism.
Based on this strategy of Xiism, WP “Joseph” puts forward the concept of “Total People’s War” (TPW) until communism, organizing and putting into action all the transforming force and unlimited wisdom of the popular masses. This implies putting all material, economic, industrial and human resources at the service of the revolution. It considers that the “total people’s war” implies the military organization of all men and resources to defend, develop, expand and consolidate socialism, moving and using everything in the midst of the development of the armed revolution against capitalism and the bourgeoisie. For this reason, the WO has recently proposed to consolidate its third instrument: the United Front, valued as “decisive weapon of the new strategic offensive of the socialist revolution”, with the objective of winning the greatest number of allies in relation to the FFO. Its strategy includes “developing the progressive forces, winning over the intermediate forces, and isolating and neutralizing the recalcitrant forces”.
Evolution of Military Intelligence in VRAEM
Until 2006, military intelligence activity in the VRAEM area was under the direction of the Intelligence Officer (G-2) of the Second Army Division based in Lima, who managed information from the sector’s Large Combat Units on the terrorist presence in the central jungle. In 2007, the Detachment of the Apurimac and Ene River Valleys (VRAE) was created under the command of Peruvian Army Brigadier General Raymundo Flores Cardenas, establishing its own General Staff that included the G-2 Intelligence Officer. During this stage, intelligence was mainly based on human sources, later complemented with visual information provided by the Peruvian Air Force (FAP) based in Lima, facilitating more precise military operations.[2]
In 2008, the VRAEM Operational Command was established with a C-2 supported by basic intelligence teams from the armed institutions. This measure significantly improved intelligence gathering capabilities, encompassing human, technical, imagery and signals resources. The Tactical Operational Analysis Intelligence Section (SIAOT) was also created to analyze the information collected. Currently, military intelligence in the VRAEM is organized in specialized units with diverse intelligence collection capabilities and has an Analysis and Processing Section (SAP) to carry out its operational functions.
Identification and Analysis of Military Intelligence Variables in VRAEM
MICMAC Analysis
The MICMAC structural method is used to perform a qualitative analysis of the relationships between the variables that make up a system. Its objective is to identify the main variables, both influential and dependent, as well as those that are essential for the evolution of the military field intelligence system.[3] Table 1 presents the classification and detailed description of these variables.
Table 1
List and Description of Military Intelligence Variables in the VRAEM
| n.º | Variable | Description |
| 1 | Organizational Culture of the Armed Institutions | Implicit and intangible system of meanings that define behaviors and shape thinking and lifestyle in an organization.[4] |
| 2 | Intelligence Architecture | Structure presented by an intelligence organization to carry out its activities. |
| 3 | Intelligence Collection | Quality of information provided by the various sources and types of intelligence. |
| 4 | Integrated Analysis | Processing of the information collected in a holistic and integrated way. |
| 5 | Intelligence Strategy | General plan of action that involves establishing objectives, determining actions, coordinating resources and evaluating risks and benefits to achieve a specific objective. |
| 6 | Source Management and Administration | Intelligence officers’ ability to manage their information sources. |
| 7 | C-2 Communication with Operational Command Decision Maker | C-2 communication capability for the Operational Command decision-maker to accept intelligence products. |
| 8 | Intelligence Support | Sustainment for intelligence activity such as budgets, administrative and personnel. |
| 9 | IVR Capability | Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (IVR) capability of intelligence units. |
Source: own elaboration
Identification of Variables and their Categories and Interpretation
Figure 2 shows the classification and description of the variables, which allows understanding the importance and role of each variable in the military intelligence system in the VRAEM.
Figura 2
Variables and their Categories
Source: Own elaboration with LIPSOR-EPITA-MICMAC software.[5]
Key Variables. They are located in the upper right zone of the plane of influence and dependence, also known as challenge variables of the system. They must face constant challenges that promote the evolution of the system towards a higher optimal level and are fundamental to maintain its functioning. In this context, Organizational Culture plays this crucial role.
Target Variables. They are located in the central right part of the plane of influence and dependence. They are highly dependent and moderately driving, hence their character of treatment as objectives, since they can be influenced so that their evolution is the desired one. The collection of all sources has been identified.
Regulatory Variables. Located in the central zone of the plane of influence and dependence, they become the stopcock to achieve compliance with the key variables and determine the correct functioning of the system under normal conditions. The Intelligence Architecture has been identified.
Environment Variables. These are the variables with little dependence on the system. They can be considered as a decorative element whose objective is to complement its added value to the system. The intelligence strategy and the communication of the C-2 with the operational decision maker have been identified.
Secondary Levers. These are the complementary variables to the regulating variables. Acting on them implies making the regulatory variables evolve, which, in turn, affect the evolution of the key variables. In this particular case, it is a question of intelligence analysis.
Autonomous Variables. These are variables with little influence or driving force and with little dependence. They correspond to past trends or inertias of the system or are disconnected from it. Often, a large number of communication actions on these variables do not represent a challenge. Intelligence Support and IVR have been identified.
Review of Relationships and Influence between Variables. Figure 3 shows the direct influence of variables, highlighting that “Organizational Culture” exerts the greatest influence on “Collection”, “Intelligence Architecture” and “Intelligence Analysis”. This finding allows decision makers to contemplate strategic actions that impact one variable as a consequence of another, in order to mitigate identified problems.
Figure 3: Influence and Direct Dependence
Influence and Direct Dependence of Variables
Fuente: Elaboración propia realizada en el software LIPSOR-EPITA-MICMAC[6]
What are the Problems of Military Intelligence in the VRAEM?
Theories and Models of Intelligence in the Fight Against Terrorism in Peru
The National Intelligence System (SINA) is fully engaged in the fight against terrorism in the VRAEM, with the intelligence agencies of the Defense Sector and the Interior Sector being the main drivers of this effort. Although both pursue the same objective, they use different methods in their intelligence work, influenced by their organizational culture and institutional structure.
To analyze the intelligence models in the fight against terrorism in the VRAEM, it is important to understand the intelligence theories that exist in this context. In the Armed Forces, when terrorism began in Peru in the 1980s, there was a change from a strictly military model for conventional warfare to a model of non-conventional warfare. This implied orienting the search for information about the enemy in its device, composition and operational force as guerrillas; it also focused on the political and administrative organization of an enemy that was hiding among the population. This led to the development of a more dynamic intelligence to carry out operations, through the execution of special procedures to obtain information.
Another model that was practiced was that of the Interior Sector, where the theory called “Operational Police Intelligence” was developed. According to Benedicto Jiménez Bacca[7], this was the one that allowed the capture of the terrorist leader of the PCP-SL, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, on September 12, 1992. This approach conceptualizes and theorizes police operational intelligence based on two phases: intelligence and investigation, which interact and complement each other. This strategy was crucial to combat terrorist organizations by renewing their investigation methods, due to the difficulty of infiltrating them because of their clandestinity, compartmentalization and subjection to the “golden rule (“remain silent and do not inform on them, even if they skin you alive”). Therefore, they were forced to create a new strategy based on a different, innovative and creative method of investigation. They went from a reactive to an offensive activity, going out to look for criminals in their comfort zone in a selective manner, and then, little by little, entering into their interaction, understanding the way of thinking, acting and feeling of these criminal organizations until they captured their leaders, leaders, bosses or leaders.[8]
Table 2 shows the intelligence theories that exist in the fight against terrorism in the VRAEM, the first of which belongs to the Armed Forces and police forces.
Table 2
Theories of Intelligence in the Fight against Terrorism in the VRAEM
| Police Operational Intelligence | Military Intelligence | |
| Definitions | It is the union of intelligence and criminal investigation, based on values and principles, with its own characteristics and an innovative methodology that includes advanced procedures and techniques. Its objective is to dismantle criminal organizations by capturing their bosses, ringleaders or leaders.
This approach provides useful knowledge on the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the power and military potential of the actors of interest. Thus, the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic are guaranteed. |
Useful knowledge about the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the power and military potential of the actors of interest is crucial to guarantee the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic.[9] |
| Characteristics |
|
Information concerning a nation’s armed forces includes aspects such as its composition, disposition, strength, equipment, doctrine, and logistical capabilities, among others. |
Source: Own elaboration.
Intelligence Architecture
The term “Intelligence architecture” refers to the organizational structure and composition of the intelligence units operating and producing intelligence in the VRAEM area. As shown in Figure 4, the specialized intelligence units of the Defense and Interior Sector stand out. This architecture is fundamental to understand. In the Defense Sector, it is crucial to make an inventory of the collection means and capabilities of each intelligence unit to then elaborate an integrated collection plan and direct the search efforts, according to the commander’s priority intelligence needs.
Figura 4
Intelligence Architecture of the Defense and Interior Sector in VRAEM
Source: Own elaboration.
Military Strategy, Terrorist Strategy and Intelligence Strategy in the VRAEM
Table 4 shows how the military strategy, the terrorist strategy and the intelligence strategy have evolved in the VRAEM from 2008 to the present. This analysis allows comparing their evolution and validity in the region, where different actors are involved, mainly the FFO and the National Intelligence System.
Table 4
Military Strategy, Terrorist Strategy and Intelligence Strategy in the VRAEM
| Year | Military Strategy of the Armed Forces | Terrorist Strategy of the OT SL of the VRAEM | Military Intelligence Strategy |
| Del 2008 al 2011 | Execution of operations with participation of several patrols and configuration according to a campaign plan of the maneuver units seeking to degrade the terrorist force. The TO calls it “Political and military campaigns of encirclement, annihilation and anti-communist disintegration” in its first part of “Strategic Offensive”, considered as the “classic way of operating of the enemy”, about which they state that it is the one that “we understand and dominate better”. According to the OT-SL analysis, in this type of military operation (“Excelencia 777”, “Silent Offensive”, “Santa”, “Libertad” and “78”) the FFO “generally attack from various directions” and “use all their military power”, employing “shock, blockade, security and reserve” patrols. The “shock” patrols go through “a part of the support base to hit” the terrorist force. | To detect this mode of operation, the OT-SL places “surveillance at strategic points to control and detect the movement of military patrols and the movement of helicopters”. The longer the operation lasts, the better the conditions for attacking the patrols. “Every day that goes by are absolutely adverse for the enemy, and the more forces you use…are very adverse for the enemy because they are more targets to attack and hit. And, as the days go on, all the patrols are detectable because they have to be supplied or evacuated only by helicopters…” | No clear intelligence strategy was implemented. Intelligence was conducted according to the traditional cycle, producing information on the terrain, device, composition, and strength of the TO. Directions of approach and location of terrorist forces were identified, in addition to seeking to understand the enemy’s likely mode of action. Combat intelligence was generated to conduct military operations. |
| From
2012 to 2021 |
Execution of operations with combat reconnaissance groups as the main operation, operating with timely intelligence and looking for encounter fighting and short duration operations. | The terrorist organization recognizes the effective action of the complementary weapon of intelligence and execution of the “operatives against revolutionaries”, executed within the Strategic Defense of the FFO, which it also calls “Circumscribed Offensive Operations that can only achieve the selective assassination of comrades and of regulated and static forces that commit gross errors of liberalism and negligence, which is abandonment of the strategy and tactics of the Military Line of the Party” for which reason they consider it important to “consolidate revolutionary support bases as a means of early warning”. | An unpublished intelligence strategy was developed from the highest level of government: the collection of intelligence from various sources is prioritized, the work is continued according to the traditional intelligence cycle and high and medium value targets are assigned by sectors of responsibility to the intelligence units. |
| From 2022 to 2023 | Execution of operations with combat reconnaissance groups as the main operation, fire support operations, prioritizing the principles of speed and the surprise factor as determining factors. | The terrorist organization pronounces on the so-called Operation Patriot: “It was only possible because it was planned and executed on the basis of serious errors in the ranks of the revolution, which is to underestimate the enemy. The military preparation of this operation, its coordinated execution at the beginning, development and culmination of the operation. The beginning was surprising, forceful, they hit the target, rapid deployment and sowing of heliborne forces, they had initiative only until the bombing, we were in disarray, because they hit the target, we had dispersed forces.”[10]. | In 2019, through Supreme Decree N°179-2019-PCM, the Joint Intelligence Strategy for the counterterrorism fight in the VRAEM was approved until 2021. However, as of this date, a new intelligence model was developed, initially from the Operations Center against Narcoterrorism in the VRAEM (CE VRAEM) and later from the CCFFAA. This model focused on an objective target through the use of convergent intelligence, with the purpose of generating and providing specific and relevant knowledge for operational decision making on the CC. |
Source: Own elaboration based on DIRCOTE book.[11]
Organizational Culture of Intelligence in the Armed Forces
Organizational culture is a set of values and assumptions, both explicit and implicit. This system involves interaction with the values and assumptions of multiple stakeholders, who bring their own knowledge and experience, influencing the behavior and actions of individuals. This culture is reflected in the goals, objectives, leadership style, incentive and sanction system, work processes and technology that the organization adopts and uses.[12]
The Armed Forces are made up of three institutions that, despite having complementary missions, do not adopt the same leadership style or share the same organizational culture. Nevertheless, they agree that both culture and leadership are fundamental for development and have a direct impact on the exercise of their constitutional functions.[13] Within the intelligence units of the Armed Forces, each has developed specific capabilities: the Peruvian Army (EP) has advanced in human intelligence, the Peruvian Navy (MGP) in signals intelligence, and the Peruvian Air Force (FAP) in imagery intelligence. These capabilities have impregnated a characteristic profile in the analysis and intelligence products they provide; however, they create a certain bias as they are influenced by their institutional doctrine, being necessary to unlearn in order to relearn. In the context of intelligence operations, this bias is reduced by integrated analysis that facilitates unified intelligence, crucial for commanders to make effective counter-terrorism decisions.
Another relevant aspect of the organizational culture is that the intelligence produced is handed over to the Operations Section for it to design and carry out the plan of a military operation. It is at this point where, in the military culture, intelligence support is usually valued and accepted; however, the intelligence process goes through the whole development of operations, and may even give rise to derivative operations or modify the course of action according to the behavior of terrorist groups.
What are the Challenges of Military Intelligence for the Coming Years in the VRAEM?
Proposal for a Theory and a Model of Military Intelligence for the Fight against Terrorism in the VRAEM
The first challenge involves the creation of a military intelligence model to guide doctrinal guidelines and produce information with a clear understanding of the behavior of the terrorist organization. A model called “convergent approach military intelligence” is proposed, which seeks a detailed and analytical understanding of the enemy. The OT-SL of the VRAEM recognizes and shows concern for what they call the “complementary weapon of intelligence”, using electronic intelligence and human intelligence to locate the positions of the revolutionary forces and surprise them with attacks. DT Jose mentions that it is fundamental to disrupt and thwart these surprise attacks.[14]
This model, similar to the “target-centric intelligence” developed by Robert Clark[15] in 2013, focuses on a detailed knowledge of the individuals and components that form a whole, creating intelligence schemes specifically oriented to concrete actions in the face of threats. It is essential in the field of intelligence and strategic analysis, as it is based on the premise that intelligence production should be the main operation, closely related to the specific objectives of an organization or entity.
Convergent approach military intelligence is a crucial perspective in the field of intelligence and strategic analysis. This model is based on the premise that intelligence generation should be the primary operation directly linked to the specific objectives of an organization or entity. To understand this, the following is described:
In the context of military intelligence in the VRAEM, the convergent approach focuses on understanding the needs and goals to be achieved in accordance with the Special Command’s Campaign Plan. That is, the emphasis is on intelligence, supported by operations, rather than prioritizing military operations, as they are currently conducted. This is because the enemy is highly mobile and has developed combat tactics to counter the type of operations of military forces.
Rather than only gathering information on the ground and the structure, composition and strength of the terrorist organization, it seeks to provide specific and relevant knowledge to support strategic and operational decisions regarding the commanders comprising the CC. This approach adapts to the changing circumstances of the terrorist force and is tailored to the specific objectives of each time and organization. It is emphasized that intelligence information, as time passes, loses its operational value.
Figure 4
Proposal of a Theory of Military Intelligence for the Fight Against Terrorism in the VRAEM
Source: Own elaboration.
The four traditional phases of the intelligence cycle used by the intelligence organs of the VRAEM to produce intelligence, i.e. the direction of the search effort, search for information, processing and dissemination of intelligence, in this new model of military intelligence of convergent approach is integrated in, i.e. the intelligence cycle must focus on obtaining greater knowledge that facilitates the interpretation of the available information and not simply more information; the objective is to provide answers or specific solutions to destructure or neutralize the Central Committee of the terrorist organization.
In the new military intelligence model of convergent approach, the four traditional phases of the intelligence cycle used by the VRAEM intelligence bodies are integrated: direction, collection, elaboration and dissemination. In this approach, the intelligence cycle focuses on acquiring more knowledge to facilitate the interpretation of available information and not simply on obtaining more information. The main objective is to provide specific responses or solutions to destructure or neutralize the CC of the terrorist organization.
The application of this theory was observed in the Counterterrorist Operation Patriot developed in August 2022. The specific intelligence objectives were: to provide system information to locate DT Jose and to identify the components of the democratic support system (logistical system of the terrorist organization). The intelligence organization for that objective researched, identified and collected specific information and intelligence related to those objectives, and provided specific recommendations for the planning of military operations based on the intelligence collected.[16]
In summary, military intelligence with a convergent approach is essential to ensure that the information collected is converted into relevant, quality and useful intelligence for strategic decisions. This approach adapts to changing needs and helps organizations to achieve their objectives more effectively.
Identify a Strategy for Military Intelligence in the Fight against Terrorism in the VRAEM.
In 2019, the Joint Intelligence Strategy for the fight against terrorism in the VRAEM was approved by Supreme Decree No. 179-2019-PCM, covering the period from 2019 to 2021.[17] This contemplated the effort to standardize and provide general guidelines on resource allocation, unity of direction, as well as supervision and control of intelligence activity; however, a comprehensive strategy involves other aspects such as the definition of guiding principles, management approaches, implementation and follow-up mechanisms, strategic objectives, goals and action plans. Another challenge is to establish a clear strategy for the coming years, where the intelligence process revolves around the best way to approach the priority target, which is the terrorist leaders.
To develop a Holistic Intelligence Analysis Model.
This challenge seeks that military intelligence analysis units develop intelligence analysis considering the target as an integral system. In the case of the VRAEM terrorist organization, which has a defined structure, strategic plans and uses a specific process for its operations, analysts must address these aspects using a systemic approach. The structure of the terrorist organization is characterized by its components and the interactions between them. This approach involves understanding how these components and relationships influence the outputs of the system, i.e., the results it generates. In addition, the process describes the sequence of events and activities that lead to those outputs.
Joint Intelligence Central Office
This challenge seeks to centralize intelligence production efforts under a central entity that will direct intelligence efforts in an integral manner, ensuring the veracity and efficiency of information through an integrated analysis. This avoids a technical dependence on the Intelligence Directorates of the armed institutions operating outside the area of operations. This command center would manage the intelligence of the direct support units to the VRAEM Special Command, promoting a convergent approach to ensure that the information gathered becomes relevant and quality intelligence, essential for the precise execution of military operations against specific targets.
It is not simply another intelligence agency competing with the existing ones, but a directive entity that advises, orients, supports, evaluates, reorients, controls and verifies the fulfillment of the objectives set by the intelligence agencies in the VRAEM, through the “generation of the operational opportunity” to neutralize the threat.[18]
Conclusions
The MPCP-MLMX-PX operating in the VRAEM has undergone a constant evolution over time seeking, in recent years, a rapprochement with the population of the VRAEM in what they call consolidating revolutionary support bases. In this sense, it is crucial for the State to reduce the social gaps in this region of the country, so the strategy must especially consider the population as a key aspect in the fight against terrorism.
The strategy of the terrorist organization operating in the VRAEM has evolved through a detailed study of the tactics of the FFO, which has led it to change its tactics and ways of waging war. It has become a highly mobile force which, together with a tactical knowledge of the terrain, early warning means and the use of the organized population as support bases, hinders the development of operations. In addition, it shows a constant concern for the intelligence activities of the FFO, considering them a complementary component with the capacity to cause damage to its organization.
According to the analysis of the variables of military intelligence in the VRAEM using the MIC MAC method, the organizational culture variable is key and should have a more holistic approach to seek unified and integrated intelligence. This is fundamental for the commander to be able to make effective decisions in the fight against terrorism.
It is necessary to develop and adopt a more dynamic intelligence theory and model, such as the one proposed and called “convergent approach military intelligence” that allows implementing effective strategies for intelligence production. This proposed model is a viable option to improve the work of military intelligence in the VRAEM, focusing on understanding the needs and objectives of the Special Command and emphasizing the task of intelligence with operations support.
Endnotes:
- Julio Zuñiga, “Experiencia como analista de inteligencia en el CEVRAEM”, Pichari, 2021. ↑
- Raymundo Flores. Entrevista realizada por Hinder Quijano (Revista Peruana de Estudios de Inteligencia10, no.2, 2024): 123-135. ↑
- Michel Godet, “La Prospective” (Revista Internacional de Estudios Estratégicos23 no.4, 2010): 123-145. http://en.laprospective.fr/. ↑
- C. E Mendez-Álvarez, “Elementos para la relación entre cultura organizacional y estrategia [Components for the Relationship between Organizational Culture and Strategy]” (Universidad & Empresa 21, no. 37, 2019): 136-169, https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/empresa/a.7681, ↑
- Ibid. ↑
- “Métodos de Prospectiva > Descarga de Aplicaciones” (sitio web La Prospective) (s.f.), consultado el 25 de abril de 2024. http://es.laprospective.fr/Metodos-de-prospectiva/Descarga-de-aplicaciones/descarga/FtIBFMTuXikFLgTNolIP/gglubo%40hotmail.com. ↑
- Benedicto Jimenez, ” La Teoría y el Método de Inteligencia Policial Operativa que Permitió La Captura Del Lider Del PCPL-SL” (Blogspot Caso Benedicto Jimenez, 11 de agosto de 2017), consultado el 11 abril de 2024, https://casobenedictojimenez.blogspot.com/2017/08/la-teoria-y-el-metodo-de-inteligencia.html. ↑
- Benedicto JiménezJ, “Teoría y Método de Inteligencia Operativa Policial” (Issuu, 2020), consultado el 11 de abril de 2024. https://issuu.com/abogadolitigante912/docs/teoria_y_metodo_de_inteligencia_operativa_policial. ↑
- Congreso de la República del Perú. Decreto Legislativo N° 1141 “Ley de Fortalecimiento y Modernización del Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional-SINA”. Leyes del Perú, vol. 2012. Lima, 2012. https://www.gob.pe/institucion/dini/normas-legales/886385-1141. ↑
- Cesar Cornelio. “Programa periodístico contracorriente. “CAMARADA JOSÉ DE SENDERO LUMINOSO habla de la Operación Patriota”. Historias del terrorismo, episodio 5, diciembre de 2022), YouTube (ID de video: 123456789) ↑
- Benedicto Jimenez, “Para conocer a la organización terrorista. Sendero Luminoso VRAEM” (Dirección contra el Terrorismo, 2021): 12-81. ↑
- ResearchGate. “La Cultura Organizacional, Su Importancia En El Desarrollo de Las Empresas” (ResearchGate, 2017), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331805271_La_Cultura_Organizacional_su_importancia_en_el_desarrollo_de_las_empresas. ↑
- Aguilar Sánchez y Edison Gelber, “Cultura Organizacional y Liderazgo en el Ejército” (Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre 1, no. 1, 2022): 95–107, https://doi.org/10.56221/spt.v1i1.9. ↑
- Partido Comunista del Perú. “Ley de Campañas y Contra campañas de cerco, aniquilamiento y desintegración”. Volante difundido en la localidad de Canayre, Ayacucho, agosto de 2012. ↑
- Clark, Robert M. Intelligence Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2012. ↑
- Luis Castro, “Experiencia como Analista de inteligencia en la Operación patriota”. Estudios de inteligencia, vol. 15, no. 2 (2022): 123-145. ↑
- Congreso de la República del Perú, “Estrategia de Inteligencia Conjunta para la lucha contraterrorista en el Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro”. Documentos del Congreso, vol. 15. El Peruano, 20 de noviembre de 2019. https://www.elperuano.pe/noticia/241409-ejecutivo-no-cesara-hasta-lograr-la-paz-en-el-vraem ↑
- Luis Castro, “Experiencia como Oficial de inteligencia del CEVRAEM”, Pichari, 2022. ↑
