This text was originally published in the book Latin America in the New Global Geopolitics.

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Summary

In an international scenario marked by the polarization of security, the fragmentation of globalization and the impact of climate change, Chile must seek to position itself advantageously in the Indo-Pacific to promote its national interests, wherever they may be. To do this, Chile must take advantage of its status as a tricontinental country (America, Antarctica and Oceania), the deep economic networks that connect it with East Asia, the possession of vast reserves of minerals critical for the energy transition and cooperation in security and defense matters with like-minded countries, starting with the United States, but without forgetting partners such as Australia, France, Japan and the United Kingdom. In its South American regional environment, the key seems to be to achieve greater coordination to face common challenges such as drug trafficking and irregular migration, which is not easy given the internal and neighboring political situation.

Keywords: Chile, tricontinental, maritime, national interest, Indo-Pacific.

Introduction

Although there seems to be agreement that we are at a time of reconfiguration of the international system,^[1] when the expected outcome is projected, visions diverge and concepts such as multipolar order or new cold war begin to emerge. Nevertheless, in the current geopolitical scenario, at least three major factors that are operating as structuring factors can be identified without fear of being mistaken.

First, there is the polarization in security, marked by the competitive interaction of major military powers,^[2] such as the United States (US), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. Added to this is the emergence of medium-sized powers that are increasingly assertive in promoting their national interests and delimiting their spheres of influence,^[3] either through warlike actions, military agreements or defense or through support to subsidiary forces.

Secondly, the fragmentation of economic globalization or deglobalization^[4] manifests itself through unilateral tariff hikes to correct trade imbalances, securing supply chains between like-minded countries (critical minerals, for example), legal protections against foreign investment in strategic sectors (telecommunications), blocking third parties from accessing cutting-edge technology (artificial intelligence, semiconductors and space equipment), and the application of financial sanctions as a tool for diplomatic pressure.

Thirdly, climate change has begun to manifest itself through extreme events,^[5] such as droughts, floods and heat waves, which make it necessary to implement adaptation and mitigation actions, including the decarbonization of economies through the introduction of clean energies.

In this context, Latin America does not appear to be high on the agendas of the major powers, although there is a greater presence of some extra-continental nations motivated by their interest in critical raw materials or to demonstrate greater diplomatic reach.^[6] The truth is that the region is highly fragmented politically, which translates into the ineffectiveness of multilateral organizations. The economies, mainly exporters of raw materials, continue to be hit by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, with high levels of indebtedness and inflation. The polarization affecting many societies is reflected in the frequent alternation of governments, generating short political cycles that make it difficult for parties to be reelected or remain in power for more than one term. Finally, the major threats to security are rooted in the power achieved by criminal organizations, especially those dedicated to drug trafficking.

In particular, the Republic of Chile presents itself as a tricontinental nation with territories in America, Antarctica and Oceania and immense marine areas. A country where its population of more than 17.5 million people^[7] and organized in the form of a presidential democracy is projected to the world through a vast network of trade agreements and security arrangements with Western countries. Although geographically the nucleus of the population is within Latin America, and this is part of its identity, at the same time it shows an accentuated and singular projection towards the Indo-Pacific, which is a product of the relative confinement generated by the deserts to the north, the Andes mountain range to the east and the southern ice fields to the south, and the decision to overcome these barriers by occupying the ocean as a privileged platform of connection. In this sense, we can affirm that it is a nation far from the centers of political and economic power, but at the same time very globalized and with a marked maritime profile.^[8]

Now, the way in which Chile develops in the face of this geopolitical scenario described above is what will be explained below. However, it must be admitted at the outset that there is no such thing as a national security structure or strategy^[9] or comprehensive policy^[10] to serve as a compass for a coordinated and coherent action of the State in the promotion and defense of national interests, which is incomprehensible for a country with such levels of development and capabilities.^[11] Therefore, we will proceed to briefly explain the evolution of the country, in order to understand from where its national interests are built, and then we will suggest how Chile should position itself in the current geopolitical scenario, understanding geopolitics^[12] as the interrelation between national interests, state power and geographic environments.

From Finis Terrae to the World

Chile’s unique configuration is the product of a gradual cycle of expansion, which began with the process of independence from the Spanish Empire. After a rocky start in 1810, which included a brief period of reconquest, the nascent State of Chile found it necessary to create a permanent national army to protect the territory against possible invasions, and a navy to break the supply system from the metropolis, which included destroying the Spanish naval power from Baja California to the Isla Grande de Chiloé, to which the nascent navy successfully devoted itself.^[13] Liberator Bernardo O’Higgins had already warned early on after defeating the royalists in 1818 in the outskirts of Santiago: “This triumph and a hundred more will be insignificant if we don’t dominate the sea.”

In the period of institutional construction of the State, an event will take place that, together with the Independence, will help to galvanize the incipient Chilean nation. In a clear geopolitical reading, the influential minister Diego Portales sensed that the emergence of the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, in the north, would make the existence of the Chilean State impossible, if it were to consolidate. Therefore, it was decided to wage a war (1835-1839) against it, more motivated by the calculation of power than by the delimitation of borders and under the understanding that there were internally confronted sides. “Chile must dominate the Pacific forever”, was Portales’ conclusion.^[14]

This period of construction and consolidation of the Nation-State between 1833 and 1879 ended with the beginning of another war against the same actors. The lack of definition of borders in the north, the ignorance of administrative management agreements due to the instability in Bolivia and Peru, and a secret pact between those countries (1873) generated a sort of defensive reflex in Chile, where the events of the War of the Triple Alliance (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay versus Paraguay, between 1854 and 1870) and the Franco-Prussian War (rupture of the balance of power between France and Prussia, between 1870 and 1871) were in mind.

Once again the conflict was taken to enemy territory, by means of a strategy that considered seeking battle, attacking supply lines, transporting troops by sea and launching amphibious operations. The final result of this conflict is fundamental to understand the Chile of today with its international projection. The country managed to expand with the annexation of Peruvian territories and others with Bolivian presence, which would turn out to be fundamental for its economic future and, at the same time, generated a permanent trauma for its neighbors. In the midst of the war, a southern delimitation was also negotiated with Argentina, which implied the loss of eastern Patagonia and the recognition of the control of the Strait of Magellan for Chile (occupied since 1843), thus establishing the Atlantic-Pacific principle. For all of the above, this war is considered as the last act of territorial consolidation of the Nation-State,^[15] but also in part for the three countries directly involved, as well as for Argentina. The current borders, with some specific modifications, are a product of it.

Having become the Pacific power, even over the U.S., Chile deepened its presence in this ocean with the annexation of Easter Island/Rapa Nui in 1888, thus gaining greater strategic depth and presence in Polynesia. There would also be a significant change in the way borders were protected and defined, which would eventually become the preferred mode of foreign policy to manage the neighborhood. In the period between 1879 and 1929, border agreements were signed with Argentina (1902), Bolivia (1904) and Peru (1929).

However, Chile’s relationship with its most direct geopolitical environment was not exempt from serious neighboring crises – with Peru in 1974 and Argentina in 1978 -, but they did not turn into wars. During the decades between 1929 and 1990, the idea that borders are stabilized through respect for international treaties and protected with deterrent actions, which includes managing the hypothesis of a conflict on three simultaneous fronts, took hold. Also in this period, with ups and downs, there is an increasingly close alignment with USA; in particular, after World War II.

The country expanded, once again, with the delimitation of the Chilean Antarctic Territory between meridians 53° and 90° west and the South Pole, which was set forth in Presidential Decree 1747 of 1940. Contiguity, effective presence and historical rights inherited from the Spanish Crown will be used as arguments for this claim,^[16] which precedes the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.

The end of the Cold War in Chile coincided with the beginning of the transition to democracy in 1990. The new governing coalition, ranging from Socialists to Christian Democrats, will opt to maintain a strategy of economic insertion that includes open regionalism and the deepening of links with global markets – especially Asian – through the signing of free trade agreements.^[17] In security matters, the hypothesis of neighboring conflicts will be complemented by commitments to United Nations peace missions in places such as Cambodia, East Timor, Cyprus, Bosnia and Haiti. At the same time, the relationship with the U.S. will be further deepened by the participation of the Armed Forces in military exercises, where they will be able to make use of their renewed weapons systems and exchange officers for training.

In the period between 1990 and 2021, the country will no longer grow territorially, but will even lose surface area, by resolving pending disputes with Argentina and Peru, voluntarily resorting to arbitration tribunals and international courts. However, the strategic culture developed over two centuries, which practically forces Chile to overcome its relative confinement, comparative size and remoteness from the centers of power by using the ocean, will now lead it to expand its economy by signing free trade agreements with the main countries of the Pacific Rim and reinforcing its security networks by participating in naval, land and air exercises such as Rimpac, Southern Star and Red Flag, to mention a few.

Diplomatic action, always very legalistic, will continue to be linked to forums such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States, but will innovate with the creation of new economic institutions, such as the P-4 agreement (Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore), direct antecedent of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico), a regional free trade bloc. Participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) will become regular.

After a wave of strong protests and with the effects of the pandemic still hitting the economy, in March 2022 the leftist Gabriel Boric Font assumed the Presidency of the Republic, who arrived with a refoundational spirit that was also expressed in foreign policy. His government program as a candidate did not even mention Asia-Pacific, despite the fact that more than 50% of Chile’s exports are channeled to that region. Members of his coalition also suggested the need to review the free trade agreements already signed and advocated blocking some in the process of ratification.

The emphasis of Boric’s government, which was taken almost entirely from a book called “New Voices of Foreign Policy”,^[18] is on enhancing Latin American integration, fostering respect for human rights and democracy, promoting care for the environment and having a markedly feminist foreign policy. Among the elements of continuity that survived are the defense of multilateralism, respect for international legality and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

However, the very idea of putting the brakes on or promoting the revision of the free trade agreements meant introducing a disruptive element in the foreign policy of the last 40 years, which aroused strong criticism and forced the government to reverse this decision. The CPTPP was finally ratified and the course towards the Asia-Pacific began to be resumed with Boric’s attendance to the APEC summit in Indonesia and to the PRC for the Forum of the Belt and Road Initiative, in addition to arranging the visit of high authorities from Asian countries. The President’s Latin Americanist vocation also quickly found its limits when his criticism of the regimes of Nicolás Maduro and Daniel Ortega, in Venezuela and Nicaragua, respectively, marked a distance from his leftist colleagues. The Mexican president’s decision not to hand over the pro tempore presidency of the Pacific Alliance to Peru, because he did not consider the government of Dina Boluarte legitimate, immobilized the bloc. Finally, the Chilean leader maintained the position of his predecessor, Sebastián Piñera, in openly condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unlike Latin American countries that prefer ambiguity.

However, the major definitions that Chile must make in order to position itself in the current geopolitical scenario have not yet been produced, it is still being resolved on contingency, and this makes it necessary to evaluate the courses of action in the face of the factors that are reconfiguring the new international order.

Sailing in Turbulent Waters

The current geopolitical scenario finds Chile on a bad footing and facing multiple crises. Its economy, which shone for its performance in Latin America and led it to join forums such as the Organization for Cooperation and Development, where good public policies are rewarded, and to install officials in the International Monetary Fund and many others, presents low levels of growth.^[19] Foreign direct investment falls and projects stagnate.

The political stability, built through the consensus reached after the restoration of democracy, has given way to an acute polarization, which has manifested itself, above all, in the electoral reduction of the traditional parties that occupied the center, in the emergence of new forces and in the predominance of the extremes in the constitutional process that was unleashed after the protests of 2019 and 2020. Only the pandemic was able to impose a pause where the clash was increasingly recurrent.

The crisis, of course, affects security in one of the most peaceful countries in the region. New organized crime gangs have erupted with unusual violence,^[20] raising homicides, in particular the Aragua Train,^[21] originating in Venezuela. Terrorist attacks are also on the rise in seven provinces in the south of the country by groups claiming supposed ethnic causes.^[22] The lack of border control has become evident with the entry of tens of thousands of irregular migrants, who occupy land and change the dynamics of entire neighborhoods. The Boric government, supported by sectors traditionally critical of the Armed Forces, has been forced to deploy the military in support of the police, both in the north and in the south, which has to be done through the declaration of states of emergency, since a permanent role in public security is not established in the current Constitution.

From this situation is that Chile has to answer complex questions such as: How will it face the polarization of security, given the sharpening competition between the US and the PRC (with its ally Russia)?

How will it deal with the fragmentation of economic globalization, which has brought it so many benefits? How will it deal with its so-called global obligations^[23] on matters such as climate change, but also organized crime, terrorism, cybercrime, migrations, financial governance and others? Finally, how will it present itself to the world, given the proliferation of new strategic narratives?

National Interests, the Infallible Compass

In times of high uncertainty, countries and decision-makers can become disoriented, but for the same reason, it is always necessary to return to national interests, which mark the Northern Star that must guide men of State, as the theorist Hans Morgenthau maintained.^[24] It is true that national interests are usually permanent, although this does not prevent them from being updated as the international context in which they are promoted or defended evolves. Only if they are well defined, as a result of a thorough strategic analysis, will it be possible to face the challenges, threats and opportunities that may arise on the horizon in an advantageous manner. Their achievement, expansion or contraction depends to a large extent on their interaction with the world.

In a document prepared by AthenaLab,^[25] the following were proposed as national interests of Chile, expressed from the tricontinental condition of the country and its intense global interconnections through the Pacific as an obligatory destination to overcome its relative confinement and remoteness: (1) Maintenance of territorial integrity (neighbors); (2) Effective sovereignty (throughout the country); (3) Political independence (powers); (4) Integration to the world (trade openness and multilateralism); and (5) Contribution to global security (combined operations and exercises). Certainly, in the face of the questions presented by the current geopolitical situation, the possible answers must consider how best to preserve and maximize these interests.

Facing the Polarization of Global Security: Chile, like many countries, faces the dilemma of having as its main trading partner the PRC and its main defense partner the U.S. As competition between these two powers in the military arena increases, it becomes increasingly complex to maintain an equidistant or uncompromising position.

The country has even been the scene of disputes over the awarding of contracts to companies for the installation of 5G networks. In 2019, while U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned that it would be difficult to share sensitive information if Chinese companies were chosen,^[26] Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that security should not be an argument to block companies from his country.^[27] Another complex case was experienced when the Chilean government revoked a contract awarded to a company with Chinese capital to print identity cards and national passports, after open pressure from the U.S. Embassy, which warned about the possible cancellation of the Visa Waiver Program.

These examples are just a sample of the growing complexity of the current geopolitical scenario for Chile. Interests such as political independence to make sovereign decisions, open integration to the world and the contribution to global stability are under pressure.

However, when it comes to security, there should be no doubt about the harmony between Chile and the U.S., which is supported by geography, coinciding visions, daily interactions between their Armed Forces and the use of common platforms and weapons systems. All this within the framework of a bicentennial bilateral relationship. In addition, both countries are part of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), which already commits them in terms of defense against possible aggressions from extra-continental powers, many of which are beginning to appear increasingly in the hemisphere. In different ways, drug trafficking is hitting their societies, forcing them to generate collective responses in terms of interdiction and intelligence.

Regarding the Indo-Pacific, where more than 55% of Chilean exports are oriented,^[28] Santiago and Washington collaborate preferably through their navies in the protection of commercial maritime routes and inter-oceanic passages, and also face transnational threats; in particular, drug trafficking and illegal, unregulated and undocumented fishing. In other words, they carry with them values that are essential, such as respect for freedom of navigation and the provision of good order at sea. It could be added that the security of the seabed is also becoming key, given the importance of the fiber optic cables that transmit data. In this sense, national interests are not necessarily confined to the territory and give a significant role to the Chilean Navy in its protection.^[29]

As far as Antarctica is concerned, both countries are original signatory members of the Antarctic Treaty and although the U.S. has no territorial claims, unlike Chile, the maintenance of status quo on the white continent seems to be a common objective, despite increased geopolitical competition and the effects of climate change.^[30] Moreover, TIAR covers part of Antarctica, which is sometimes forgotten.

Many of the weapon platforms used by Chile, such as F-15 fighters, C-130 transports, KC-135 tankers, Bell 214 and Black Hawk helicopters, as well as missiles, radars and communications systems used by ships, are of U.S. origin.^[31] This situation, which includes training and maintenance plans, creates a de facto dependency, positive so far.

As for the PRC, the security relationship is practically non-existent. Beyond academic exchanges and visits, there is no participation in combined exercises or common platforms. However, polarization in this field is not directly manifested. Perhaps the most symptomatic is that neighbors such as Argentina, Bolivia and Peru are admitting more presence of the Asian country in the space field^[32] and ports.^[33]

In view of the above, Chile should have no doubt that its capabilities should be oriented, first and foremost, to the defense of its sovereignty, but since its economy is dependent on international markets, it must cooperate in order to strengthen the rules-based world order and take safeguards against those who use economic pressures to bend sovereign decisions. The stability of the international system is beneficial to the country from the point of view that this not only creates a better environment for global trade, but also improves the likelihood of respect for territorial integrity, political independence and open connection with the world, among other national interests.

In this sense, the polarization of security should not generate a major dilemma, because it has already been resolved. It should only be added that, in the search for like-minded partners, there are also medium-sized powers, such as Australia,^[34] France,^[35] Japan^[36] and the United Kingdom,^[37] that seem highly attractive for the same reasons mentioned above, all of them democracies that, of course, condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Neighboring relations do not seem to be subject to a new polarization as the one that led to wars or crises in the past, since the countries already have legal mechanisms to solve their disputes,^[38] as the Pact of Bogotá (1948), and they see diplomacy as the privileged tool to relate, since there is no major trade with them either. At least, this is the path chosen by Chile, which does not prevent it from having a permanent deterrence capacity, a great contribution to stability and promoting cooperation measures in the face of natural disasters or other common challenges.^[39]

Facing the Fragmentation of Economic Globalization: Chile must insist on the advantages and benefits of free trade, both through the ratification and modernization of existing treaties, and in the search for new markets to place its exports and attract capital. Protectionism is not an option or a possibility for a country that has 25 free trade agreements that give it access to economies that represent 85% of the Global Gross Domestic Product.^[40] However, the realignment and securing of supply chains sought by industrial powers through mechanisms such as nearshoring and friendshoring,^[41] generate new opportunities that can be advantageously exploited, particularly when it comes to the exploitation of critical minerals for the decarbonization of economies, such as copper, lithium and rare earths, of which Chile has abundant reserves.

However, in a world where economic coercion is back, directly or indirectly, it is a must to have an approach to investments in strategic sectors that considers the security variable. Despite being very globalized, Chile does not have legislation or a specific institution that defines what those sectors are and how to proceed when foreign interests manifest themselves. South African leader Nelson Mandela is credited with the phrase when you have what the powerful want, you must either negotiate properly or prepare to defend it. Probably, here we are facing one of the threats to national interests, in terms of political independence and market opening, and which is a product of a certain naivety regarding the relationship between geography, trade and security. The very option of continuing to use the Asia-Pacific concept over the Indo-Pacific seems to reflect this.

Facing Global Obligations: To the extent that it may affect the country’s development and welfare, and thus compromise the promotion and defense of national interests as a whole, climate change requires the generation of national, but also regional and global cooperative responses. If in American Chile drought seems to be the most evident sign,^[42] the rise in ocean levels represents a real threat to insular oceanic Chile; meanwhile, the gradual melting of ice in Chilean Antarctica is beginning to modify the landscape. Undoubtedly, there is an opportunity to decarbonize the economy thanks to the availability of critical minerals^[43] and renewable energies of all kinds, not to mention the reality that the country is a net importer of hydrocarbons. The creation of new protected marine areas is one of the contributions, as well as the signing of commitments derived from the Paris Agreement (2015) and the various Conferences of the Parties (COPs)

 

Other challenges, such as migration, drug trafficking and terrorism, are also approached in a cooperative manner, given their transnational character and their American origin; although trust between neighboring countries does not always facilitate exchanges, nor does political instability, with untimely changes of government in Peru and Bolivia, revolts in Chile and alternation in Argentina. The curious thing is that according to the AthenaLab-Ipsos survey, drug trafficking is considered the main threat to the four countries.^[44]

Facing New Strategic Narratives: As explained, the country known today as the Republic of Chile is the product of a historical evolution. This conception makes it possible to understand both its tricontinental geographic positioning and its constant search to overcome its confinement and relative remoteness through the profitable use of the sea, which should continue.^[45]

Latin American, Indo-Pacific (in its southeastern quadrant) or Global South? Critical geopolitics,^[46] unlike traditional geopolitics, focuses on the role of discourse and ideology, therefore, it is fluid and subject to interpretation. In this sense, the interaction between human beings and physical space produces geopolitics”.

In every period of transition, concepts tend to appear to try to account for the new realities. Therefore, we could say that Chile is a country of multiple belongings, extending Pellicer’s (2005) concept,^[47] and the Indo-Pacific seems to be the most suitable place to settle, insofar as it implies adherence to international standards, respect for freedom of navigation, open markets and, in the best of cases, democracy. This is, in short, the original Japanese version of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, developed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and continued by his successor, Kishida Fumio.^[48]

The Indo-Pacific also includes the territories on the American coast, in Oceania and in Antarctica, since it closes the picture to the south. It is true that since the U.S. While the U.S. adopted the concept,^[49] the PRC sees it as a simple containment strategy. But as Chile’s economy and security are increasingly at stake in this area, – and also the world’s – it would be advisable to adopt it, since it responds to more challenging geopolitics, both in its traditional and critical conception.

Endnotes:

1. Kissinger, Henry. “Orden mundial”. Barcelona: Penguin Random House. Debate, 2016: 371. ↑
2. Medeiros E. ed. “Cold rivals: The New era of US-China strategic competition”. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2023: 4. ↑
3. Allison, Graham T. “The new spheres of influence”. Foreign Affairs, n.° 99, marzo – abril 2020: 30 – 40. ↑
4. Roubini, N. “Megaamenazas: Las diez tendencias globales que ponen en peligro nuestro futuro y cómo sobrevivir a ellas”. Santiago: Ediciones Deusto, 2023: 194. ↑
5. Wallace-Wells, D. “The Uninhabitable Earth: A Story of the Future”. London, Penguin Random House, 2019: 23. ↑
6. Toro, Juan P. “Las potencias extracontinentales en América Latina”, Vol. XXXVII. Política Exterior n.° 214, julio – agosto 2023: 50. ↑
7. Ine. “Resumen de censos de población y vivienda”. Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. https://www.ine.gob.cl/estadisticas/sociales/censos-de-poblacion-y-vivienda#:~:text=Resumen%20de%20censos%20de%20poblaci%C3%B3n%20y%20vivienda&text=Sus%20resultados%20indican%20que%20la,51%2C1%25)%2C%20mujeres ↑
8. Green, C. “¿Es Chile una potencia marítima?”. Valparaíso: Imprenta de la Armada, 2023: 114. ↑
9. En el Congreso Nacional descansa la “Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad y Defensa” enviada por el Ministerio Defensa, en 28 de junio de 2012. https://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=repositorio/10221/15344/1/La%20Estrategia%20Nacional%20de%20Seguridad%20y%20Defensa_v6.doc ↑
10. El Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores publicó en 2016 y 2018, respectivamente los libros “Vocación de Paz: La Política Exterior de Chile” y “Política Exterior de Chile 2030”, que no tienen carácter vinculante y más bien responden a necesidades de difusión y reflexión académica. ↑
11. The Henry Jackson Society-AthenaLab, “Auditoría de capacidad geopolítica: Sudamérica” y “Auditoría de capacidad geopolítica: Cooperación Asia-Pacífico”. Athena Lab, agosto de 2019. https://athenalab.org/auditorias-de-capacidad-geopolitica-sudamerica-y-apec/ ↑
12. Dodds, K. “Geopolitics: a very short introduction”. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019: 4. ↑
13. La amenaza española no desapareció hasta las postrimerías del siglo XIX, ya que se libró una breve guerra naval entre los años 1865 y 1866. ↑
14. Historia de Chile Siglo XIX. “Diego Portales a Manuel Blanco Encalada, 10 de septiembre de 1836”. Universidad de Las Américas, 2024. https://historiachilexixudla.wordpress.com/2008/09/03/epistolario-de-diego-portales ↑
15. Fermandois, J. “Mundo y fin de mundo: Chile en la política mundial 1900-2004”. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Pontifica Universidad Católica de Chile, 2008: 37. ↑
16. Pinochet de la Barra, O. “La Antártica chilena”. Santiago: AthenaLab, 2023. Quinta edición. ↑
17. Consejo Chileno para las Relaciones Internacionales. “150 años de Política Exterior de Chile: 1871-2021”. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones UC, 2022: 154. ↑
18. Bywaters, C.; Sepúlveda, D. y Villar, A. “Nuevas voces de política exterior”. Santiago de Chile, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2021: 21. ↑
19. Salazar, Daniel. “Los países de LatAm que más crecerían en 2024: los motores económicos pierden fuerza”. Bloomberg en Línea, 5 de enero de 2024. https://www.bloomberglinea.com/2024/01/05/los-paises-de-latam-que-mas-crecerian-en-2024-los-motores-economicos-pierden-fuerza/ ↑
20. Poduje I. “Chile tomado: pobreza, crimen, inmigración y narcotráfico”. Santiago de Chile. Uqbar Editores, 2023: 73. ↑
21. Rísquez, R. “El Tren de Aragua”. Santiago. Planeta, 2023: 216. ↑
22. Institute for Economics and Peace. “Global Terrorist Index”. Vision of humanity, 2023: 47. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/ ↑
23. Haass, R. “A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order”. New York, Penguin Random House, 2017: 227. ↑
24. Morgenthau, Hans. “Politics Among Nations”. New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2005. ↑
25. AthenaLab. “Aproximación a una política exterior basada en intereses nacionales”, junio de 2020: 19. ↑
26. “Pompeo advierte sobre Huawei: ‘Poner información en esa infraestructura china presenta riesgos a los ciudadanos de tu país’”. CNN Chile, 12 de abril de 2019. https://www.cnnchile.com/lodijeronencnn/mike-pompeo-entrevista-cnn-huawei-china_20190412/ ↑
27. El Mercurio. “Canciller Wang Yi: Es injusto e inmoral que algunos países abusen de razones de seguridad nacional para poner obstáculos al desarrollo de empresas chinas”. Emol, 28 de julio de 2019. https://www.emol.com/noticias/Internacional/ ↑
28. Cifras de 2021 tomadas del Observatorio de Complejidad Económica. Observatorio de Complejidad Económica, 2024. https://oec.world/es/profile/country/chl?subnationalDepthSelector=productHS2 ↑
29. Armada de Chile. “Horizonte en el Pacífico: Visión oceánica de la Armada”. Valparíso: Imprenta de la Armada, 2020: 105. https://www.armada.cl/custom/radio_naval/libros/libro_horizonte.pdf ↑
30. AthenaLab – Henry Jackson Society. “Chile y el Hemisferio Sur: ¿Antártica en Transición?”. Athena Lab, 2020. https://athenalab.org/estudio-chile-y-el-hemisferio-sur-antartica-en-transicion/ ↑
31. IISS. “The Military Balance 2022”. International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Routledge, 2022: 403. ↑
32. Cadell, Cate  & Perez del Carpio, Marcelo. “A growing global footprint for China’s space program worries Pentagon”. The Washington Post, 21 de noviembre de 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/china-space-program-south-america-defense/ ↑
33. Wsj. “How the U.S. is trying to block China’s control of the ports around the Globe”. The Wall Street Journal, 11 de mayo de 2023. https://www.wsj.com/video/series/wsj-explains/how-the-us-is-trying-to-block-china-control-of-ports-around-the-globe/6534955D-DE84-463C-A1DB-5628735EB4D7 ↑
34. Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Australia. “Foreign Policy White Paper”. Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, 2017. https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/2017-foreign-policy-whitepaper/fpwhitepaper/pdf/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf ↑
35. Toro, Juan P. “Le Chili et la France, appartenances et opportunités multiples”. Revue Conflit, 3 de diciembre de 2021: 72. ↑
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49. DoD. “Indo-Pacific Strategy”. U. S. Department of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF ↑