This article was initially published in the Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre
Vol. 3 No. 3 (2024): July to September
https://doi.org/10.56221/spt.v3i3.65

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Summary

Morocco’s latest arms acquisitions turn the possibility of risk into a real threat of attack on the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla. The recent supply of Javelin missiles^[1] by the United States (US) to Morocco reduces the deterrent capability of the Spanish Leopard tanks^[2] positioned in both cities. In addition to the supply of Javelin missiles, the U.S. has established several factories in the country, giving Morocco some autonomy to resupply the weaponry used. The continuous procurement of short, medium and long range surface-to-air, air-to-ground, air-to-air, anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, together with advanced 3-D radar^[3]-based air defense systems, makes the African country one of the best armed on the continent, second only to Algeria.

Keywords: Morocco, Algeria, Polisario Front, Spain, Armament, Armed Conflict.

Introduction

The status of best ally granted by the US to the Maghreb country has allowed it to equip itself with state-of-the-art weaponry from different countries, the most relevant being Israel, France, China and Turkey. The main purpose of this acquisition is to face the different threats faced by the country, where the conflict perpetuated over time with Algeria and the Polisario Front are clear justifications for the modernization of the Alawite armed forces.

Morocco

Morocco has become the first African country not to depend on the US for the maintenance of its military arsenal, due to the constant supply of armaments to the country. The US intends to reinforce its foreign policy in the region by improving the defensive and offensive capabilities of its most important non-NATO ally on the African continent. A strong Moroccan military, facing regional terrorist threats, also serves as a counterweight to Algeria’s claims to access the Atlantic.

With the authorization of maintenance operations and the manufacture of spare parts for Apache helicopters, Morocco has signed several contracts with American arms companies such as:

1. Boeing^[4]
2. Lockheed Martin^[5]
3. Raytheon^[6]
4. Orbital ATK^[7]
5. General Dynamics^[8]
6. Chemring^[9]
7. Kaman precisión^[10]

It also owns several arms production centers in the country.:

1. EE. UU.: Airbus,^[11] Safran,^[12] Thales^[13]
2. Israel: Elbit Systems,^[14] Bluebird,^[15] Israel Aeroespace Industries^[16]

Israel, following the Abraham agreements in 2020, has become a relevant arms supplier to the country, with the possible acquisition of Merkava^[17] tanks that will give a significant boost to the ground army’s blind warfare capabilities.

With a budget of 124.7 billion in 2024 for the defense industry, it has signed agreements with Russia and China for the acquisition of short- and medium-range missiles, allowing it to have advanced air forces in the medium term, supported by various air systems. Significantly, the fleet of drones of different origins: Chinese, Israeli, American and Turkish, the most extensive in the continent, stands out. Within its drone arsenal are 150 Wander B^[18] and Thunder B,^[19] vertical take-off and landing units, produced by Bluebird Aero Systems; three Heron^[20] TPs and roving munitions, manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries; four Hermes 900,^[21] fabricados por Elbit Systems; aviones no tripulados turcos Bayraktar TB2^[22] drones and Chinese Wing Loong drones,^[23] used for combat.

Gradually, with its arms acquisitions, it has become a regional and international power, basing its effectiveness on a modern air force, supported by advanced anti-aircraft systems, thus achieving a deterrent effect on its regional enemies.

With a land army superior in armament in terms of tanks, armored vehicles and artillery pieces with respect to the Spanish one, it intends to continue increasing its forces, with the acquisition of the Israeli Iron Dome defense systems,^[24] Green Pine radar system^[25] and Arrow system,^[26] making up for its most outstanding weakness with these advanced air systems.

Figure 1
Recent Military Equipment Acquired by Morocco

Source: Prepared by the author

Likewise, the army has the support of 75% of young people, although there is a level of distrust of 15%. Similarly, the professionalization of the armed forces has begun with the reduction of compulsory military service from 18 to 12 months, divided into two phases of instruction: a) general and basic military training for 4 months, and b) training in various areas and specializations for the remaining 8 months. This strategic approach provides crucial support in the event of conflict with Spain, which currently lacks this capability.

The country’s military has participated in several international peacekeeping missions, which has provided them with operational experience in various scenarios. They are also directly advised by Israeli advisors, who have formed units of combat engineers trained to fortify positions and perform tasks such as planting obstacles, minefields, barbed wire, among others. However, one of its weaknesses is the lack of morale within the land army, described by deserters as poorly treated, poorly paid, poorly fed and poorly equipped.

Due to the country’s regional conflicts, the government has created two military zones: The first is located in the south, based in Agadiry está vinculada al resurgido conflicto armado con el Frente Polisario. La segunda se encuentra en el este, con sede en Ougda^[27], and is linked to the resurgent armed conflict with the Polisario Front. The second is in the east, based in Ougda, and is motivated by the ongoing tension and consequent enmity over Algerian support for the Polisario Front in its claims to Western Sahara. Recently, the government has created a third military zone based in Al Hoceima,^[28] 90 km from Melilla, with the stated objective of fighting immigration and jihadist terrorism; however, the existence of the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, claimed by Morocco as its own, creates the possibility of different purposes in the motivation for planning and creating this third military zone.

Figure 2
Moroccan Military Zones

Source: Prepared by the author

Algeria

Algeria has the most powerful army on the African continent, with an operational and weapons capability equipped to counter the country’s external and internal threats. Its National People’s Army includes land forces, an air force, navy and an air defense command. It also forms one of the strongest deterrents to Alawite expansionism, being considered the first African country to acquire the Russian-made S-350.^[29] anti-aircraft defense system. Although the U.S. Congress has, on several occasions, called for sanctions against the country for the volume of arms acquired from Russia, the latter has recapitalized about half of its inventory of fixed-wing combat aircraft. For its part, the navy has invested in its fleet of submarines and frigates, taking advantage of the local industry’s capacity for the repair and maintenance of this equipment.

Polisario Front

The Polisario Front possesses a significant but obsolete armament endowment, mostly of Soviet origin. The movement constitutes one of the Alawite^[30] drawbacks in its expansionist pretensions towards Western Sahara, “territory claimed by the movement as its own.” Armed by Algeria, Cuba and Libya during the 1970s and 1980s, Polisario forces^[31] have pioneered hybrid warfare, ombining guerrilla warfare with heavy weaponry. Currently, there is no record of modernization of their military hardware, which, for the most part, remains as supplied in the 1980s.

It is estimated to have around 100 tanks, mainly T-55th and, to a lesser extent, T-62 Obr.72,^[32] donated by Libya, infantry fighting vehicles and troop transports, with an estimated 81 vehicles, the 1966 Soviet BMP-1^[33] being the most common of all. In addition, it is accompanied by the rare Brazilian EE-9 Cascavel ^[34] from the Engesa company, a six-wheeled armored vehicle on loan from Libya, with 380 in use. Without a precise estimate of the exact number, the artillery complement is composed of 122 mm artillery pieces^[35] and Grad/Grad-P missile launchers^[36], as well as anti-aircraft assets composed of SA-6,^[37] SA-8^[38] y SA-9^[39], as designated by NATO.

The current lack of air assets significantly undermines the operational capacity of the Polisario’s ground assets, making the operational deployment of armored troops unfeasible due to the risk of being destroyed by air assets. This lack of air capabilities also affects the mechanized capacity of its units, forcing them to adopt guerrilla tactics consisting of small “attack and retreat” skirmishes along the Moroccan defensive wall. Moreover, the possibility of acquiring air assets and modernizing the current armament, except for occasional concessions made by Algeria, is completely unfeasible due to the current international isolation of the Polisario Front.

Spain

In recent years, Spain has relegated the modernization of its armed forces to the background, allocating most of its budget to the maintenance of troops, barracks and the upgrading of its existing military equipment. The latest generation of military acquisitions is mainly limited to four S-80 submarines,^[40] 8×8 armored vehicles^[41] and two military communications satellites as highlights.

On the other hand, it is committed to the modernization of existing military material, relegating the acquisition of new state-of-the-art equipment to a secondary plane, focusing this investment on the participation in projects at European level. It is worth mentioning that “many have failed or suffered great delays in their execution”, as well as in the purchase of equipment produced in Spain.

Although the option of updating the existing military material has become the main option to be carried out:

• 1. Updating of Leopards 2-E^[42]
  2. Updating the Chinooks ^[43]
  3. Eurofighter Upgrade ^[44]

However, the repeated extensions in the accounts linked to military investment, despite the reflected increase, create a probable scenario of non-compliance in the defense investment (2 % of GDP) established by NATO. However, Spain has a trained and educated professional army, with approximately 120,000 active troops distributed throughout the country’s different military branches, which gives it a certain advantage, especially in the navy and aviation, “in spite of the modernization of the Moroccan army”.

Figure 3
Military Statistics of Morocco, Algeria and Spain

Source: Prepared by the author

The current level of budget allocated to Ceuta and Melilla does not match the dynamics required for the acquisition of military technology essential for optimal defense and deterrence in the event of an attack. Currently, the military endowments in charge of the custody and defense of both cities are:

Ceuta:

1. Regiment Duque de Alba:^[45] Three companies (companies): Rifle Co., Support Co. and Tank Defense Co. with assigned armament; assault rifles, AG-36 single shot launchers.^[46] 40mm rifles, Barrett rifles, 40mm rifles coupled to rifles, Barrett,^[47] automatic grenade launchers LAS-40M1,^[48] mortars 81mm SAL.^[49]
2. Montesa Cavalry Regiment No. 3: It has assigned armament, such as Leopards 2-A4 battle tanks and Pizarro infantry fighting vehicles.^[50]
3. 54th Regulars Group: Rifle Companies equipped with assault rifles, sniper rifles, VRO (Tracked Wheeled Vehicle) Vamtac Rebeco^[51] and Pegasus transport vehicles.^[52]
4. Mixed Artillery Regiment No. 30: It has the following assigned armament: 155-52 CIAC howitzers, AAA 35-90 twin-tube anti-aircraft guns, 105-14 Otto Melara M-56 towed howitzers, MISTRAL anti-aircraft missile system.
5. Engineer Regiment No. 7: Composed of three companies “Sappers, support and staff and services, its mission is the construction and maintenance of the perimeter and existing roads in Ceuta, support to the civilian population in case of catastrophes “fires and floods”, deactivation of explosives and construction of camps as the most relevant
6. General Battalion of the Ceuta Command: Recently founded in “November 1997”, equipped with anti-riot police material, it participates in the maintenance of order in the autonomous city when required.

Melilla:

1. Tercio Gran Capitán: four companies with assigned armament: assault rifles, AG-36 40 mm single shot launchers, 81 mm SAL mortars, Barrett rifles, 40-M1 automatic grenade launchers, 1st defensive company against tanks.
2. Cavalry Regiment Alcántara X: A mechanized squadron with assigned strength: TOA^[53] tracked transport with 120 mm mortar, Spike LR missiles ^[54] and Pizarro infantry vehicles. An armored squadron with assigned Leopard 2-A4 battle tanks.
3. Regiment of Regulares nº. 52: Company of riflemen with assigned armament, assault rifles, Barrett precision rifles, VRO vehicles, Rebeco Band and Pegaso transport vehicles.
4. Mixed Artillery Regiment No. 30: It has the following armament assigned: 155-52 CIAC howitzer, AAA 35-90 GDF007 twin-tube cannon, 105-14 Otto Melara M-56 towed howitzer, MISTRAL anti-aircraft missile system.
5. Engineer Regiment No. 8: Detached in the city of Melilla, it performs the same functions as its counterpart in Ceuta.

However, since 2005, the two sites have experienced a constant siege of immigrants coming “mostly from the Sahel”,^[55] suffering on numerous occasions massive leaks that have resulted in heavy losses, both financially and in credibility. These incidents have undermined the internal and external effectiveness of the fences and the meticulously used defenses

Figure 4
Statistics of Hurdle Jumping Period 2013-2022

Source: Prepared by the author

On the other hand, over the years, the migrant jumps have been linked to Morocco, a country that has carried out tests of strength, capacity and level of action in the assaults on the border fences of both cities.

Figura 5
Timeline Period 2005-2022 Fence Assault in Ceuta and Melilla

Source: Prepared by the author

Hypothetical Future

1. a. Morocco has for years claimed the cities of Ceuta and Melilla as its own. The constant siege to which they will be subjected includes border closures, silent invasions of the cities by Maghrebis^[56] and the assault by force with conventional and hybrid means,^[57] including the “use of migrants in its execution”. This meticulously rehearsed strategy over years could eventually achieve unprecedented coordination and effectiveness.
2. Morocco will become a real and existing threat capable of dispossessing Spain of Ceuta and Melilla, the latter being, “given statistics”, the first to fall.
3. The continuous acquisition of state-of-the-art weaponry, the strategic position of Morocco for the US, France and Israel, as well as the privileged influence that Moroccan lobbies^[58] could have in the world, together with the penetration of Maghrebis in various social strata in Spain and the perception of vulnerability, due to the lack of institutionality and cohesion of its population, will determine the level of damage that the African country could inflict on the Spanish government, being able to strip the country of both cities.
4. The attack will not take place imminently; its execution will take place in the medium to long term, taking advantage of a capable army and a world geostrategic situation favorable to Morocco’s pretensions. In this scenario, Spain’s theoretical allies will not intervene directly in the face of the aggression suffered, limiting themselves to sterile feints of protest.
5. Spain will be dispossessed of both cities through coordinated conventional and hybrid attacks. Although it may react with a counterattack, it will be repulsed due to Morocco’s air defense capability and superior ground forces, which will take time to recover. This will give the Maghreb country the opportunity to establish effective defenses capable of repelling any attempt to recapture the two positions.
6. The loss of Ceuta and Melilla will cause the current government to lose credibility and will negatively affect the economy due to the losses. In addition, it will eliminate any hint of conflict between the two countries due to the rejection of the Spanish society, the diminished human capacity to sustain it and the scarce international support received.
7. The situation will lead to an unprecedented political, economic, institutional and social crisis, making the country vulnerable to its historical natural enemies in Europe, such as “France and England”.

Conclusions

An attack on Ceuta and Melilla by Morocco, in all probability, will have no effect in the short term, being the medium-long term the most viable option. Current indications such as the acquisition of state-of-the-art weaponry, the professionalization and preparation of its army, together with the division by military sectors of the country’s natural borders, suggest that it will become a reality over time. It is crucial to take immediate action in several areas to prevent the hypothetical future described above. The following sections are recommended to be addressed as priorities for an optimal future of the country:

On the military front, a significant increase in the budget and the acquisition of state-of-the-art weaponry capable of countering potential attacks on the country’s interests is necessary. In addition, a restructuring of policies related to the human training of the armed forces is required, reintroducing general and specific military instruction for military-age youth, with the foreseeable result of increased human capacity in the event of armed conflict.

In the political arena, direct and significant changes are crucial. This includes changing foreign policy with the US and Israel to make Spain an unconditional ally of both, comparable to the level achieved during the invasion of Iraq and the dismantling of the terrorist organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) Indirectly, it is recommended to resume relations with Algeria and the Polisario Front, natural enemies of Morocco and proven regional counterweights, capable of mitigating any offensive towards border cities in Africa. This is fundamental due to the diversification in armaments, human and logistical resources in the various military zones of Morocco, in the face of possible tensions on its eastern and southern borders.

In the social sphere, it is crucial to create national projects that promote social, political and military cohesion of each individual in society, with the clear objective of unifying criteria and strengthening unity. This is fundamental to increase the perception and awareness of the reality and priority of an institutionalized society, where the concept of nation is always a priority.

Endnotes:

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