This text was originally published in the book América Latina en la Nueva Geopolítica Global.

“Choose well, you shall, my young apprentice”.
Master Yoda, Star Wars: The Empire Strikes Back

Summary

The growing competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is affecting the prospects of countries that have a clear role in their respective regions. The foreign and defense policy dynamics in Argentina are an excellent example of this, particularly regarding the South Atlantic. This space considered politically tripartite (as ocean, Malvinas Islands and South Atlantic islands, and Antarctica), requires the search for a coherent defense and foreign policy strategy. Accordingly, Argentina will have to face the consequences of its decisions, which have been made based on a combination of perceptions and ideological appreciations, which may condition the relative position of the country in the future. Selective Engagement appears as a viable alternative to be developed, contemplating the existing complexities, where competitive and cooperative interactions converge within the Western bloc and revisionist powers.

Keywords: Argentina, defense, foreign policy, selective engagement.

Introduction: Between a Rock and an Unwanted Place

In the field of international security, two characteristics can be considered when thinking about the strategic positioning of a country like Argentina. The first one is the growing structural rigidity and the widening of competition spaces between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States (US). This situation generates the possibility that countries may have to opt for one of the potential axes of alignment, as Richard Fontaine points out in his recent article “The Myth of Neutrality”^[1] Although international competition presents In addition to variations in intensity among different regions, Argentina’s position of economic, military and social vulnerability means that in its international dimension there are obvious limits for an attentive external observer moderately familiar with the dynamics of the country, since in the face of structural rigidity there may be little margin left to avoid having to make a choice.

A structural constraint, in itself, is not necessarily counterproductive, since it forces adaptation, with consequences that are not necessarily negative. However, changes in the distribution of power call for adjustments in both defense and foreign policy. The magnitude will depend to a large extent on the power available to face the effects of the changes, the proximity to points of geopolitical tension and the proximity or remoteness of the region’s major power.

For decision-makers, transitions are complex moments in the international system, since they involve changes that will affect the position of power relatively closely, as the rise and fall of the major powers affect the strategic calculation of the countries as a whole, thus impairing their external relations strategy. This situation is particularly demanding for any leader because it involves both the long-term positioning of the country and public policy decisions that are based, albeit indirectly, on estimates of the impact of changes in the distribution of power on the structure.

The uncertainty that is usually generated by the breakdown of the existing order affects the perceptions of decision-makers in the powers and peripheral countries, in a context that still shows features of the previous stage, combining or generating friction with new interactions and emerging patterns. Undoubtedly, preferences and expectations affect perceptions of the consequences of changes in the distribution of power. In this context, the discussion on transition takes shape, maintaining an open debate on the configuration of the present and future power structure, and on the consequences of the conformation of a bipolar order,^[2] multipolar,^[3] apolar,^[4] or the continuation of the current unipolarity, but attenuated, in Wolforth and Deudney’s words.^[5] Even when the polar construction has not been defined, it is known, on the one hand, that there are decisions that must be made now and whose impacts will be seen in an undetermined future, although close in time, and, on the other hand, that in defense, equipment and operational capacity decisions take time to be implemented, which is far from immediate.

Compared to other moments of international transition, Argentina had a position of political prestige, structured in both latent and effective power capabilities, among them: (1) a modern military power that was nourished by military equipment and doctrines coming from the European powers; (2) a diplomacy – especially at the level of international law- influential and recognized by the great powers of its time, such as the Drago Doctrine; (3) a referent culture for Latin America and for the world; and (4) a booming economy, product of its process of international insertion and the internationalization of its economy, becoming the eighth economy of the planet.

Until the first decade of the second half of the 20th century, Argentina had resources that translated into relative weight in international affairs, which allowed it to absorb certain costs of its international positioning, such as neutrality in the First and Second World Wars, or rivalry with the U.S. in the Pan- American conferences. Political leadership could combine, in a functional way, elements of soft and hard power that translated into a defined international status and shared perceptions about Argentina’s status, a time when there was usually talk of the existence of a middle power and where countries of greater or lesser weight developed a strategy towards Argentina.

However, at present and as a result of a long process of decline, Argentina has lost a substantial part of this substrate.^[6] Economically, the country has a debt that reaches 85% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with no immediate payment capacity and forced to constantly refinance it, with closed international markets, with difficulties to accumulate reserves and with an economic structure that is far from being efficiently exploited. Argentina is also dependent on a conflictive relationship with the International Monetary Fund, with China emerging as a lender of last resort, which, although it does not promote institutional or economic reforms, tends to translate those loans into a plane of greater dependence. In terms of relative military power, Argentina went from the 14th position in 2001 to the 49th in recent years.^[7] Its real and effective military capabilities to fulfill its main mission are deficient.^[8] Its Armed Forces (AF) are used to perform social tasks, assistance to natural disasters and, in the best of cases, functions related to peace missions. With a military budget of between 0.5 % and 0.8 % of the GDP^[9] and formed by systems that can be considered legacy or obsolete, today it does not represent a combat force capable of fulfilling its main mission, as highlighted by several reports that analyze the military capabilities of the countries in a comparative way.^[10]

Nevertheless, Argentina still maintains a certain influence in terms of soft power, based on its relevance in what Joseph Nye calls popular culture,^[11] which today is reflected in sports and diverse cultural and artistic expressions. Socially, the country has been facing tensions as a result of the frustration generated by the persistent decline, as revealed by its social indicators – inherited from the previous government – with 40% poverty, 130% inflation, a frayed currency and growing uncertainty about the country’s future.

Despite its decline, Argentina still has some interesting competitive advantages. On the one hand, its extension and advantageous territorial position in terms of remoteness from the main areas of current conflict gives it an insular position that allows it to consider inoculating itself from the worst effects of current competition. On the other hand, it has a scientific-technological complex, a niche of excellence in the production of satellites, radars and launching vectors. Both could be considered proof of its weight and relevance in the world. Accordingly, the discussion on the transition is important because it establishes potential partnerships, alliances, competitors, along with the place of the country and the region in terms of what to do and what to offer, being a region that demands infrastructure, that has domestic security problems of different kinds and that has the resources to provide the actors of the fourth industrial revolution, being far from the current international fracture zones.

The second of these characteristics is the digital transformation, which is interrelated with the change in the distribution of power. The exponential acceleration of digital technologies, together with the magnitude of their impact, is such that it affects all sectors of domestic and international politics. In the social field, social networks constitute an indicator of the execution of disinformation policies, including the possibility of executing influence campaigns or Sharp Powers^[12] by great powers,^[13] which can affect the influence of rival powers. Likewise, in the military field, the growing deployment of artificial intelligence and robots is seen, as seen in the battlefields of Ukraine; while the economic field is seen in the growing rivalry of microchip production,^[14] where the characteristic is the growing militarization of interdependency as a consequence of this change,^[15] in a world where better knowledge of air, maritime, terrestrial and ultra-terrestrial domains is needed, as well as understanding what it means – in terms of advantages – to work on their integration and the transition to an all domains knowledge, thanks to an increasingly sensor-based world.

In this regard, Wale Dalton points out that the present situation demands a change in the outlook of decision-makers, as a result of the increased competitive pressures generated by the environment. Transition and transformation shift the geographic center of power and the material base of wealth and security, respectively. Therefore, the world is facing a revolution in strategic perspective that forces the updating of strategy to a 2.0 version.^[16] In order to operationalize a scenario, the following perception will be used in South America as a region -and in Argentina in particular- about the accelerated arrival of a bipolar order based on interdependent networks with links of different density and the possibility that such order implies some sort of cold war 2.0 that reflects the growing tensions existing at a structural level.

While transformation implies uncertainty, transition is the only one that can provide some of the certainty needed to drive action in foreign policy and defense. The widespread perception of the constitution of a bipolarity between the PRC and the US has generated a discussion on the foreign and defense policy options available to the countries of the region. In Argentina, people tend to think again – erroneously – of a triangular situation, as one more vertex of the relationship between the US and the PRC, since this binary view does not consider the interdependent and multinodal framework of international politics. In general terms, most of the region has followed an external formula based on a combination of prudence and necessity, where business is done with everyone, but in the field of international security it has maintained a close and cooperative relationship with the US, based on a relationship centered on the US Southern Command. This formula is not one of equidistance, but one of selective engagement or, in some specific cases, alignment.^[17]

However, three countries (Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua) opted to follow a policy of opposition to the US, generating various relations with extra-regional actors, and ordered their security and defense policy by involving Russia, the PRC and Iran. This was done with varying degrees of intensity in order to modernize their Armed Forces, distancing them from the Western pattern. In this way, these countries served as an arena for different types of actions by these great rival powers, to implement their wedge policy^[18] in a previously closed space, thanks to a sustained and intelligent implementation of the Monroe Doctrine. Only Argentina has remained – in recent years- in a situation of ambiguity, wrapped in a trap based on domestic dynamics and obsolete discourses that have not allowed it to give modernity to its strategic situation: to simply think of a formula of friend of all and ally of none^[19] is extremely difficult in the current political context of Argentina.

Argentina has extensive trade relations with both the US and the PRC. On the military front, Argentina maintains in its force most of the military materiel from the U.S. and Europe. Likewise, the Kirchner and Fernandez de Kirchner administrations focused on reducing the existing defense and security ties with the US, although this effort was limited by the existing Western military capabilities in the country, and by the discontinuity that the short Macri administration proposed in this area. Recently and prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a beleaguered and indebted Argentine president, Alberto Fernandez, offered Russia a kind of alliance, where Argentina positioned itself as the gateway to Latin America.^[20] That political leadership sought alternative sources of military equipment from China, India and, among the more radicalized sectors of the administration, Russia, which paid off when MI-17 heavy helicopters and four Neftegaz class supply ships were brought in at the end of the Fernandez de Kirchner administration, the first in a state of limited use.

They are usually presented as actions for the recovery of sovereignty of technological exchange, having as a common denominator an anti-western bias. In the same logic, a PRC dual-use space facility in Bajada del Agrio, Neuquén, became the center of a rhetorical dispute between certain sectors of the U.S. security policy elite and the Fernández administration over its dual status as part of the global military infrastructure that the PRC is developing. The argument frequently used to remove such components from the defense structure is the presence of the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic, the occupation of the Malvinas Islands, the existence of the British vetо on the equipment that the Armed Forces require in order to modernize them, and the special relationship existing between the US and the UK.^[21] For a nationalist sector with influence in decision making this is unacceptable.

The reading carried out by the administration of international affairs is usually binary in that it follows logics associated with positions that are presented as strategic, where the balance between the ideological and pragmatic components of the complexity of today’s world is not established. The intertwining of globalization and geopolitics explains the current international competition in this century, the product of a confusion of the idea of globalization with a liberal agenda and of geopolitics with grand strategy.

While the former is about flows of communications, trade, finance, ideas and people, the latter is linked to the proper positioning to ensure that such flows contribute to the preponderance of the nations that control it. Globalization expands horizons and wealth, while geopolitics enables or blocks access to the spaces that are necessary to realize any globalization project. International politics is the result of the balance between both forces. There is no foreign trade without geopolitics and there is no geopolitics without organizations aware of how national interests translate into the international political map and the limitations that exist as a result of the interests of other political units. Foreign policy is the ability to maneuver in a given environment, while defense becomes vitally important when vital international security and national defense interests are involved.

Thereupon, this article initially presents the rationale of the selective engagement as the basis of geopolitical relations in the field of foreign policy and international defense. Subsequently, it is put in context in a specific environment: the South Atlantic, as an area of growing dispute between actors and treated as an integrated system, focusing on the Malvinas Islands, when it should work as an area with three converging dynamics that demand an active policy of linking issues, shifting the center of relationship with the environment from the Malvinas dispute. Both considerations allow us to think -as a conclusion- of a possible defense mechanism that is functional to the interests of the country, that also allows the recovery of the military instrument and is useful to the interests of the region and the hemisphere.

Selective Engagement as an External Relationship Strategy

Selective engagement is a foreign and defense policy option that involves establishing in an adjusted manner the national interests and the resources available to fulfill them, accepting that, although there is no dichotomy in the so-called vital interests (everything that allows the construction of security and economic welfare) and the desirable ones (everything that allows the achievement of values and a more stable international order), there is an order of priority between the two.^[22] This type of policy is useful both for central and peripheral powers, since the execution of political actions requires a certain humility in the establishment of objectives and prudence in terms of available capacities for their realization.

As a strategy that assumes the need to avoid the problems of overaction or neglect that occur in the formulation of foreign policy, action is built on a series of indicators that reinforce the cost-benefit ratio of external action, among them: the establishment of basic goals, selective and early action, the primacy of the inter- state relationship and considerations on the use of force. These premises make it necessary to establish a certain clarity of action and objectives; therefore, they clarify national interests as the axis of political action in order to establish a policy that limits ambiguity as much as possible and sends clear signals to partners, allies and detractors.

If the basic goals are observed, they should be translated into the agenda in the clearest and most specific way possible, avoiding broad-spectrum policies and limiting the spaces for confrontation in order to exercise economy in the means, as well as avoiding the diversification of efforts required to achieve them. The policy of selective engagement is one that establishes limited, scalable and eventually achievable objectives. The basis is to carry out an effort economy, which does not mean the development of a gray or mediocre policy.

Selective engagement proposes to make clear to each actor in the international competition what convergences and divergences exist in the political relationship. Its impact is the result of agenda setting and issue linkage, identifying the key players, the interests pursued and the possible options. Selective engagement shifts the weight of interaction to the country with the greatest relative weakness, demanding a certain capacity for bureaucratic anticipation in agenda building, seeking the greatest possible number of positive results and foreseeing actions around negative linkage agendas. Likewise, it implies selecting options based on what the country has to offer to the world, seeking openness to third States, middle powers or networks that allow maneuvering a situation of an eventual conflictive bipolarity. In this way, common agendas, limits and margins of maneuver are established for each counterpart. Likewise, the topics for discussion are chosen, with clear communication, but without closing the option of advancing in other equally important, although not urgent or circumstantial, issues.

Those approaches that inevitably emerge from the major powers will be limited and harsh, but will have the advantage of avoiding ambiguity. Nevertheless, the problems of cross-linking will be faced, depending on the capacity of the bureaucracy and how the domestic or external context may contribute to the solution. The logic assumes doing business with everyone, but in the field of international security – particularly in the hemispheric field- the priority is focused on the US and the West, while in terms of values the positioning is close to liberal democracies; however, the objective is to strengthen them internally rather than condemn external actors despite the demands of the hemispheric power, when it comes to positions that are related to other great powers with which there is a broad commercial agenda.

In essence, it is to ensure the political balance between doing too much or doing too little, finding the right action for the issue sought. The starting point is to establish what is convenient for the State, proposing a certain degree of selfishness in the action, communicating clearly to the counterpart the reasons for the decisions, when they involve divergences that may lead to a crisis of some kind. What happens when security and business are opposed, as it happens in the digital field? The selective commitment is clear: segmenting without excluding and articulating spaces, which will demand a degree of sophistication throughout the negotiation process. Security prioritizes, but does not annul possibilities. This guide will be key in the agenda linked to the South Atlantic, as a practical case of selective engagement.

If selective engagement is broken down into its various components, early action involves anticipating events that may be detrimental to vital interests, this being key as it allows deploying precautionary actions rather than trying to correct the so-called faits accomplis. In this context, preventive diplomacy is central to work on this aspect. For Argentina, with various issues on its agenda (such as fishing in the South Atlantic, Antarctica, Lithium or the consequences of a war in the Pacific) that may severely affect the country, it is necessary to analyze possible scenarios and courses of action.

Globalization and geopolitics have a multiplicity of actors that determine how both evolve. However, the primacy of the inter-state relationship implies accepting that – even in an interdependent world- there are periods when globalization falls prey to geopolitical competition. Although we live in a world of decentralization of power, the war in Ukraine demonstrates that power can be re-centralized, that non-state actors align their interests as long as it suits them or they do not have sufficient resources to act otherwise, and finally, that the existence of horizontal and vertical networks forces the state to coordinate multiple entities and interests, as well as regulate relationships. Selective engagement requires the peripheral State to analyze the networks of contacts and interests of partners to advance the national interest, understanding the potential barriers to its implementation.

Every foreign policy has a section related to the use of force. While strategic positioning is determined by both domestic and structural issues, it is generally established that the defensive condition is the priority. Therefore, as a foreign policy and defense strategy, selective engagement has the following advantages:

• It recognizes the areas of compatibility and those where there will be opposition to one or the other actor. In this sense, preferences, needs and signals must be consistent since the credibility of the commitments undertaken will be the currency of exchange. For example, although Argentina’s economy has recently taken on a more Eastern face, this should not be to the detriment of the West and should not translate into its international security discussions.
• It draws clear lines of convergence and divergence based on the country’s interests.
• It expresses vital and desirable interests, including: opening markets for the country’s exports, strengthening connectivity with the world, and modernizing the country’s economy to the requirements of the fourth industrial revolution.
• In terms of defense, it demands a realistic policy on the South Atlantic, while recognizing that the unilateral British advance (the result of contradictory and inefficient policies) makes it necessary to carry out a scheme of linking issues as broadly as possible, in a context of weakness. If this premise is not taken into account, the country’s interests in Antarctica, as a vital space, will be severely affected in the coming years. If confrontation is chosen, it will be better to equip oneself adequately since there is nothing more futile than a futile threat, although this may generate disruptions with other agendas. In that context, it is a matter of looking at bilateral policy with Britain, disregarding domestic passions.
• It organizes the defense scheme on the basis of two steps: a multilateral cooperative one with the neighboring actors present in the region and a unilateral one that allows thinking about the execution of area denial options, giving a functional sense to the defense policy.
• It allows the economic dimension of international policy to be placed on an equal footing with defense, since the basis for the success of selective engagement is the intelligent coordination and interaction in the articulation of the interests of the agencies that make up the State, the structural dynamics and the communication of actions both in the foreign and domestic spheres, where resistance to certain actions is often immediate. Selective engagement attacks the problems of the structural situation, bearing in mind the conjuncture.

But how does it apply to the South Atlantic context?

Selective Engagement in the South Atlantic Scenario: A System with Three Differentiated Dynamics

The South Atlantic is usually highlighted as an ocean of vast geopolitical value as an abundant source of food, energy, mineral and biological resources. As a scenario it is ideal for testing the dynamics of selective engagement as multiple actors and interests converge and, in particular, because it reflects – with less intensity – what is happening in all the world’s oceans, where business and international and regional security issues are at stake. In this regard, the South Atlantic has historically been a nexus between South America, Africa and Europe. Its relevance in terms of connectivity is beyond question for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The South Atlantic is relevant for Brazil’s foreign policy as a connecting platform and enabler of its strategy towards Africa and Asia. However, it is an ocean that does not present the tensions of global competitive dynamics, although it has its own security dynamics.

Although there are those who see the South Atlantic as an integrated area, the truth is that it has three subsystems. The first subsystem is the oceanic or maritime subsystem, which involves multilateral and cooperative aspects with multiple navies, but also unilateral aspects in the national sphere; therefore, as a sphere it is related to the capabilities that the State can assign to control the maritime sphere based on its own capabilities. The second subsystem is competitive and conflictive, since it concerns the Malvinas Islands, where bilateral dynamics govern the policy between Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and where political ups and downs condition the feasibility of changing the current status quo unfavorable to Argentina. Finally, the third subsystem is the Antarctic, where although there is a multilateral dynamic, in the sector that Argentina claims as its own there is a trilateral convergence with Chile and the United Kingdom; therefore, Argentina has to develop a defense policy aware that changes in the distribution of power affect it effectively since, although that space remains as common thanks to international law, its destiny is uncertain.

Geographically, in Africa, the South Atlantic extends for 7,800 kilometers, from Guinea Bissau to Cape Town, crossing 16 African countries. In South America, it extends 9,000 kilometers, from Cape San Roque in Brazil to Tierra del Fuego Island, of which 4,179 kilometers belong to Brazil, 330 kilometers to Uruguay and 4,500 kilometers to the Argentine Republic. Undoubtedly, it is a demanding ocean in terms of naval capabilities for all the States that comprise it and where naval capabilities, with specific exceptions such as Brazil, are limited. On its margins there is a proliferation of projects related to exploration, oil exploitation and development of underwater mining. In addition, there is a large number of communications cables on both coasts, with four transoceanic cables (Ela Link, South Atlantic Link, South Atlantic Cable System and Equiano)^[23] which are today considered critical infrastructure, being the backbone of the current economic systems.

Likewise, on both margins there are security problems with activities related to narcotics, wildlife trafficking and, to a lesser extent, human trafficking, piracy and possible threats to the offshore economic infrastructure. Additionally, there is a growing effort for an effective control of sovereign rights over its waters, guaranteeing freedom of navigation and the establishment of law and order in the maritime sphere, along with the protection of maritime resources. In this context, various strategies are being developed, such as Amazonas Azul in the case of Brazil, or Pampa Azul in the case of Argentina. These processes are carried out with a low degree of militarization while the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCAS) is in operation, presenting the action as part of the commitment of the countries that make up the South Atlantic system, as part of their contribution to international order and security.

In the South Atlantic, the most important countries in terms of GDP per capita are Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Gabon and Uruguay, while in terms of population they are Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola. This maritime space, on the one hand, is considered an important naval line of communication and a contributor to the interests of several countries that are in a rapid process of development. On the other hand, it is a platform for the development of international cooperation, since the pressures on its waters are less intense than in other oceans or seas of the world.

In terms of biological and economic wealth, in the South Atlantic there are a number of archipelagos of varying size and importance that are part of the southern projection system of the United Kingdom of Great Britain. Among them are the Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, which were the scene of an extraregional war between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982 and which today are part of a diplomatic dispute, and whose strategic value is recognized for their Antarctic projection. In geostrategic terms, due to the separation between both continents, it is considered the existence of two connected systems, although differentiated, with an oceanic region and an Antarctic region. Access to this maritime space can only be made through the North Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific.^[24]

The South Atlantic has multiple fishing zones established by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), known as zones 41, 47 and 48, where there is intense fishing activity that faces the recurring problem of the limited capacity of control exercised by coastal States over foreign fishing fleets, which use techniques and technologies that do not always take environmental protection into account. This situation of fishing control is added to the territorial dispute between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the Argentine Republic over sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, a situation that ends up affecting the use of food, energy and mineral resources in that area, in addition to affecting physical communications between the Islands and the continent.

In terms of fishing in the Southeast Atlantic, this activity has decreased from 3.3 million tons in the early 1970s to stabilize at 1.3 million tons in the last decade, making it necessary to improve regulations in this area in order to avoid predation and recover fish stocks. On the Southwest Atlantic side, fishing remains stable, fluctuating between 1.7 and 2.6 million tons, although there are species such as squid that are overexploited.^[25] Fishing has become a contentious issue particularly since the U.S. strategy known as Illegal, Unregulated, Unregulated Fishing (IUU) was made public. The strategy, known as Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU Fishing), involved the deployment of different units of the U.S. Coast Guard in the waters of the South Atlantic and a series of exercises with the navies and prefectures of the region, as well as a naval cooperation that includes the provision of patrol boats belonging to that organization to the Uruguayan Navy.

The South Atlantic is home to one of the most powerful navies in the region, Brazil, and another nominally strong one, Argentina. The Brazilian Navy has 85,000 troops, 5 submarines, 7 frigates, 44 coastal patrol vessels, 3 demining ships, 4 amphibious ships, and 43 different logistic ships. In addition, this Navy is in the process of developing a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN), which is expected to be operational in 2027, providing the Brazilian Navy with a long-range patrolling capacity superior to that of any other country in the region. The Brazilian Navy mainly carries out operational deployments in the South Atlantic, but its willingness to be part of an integrated maritime order leads it to cooperate in the protection of western naval lines of communication in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, both in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, as part of the Combined Maritime Forces.^[26] Its area of responsibility being the South Atlantic, its capabilities and deployment demonstrate its willingness to act with what it considers Western allies in the protection of the global lines connecting with those of the South Atlantic.

Argentina has a 16,400-strong Navy, 5 destroyers, 24 patrol and coastal defense ships, 16 logistic ships and 1 submarine with uncertain operational status. South Africa also has a naval configuration more demanding as it has responsibilities not only in the South Atlantic, but also in one of the most demanding oceans from a global geopolitical point of view, the Indian Ocean. For this purpose, the South African Navy has 2 submarines, 4 frigates, 4 patrol vessels, 3 demining vessels and 2 logistic vessels. Similarly, Nigeria has a 25,000-strong Navy, 1 frigate, 122 patrol vessels (mostly for coastal defense), 2 demining vessels, 4 amphibious ships and 2 logistic vessels. In addition, it cannot be overlooked that the United Kingdom has in the Malvinas Islands a minuscule established force, consisting of a patrol vessel, a major line unit (which may be a frigate or a rotary destroyer), an occasional submarine deployment (which may become frequent), a logistic vessel and an Antarctic vessel, which is part of the patrol of the South Atlantic carried out by the United Kingdom.^[27] In this sense, the core of responsibilities falls on Brazil, as it has ample naval means, maintaining an economy and a foreign policy with global aspirations and being the actor where a series of global initiatives promoted by the US and England converge.

This brief presentation of the South Atlantic environment reminds us that geography is intrinsically related to a country’s foreign and defense policy, as pointed out by Nicholas Spykman in his work “Geography and Foreign Policy” (I and II).^[28] In this regard, this author highlights the existence of three distances that must be considered when understanding the execution and priorities of a country in its external plane: geographical, topological and ideational distance. Each of them implies either proximity or remoteness and they are related to each other. Ultimately, geography affects the foreign and defense policy calculus.

Argentina has a geographical virtue in the current international context as it is far from the current geopolitical tipping points (Eastern Europe and the China Sea), but it is not exempt from activities carried out in the South Atlantic, whether in terms of trade, foreign direct investment, emergence of dual infrastructure, within the framework of a global competition that is becoming more acute. Both in terms of geographic and topological distance, Argentina is close to the US and far from the PRC, which, moreover, does not have the capacity to come to support or aid the objectives of the country in case of a conflict, as at least in the near future, it will not have the means to militarily break the siege imposed by the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

In terms of distance, the situation can be debated, but considering Argentina’s constitutional political order as a criterion, it can be argued that this country has a closer relationship with the West in the figure of the US, while the relative lack of knowledge about PRC culture, politics and society does not act as a barrier, on the contrary, it generates a curiosity that provokes an aspiration for greater knowledge about that country. This brief observation on how distances affect foreign policy reminds us of the weight of the proximity factor in terms of the influence that will eventually be exerted in a given area, although to the question of proximity, we must add the effective capacity to be able to affect that area.

Argentina is a key player in the South Atlantic, where its interests extend from the 36th parallel to Antarctica, being affected by what happens in this environment. It is almost unanimously thought that the South Atlantic is an integrated system, where actions and effects cannot be differentiated and where the treatment of this area of geographical relations must be uniform. This approach has a center of gravity in the issue surrounding the Malvinas Islands and the South Atlantic. The mixture of nationalist sentiment and geopolitical simplism tends to work with this environment based on the idea of incompatibility of hemispheric interests (especially with the United Kingdom and transitively, if you will, with the U.S.) and a certain sense of cooperative solidarity with the countries of the region that are part of the broad system that is the South Atlantic, such as Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay, which in terms of knowledge of the maritime environment formed the South Atlantic Maritime Area (AMAS), which in turn has operational agreements with Chile, South Africa and Spain, for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the maritime environment.

In this sense, the South Atlantic serves to be able to see how to implement a selective engagement strategy in a functional way with the country’s national interests. Argentina’s National Defense Policy Directive (DPDN), enacted by Decree 457/2021 in July 2021, establishes that defense – as a public policy – is autonomous, its main mission is to deter, conjure or repel aggressions of state origin, collaborating with the Security Forces and with the interest of the foreign policy of the country as a provider of regional and international security through its participation in peace missions, setting the following operational priorities. First, the South Atlantic Ocean, the Argentine Antarctic Space and Patagonia, emphasizing the integration of the forces to be able to comply with what has been established. It recognizes that due to the illegal occupation of the Malvinas Islands, it is necessary to take precautions in the planning and disposition of capabilities regarding this dispute. Then, it adds the defense of natural resources pointing out a non-exhaustive list of those issues that are considered relevant and establishing a National Aerospace Surveillance and Control System (SINVICA) that would help to create something close to the knowledge of the domains of interest.

From the point of view of external action, the priority is in the South Atlantic system, where three dynamics converge. The first dynamic is the oceanic space where Argentina holds sovereignty and, therefore, can act unilaterally as a vital space, and as a broad space (beyond mile 200, plus the continental shelf rights established by the UN) it should be considered multilateral with two steps, one regional and the other hemispheric/extraregional. In this area, the relationship with the region, both the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCAS), which is facing a revival as a result of a greater maritime awareness on the part of the Atlantic actors, takes precedence.

In this sense, the India-Brazil-South Africa Trilateral Forum (IBSA), known as the South Trinity, was created to promote dialogue between the three countries with the greatest weight in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans due to their maritime connection, forming part of a regional effort to protect globalization in a functional manner. The IBSA has a sense of naval projection for the purpose of maintaining law and order at sea, as well as protecting maritime resources, verifying the routes of fishing vessels and trade flows that pass through both oceans, which then derive in two secondary lines of communication, one to the north and the other to the south of South America. To this end, the IBSAMAR naval exercise is carried out annually in South Africa, in order to give geopolitical vitality to the commitments of globalization, following the premise of freedom of navigation.

The extra-regional dimension appears on the horizon with the new initiative to unify in political terms the North and South Atlantic presented by Anthony Blinken in September 2022, thus establishing an integrated Atlantic policy, involving Africa and involving foreign powers such as France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain vis-à-vis China, Russia and Iran, as well as a growing and increasingly active Atlantic presence. This initiative seeks to counter the presence of the PRC in critical maritime infrastructure such as ports, cables and land connectivity with ports, and although it is noted that it does not have a military component, it may eventually develop a chapter linked to security. However, those who lead the transatlantic and transcontinental work process are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the member countries, therefore, it would not dispute competences with the pre-existing ZPCAS.

The second dynamic is bilateral and is marked by the dispute over the Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands. The United Kingdom exercises a policy of Anti-Access/ Area Denial (A2/AD) with a minimal military device, supported by the existing infrastructure on the islands of Ascension and St. Helena and an exclusion zone that has no justification in the 21st century. This is a point of tension that limits and generates contradictions in the country’s defense policy and its cooperation with the West.

The third dynamic is Antarctica, where there are overlapping claims, but which due to the validity of the Antarctic Treaty must be addressed simultaneously from a multilateral approach and, eventually, as a trilateral issue, recognizing the excellent relationship between Great Britain and Chile, with the tensions that this implies, leaving the unilateral one in reserve in case the country’s interests are effectively affected.

The South Atlantic system is closely connected to Patagonia, which is subject to the country’s sovereignty and where the concerns lie in the potential passive disintegration of its territory, as a result of irregular or insurgent forces operating in it, and in the protection of the energy resources of the Vaca Muerta area against potential disruptions in operations by non-state armed groups or by a direct military action of a state actor. In the north of the country there are challenges of the same magnitude, but they fall within the border of hybrid threats where, for the time being, the Armed Forces play a secondary role, even though they already perform a commendable task to strengthen existing vulnerabilities.

If the South Atlantic system is considered in its oceanic dimension, the Navy and the Air Force represent the forward defense component needed to prevent penetration into Argentine territory, while the Army represents the rearguard of the defense, which would operate when the air and naval shield had been breached and failed.

Likewise, if the Malvinas and Antarctica are considered, the Argentine Navy and Air Force continue to be a priority since they are the enablers of the actions that the Army may conduct in that area, for example, with a conventional strategy of limited objectives. This situation would be reversed only if some kind of land invasion to the continental territory were considered, in which the Army and the Argentine Air Force would become a forward defense and the Navy a supporting actor to both components and, eventually, a barrier to prevent them from opening a front that would force t h e division of forces. For this, the DPDN should make explicit some territorial rivalry with neighboring countries, which is expressly left out since the great political capital that is recognized to the Latin American space is to represent a peace zone.

What has been described above allows us to think of some options for the A2/AD. One of these options involves a decisive articulation with the West, in which, even with the Malvinas dispute still open, Argentina’s interests are articulated with those of the U.S. and Great Britain, starting an action of reciprocity and mutual security guarantees ranging from common equipment, training, increased exchanges of officers and the termination of the existing British exclusion zone. This would freeze the existing negative dynamics and would allow thinking of Antarctica in terms of the same cooperative and non-competitive articulation. At the regional level, it would help to work on the joint and integrated monitoring of the activities of actors that depredate the resources in South Atlantic waters, including the restricted membership of the Western intelligence network, making Argentina’s policy converge with those of Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Paraguay and Colombia.

However, it is necessary to ensure that Argentina is covered against future unilateral action by the United Kingdom or Chile on Argentine Antarctic interests. Therefore, it is necessary to develop capabilities that allow not only to effectively block and increase the operational risk to external actors in a triangle formed between Antarctica, Malvinas and Tierra del Fuego Island, but also to protect a landing force that safeguards the country’s continental Antarctic interests, in the event of an event of tension on the white continent after 2040, either to support the defense of the interests of the three countries that have Antarctic claims or to support sovereignty negotiations and, eventually, to counteract the unilateral action of some actor against Argentine interests.

Another of these options involves placing the Argentine-British rivalry over the Falkland Islands at the center, accepting that it will inevitably be transferred to the context of the Antarctic. Doing so in a serious manner implies changing the alliance system towards China or Russia, allocating resources to effectively pressure the British contingent in Malvinas, projecting a military action that should well involve St. Helena Island since the defense and projection device includes dual facilities in that island, as well as in Ascension. However, it should be considered that the United Kingdom represents the third largest military expenditure on the planet with $71 billion and a limited global deployment. In addition, this would mean a break with the Western base equipment that today is part of Argentina’s defense capabilities, so that during the transition Argentina’s position would be worse than at the starting point and it would not be assured that such transition would take place. At the regional level, this option would have consequences with its neighbors since it would make interoperability more difficult and would make converge, by necessity, with countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela.

Likewise, enormous resources -of the order of 3 to 4 GDP points- would have to be allocated in a relatively short time because the reaction of the UK, in the first place, and of the US, in the second, would be immediate to the effects that such alteration of the status quo would effectively manage to threaten the interests of both countries. This situation, although attractive for a minority and noisy nucleus of the Argentine defense ecosystem, seems impracticable from the political point of view, since it distances Argentina from the equipment premise that has traditionally managed the political power towards the Armed Forces (good, nice, cheap and with financing plans) and does not recognize the wide dependence that Argentina has on the West in other planes, particularly the economic one.

This reality makes it necessary to consider a pragmatic defense scheme that fits the premises of selective engagement. The alternatives leave Argentina in a situation of political vulnerability, not by snubbing one or the other contender in the bipolar dynamic in which we would seem to enter, but by worsening the pre-existing conditions in the South Atlantic. This situation opens a dispute at the regional level, which would increase the generalized perception of a major crack in the so-called Monroe Doctrine, where the so-called wedge policies are executed, as already seen in Venezuela, in Nicaragua and, more recently, in Bolivia, to which Argentina could be added if it chooses to follow a policy that may be considered imprudent as its power position in the international system is diminished, with immediate consequences on its defense system and long term consequences for its position in the regional sphere.

Conclusions: Selective Engagement and the Future of the South Atlantic.

Argentina is between a rock and a hard place. Having to choose is a situation that, in a context of transition, becomes complex for any decision-maker, especially when in a position of vulnerability, being exposed to pressures to meet the demands of the great powers that are engaged in their own competitive dynamics.

At the domestic level, there has been no clear convergence among the various sectors that would make it possible to put together a coherent and long-term strategy on how to maneuver the transition. At best, the sectors that have an impact have agreed on a slogan that is empty of content: “to have a balanced relationship between the parties, prioritizing the country’s interests”. However, when such a slogan has to be filled with substance, there the agreements end and political frustrations emerge, leading – in a situation of political instability – to policies that are directly linked to the relationship with the great powers of the day not lasting beyond one administration. If one observes the existing positions in social networks between factions that usually have no impact on public policy, but do have an impact on public discussion, or if – for a moment – one were to consider the factious arguments distilled therein, one would identify that we are in the middle of a cipayos war,^[29] where factions accuse each other of seeing who is more servile to one power or the other. This waste of time and energy only serves to maintain a status quo that is negative for public defense and foreign policy.

Those policies that endure are directly related to pre-existing structural conditions, particularly with the US, which, with its own ups and downs, has consolidated policies in the field of defense and international security, giving a certain privilege to the bilateral dimension. The PRC is beginning to do the same, not in the field of defense and security, although it has tried -without success so far- to gain greater influence in this area, but in the field of infrastructure linked to development, financial issues, and more recently to dual issues such as the space station in Bajada del Agrio, Neuquén, which, despite being presented as a civilian facility, there is increasing evidence of its intertwining with the military complex of that country. Simultaneously, the PRC has attempted to move forward with the construction of a port in the city of Ushuaia that would have also attracted the attention of the U.S. Southern Command and -unlike the previous situation- have been more questioned by representatives and by part of an informed sector engaged in foreign and defense policy. The PRC appears on the horizon as a caring nation, thanks to the growing and diffuse myth known as Global South that creates a perception of common destiny and non-alignment, when in reality it involves unquestioning acceptance of Beijing’s leadership.

As has been evidenced, the South Atlantic provides an opportunity to exercise selective commitment based on a cooperative agenda, which implies working on the control of the fishing stock, the adequate use of maritime resources, the corresponding authorization of fishing licenses, the cooperative and non-exclusive control of the ocean and the development of mutual trust measures that allow working in a coordinated manner against those actors who wish to use the maritime environment to generate predatory actions or eventually as a platform to carry out espionage actions that damage the existing security environment.

Additionally, it allows thinking about clear unilateral defense options, establishing what the country’s strategic priorities are and what kind of action should be taken to respond to potential future challenges involving the oceanic passages, Antarctica and giving functionality to the existing territorial claim over the Malvinas Islands. In this sense, it is necessary to continue working with the West in order to improve trust, disambiguate policy, and prevent unilateral advances by the United Kingdom on specific interests of the country from being legitimized by a policy of involvement of the PRC in the regional environment, which -so far- has proven to be flawed, since its main component lies in the will of a nationalist leadership.

Regional stability depends on Argentina’s ability to avoid being trapped in an ideological game that could damage its permanent interests and jeopardize the future of its role in the ocean and in Antarctica. Political prudence and an intelligent articulation of its interests with an international context that is becoming increasingly complex for vulnerable countries will allow Argentina to come out ahead in any situation. The ability to manage risks will be key to its leadership, understanding that its current decisions will have -at the international level- a more immediate impact than what is usually considered. Choosing wisely with whom and what will be the crux of the matter, which is the function of Selective Engagement.

Endnotes:

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29. A native Indian soldier who, in the 18th and 19th centuries, served for Great Britain, Portugal and France. By extension, the term began to be used to refer to an individual who, for ideological reasons or in exchange for money, defends foreign or foreign interests; in other words, a kind of mercenary. ↑