R. Evan Ellis^[1]

Summary

The article discusses Chile’s Defense Minister, Maya Fernández Allende’s trip to China in September 2024, where she participated in the Xiangshan Defense Forum. During the visit, Fernández expressed her interest in revitalizing defense cooperation between Chile and China, including reactivating a previously established Joint Working Commission. This sparked controversy in Chile, with critics fearing that closer ties with China could harm Chile’s relationship with the U.S. and increase the risk of espionage. Despite the criticism, Fernández clarified that no new agreements were signed, but existing cooperation, such as the 2011 defense agreement, would be strengthened. Concerns are raised regarding democratic values, China’s influence, and the risks of expanded military and space collaboration between the two countries.

Keywords: Chile, China, Maya Fernández Allende, Military cooperation, People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Foreign policy.

Introduction

From September 9-14, 2024, Chilean Defense Minister Maya Fernandez Allende, granddaughter of Chile’s first socialist president Salvador Allende, traveled to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attend the 11th annual Xiangshan Defense Forum^[2] in Beijing. The meeting, the most significant event of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) global defense “diplomacy” during the year, was attended by over 500 representatives^[3] from more than 90 countries,^[4] including 30 Defense Ministers.^[5] While there, presumably following many positive encounters and generous PLA hospitality and a meeting with PLA Defense Minister Dong Jun,^[6] Minister Fernandez publicly proclaimed her interest in reviving closer Chile-PLA defense cooperation. Her statement, which included the intention to re-activate a previously established PRC-Chile Joint Working Commission.^[7]

Her expressed desire to reinvigorate the Chile-China defense relationship generated significant controversy in Chile,^[8] including criticism by former Defense Minister Jorge Burgos,^[9] as well as respected Chilean strategists such as Manfred Wilhelmy.^[10] Critics expressed concern that Minister Fernandez was effectively committing to significant changes in Chilean foreign policy that could undermine the country’s relationship with important partners such as the United States, as well as opening up Chile to espionage risks through expanded PLA access to Chilean military institutions and personnel. Members of the Defense Committee of the Chilean Senate called for the Minister to testify before the Committee^[11] to explain the strategic logic behind the significant change in Chile’s posture implied by her statement in China, and whether it represented a policy shift approved by or coordinated with President Boric and the Chilean Foreign Ministry.

In responding to such concerns, Defense Minister Fernandez emphasized that she had not signed any new formal commitments^[12] while in the PRC, but rather, had only committed to increasing cooperation already contemplated by the PRC-Chile Defense Cooperation Agreement that former Chilean Defense Minister Andrés Allamand^[13] signed with his Chinese counterparts in June 2011.^[14] That agreement, like adherence to China’s Belt and Road initiative and other ambiguous MoUs that governments in the region illustrates how the PRC uses a web of contracts and seemingly non-committal declarations to envelop its partners in relations which can be later exploited when opportunities with more willing, or needy, governments present themselves.

To date, Chile’s defense relationship with the PRC^[15] has resembled that of other Western democratic governments that have reasonably strong institutions, and that wish to benefit from interactions with defense establishments of a range of regimes in their country’s sphere of interest, without jeopardizing core relationships with countries aligned with their values, which meaningfully contribute to institutional capabilities.

The PRC and Chile each have military attaches^[16] in each other’s countries. Chile has sent officers to the PLA National Defense University since 1997,^[17] and the Chilean Army language school hosted two PLA Mandarin language instructors^[18] for several years beginning in 2005. Chinese ships have long operated out of Chile’s southern ports^[19] to resupply PRC government scientific installations in Antarctica. Following the previously noted 2011 signing of a Chile-PRC defense cooperation agreement, in 2013, Chile received and conducted combat drills with^[20] visiting PLA Navy missile frigates Lanzhou and Liuzhou.^[21] Those Chinese warships, accompanied by a fuel support ship, went on to transit the straits of Magellan. In December 2018, the Chinese hospital ship “Peace Arc” visited Chile^[22] as part of a larger trip to the region.

The PLA and Chilean military have also periodically interacted in Pacific Ocean Naval exercises such as RIMPAC, as well as in forums such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.^[23] Chinese defense companies are regularly present at important Chilean military shows such as EXPONAVAL^[24] and FIDAE.^[25]

In the Space domain, the Chinese government has operated an astronomical observatory on Calan Hill, near Santiago, while the PLA-affiliated China Satellite Launching and Tracking and Control (CLTC) organization operates two C-band radars^[26] relevant to military purposes in the Santiago Satellite Station^[27] facility in the north of the country.

The agenda of Defense Minister Fernandez’ trip to the PRC, which included arrival three days before the start of the forum^[28] to make time for visits to other PRC government facilities suggests the likely initial direction for Chile-PRC cooperation initiatives. Her visit to China’s National Defense University^[29] suggests a possible increase in Chilean security sector personnel attending courses there, and possibly reciprocal visits^[30] to Chilean military institutions, with the Minister mentioning such cooperation in Chile’s National Defense University ANEPE,^[31] in public comments. Similarly, her visit to China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC)^[32] suggests possible Chilean purchases of PRC defense electronics systems, while her visit to the Institute of Chemical Sciences^[33] of the Chinese Academy of Military Science of the PLA suggests interest in cooperation in military materials and other research. Her meeting with the Director of China’s National Space Agency^[34] suggests interest in expanding PRC-Chile space cooperation,^[35] possibly including on satellite development and launches, data sharing, and possibly a move away from termination of the previously mentioned CLTC contract to operate at the Santiago Satellite Station when its lease expires. Chile’s naval shipbuilding^[36] sector was also mentioned during the trip as an area of potential cooperation with the PRC.

Persons in Chile consulted knowledgeable of the Fernandez trip, consulted for this work, differed in their assessment of the intentions behind Minister Fernandez’ commitments to the PRC. Some attributed them to the Minister’s relative inexperience in defense matters and her efforts to bolster her position within the Chilean left after being seen as cooperating too closely with the U.S. Others noted that, despite her words, to date, Chile has relied on the systems and support of the U.S., not the PRC, as the backbone for its defense modernization. Nonetheless, the combination of her expressed intentions, and the existing agreement suggests that some expansion of cooperation with the PRC is likely.

Conclusion

If Chile proceeds forward with such expanded cooperation, it will need to move cautiously to ensure that the benefits achieved offset the risks, and are consistent with the values^[37] of civilian, democratic control and human rights prioritized by the Boric government. These include risks of espionage from PLA personnel given access to Chilean institutions, and the reciprocal risk of PRC influence over future Chilean leaders being courted for extended periods during educational visits and other postings in China. It also includes the question of values imparted to Chilean security personnel by PRC institutions whose own security forces have been active in repressing protesters in Hong Kong,^[38] Xinjiang^[39] and elsewhere, militarizing islands and challenging neighbors’ territory in the South and East China seas,^[40] supporting Russian aggression against Ukraine^[41] through arms sales,^[42] commodity purchases, and other means, as well as China’s history of aggression against its neighbors India (2020) and Vietnam (1979).^[43] Chile must also consider risks of increasing engagement with the PRC just as it is engaged in ever more significant confrontations with Chile’s closest allies the United States and the European Union in the South China Sea,^[44] including the possibility of a PRC invasion or blockade of Taiwan.^[45]

The US has a strong and longstanding relationship of confidence with Chile. The Boric government likely understands that sending of significant numbers of personnel to the PRC for courses and visits, granting access by PLA personnel to Chilean institutions, and the incorporation of Chinese equipment into Chilean security, space, and other government architectures would complicate the ability of the US to share information and work closely with its Chilean counterparts, however much it desires to do so.

The decisions that the principled, democratic Boric government in Chile will make in the coming months regarding its military relationship with the PRC will be important for how the country defines itself and its position vis-à-vis democratic and non-democratic regimes in the increasingly dangerous world order.

Endnotes:

1. The author is a research professor for Latin America at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this paper are strictly his own. ↑
2. EFE. “Arranca el Foro de Xiangshan de Pekín, el mayor evento anual de diplomacia militar de China”. Abc España, 13 de septiembre de 2024. https://www.abc.es/espana/arranca-foro-xiangshan-pekin-mayor-evento-anual-20240913060908-vi.html?ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.abc.es%2Fespana%2Farranca-foro-xiangshan-pekin-mayor-evento-anual-20240913060908-vi.html ↑
3. Li, Yuchen. “China kicks off top security forum amid global tensions”. Deutsche Welle, 12 de septiembre de 2024. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/china-kicks-off-top-security-forum-amid-global-tensions/ar-AA1qswKR?ocid=BingNewsVerp ↑
4. EFE. “Arranca el Foro de Xiangshan de Pekín, el mayor evento anual de diplomacia militar de China”. Abc España, 13 de septiembre de 2024. https://www.abc.es/espana/arranca-foro-xiangshan-pekin-mayor-evento-anual-20240913060908-vi.html?ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.abc.es%2Fespana%2Farranca-foro-xiangshan-pekin-mayor-evento-anual-20240913060908-vi.html ↑
5. Chenglong, Jiang. “Over 90 nations, organizations set for Beijing Xiangshan Forum”. China Daily, May 9, 2024. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202409/05/WS66d90474a3108f29c1fca389.html ↑
6. Williams, Lachlan. “Chile Forges Strategic Alliance with China to Boost Military Innovation”. The Rio Times, September 17, 2024. https://www.riotimesonline.com/chile-forges-strategic-alliance-with-china-to-boost-military-innovation/#:~:text=China%20extended%20an%20invitation%20for%20training%20advanced%20scientific,for%20strengthening%20defense%20relations%20between%20the%20two%20nations. ↑
7. Ibid. ↑
8. Zúñiga, Arelí. “Tras polémica por visita a Pekín: Ministra Fernández descartó haber firmado convenios de defensa con China”. CNN Chile, 16 de septiembre de 2024. https://www.cnnchile.com/pais/vista-pekin-fernandez-descarto-firmado-convenios-china_20240916/ ↑
9. Burgos, Jorge. “Columna de Jorge Burgos: Bien Presidente”. La Tercera, 21 de junio de 2024. https://www.latercera.com/opinion/noticia/columna-de-jorge-burgos-bien-presidente/7SZA3HRL7VAZZI3UIQ36GHDTZQ/ ↑
10. Riquelme, Javiera. “Ampliar cooperación militar con China: El profundo debate que surgió tras la afirmación de Fernández y los impactos que tendría”. Emol, 16 de Septiembre de 2024. https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2024/09/16/1142859/china-fernandez-cooperacion-militar-debate.html ↑
11. González, Alberto. “Ministra Fernández descarta haber firmado acuerdos nuevos con China tras polémica por visita a Pekín”. Bio Bio Chile,16 septiembre de 2024. https://www.biobiochile.cl/noticias/nacional/chile/2024/09/16/ministra-fernandez-descarta-haber-firmado-acuerdos-nuevos-con-china-tras-polemica-por-visita-a-pekin.shtml ↑
12. Ibid. ↑
13. Republic of Chile. “President Sebastián Piñera appoints Andrés Allamand Zavala as Minister of Foreign Affairs”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 28, 2020. https://www.minrel.gob.cl/minrel/news/president-sebastian-pinera-appoints-andres-allamand-zavala-as-minister ↑
14. ID. “Chile y China firman un acuerdo de cooperación en Seguridad y Defensa”. Info Defensa, 10 de junio de 2011. https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/3145136/chile-china-firman-acuerdo-cooperacion-seguridad-defensa ↑
15. Ellis, R. Evan. “China’s Advance in Chile”. Dialogo Americas, December 13, 2023. https://dialogo-americas.com/es/articles/el-avance-de-china-en-chile/ ↑
16. Cooperativa. “Efecto China: La ministra Maya Fernández y su visita oficial a Pekín”. Cooperativa, 16 de Septiembre de 2024. https://www.cooperativa.cl/noticias/corporativo/efecto-china/efecto-china-la-ministra-maya-fernandez-y-su-visita-oficial-a-pekin/2024-09-16/222400.html?=efectochina?=efectochina ↑
17. Hughes, Matthew A. “Lessons in the Dragon’s Lair: The People’s Liberation Army’s Professional Military Education Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean”. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, October 5, 2023. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3540678/ ↑
18. Ellis, R. Evan. “China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position”. Strategic Studies Institute, August 2011. https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/04/2003215913/-1/-1/0/2150.PDF ↑
19. Zhou, Laura. “How Chinese access to Chilean port could give Antarctic exploration activities a boost”. South China Morning Post, 19 de septiembre de 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3027957/chinese-access-chilean-port-may-give-antarctic-exploration ↑
20. Ellis, R. Evan. “China’s Advance in Chile”. Dialogo Americas, December 13, 2023. https://dialogo-americas.com/es/articles/el-avance-de-china-en-chile/ ↑
21. “Unidades de la Armada del Ejército Popular de Liberación China recalaron a Valparaíso”. Armada de Chile, 7 de octubre de 2013. https://www.armada.cl/noticias-navales/unidades-de-la-armada-del-ejercito-popular-de-liberacion-china-recalaron ↑
22. Xinhua. “ESPECIAL: Buque hospital chino arriba a Chile por primera vez”. China-Celac Forum, March 12, 2018. http://www.chinacelacforum.org/esp/zgtlmjlbgjgx_2/201812/t20181203_6573655.htm ↑
23. Xinhua. “China hosts 19th Western Pacific Naval Symposium”. The State Council Information Office the People’s Republic of China, April 22, 2024. http://english.scio.gov.cn/chinavoices/2024-04/22/content_117141153.htm ↑
24. EN. “ExpoNaval”. website oficial, 2024. https://www.exponaval.cl/en/ ↑
25. Fidae. “Feria Internacional del Aire y del Espacio”. Website official, 2024. https://www.fidae.cl/nosotros/ ↑
26. Jones, Andrew. “Report highlights U.S. concerns over China’s space infrastructure in South America”. Space News, October 6, 2022. https://spacenews.com/report-highlights-u-s-concerns-over-chinas-space-infrastructure-in-south-america/ ↑
27. Ellis, R. Evan. “China-Latin America Space Cooperation: An Overview”. The Diplomat, February 16, 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/china-latin-america-space-cooperation-an-overview/ ↑
28. EFE. “Arranca el Foro de Xiangshan de Pekín, el mayor evento anual de diplomacia militar de China”. Abc España, 13 de septiembre de 2024. https://www.abc.es/espana/arranca-foro-xiangshan-pekin-mayor-evento-anual-20240913060908-vi.html?ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.abc.es%2Fespana%2Farranca-foro-xiangshan-pekin-mayor-evento-anual-20240913060908-vi.html ↑
29. Cantillana, Rodrigo. “Ministra Maya Fernández se reúne con su par de Defensa de China en visita clave para la cooperación militar”. Radio Agricultura, 14 de septiembre de2024. https://www.radioagricultura.cl/noticias/nacional/maya-fernandez-se-reune-con-su-par-chino-por-cooperacion-milita_20240914/ ↑
30. Cooperativa. “Efecto China: La ministra Maya Fernández y su visita oficial a Pekín”. Cooperativa, 16 de Septiembre de 2024. https://www.cooperativa.cl/noticias/corporativo/efecto-china/efecto-china-la-ministra-maya-fernandez-y-su-visita-oficial-a-pekin/2024-09-16/222400.html?=efectochina?=efectochina ↑
31. Ibid. ↑
32. Cantillana, Rodrigo. “Ministra Maya Fernández se reúne con su par de Defensa de China en visita clave para la cooperación militar”. Radio Agricultura, 14 de septiembre de2024. https://www.radioagricultura.cl/noticias/nacional/maya-fernandez-se-reune-con-su-par-chino-por-cooperacion-milita_20240914/ ↑
33. ERD. “Fortaleciendo Lazos Militares: La Visita Clave de la Ministra de Defensa de Chile a China”. El Reporte Diario, septiembre 2024. https://reportediario.cl/2024/09/14/fortaleciendo-lazos-militares-la-visita-clave-de-la-ministra-de-defensa-de-chile-a-china/ ↑
34. Zamarin, Felipe. “En visita a Beijing: ministra de Defensa afirma que Chile busca ampliar cooperación militar con China”. Bio Bio Chile, 14 septiembre de 2024. https://www.biobiochile.cl/noticias/nacional/chile/2024/09/14/en-visita-a-beijing-ministra-de-defensa-afirma-que-chile-busca-ampliar-cooperacion-militar-con-china.shtml ↑
35. CHN. “Ministra Fernández resalta lazos diplomáticos y busca fortalecer cooperación en defensa con China”. Chile Noticias, septiembre 2024. https://www.chilenoticias.cl/ministra-fernandez-resalta-lazos-diplomaticos-y-busca-fortalecer-cooperacion-en-defensa-con-china/ ↑
36. García, Nicolás. “Chile defiende ampliar la cooperación militar con China calificándola como ‘una política de continuidad´”. Info Defensa, 17 de septiembre de 2024. https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/4999873/chile-defiende-ampliar-cooperacion-militar-china-calificandola-como-politica-continuidad ↑
37. Riquelme, Javiera. “Ampliar cooperación militar con China: El profundo debate que surgió tras la afirmación de Fernández y los impactos que tendría”. Emol, 16 de Septiembre de 2024. https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2024/09/16/1142859/china-fernandez-cooperacion-militar-debate.html ↑
38. Maizland, Lindsay and Fong, Clara. “Hong Kong’s Freedoms: What China Promised and How It’s Cracking Down”. Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20Beijing%20imposed%20a%20sweeping%20national%20security,and%20limited%20freedoms%20of%20the%20press%20and%20speech. ↑
39. Maizland, Lindsay. “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang”. Council on Foreign Relations, September 22, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights ↑
40. CSIS. “Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative”. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024. https://amti.csis.org/chinese-power-projection/#:~:text=Since%202014%2C%20China%20has%20substantially%20expanded%20its%20ability,outposts%20in%20the%20disputed%20Spratly%20and%20Paracel%20Islands ↑
41. Riquelme, Javiera. “Ampliar cooperación militar con China: El profundo debate que surgió tras la afirmación de Fernández y los impactos que tendría”. Emol, 16 de Septiembre de 2024. https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2024/09/16/1142859/china-fernandez-cooperacion-militar-debate.html ↑
42. Abraham, Hannah. “The US accused China of helping Russia’s military in a deal that gets it secret submarine and missile tech”. Msn, September 11, 2024. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/the-us-accused-china-of-helping-russias-military-in-a-deal-that-gets-it-secret-submarine-and-missile-tech/ar-AA1qnPky?ocid=BingNewsSerp ↑
43. Riquelme, Javiera. “Ampliar cooperación militar con China: El profundo debate que surgió tras la afirmación de Fernández y los impactos que tendría”. Emol, 16 de Septiembre de 2024. https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2024/09/16/1142859/china-fernandez-cooperacion-militar-debate.html ↑
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