By:

Research Analyst – Peruvian Army

21st Century Geopolitics and Peru in the New World Order

Abstract

This article examines the contemporary meaning of geopolitics in the context of world reordering and Peru’s position in the new power scenarios. Through an interpretative and strategic qualitative methodology, it analyzes specialized sources and comparative regional doctrines, with the aim of understanding the factors that influence the articulation of national power. The purpose is to contribute to the formulation of a national strategy that will allow Peru to face the challenges of the international environment with autonomy and long-term vision. It highlights the urgency of a modern geopolitical doctrine that integrates security, defense, development, education, productive infrastructure and strategic leadership. It also addresses transnational threats, regional dynamics in Latin America and the influence of global powers on the international system. The research proposes to reposition Peru as a geostrategic node in South America, combining logistical development, institutional strengthening, professionalization of the Armed Forces and an educational policy aligned with national interests. This analysis offers guidelines to build a prospective national geopolitical vision, multisectoral and coherent with the permanent interests of the State in a complex and competitive global environment.

Keywords: Geopolitics, national security and defense, multisectoral strategy, strategic sovereignty, new world order.

Introduction

Geopolitics has ceased to be a discipline reserved exclusively for the great powers and has become a fundamental tool for any State that aspires to preserve its sovereignty, promote its development and consolidate internal stability in an increasingly volatile international environment. The 21st century is shaping a global scenario in permanent transformation, characterized by strategic disputes, competition for critical resources, technological advances and the struggle for control of global logistical routes.[1] In this environment of competition between large blocs and challenges to multilateralism, medium-sized and peripheral states must rethink their geopolitical strategy to avoid being subject to contradictory external pressures.[2] In this context of rivalry between blocs and challenges to multilateralism, medium-sized and peripheral states must rethink their geopolitical strategy to avoid being subject to contradictory external pressures.

Peru, despite its strategic location in the South Pacific and abundance of natural resources, lacks a geopolitical doctrine of its own that would allow it to anticipate, influence and protect its national interests. This lack restricts its regional protagonism and exposes the country to growing risks of dependence, fragmentation and structural instability. Traditionally, geopolitical studies adopted a deterministic perspective, focusing on physical space, borders and power relations between states, as proposed by Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan.[3] Although these contributions laid the foundations of the discipline, applying their categories without a critical analysis is insufficient in the face of current dynamics. Hybrid warfare, digital interdependence, migratory flows, Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and the dispute for the dominance of cyberspace and public opinion considerably broaden the geopolitical challenges.[4]

In the Peruvian case, maintaining a rigid geographic or strictly military vision is not only a theoretical limitation, but also an obstacle to the design of strategic and multisectoral public policies. Failure to assume the category of pivot state or intermediate power with a vocation for regional articulation could condemn the country to geopolitical irrelevance in a polarized international system.

Against this backdrop, this analysis proposes an updated and critical reading of contemporary geopolitics, understanding it as a tool for national power planning. Based on an argued review, with a pragmatic approach and emphasis on the Andean-Pacific regional context, an integral vision of Peru’s current challenges is articulated, considering dimensions such as security, defense, education, economy, infrastructure and political-military leadership. Beyond the diagnosis, the purpose is to provide practical guidelines for the construction of a solid, realistic and transforming national geopolitical vision, capable of protecting the permanent interests of the State and positioning the country strategically in the international scenario. In this sense, it is essential to incorporate the lessons learned from medium-sized countries in transition that, in the face of cross pressures between great powers, have developed their own doctrinal frameworks to preserve their autonomy and strategic relevance.

Classical Geopolitics and Strategic Thinking in the 21st Century: Conceptual Changes and Challenges for Peru

Geopolitical thought originated in the 19th century, when authors such as Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellén established a direct relationship between territorial space and the vitality of the state. Ratzel formulated the concept of “living space” (Lebensraum), arguing that states, conceived as living organisms, needed to expand territorially to ensure their development and survival.[5] Kjellén coined the term “geopolitics,” defining it as an analytical tool for understanding state power in terms of geography.[6] These ideas gave rise to a deterministic and organic geopolitics that would influence later theories, such as Halford Mackinder’s Heartland, who postulated that control of the center of Eurasia conferred global dominance,[7] and Alfred Thayer Mahan’s naval doctrine, which emphasized maritime supremacy as the key to world hegemony.[8]

While these perspectives were essential at the time, they reflected a static view of power, focused exclusively on territorial control and conventional military capabilities. Their logic responded to a context of imperial confrontation, territorial wars and colonial expansion, far removed from the fluid and multidimensional dynamics that characterize contemporary international relations.

However, the 21st century has profoundly modified the conditions that shape power relations between states. Today, strategic dominance transcends land and sea, encompassing cyberspace, outer space and the cognitive realm.[9] The notion of power is not limited to the possession of tangible resources, but is based on the ability to control global circuits of data, information, finance, technology and culture.

Contemporary geopolitics recognizes that global influence is manifested through the control of financial, technological, informational and symbolic flows; and understands that conflicts are no longer fought solely with armies, but adopt new modalities through algorithms, narratives, digital platforms and disinformation campaigns. The concepts of soft power and smart power illustrate how power is now built through cultural attraction, diplomacy, innovation and symbolic positioning.[10] In this scenario, the traditional tools of coercive power continue to be necessary, but are insufficient without a cross-cutting strategy that articulates the tangible with the intangible. Consequently, geopolitics must be conceived as a dynamic strategy aimed at consolidating national power and not simply as an analysis of maps or borders.

Questioning the classical bases does not imply discarding them, but rather adapting them to the new conditions of the global environment. As Zbigniew Brzezinski warns, today’s geopolitical chessboard demands strategic thinking that combines a global vision with concrete national objectives.[11] This implies that States -particularly those such as Peru, which have lacked a consolidated geopolitical doctrine- must abandon the idea of geopolitics as a mere academic or military discourse, and assume it as a key tool for designing coherent, multisectoral and long-term public policies.

The incorporation of geopolitics into national planning cannot be limited to declarative documents or abstract visions; it must be translated into institutional decisions, strategic investments and intersectoral articulation. Consequently, national strategic thinking must be nourished not only by the classical geopolitical tradition, but those responsible for its formulation must integrate contemporary approaches that incorporate anticipatory intelligence, scenario planning, analysis of structural vulnerabilities and the construction of power from multiple dimensions: territorial, economic, technological, institutional and cultural. In this way, the geopolitics of the 21st century is not inherited; it is deliberately constructed by the State with a national vision and intergenerational commitment.

Considering the above, Table 1 compares the key characteristics of classical geopolitics and contemporary strategic geopolitics, highlighting the main conceptual changes and their relevance for Peru.

Table 1. Comparison between classical geopolitics and contemporary strategic geopolitics

NO. Comparative dimension Classical geopolitics (19th-20th centuries) Contemporary strategic geopolitics (21st century)
1 Conception of power Territorial determinism, power based on physical resources and expansion Dynamic power based on symbolic, technological, financial and cultural influence.
2 Spheres of influence Land, sea and control of physical borders Cyberspace, outer space, digital networks and cognitive dominance
3 Instruments of domination Armies, navies, territorial occupation Narratives, algorithms, financial and technological flows
4 Central actors Imperialist states and military powers States, corporations, technological platforms and transnational networks
5 Dominant strategy Geographic control and territorial expansion Multi-sectoral articulation, scenario planning and national power-building
6 Implications for Peru Lack of protagonism, passive role in the periphery of the international system. Need to build its own geopolitical doctrine with a long-term vision and multisectoral approach.

The New World Order: Competing Powers and Confrontational Scenarios

The international order that was consolidated after the Second World War reflected the political, economic and military leadership of the United States. Multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) promoted a liberal international system that functioned as a hegemonic model of global governance; however, the emergence of new regional powers and the loss of legitimacy of this model have weakened its influence.[12]

Over the last two decades, the international system has shifted from a unipolar structure, led by the United States, to a multipolar configuration characterized by greater volatility and strategic competition. In this new scenario, powers such as China and Russia have consolidated their global projection capacity, while countries such as India and Turkey, considered regional powers with growing influence, dispute strategic spaces previously monopolized by Western powers.[13] Moreover, actors such as Iran have strengthened their geopolitical role in key regions, despite their economic limitations, challenging the traditional balances of global power.[14]

This reordering process affects not only the economic and military spheres, but also international norms and symbols. The universalist narrative of Western values is being questioned, favoring a trend towards the de-Westernization of the international system. In this sense, it is essential to identify the strategies deployed by the main geopolitical actors and to analyze their implications for Peru.

Table 2 presents the competing powers, the scenarios of global confrontation and the opportunities and risks faced by the Peruvian State in this changing environment.

Table 2. Competing powers and scenarios of global confrontation

NO. Actor / Geopolitical bloc Current geopolitical strategy Opportunity / Risk for Peru
1 The United States Leadership in multilateral organizations, maintains technological and military supremacy, and exercises a policy of global containment. Maintain cooperative relations without falling into strategic dependence.
2 China Reconfigures global interdependencies through the Belt and Road, expands its technological and financial influence Avoid structural dependence; diversify alliances in technological and financial sectors.
3 Russia Projection of asymmetric power in Ukraine, strategic use of energy resources, dissemination of disinformation and promotion of non-Western alliances Indirect risks due to international alignments and digital influence.
4 European Union Energy diversification, facing internal tensions and subordination to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Potential for economic cooperation with an ally of limited autonomy
5 BRICS Promotes an alternative South-South order, creates its own banks and challenges the hegemony of the dollar in bilateral processes. Potential for economic cooperation without rigid ideological alignments
6 Peru Lack of a consolidated geopolitical doctrine, weak application of strategic plans and marked political instability. Urgent need to build a coherent, realistic and stable geopolitical doctrine.

In this new global chessboard, China emerged as the main counterweight to U.S. power. Beijing is promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), penetrating economically into Africa and Latin America, and strengthening its technological and financial power. This strategic expansion seeks to reconfigure the networks of global interdependence around its geostrategic interests,[15] which represents a direct challenge to traditional US hegemony.

For its part, Russia, despite its structural limitations, projects asymmetric power through its intervention in Ukraine, employs energy as a geopolitical tool, spreads digital disinformation campaigns and fosters non-Western strategic alliances.[16] These actions aggravate the complexity of the global environment and add new dimensions to international conflicts. Meanwhile, the US maintains its technological and military supremacy, as well as control in multilateral organizations, although it faces internal and external challenges that erode its leadership.[17]

In this regard, the EU has rapidly diversified its energy supply sources since 2022, significantly reducing its dependence on Russian gas.[18] However, Member States face internal tensions and the EU maintains limited strategic autonomy due to its alignment with NATO, which conditions its capacity for independent projection. This situation reflects the complexities and contradictions that the European bloc is going through in its attempt to consolidate a more autonomous geopolitical role.

In parallel, the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has positioned itself as a platform for political, economic and financial coordination that challenges the Western-led order. The BRICS have created an alternative payment system to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial

Telecommunication (SWIFT), established their own banks such as the New Development Bank (NBD) and promote a South-South cooperation agenda. Although the bloc seeks to de-centralize the dollar and offer developing countries an alternative to the liberal model,[19] China is gradually promoting the use of the yuan in bilateral agreements, but to date there is no structured alternative monetary system on a global scale.

This complex international landscape generates multiple forms of hybrid confrontation, in which traditional conflicts coexist with cyber disputes, economic sanctions, media manipulation and technological control.[20] As a result, contemporary geopolitics has transcended the confrontation between two rigid blocs and presents a fragmented system characterized by shifting alliances, multiple regional tensions and accumulated systemic risks.[21] For this reason, States, including Peru, must understand that staying on the sidelines implies making decisions regarding their participation and position on the global chessboard.

In the Peruvian case, foreign policy has lacked an explicit, coherent and sustained strategic doctrine. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) sets out guidelines for diversified international insertion in its Institutional Strategic Plan (PEI) 2025- 2030,[22] its implementation has been limited due to internal political instability, the frequent rotation of authorities and the absence of a cross-cutting geostrategic vision. These conditions have hindered the consolidation of a State diplomacy oriented to the defense of permanent national interests and the positioning of Peru as an articulating actor in South America. This doctrinal vacancy in the conduct of foreign policy evidences the urgency of building a national geopolitical vision that transcends political conjunctures and is aligned with strategic objectives of development, security, autonomy and national sovereignty.

Latin America in the Global Geopolitical Fragmentation

Latin America is going through a deep geopolitical fragmentation, as a result of the absence of a shared vision of development and the resurgence of ideologized political agendas that hinder regional integration. Historically considered the “backyard” of the U.S., the region has tried at different stages to consolidate its strategic autonomy, albeit with mixed results. Initiatives such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) failed to consolidate a robust institutional architecture, while the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Pacific Alliance (PA) show internal fractures, ideological contradictions and lack of political continuity that limit their effectiveness.[23]

This scenario favors the simultaneous penetration of extra-regional actors, such as China and Russia, which generates greater geopolitical competition; it also increases dependence on external interests. Without a common roadmap or the will for strategic convergence, Latin America oscillates between a fragmented multipolarity and a structural isolation that reduces its capacity for influence.

To illustrate these dynamics, Table 3 presents the main dimensions of analysis, the current situation and the geopolitical implications facing the region in this fragmented context.

Table 3. Latin America in global geopolitical fragmentation

NO. Dimension of analysis Current situation Geopolitical implications
1 Regional integration Fragmented organizations (UNASUR, CELAC, MERCOSUR, Pacific Alliance); without a common vision. Lack of solid architecture prevents the defense of common interests.
2 Extra-regional actors Simultaneous presence of China and Russia in strategic sectors. Increasing dependence on external agendas without own control.
3 Critical governance cases Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia with structural and institutional crises Internal delegitimization that facilitates foreign intervention or influence.
4 External influence (U.S. / China) United States toughens measures; China seeks ports and telecommunications; Panama shows tactical resistance. Geostrategic tension with no clear regional positioning
5 Capacity for strategic articulation Low capacity for international advocacy; no supra-regional roadmap Structural fragmentation; Latin America as a passive zone of global dispute.

The cases of Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia illustrate how ill-advised political decisions can lead to deep structural crises. Cuba maintains a rigid economic system, lacks political pluralism and faces a collapsed infrastructure, a situation that has led analysts to classify it as a failed state, characterized by high rates of emigration and chronic external dependence.[24] Venezuela, despite its vast energy resources, faces an unprecedented economic and social collapse, marked by hyperinflation, food insecurity and a massive migration that exceeds 7.7 million people, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). [25] Bolivia, after a period of growth driven by commodity prices, is currently experiencing inflation, currency devaluation, loss of international reserves and heightened political polarization.[26] In all these cases, poorly executed statist policies, institutional deterioration and the co-optation of state apparatuses have weakened internal sovereignty and made them vulnerable to external actors.

Similarly, phenomena such as the hardening of U.S. foreign policy under the Donald Trump administration -especially in the areas of migration and trade- have had a direct negative impact on the region’s most vulnerable economies.[27] Protectionist tariff measures, the implementation of physical and legal barriers to migration, as well as cuts in cooperation programs, have deepened the structural imbalances of several countries. Added to this is China’s renewed interest in securing its strategic influence in ports, telecommunications, energy and logistics infrastructure. However, the case of the Panama Canal is a significant exception: following high-level diplomatic pressure, Panama rejected China’s port proposals and reaffirmed its alignment with the U.S., prioritizing its strategic interests and consolidating preferential transit for U.S. ships.[28] This episode shows that some states can still exercise margins of tactical autonomy, although, in general, the region lacks a common voice vis-à-vis the interests of the global powers. In the light of this panorama, Latin America not only loses relevance in the international system, but also becomes a space of passive competition, with no effective capacity for articulation as a strategic bloc. Internal fragmentation, political short-termism and the absence of a supra-regional vision have weakened its international projection and eroded its ability to act as a collective actor with its own voice.

Peru and its Transition from Periphery to Geostrategic Opportunity

Peru has historically been considered a peripheral country in the international system, with little capacity for geopolitical projection and limited weight in global decision-making processes. This situation can be explained, in part, by a domestic political tradition marked by institutional disarticulation, governmental short- termism and lack of continuity in State policies.[29] In addition, the absence of a strategic culture has hindered the development of a national geopolitical doctrine capable of guiding the multisectoral actions of the State in terms of permanent interests. In contrast, this perception of marginality is opposed to a geographic and economic reality that offers substantial advantages for the country’s regional and global repositioning. Peru has one of the longest coastlines in the South American Pacific, critical mineral resources for the global energy transition -such as copper-, fresh water reserves, strategic biodiversity and a natural proximity to Asian markets.[30]

According to data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), Peru was the 49th economy (out of 195) in terms of GDP (current US$), the 51st country (out of 226) in total exports, and the 97th economy (out of 196) in terms of GDP per capita (current US$),[31] reflecting both its potential and its structural limitations. In geoeconomic terms, the country remains one of the world’s leading producers of copper, zinc, gold, silver and tin. It has also begun exploring lithium deposits in regions such as Puno, Moquegua and Cusco, forming what some analysts have called “the lithium belt”,[32] which could increase its strategic value in the coming years, particularly in the context of the global energy transition.

However, the economic structure remains highly dependent on the export of raw materials without further industrial processing, which restricts its insertion in global value chains. As a result, Peru faces a historical dilemma: to persist as a primary exporter vulnerable to the ups and downs of the international market or to implement a productive transformation strategy that will enable it to become a relevant logistical, technological and energy player in the hemisphere.

Peru’s privileged geographical location makes it a potential hub between South America and the Asia-Pacific region. The Peruvian coast offers the possibility of projecting itself as a bioceanic platform if it manages to efficiently integrate the logistic corridors that connect Brazil and the heart of South America with the Pacific, thus favoring the transit of goods and investments.[33] Based on the above, the country must strengthen its port, energy and digital infrastructure, as well as its institutional framework, in order to attract quality foreign investment that contributes to sustainable development. It should be added that consolidating itself as a strategic hub does not imply assuming the role of a power; on the contrary, it requires exercising a tangible influence as a logistic, articulating State with full decision-making autonomy in the regional geopolitical reordering.

Peru faces a historic opportunity to build its own geopolitical profile, with a voice and the capacity to maneuver in international forums. This new approach requires strategic vision, multi-sectoral planning, political stability and a governing elite capable of acting under a logic of national interest with a long-term perspective. Becoming a geostrategic actor does not depend solely on geography or resources, but on the intention and political will to use both to build sovereignty and project power in an intelligent and sustained manner.

To better understand the country’s challenges and potential, Table 4 presents a strategic diagnosis that identifies the current conditions, the keys to geostrategic transformation and the opportunities for a solid national strategy.

Table 4. Strategic diagnosis of Peru

NO. Dimension Current condition Key to geostrategic transformation Opportunities for a national strategy
1 Geopolitical insertion Peripheral role without a clear national doctrine Position itself as an articulating node between South America and Asia- Pacific. Consolidate logistical leadership in the South Pacific and increase regional influence.
2 Economic model Extractive dependence and low value added Promote sovereign industrialization with its own value chains. Diversify exports with technological autonomy and territorial inclusion.
3 Institutional capacity Fragmentation, improvisation, and weak political leadership. Modernization of the State with strategic vision and multisectoral planning Align institutions to PEDN 2050
4 External insertion High vulnerability to global actors Strategic opening with technological autonomy Reconfigure economic alliances
NO. Dimension Current condition Key to geostrategic transformation Opportunities for a national strategy
and sovereign negotiation. based on permanent national interests.
5 Education and leadership Structural gaps and ideological capture in key sectors National educational reform, formation of elites with a vision of the State Making education a pillar of national power and internal cohesion

Commercial and Technological Insertion as a National Strategy

In a world where comparative advantages no longer guarantee development, a country’s commercial insertion must be accompanied by a technological and industrial strategy that allows it to add value to its resources, diversify its economy and reduce dependence on the export of raw materials. Peru has consolidated its role as a global producer of minerals and strategic resources, but it continues to show structural lags in terms of industrialization, technological innovation and effective integration into global value chains.[34]

Despite being an active member of mechanisms such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Pacific Alliance or treaties such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the country has not yet managed to articulate a coherent trade policy at the service of a national project for productive transformation. [35] In practice, Peruvian foreign trade has been functional to a low value-added extractive economy with

little capacity to generate formal employment and equitable territorial development. This reveals a trade opening that was not strategically directed.

To illustrate the current limits and the proposals for moving towards strategic autonomy, Table 5 presents a diagnosis of Peru’s international economic insertion.

Table 5. International economic insertion: current limits and proposal for strategic autonomy

NO. Economic aspect Current model Implications for autonomy Proposed strategic reorientation
1 Foreign trade Primary exports with low value added, low diversification. Dependence on global prices, vulnerability to logistical disruptions. Promote industrial value chains, diversify the export matrix and link exports to national technological content.
2 Logistics infrastructure Ports and corridors disconnected from geostrategic planning Territorial disarticulation, loss of geographic advantage Planned bioceanic integration, logistic nodes such as Chancay and Corío, and multimodal networks with a national sense.
3 Foreign direct investment High presence of foreign capital with weak strategic regulation Capture of strategic sectors, no technology transfer. Reformulate contracts, demand local content, promote technological alliances with a sovereign vision and industrial autonomy.
4 Regional insertion Limited presence and no capacity to influence Loss of South American leadership and commercial subordination. Reformulate contracts, demand local content, promote technological alliances with a sovereign vision and industrial autonomy.

Considering this scenario, port infrastructure represents one of the main geopolitical levers to reposition Peru as a South American logistics platform. The entry into operation of the port of Chancay – conceived as a multipurpose node for connection with Asia – represents a unique opportunity to transform the country into a bioceanic integration hub.[36] This megaproject, together with the future port of Corío and the logistics corridors to Brazil, should be seen not only as infrastructure works, but also as the starting point of a territorial development and international insertion policy.

Peru could become the main channel for Brazilian trade to Asia-Pacific, reinforcing its position as a connection point between South America and the Asian economies.[37] To take advantage of this opportunity, it is essential for the country to strengthen strategic planning, foreign investment regulation and technological development, ensuring that trade openness translates into sustainable growth, productive diversification and greater economic autonomy.

Strategic Resources as a Basis for Geoeconomic Autonomy

Peru has strategic resources that constitute a fundamental basis for building a solid and sustainable geoeconomic autonomy. However, this potential will only be consolidated if it is accompanied by complementary policies, such as the creation of special economic zones (free trade zones), industrial parks, intelligent tax incentives and, above all, a national strategy for technological development.

Table 6 presents the country’s main strategic resources, their current geostrategic relevance, the risks associated with the current model and the proposed strategic lines aimed at strengthening national autonomy.

Table 6. Strategic resources as a basis for geo-economic autonomy

NO. Resource Current geostrategic importance Risk in the current model Strategic line for national autonomy
1 Minerals Key inputs for energy transition and global technology. Exploitation without national industry or strategic control Industrial clusters with local content and technological sovereignty
2 Water and biodiversity Critical resources in the face of climate and food crisis Environmental crimes and loss of state control Protected areas with institutional control and sovereign management
3 Geographical location Natural axis between South America and the Asia-Pacific region Territorial disconnection and fragmented infrastructure National logistic system with sovereign bioceanic integration
4 Port of Chancay Natural axis between South America and Asia-Pacific External operational and technological dependence Industrial and logistic axis with national regulation and participation.

This effort implies overcoming the traditional discourse of “trade openness” and moving towards a logic of “strategic openness”, where foreign investment is conditioned to the generation of domestic value. In this sense, the Peruvian State must demand that large projects -such as those promoted by China or by European and North American multinationals- include real commitments to domestic industrialization. This means setting up processing industries, fostering local productive clusters, promoting technological innovation and ensuring effective knowledge transfer mechanisms.[38]

Sustainable development will not come with more treaties or inertial trade liberalization, but with a national vision that orients this opening towards structural objectives: quality employment, productive diversification, territorial integration and technological autonomy. Betting on trade reinsertion without strategy or industrialization is to perpetuate the extractive model; betting on management and technological innovation will lead to a productive transformation with a geopolitical vision, ensuring the sovereignty, progress and welfare of the nation in the new world order.

China in Peru: Investment Yes, But with Strategic Conditions

China has become Peru’s main trading partner, surpassing even the U.S. in terms of bilateral trade volume. This relationship has been key to sustaining economic growth in recent years, especially through mining exports.[39] Chinese companies control important assets in sectors such as mining, energy, infrastructure and telecommunications, and have shown increasing interest in expanding their presence in the country with mega-projects such as the port of Chancay.[40] However, this intensification of ties has not been accompanied by a clear national policy that channels such investment towards structural development and technological autonomy. In this context, Peru has received capital, but not

necessarily the industrial support or technological leverage needed to promote a true productive transformation or institutional strengthening.

It is clear that the country needs Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to boost key sectors and close structural gaps. However, it is also essential to recognize that all investment has geopolitical implications. A policy of trade openness and capital attraction cannot be limited to creating conditions of “ease” for the investor, but must be based on a sovereign national project that prioritizes domestic development, the generation of skilled employment and technology transfer.[41] In this sense, China should not be seen either as a threat or as a lifeline, but as one more player on the global board of alliances that Peru should know how to manage with strategic autonomy and national vision. In this approach, what is desirable is a proactive diversification of economic and technological ties with Asia, Europe, the U.S. and other emerging blocs, avoiding any form of structural dependence or geopolitical subordination.

The Peruvian State has the responsibility to generate a legal and institutional framework for a sovereign strategic opening, with clear and stable rules, but also with conditions that ensure tangible and lasting benefits for the country. This implies, for example, establishing local content clauses, promoting public-private alliances for technical training, guaranteeing national participation in logistics projects and demanding concrete commitments to industrial development.[42] National development cannot depend on the goodwill of foreign capital; it must be driven from within, with multi-sectoral planning, geopolitical vision and transformational political leadership. Foreign investment, including Chinese, is welcome as long as it respects Peru’s sovereign interests and contributes to the construction of a more complex, diversified and autonomously integrated economy.

Likewise, strategic institutions such as Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA), Empresa de Servicios de Materiales de la Marina (SEMAN) and Fábrica de Materiales de la Marina (FAME) should assume a more leading role in the dissemination of technological and industrial capabilities to the rest of the state apparatus, the academic and productive sectors.[43] To prevent their development from remaining as technocratic enclaves disconnected from the national economy, a deliberate policy of articulation with public universities, research centers, technical programs and regional industrial poles is required. This ecosystem would make it possible to build national technological sovereignty, generate qualified employment, strengthen the industrial fabric and sustain a productive strategy with a geopolitical sense.

National Security, Strategic Defense and TOC

No national development project is viable in an environment of structural insecurity. Security, understood as an enabling condition for political stability, investment and human development, should be considered a strategic function of the State and not a dispensable expense. In recent decades, Peru has faced increasingly complex threats, such as TOC, Illicit Drug Trafficking (ITD), illegal mining, smuggling, residual terrorism and induced social conflicts, often linked to external networks or ideological interests. [44] These threats not only affect isolated areas, but also erode the legitimacy of the State, weaken its territorial presence

and distort its economy. Without a firm, articulated and sustained response, the country runs the risk of fragmenting into spaces under criminal domination or outside sovereign control.

In order to analyze the main threats Peru faces in terms of national security and strategic defense, Table 7 summarizes the current risks, their impact on the State, the limitations of the current approach and the strategic requirements necessary to strengthen national sovereignty and promote the country’s sustainable development.

Table 7. Security, Defense and National Sovereignty

NO. Threat / Risk Impact on the State Current limitation of the approach Strategic requirement for sovereignty and development
1 Transnational organized crime Fragmentation of territory, institutional capture and structural violence Reactive responses, without planning or clear legal support. Integral territorial defense strategy with legal, military and inter-institutional articulation.
2 Illegal mining and logging Loss of strategic resources, ecosystems and legitimacy of the State Little sustained state presence and weak local articulation. Revalue the role of the Armed Forces in critical areas together with integral development projects.
3 Unprotected borders Entry of transnational organized crime (TOC), Residual Organized Armed Groups (RAGs), Aragua Train and Red Command (Comando Vermelho) Defense system disconnected from territorial and economic control. Reorient the defense model towards the protection of logistic corridors and border resources.
4 Lack of National Security Strategy Lack of strategic vision to anticipate hybrid threats Inertial planning, without multi- sectoral articulation Formulation of a national security and defense doctrine with a geopolitical and multisectoral basis.

In order to fulfill these functions, it is imperative to provide the Armed Forces with material, technological, logistical and human capabilities in accordance with the new threat scenarios.[45] In particular, the Peruvian Army (EP), as a fundamental component of the protection of the land dimension and with an active presence throughout the national territory, requires a comprehensive and profound transformation of its capabilities. Under this approach, strategic roles cannot be demanded without providing adequate resources to fulfill them. Without a budget, no modernization, professionalization or capability expansion plan can be effectively implemented.

Defense investment must cease to be seen as an expense and be understood as an essential component of development policy. Countries that have faced similar challenges, such as Colombia or Israel, have managed to consolidate comprehensive national defense models thanks to political will and sustainable budgets over time. In the Peruvian case, it is urgent to implement the National Multisectoral Policy for National Security and Defense (PNMSDN 2030), integrating the Armed Forces into territorial development plans, the fight against organized crime and the protection of critical assets.[46] The equation is clear: without security, there is no investment; without investment, there is no growth; and without growth, there is no development.

In this framework, the EP should be conceived not only as a defense institution, but also as a strategic actor of the modern State, committed to stability, governance and national sovereignty. Its role does not end in traditional territorial defense; it must expand towards leadership in contexts of hybrid threat, disinformation and

systemic vulnerability.[47] The figure of the modern military cannot be limited to the battlefield: he must be a strategist, a planner, a statesman, with geopolitical vision and a builder of stability and national unity.

No state that aspires to develop can weaken its armed forces without paying a high cost in autonomy, security and cohesion. Recent history shows that the neutralization, subjugation or delegitimization of military institutions has preceded the collapse of entire states, creating power vacuums that have been exploited by criminal, ideological or foreign actors.[48] In this sense, the institutional strengthening of the EP, as a strategic land force for national deployment, should be understood as a decision for geopolitical survival, especially in a region marked by tensions, cross-border illegalities and expanding strategic rivalries.

External interests seeking to fragment territories, capture resources or expand their influence in the hemisphere recognize in the Armed Forces the main obstacle to their ends.[49] Therefore, the military leadership must be up to the historical times, trained not only for war, but also for the design of the national future.[50] In turn, all its commands must keep in mind that positions are temporary, but institutions are permanent; and among all of them, none represents with greater continuity, identity and sovereignty than its Armed Forces. Thinking of Peru as a geostrategic unit implies defending it from within its vital institutions. Strengthening them is not a militaristic act, but a rational action of national survival.

Education as a Tool for Power and Strategic Leadership

Education not only fulfills an instructive or technical function within the state apparatus; it is, above all, an instrument of national power. Through the educational system, collective consciousness is built, foundational values are transmitted, national identity is consolidated and the strategic vision of a society is projected.[51] When this tool is weak, incoherent or ideologically co-opted, it becomes a factor of social fragmentation and disarticulation of the national project.[52] Therefore, no state that aspires to consolidate its internal sovereignty and international autonomy can neglect its education policy.[53] Education must be conceived as a strategic instrument of national power, and must form committed citizens, endowed with critical thinking, solid ethical values and a clear awareness of their role in the defense of the country and in the construction of the collective future.

In the case of Peru, deep gaps persist in coverage, quality, infrastructure and teacher training, which seriously limit the development of qualified human capital. Beyond the material limitations, there is a silent and long-term threat: the penetration of ideologized narratives in educational spaces, especially in regular public basic education and in public higher education institutions -and in some private ones- where certain sectors promote discourses that are alien, and even

contrary, to the national interest.[54] This problem must be approached with prudence and balance, guaranteeing freedom of thought, but ensuring that the educational content is aligned with constitutional principles, the defense of national unity and democratic values. The State has the duty to prevent the classroom from becoming a space for indoctrination or political agitation; on the contrary, it must promote it as a hotbed of strategic thinking, innovation and social cohesion.

To illustrate the main challenges and proposals in this area, Table 8 summarizes critical variables, the current situation, obstacles to strategic autonomy and proposed strategies.

Table 8. Education, leadership and strategic capacity building

NO. Critical variable Current situation Obstacle to strategic autonomy Proposed strategy
1 National education system Low quality, ideologization and disconnection with the country’s strategic interest. Weak training in citizenship, technical cadres, geopolitical leaders and statesmen. Educational reform with a focus on sovereignty, innovation, identity and geostrategic vision.
2 Political- technical leadership Weak strategic training, improvisation and short-term vision. Institutional capture and lack of multisectoral leadership Formation of elites with State thinking in defense, development and security.
3 Role of the Armed Forces in education Underutilization of its training capabilities at the strategic level. Reduction to the operational level without national articulation Converting them into poles of national strategic training with a multi- sectorial vision.
4 National narrative Fragmented, influenced by external agendas and lack of cultural direction Loss of internal cohesion, national identity and identification, and sense of country- project. Reconstruction of national narrative based on unity, sovereignty and productive development.

At the same time, it is essential to consolidate the training of civilian and military leaders with a geopolitical vision, since national development depends not only on good technicians, but also on strategists capable of thinking of the country as an enclave of power, security, development and sovereignty. The training of leaders at all levels of the State -including the Armed Forces- must be part of a long-term comprehensive educational strategy, where military institutions are strengthened as schools of strategic leadership at the service of the nation.[55] Political leadership can no longer be improvised or based solely on media charisma; it must be based on knowledge, planning and State responsibility.[56] Therefore, the Armed Forces, higher education institutions, government schools and public agencies must coordinate and articulate efforts to train leaders with multi-sectoral leadership skills.

Consequently, education must be conceived as a strategic capacity of the State, not only as a public service. Through this process, leadership is forged, national identity is transmitted, internal cohesion is consolidated and a vision of the future is formed. To face the challenges of a geopolitically fragmented world, Peru needs an educational system aligned with its permanent interests.[57] The training of strategic cadres -civilian and military- with State thinking, geopolitical vision and

vocation for national service must become a priority. Institutions such as the Armed Forces, government schools, public universities and higher education institutions must take up this challenge, articulating knowledge, values and capabilities oriented to an integral and sovereign national project.

Based on this analysis, it is possible to identify different future strategic scenarios for Peru within the framework of global reordering. These scenarios are conditioned by the decisions taken by the State with respect to its development model, international insertion, institutional capacity and political leadership. Table 9 summarizes these possible trajectories and their implications for sovereignty, stability and the country’s projection in the international system.

Table 9. Future strategic scenarios for Peru: leadership, education and national projection

NO. Strategic Scenario Key conditions and decisions Implications for sovereignty,

stability and national projection

1 Strategic leadership and aligned education Training of civilian and military elites with a geopolitical vision; articulation between the Armed Forces, universities and government schools; educational system oriented to national interests. Articulation between the Armed Forces, universities and government schools; education system oriented to national interests. Strengthening of sovereignty, greater internal stability, regional and global projection of the country.
2 Continuity of fragmented models Lack of articulation between sectors; improvised political leadership; education disconnected from national strategy. Vulnerability to external pressures, political instability, loss of autonomy and less international prominence.
3 Partial reforms and technocratic leadership Technical improvements without strategic vision; emphasis on management but without multisectoral integration or geopolitical perspective. Limited progress in development, persistence of structural gaps, low capacity for international advocacy
4 Dependence on external models Uncritical adoption of foreign paradigms; subordination to external interests in education and leadership. Loss of sovereignty, increased dependence, institutional weakness and risk of strategic irrelevance.

Conclusions

The contemporary world is going through a critical geopolitical transition, characterized by volatile power balances, shifting alliances and multidimensional threats. In this context, Peru cannot afford the absence of an articulated, multi- sectoral and long-term oriented national geopolitical doctrine. The lack of a coherent strategy weakens the country’s capacity to respond to external threats and, at the same time, increases internal risks, perpetuating a situation of structural dependence in the international system. Geopolitics should be conceived not as an academic or military discourse, but as an operational tool for planning national power from an integral, pragmatic and prospective approach.

Peru faces a historic crossroads: to remain trapped in extractive, reactive and subordinate models, or to move towards development based on decisional autonomy, technological sovereignty, territorial integration and multi-sectoral security. This transition requires a firm political decision to rethink the State, modernize its institutions and place strategic intelligence and geopolitical anticipation as the basis for national planning. In this sense, the strengthening of the defense apparatus, especially the EP, constitutes a structural coalition to guarantee governance, protect critical resources and project the country as a strategic actor in South America.

From a forward-looking perspective, building a national geopolitical vision implies recognizing that future scenarios are not only defined in stock exchanges or chancelleries, but also in classrooms, innovation centers, laboratories and leadership training spaces. Consequently, education must be placed at the service of an integrating and sovereign national project, safeguarding its independence from ideologized agendas or external pressures. Civilian and military leadership must be conceived with the logic of the State, aligned with the permanent interests of the country, and not as an extension of partisan projects or corporate interests.

Sovereignty is also exercised in the field of thought and institutional leadership. In this dimension, Peru is called upon to reposition itself through strategic intelligence, institutional coherence and transforming will. It is not a matter of competing in power with the great powers, but of clearly defining the national role in the new global order and building the necessary capacities to play it with dignity, vision and firmness. In this sense, geopolitics must be consolidated as a State culture, strategic public policy of a sustainable and long-term nature, as well as a living doctrine for the sovereign and integral development of the nation.

Endnotes:

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The ideas contained in this analysis are the sole responsibility of the author, without necessarily reflecting the thoughts of the CEEEP or the Peruvian Army.

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