This text was originally published in the book América Latina en la Nueva Geopolítica Global.

Karina Furtado Rodrigues and Sandro Teixeira Moita^[1]

Summary

This article examines -from four perspectives- Brazil in the framework of the new geopolitical scenario: the first one analyzes how global and regional defense changes and trends affect the country; the second one analyzes the evolution of defense thinking, policies, structure and programs; the third, how this positioning is reflected in documents and in the current context; fourth, what to expect in the coming years based on current trends. The conclusion is that, in spite of the international context, the internal dynamics of the defense institutions and fiscal constraints in Brazil hinder an effective change in their positioning. However, there are processes of institutional change underway that, in the medium and long term, could improve the situation.

Keywords: Brazil, geopolitics, Defense Policy, Defense Strategy, Ministry of Defense.

Ministry of Defense.

Introduction

How do defense policy and strategic planning of the Brazilian Armed Forces influence the positioning and performance of Brazil in the new geopolitical scenario?

The new global geopolitical context is characterized by uncertainty, due to the constant clashes between the order led by the United States (U.S.) and the western bloc, and the revisionist powers such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. Revisionism is compounded by the limitations of U.S. dominance, worn down in the Global War on Terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, which resulted in unfinished military campaigns in Asia and Africa, as well as a shake-up in the fragmented power dynamics in the Middle East.

In 2023, for the ninth consecutive year, global military expenditures grew, surpassing $2 trillion by 2022.^[2] Mass production of military equipment and ammunition was again a priority, with costs that go beyond the economic factor and with impacts on societies, including on their living standards. Such a moment of transition has no clear horizon. Thus, the feeling of insecurity with these conflicts that have erupted in various parts of the world has led to the reformulation of security and defense policies. Although it is a region far away from the conflicts, Latin America continues to be influenced by them in multiple ways, with clear consequences in the political and economic spheres.

As these conflicts become more protracted, Latin American countries are drawn into the global geopolitical dispute, forcing them to choose an alliance with nations of a particular bloc, causing inexorable effects on their societies. This context generates transformations in the relations between the region’s actors, influenced by ideological positions and the search for prestige with Western nations. In the midst of this scale of change, the policies developed by Latin American states are being impacted in a variety of ways, either by the adaptations manifested in current conflicts, by the role of technology in them, or by the impact on the value chains of global defense industries, just to mention a few of the many points that raise the tension in the debate on proposals and the importance of producing defense-related policy documents.

The challenge in producing these documents involves identifying avenues that can be exercised in a convulse geopolitical context, which leads to decisions that are difficult to make given the aggressive competition between powers on the international stage. The fracture that has opened up influences – and will influence – economic exchanges, the reorganization of alliances and even defense procurement. In response, states are expected to change: (1) their political and diplomatic defense discourse; (2) their de jure defense policies, i.e., in their documents; and (3) their de facto policies, i.e., in their procurement planning, doctrine and organization.

The argument developed in this article is that, despite some changes in the Brazilian discourse and an apparent continuity in defense policy documents, the Brazilian defense decision-making structure imposes major challenges for a clear change of positioning in the new regional context, and that the discretion of the Armed Forces in the delineation of priorities imposes fragmentation in these strategies.

To analyze how the documents in force respond (or not) to the current scenario of threats and tensions, we will address the evolution of Brazilian defense since its democratization, considering the four National Defense Policies (1996, 2005, 2012 and 2018), the two National Defense Strategies (2008 and 2018), and the White Paper on Defense (2012).

The analysis will assume that the domestic structural dimension significantly moderates the direction of geopolitical positioning of liberal democracies,^[3] including Brazil. In addition, it will consider the degree of involvement of civil society in the formulation of defense policies, since, given the complexity of today’s threats, an isolated and self-absorbed defense sector is unlikely to succeed in implementing its policies. It also shows examples of how these general objectives are being pursued, since, in the face of so many strategic objectives with no prioritization, what is essential is the execution of what is planned.

The conclusion is that Brazil is facing structural difficulties in decision-making in terms of long-lasting geopolitical positioning, whether in the direction of South-South cooperation or to plan the defense sector in an integrated manner. There are, however, processes of institutional change underway that, in the medium and long term, can have a significant impact on decision making.

Brazil in the Global and Regional Geopolitical Context

Thinking about Defense implies reflecting on geopolitics, without neglecting a holistic reflection of other fields, not to lose the ability to formulate and adequately understand the context in which Brazil is inserted, how it reacts, and how it influences and is influenced.

The global order is in a process of fracture. The current moment is understood as the era of superpowers competition, in which the actors would be the US, the PRC and Russia. However, these actors are not alone in the complicated global security situation, they share spaces with other countries that exercise power on a regional scale with global consequences, taking advantage of the characteristics of the global dispute.

An example can be seen in the current situation in the Middle East, where, although Israel is a strong ally of the US, it does continue to have its own dialogue with Russia due to the Russian presence in the Middle East due to the Russian presence in Syria, a country with a long history of animosity towards Israel. This has allowed for Israeli attacks on hostile targets in Syrian territory, especially against forces or locations linked to Hezbollah or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

At the same time, the case of Saudi Arabia is remarkable. Historically a US ally, in recent years Saudi Arabia has sought diplomatic rapprochement with Russia and the PRC, which has run counter to US political interests and has altered regional dynamics. One example is the PRC’s mediation to normalize relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, countries in an increasingly tense and violent political-ideological dispute over the Middle East through third party actors.

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East contribute greatly to the sense of global insecurity. Since February 2022, Russia has tried to impose a new old order on Ukraine, which has resisted largely thanks to the support of Western powers, led by the US, by providing armaments, equipment and financial aid. The scale of the conflict, in terms of material consumption and human losses, is considerable and is already affecting the security of Europe, forcing US intervention due to NATO commitments and affecting its planned geo-strategic shift towards the Pacific.

The perception of an open rift in the international system is growing among analysts, whether they be from Western countries^[4] or outside this bloc.^[5] The war in Ukraine would be the first manifestation of such a rift, but not the only one, indicating a possible future bifurcation of the global order between rival coalitions.

Given the current uncertainty, there are different hypotheses for thinking about the international order, such as identifying a struggle for global shaping between three worlds the Western bloc, led by the US and Europe; the Eastern bloc, led by the PRC and Russia; and the third bloc, which would unite the mass of nations that fall within the definition of a Global South, not aligned with the first two blocs. These blocs would be more informal associations than established political entities, which would present an order around a system of three worlds.^[6]

The quest for security becomes an imperative for states, which explains the $2.44 trillion dollars in military spending by 2023.^[7] Security and defense have returned to the political agenda, with more investment in armaments, technologies, and military forces, which could reduce resources for other public policies, affecting the global quality of life and impacting politics and electoral processes.

It is impossible to talk about Brazil without considering its nearby space, Latin America, and its role in an era of competition between large powers. The region, historically seen as a US domain, can no longer be seen as such: competition has arrived, with different contours in Europe, Asia and Africa. In this context, the US has distanced itself from the region, while the Chinese and Russian presence has increased, with economic and security partnerships. This has had a profound effect on Brazil, which has begun to seek regional integration as a way of counteracting it.^[8]

An important factor to consider is that in its foreign policy, especially in the post-1985 governments, with the re-democratization, Brazil sought to broaden its relations with actors considered to be potential partners in two ways: economically, with advantageous exchanges due to the growth of the Brazilian economy, and diplomatically, allowing Brazil to build an image of regional leader based on alliances with other similarly positioned countries, as well as by focusing on developing countries.^[9]

Brazil’s construction of its role as a regional leader occurred especially after the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), with a great effort to build a regional leadership role in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the South-South cooperation initiatives,^[10]diversifying alliances and welcoming China’s increased presence in Latin America as a complement to Brazil’s role.^[11] Brazil’s role in the creation of the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), especially in its first steps, follows the logic of regional leadership the logic of regional leadership: the bloc was perceived as a way to diversify ties, to escape from the dependence on the US and Europe, and solidify the project of showing Brazil as a regional leader with a global projection.^[12]

This process also implied the creation of alternative institutions to those led by the US, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In response, the BRICS founded the New Development Bank in 2014, during the Dilma Rousseff administration, who strengthened ties with the PRC, the destination of 20% of Brazil’s exports in her last year in office. Unlike Lula, Rousseff favored relations with the PRC over other members of the BRICS, such as India, South Africa and Russia.^[13]

The Bolsonaro administration (2019-2022) attempted to create an anti-China discursive spin, but had practically no effect, given the persistent weight of the PRC in the Brazilian economy. Despite the sympathies of that administration, the US remained inert in any line of effort to promote a reduction in the ties between the PRC and Brazil.^[14] The administration’s moves were often blocked by the influence of congressmen and productive sectors whose activities were closely linked to trade with the PRC. Even with public protests of the president and other figures linked to him, Sino-Brazilian economic relations advanced, reaching 33% of Brazilian exports by the year 2020.^[15]

What is patent is that Brazil’s investment in South-South cooperation links has brought advantages for the country, especially in terms of international prestige; however, the increase in relations of strong dependence with the PRC leaves Brazil at risk from economic volatility resulting from competition from the great powers in the international arena.

Gerson Moura, in a well-known work, coined the term pragmatic equidistance to describe the Brazilian position in the years prior to World War II,^[16] when Brazil sought to balance itself against the growing rivalry between the US and Germany by postponing its participation in the war to achieve the maximum rewards from both sides. Today, there is a parallel in the positioning of Brazil in the context of the rivalry between the US and the PRC.

The Evolution of Brazilian Defense: Documents and Actions

Brazilian legislation establishes that the defense policy must be updated every four years, with the preparation in charge of the Executive, represented by the Ministry of Defense, reviewed and ratified by the legislative chambers.^[17] However, the approval process for the proposals is worryingly slow and has failed to involve much of society.

Brazil’s first National Defense Policy (PND) was launched in 1996, during the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. This policy emerged in a context of a delicate democratization process, after more than 20 years of military rule. The 1996 PND was not – in itself – a policy, but rather an effort to balance and harmonize the various visions of the country’s different military forces and organizations.^[18]

It was the first time in Brazilian democracy that a document was prepared between civilians and the military, setting out part of the Brazilian vision on defense, and symbolically representing the opening of the Brazilian defense to civilians.^[19] This openness was consolidated with the creation of the Ministry of Defense in Brazil, which eliminated the military ministries and inaugurated the possibility of assigning to a civilian the ministerial responsibility for defense and, thus, of the armed forces.^[20]

The document focused on external threats and pointed to risks such as the resurgence of ethnic, nationalist and religious extremism, and areas of instability in neighboring countries that might encourage transnational crime. In budgetary terms, the time was a time of fiscal and economic crisis, which imposed large cuts on the Armed Forces and a stagnation of troops.

However, important actions were launched, such as the Strengthening of the Calha Norte Program in the Amazon region at the initiative of the Ministry of Defense, and the start of the SIVAM (Amazon Surveillance System) and SIPAM (Amazon Protection System) programs in 1997. In addition, the main use of the Armed Forces was Law and Order Guarantee Operations (GLO) and other subsidiary missions.^[21]

The 2005 edition of the National Defense Policy, since its processing at the beginning of 2000, incorporated several civilian groups such as academia, media, industry and Congress.^[22] In 2003, during Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration, the Minister of Defense, José Viegas, decided to continue the inclusive discussion of civilians on defense. Between 2003 and 2004, several seminars and meetings were held, known as the Itaipava meetings, which generated four volumes of studies, published by the Ministry of Defense. However, the meetings were simply to comment on already prepared policy texts in a consultative manner on the policy, with no deliberative capacity.^[23] Little was done with these volumes after their publication.^[24]

In the same year, Brazil initiated actions aimed at achieving greater international influence, assuming the leadership of the Peace Operation (MINUSTAH) in Haiti, where they remained until 2014 with military forces, and leading until the end of the mission in 2017. Added to this is the implementation of SIVAM and SIPAM, previously incipient.

In terms of bringing the Defense sector closer to civil society, Brazil launched the Programa de Apoio ao Ensino e à Pesquisa Científica e Tecnológica em Defesa Nacional (Pró-Defesa) for the induction of a field of defense studies in Brazil. The first edition of Pró-Defesa took place in 2005, with an investment of R$4 million for 12 projects involving 37 scholarship holders. In the second edition, in 2008, the amount allocated to the program surpassed the previous stage, reaching R$7 million for 16 proposals, awarding 45 scholarships. In the third edition, the budget was R$3 million, earmarked for 12 projects and the awarding of 82 scholarships. The fourth edition saw investments of R$6.6 million and the fifth, R$6.6 million, with R$3.3 million earmarked for scholarships and resources for operational and capital expenses.^[25]

This initiative has been promoting the training of civilians in this area and fostering the creation of research networks that include both military organizations and institutions of higher education, as well as the integration of institutions from different regions of Brazil’s vast territory.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy (END) highlights the revitalization of the Brazilian industrial-military complex and the continuity of official geopolitical thinking, emphasizes the importance of the security and defense of the Amazonian borders and the coastline. Over the centuries, Brazil’s containment strategies have focused on land borders, significantly shaping regional economic development policies.^[26]

Criticisms of the Strategy focus on the lack of an economic vision of defense that has not considered economic costs and resource availability; the absence of definition and support for peacekeeping operations; the lack of clarity on enemies and threat scenarios; the absence of a discussion with the military, who considered the document a governmental strategy and not a state strategy; and finally, the neglect of the defense industry as an important actor in the development of the defense objectives.^[27]

The PDN and the END were disconnected. Many important objectives present in the PDN did not appear in the END, which focused almost exclusively on a new mindset to Brazil’s greater role as a regional power and in the area of defense. Moreover, in that document, “each of the Armed Forces was responsible for elaborating its Equipment and Defense Plans, redefine their territorial structures and develop new programs for the acquisition of materials, equipment and armaments “.^[28] Based on the Strategy, Brazil formalizes its position in three important fields for defense, establishing responsibilities for the development of nuclear technologies for the Navy; cybernetic capabilities for the Army; and aerospace capabilities for the Air Force.

As a follow up to this positioning, the Submarine Development Program was created, with the intent of developing nuclear propulsion technology.^[29] The rationale for the program was based on the strategic environment concept of the defense documents, which included the South Atlantic to East African countries as an area of interest.^[30]

During Dilma Rousseff’s administration, the Defense White Paper (LBD) was published in 2012, defining clearly the role of the armed forces in the country, Brazil’s regional function, and its strategic position vis-à-vis other countries. In the same year, a law was enacted to promote the Defense Industrial Base (Law 12,598/2012),^[31] which introduced crucial concepts and actions, such as Defense Product, Defense System, Strategic Defense Product, Strategic Defense Company, Compensation Agreement, and the Special Tax Regime for the Defense Industry.

In 2013, the Brazilian Army created the Northern Military Command^[32] in order to develop better capabilities to achieve the goal of protecting the Amazon. The Amazon protection goal is not new, but it was intensified with the threats related to the emergence of the climate crisis and transboundary crimes, which is highlighted in the documents of 2005.^[33] That same year, Snowden’s leaks revealed information focused on Brazilian authorities.^[34] Following this, cyber defense policies were accelerated with the creation of the Center for Cyber Defense (CDCiber) in the Army, and a Cyber Defense Policy by the Ministry, both in 2012.

In 2015, Wikileaks revealed political and economic espionage actions of the U.S. government on Brazil.^[35] Subsequent governmental actions sought to strengthen Brazilian capabilities in this area, transforming the CDCiber into the Joint Cyber Defense Command in 2016, launching the National Policy of Information Security by the Cabinet of Institutional Security of the Presidency in 2018, and including the cyber component in the Doctrine of Joint Operations of the Ministry of Defense, among other measures.

During the government of Michel Temer, between 2017 and 2018, groundwork was laid for a greater presence of military personnel in management positions in public policy sectors unrelated to Defense. The milestone of this process was the Federal Intervention in the Public Security of the state of Rio de Janeiro, which placed a general in charge of the Federal Intervention Cabinet and another at the head of the Secretariat of Public Security. These generals focused on improving the management of the police forces and training in public procurement, achieving reductions in most crime rates, except for the number of deaths due to police intervention.^[36]36

Brazilian Defense in the New Geopolitical Scenario: Between the Discourse, the de jure of Policies and the de facto.

The 2016 NDP began to take effect in 2018. In this regard, international policy analyst Rubens de Siqueira Duarte points out that the document sent to Congress in 2016 did not undergo any modifications during its processing.^[37] The policy came into force shortly before the election of Jair Bolsonaro and maintained a position of autonomy and respect for the great powers, although this did not coincide with the vision of the new government.^[38] In the military sphere, there were no drastic changes, but there was greater attention to military demands; for example, during this government no GLO operations were carried out, as the military is notoriously reluctant to use its forces in public security.^[39] Between 2016 and 2019, defense investments fluctuated considerably, following the trend of declining federal budgets since 2015. However, during this period, investment targets were mostly met for investments in strategic defense projects related to the development of technologies (72.6% compliance), despite the shortage of investment, especially in comparison to the Defense Articulation and Equipment Plan (PAED). Many programs achieved good results, although only 15% of what was needed to achieve the PAED goals was available. However, there was low execution in important projects, such as the Science and Technology pole in Guaratiba, FX-2, Astros, Sisfron and Link-BR2.^[40]

Another role to consider for the Armed Forces was the coordination of Operation Acolhida, in response to the large migration of Venezuelans entering Brazil through the state of Roraima. Since 2018, the Logistical Task Force Acolhida uses the State’s military structure to coordinate the process of entry of migrants. This operation has put so much pressure on the Army’s capacity, that it is sustained through a system of rotation of personnel from various parts of the country, as well as local governments, which suffer economic and public services impacts.^[41]

The Current Defense Policy and Positions

The process of preparing the current documents has not been as inclusive as in other cases, based on the following mechanism: the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces writes the drafts of the PND and the END, and the Planning Advisory of the Ministry of Defense drafts the LBD. The drafts are sent for evaluation to the other ministries of the Federal Executive. Once the suggestions are added, the drafts are sent to the Civil House of the presidency to be evaluated by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The proposals are received by the Foreign Relations and National Defense of both legislative chambers.^[42]

In 2019, a revised version of the PND, the END and the LBD was launched, submitted as Proposed Legislative Decree 1127/21. These documents were sent to the Senate on July 22, 2020 and approved on June 3, 2022, with very few modifications. Subsequently, they were sent to the Chamber of Deputies and, in spite of having been included in the voting agenda on fifteen occasions during the years 2022 and 2023, were only approved on May 15, 2024, in the midst of the process of formulating a new version of the policy. Several authors have pointed out that the lack of continuity in the participation in the formulation of defense documents could call into question future advances in civil-military integration (towards civilianización), as well as in the updates of positioning in the face of changes and crises in world geopolitics.^[43]

Moreover, the disconnection between the Defense Policy and the country’s Foreign Policy persists. A clear example is the recent negotiation between the Army and Ukraine, interested in buying 450 Guaraní armored ambulance vehicles. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vetoed the sale of 3.4 billion reais and had to pronounce itself through a request for information in the Chamber of Deputies.^[44] Lula’s final decision was to uphold the veto of the of the purchase so as not to strain the relationship with Russia, given his attempt to create an environment for peace negotiations between the two countries.

But the policy presents great stability. The following is a comparison of Defense objectives, based on a comparison made by Marques and Maia Neto,^[45] to which we add the data from the 2020 documents, approved in 2024:

Table 1 – Comparison of national defense objectives in Brazilian Defense Policies

1996	2005	2012	2016	2020
Guarantee sovereignty, preserve territorial integrity, patrimony, interests	Guarantee sovereignty, national treasures, territorial integrity	Guarantee sovereignty, national treasures, territorial integrity	Guarantee sovereignty, national treasures, territorial integrity	Guarantee sovereignty, national treasures, territorial integrity
Guarantee the rule of law and democratic institutions
Maintaining cohesion and national unity	Contribute to the preservation of cohesion and national unity	Contribute to the preservation of cohesion and national unity	Contribute to the preservation of cohesion and national unity	Preserving cohesion and national unity
Contribute to the maintenance of peace and international security	Promote regional stability	Contribute to regional stability	Contribute to regional stability, international peace and security	Contribute to regional stability, international peace and security
	Contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security	Contribute to the international peace and security
Protect individuals, property and resources be it Brazilian or under Brazilian jurisdiction	Defend national interests, assets and resources of Brazilian citizens abroad	Defend national interests, assets and resources of Brazilian citizens abroad	Protect national interests, assets and resources of Brazilian citizens abroad	Protect national interests, assets and resources of Brazilian citizens abroad
Achieving and maintaining Brazilian interests abroad
Giving Brazil a significant role in international affairs, greater participation in international decision making	Participation of Brazil in the community of nations, and increase its role in the international decision-making process	Increase the participation of Brazil in the community of nations and its role in international decision making	Enhance the participation of Brazil in the community of nations and in the process of international decision-making	Increase the participation of Brazil in the community of nations and its role in international decision making
		Maintain modern, joint, well-trained balanced, professional and adequately deployed Armed Forces throughout the national territory	Ensure the defense capabilities for the fulfillment of constitutional missions of the Armed Forces	Ensure the defense capabilities for the fulfillment of constitutional missions of the Armed Forces
		Structure the Armed Forces around capabilities, provide personnel and material in accordance with strategic and operational planning
		Develop the Industrial Defense Base to ensure autonomy in vital technologies	Promote productive and technological autonomy in the Defense sector	Promote productive and technological autonomy in the Defense sector
		Develop the potential for defense logistics and national mobilization
		Raise the awareness of the Brazilian people about the importance of defense for the country	Enhance the participation of Brazilian society in matters of National Defense	Enhance the participation of Brazilian society in matters of National Defense

Source: Marques and Maia Neto,^[46] and authors.

The 2020 NDP repeats the defense objectives of the 2016 NDP. Under other labels, the document adds important and similar ideas to the previous documents, namely: the focus on the protection of the Amazon, national mobilization, the protection of the South Atlantic, and the connection between Defense and Development, using the concept of the strategic environment.^[47]

For the first time, budgetary and financial stability is also present in defense policy, and not only in the defense strategy, as in the 2016 NDP. This is also because Brazil has experienced constant and drastic fiscal constraints before^[48] and after the Constitutional Amendment No. 95/2016, which established a spending ceiling for the three branches of government and the Public Ministry. The impacts of such ceiling, together with the slow growth of the Brazilian GDP and the public debt caused by the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, have resulted in the contingency of public funds.

This, coupled with the fact that most of Brazil’s defense expenditures are earmarked for personnel,^[49] has affected the country’s ability to carry out all of its projects with the desired speed. This is especially worrisome because the 2020 version of the documents does not update the PAED, disseminated for the first and only time in the 2012 LBD. Thus, it does not provide parameters to evaluate the objectives and the execution of the plan. Relying only on the assumption that defense expenditures should increase and without a prioritization of strategic objectives, the current Policy repeats the vice of the previous ones of considering everything as important, without prioritizing.^[50]

The Ministry of Defense has tried to unify the planning of each one of the Armed Institutions through its Planning Advisory (ASPLAN/MD). In 2020, this office launched the document Portfolio of Strategic Defense Projects of the Ministry of Defense 2020-2031, which was the result of alignment meetings with the representatives of each of the forces,^[51] which meant a great effort of this advisory to have each institution choose only four projects, instead of the previous multiple ones. But on the Army’s official web page,13 projects have the title of strategic. In the Navy, on the other hand, there are seven. The current Strategic Programs of each of the Brazilian Armed Forces, according to the Ministry of Defense, are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 – Portfolio of Strategic Defense Projects of the Ministry of Defense

Sub-portfolio National Defense
Ministry of Defense	Army	Navy	Air Force
Strategic Command and Defense Control Program	Cybernetic Defense Program in National Defense – PDCDN	Navy Nuclear Program -NMP	Strategic Space Systems Program – PESE
HX-BR Project	Integrated Border Monitoring System – SISFRON	Submarine Development Program – PROSUB	SISDABRA Program
TH-X Project	Strategic Program ASTROS	Blue Amazon Management Program – SisGAAz	KC-390 Program
Program to Support Teaching and Scientific and Technological Research in National Defense – PRÓ-DEFESA	Armored Forces Strategic Program	Development of Patrol Vessels – PRONAPA	F-39 Program
Subportfolio Cooperation with National Development		Subportfolio Environment, Oceans and Seas
Forces in Sports Program – PROFESP / Project João do Pulo – PJP		Brazilian Antarctic Program – PROANTAR
Rondon Project
Calha Norte Program – PCN
Soldier-Citizen Project – PSC
Amazon Project – SAR
SipamHidro Project

Source: Adapted from Teixeira Junior.^[52]

It remains uncertain whether the Ministry of Defense’s efforts to reduce the number of such projects have become a better de facto prioritization. Thus, each force ends up competing for resources and ideas, without having a complementary view of the defense apparatus needed against the threats identified in the defense documents. And all this in a context of reduced defense expenditures, which, in 2010 accounted for 57% of defense spending in Latin America and, by 2022, will account for 45%.^[53]

Another challenge of the current defense policy is that its document is the only one in the Brazilian norms that conceptualizes national security. No other state entity, not even the Institutional Security Cabinet, addresses the issue in depth, treating it superficially, as in the case of cyber security.^[54] This is due to the concept still being considered taboo, as per its extensive use during the military regime to justify a doctrine centered on the internal enemy.^[55]

The absence of the concept is a consequence of the militarization of politics during the military regime and can be seen as a cause of even greater alienation. Given that basic issues of critical infrastructure security, which would typically be handled by the very civilian sectors that execute them, are seen as the business of the military. This reinforces the need for civilianización of national security and defense, rather than the militarization of civilian affairs.^[56]

Conclusions: Prospects for the Future

Considering the stability of Brazilian defense objectives, what can be expected from the next Ministry of Defense document and what should be included? Likewise, what positioning decisions should have already been modified in the recently approved document and in current programs and actions?

The Ministry of Defense has been carrying out consultations and working groups to update the recently approved defense documents, already obsolete when they were approved. They do so by means of virtual wiretaps,^[57] about whose results there is no news, and by working groups in two different schools, the War College and the Defense College. Such calls seem more to comply with institutional regulations than to facilitate effective reflection on the field and the influences of global geopolitics.

Different measures such as action on the development of national science and technology are positive examples, but the tensions raised in civil-military relations during the Bolsonaro administration are still unresolved, with an atmosphere of mistrust regarding the role of the Armed Forces in national life.^[58] Thus, to overcome this, one of the important ways came from the current Minister of Defense himself, José Múcio Monteiro, who aimed at rescuing a project already present in the 2008 END: the civilian career in the Ministry of Defense.^[59] If the creation of such a career were to be approved, in addition to reducing dependence on military personnel in the three Forces, it would increase civilian presence in the Defense bureaucracy, with capacities for planning, direction and functional stability.^[60]

However, this ends up touching on critical points that contribute to the inadequacy of the Ministry of Defense: the (still) timid civilian control, the great autonomy of the Forces, and the budgetary issue. These points are linked and cannot be treated separately. If, on the one hand, civilian control is a matter of little political interest to establish control mechanisms of the Armed Forces, given the low perception of threats in the region historically,^[61] on the other hand, the country has no shortage of defense specialists. This, given that, since 2005, Pró-Defesa has not only been training civilians in the area, but also creating research and regional integration networks to think about Defense. However, at the moment, there is no space in the market or in the State for this type of defense professionals beyond academia.

Therefore, the historical-institutional reality that is imposing itself at the present time, and which will also impose itself on these new civilian defense experts and on the changes they wish to introduce in the sector, is that of military autonomy in planning, procurement, project management and other processes, where the actions of the Armed Forces themselves end up undermining the ability of the Ministry of Defense to centralize authority and, therefore, decisions on the field in Brazil. While similar structures exist in the Ministry of Defense, they ended up being meager due to this autonomy.^[62]

The budgetary issue reveals another debilitating characteristic of the Ministry of Defense: about 85% of the budget allocated to the Ministry of Defense is spent on personnel, while only 5 percent is spent on investments and 10% on financing. Such figures indicate a difficulty promoting the debate on the need to adapt the Armed Forces to future challenges involving reorganization and definition of priorities for defense.^[63]

The disconnection between Brazilian foreign policy and defense policy is evident, with few supplementary initiatives. Although the diversification of alliances is clear in foreign policy and defense documents, the lack of action in the strategic environment weakens the discourse on Brazil’s regional leadership. One example is the lack of ability to challenge the actions of great powers in the South Atlantic, due to the lack of means to portray power.^[64]

Cooperation with South-South countries, although desired, is not highlighted in foreign exchanges, since most of the Brazilian military personnel are sent to the US and to institutions such as the Inter-American Defense Board and the Inter-American Defense College. Although actions with countries in the strategic environment, such as Sao Tome and Principe, Namibia, Paraguay and Bolivia, are on the rise, they still do not match the presence in the US and Western Europe, reflecting a practice that is not adjusted to the global context of change.^[65]

In the long term, it is difficult to foresee Brazil’s future in the field. It is necessary to wait and observe the development of the defense civilianización processes, which could lead Brazil to overcome disputes and achieve convergence between foreign policy, defense policy and infrastructure policies, consolidating its global leadership position. In the worst-case scenario, if these processes are not effective, Brazil could be misaligned with geopolitical circumstances, focused on its own problems.

Endnotes:

1. The content, data and analysis in this article reflect the opinions of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Brazilian Army. ↑
2. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The Military Balance.” London: Routledge, 2023. ↑
3. Owens, M. T. “Force planning: the crossroads of strategy and the political process”. Orbis, 59(3), 2015: 411-437 ↑
4. Brands, H. “The Ukraine War and Global Order”. In: Brands, H. (editor) 2024. “War in Ukraine: conflict, strategy, and the return of a fractured world”. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press: 2024. ↑
5. Tsygankov, A. The Russian idea in international relations: civilization and national distinctiveness. Abingdon, Routledge: 2023. ↑
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13. Berg, R. C., and Ziemer, H. S. 2023. “Latin America’s Role in Great Power Competition.” In The Ascendancy of Regional Powers in Contemporary US-China Relations: Rethinking the Great Power Rivalry. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023: 237-257. ↑
14. Duarte, L., Albro, R., and Hershberg, E. “Communicating influence: China’s messaging in Latin America and the Caribbean”. Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, 2022. ↑
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18. Alsina Jr, J. P. S. “A síntese imperfeita: articulação entre política externa e política de defesa na era Cardoso”. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 46(2), 2003: 53-86. ↑
19. Ibid. ↑
20. Rodrigues, K. F. “Transparency and Civil-Military Relations: assessing civilian access to military records in Brazil and Mexico (1981-2012)”. Amorim Neto (Org). New studies on civil-military relations and defense policy in Brazil. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2022. ↑
21. Dos Santos, L. W. “Política de defesa nacional do Brasil: uma política de Estado ou de governo?” Revista Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa, 5(2), 2018. ↑
22. Vasconcellos, C. A. R. “A sociedade brasileira e a Defesa Nacional: uma aproximação após a criação do Ministério da Defesa”. In Desafios Gerenciais de Defesa, Rio de Janeiro: 2012: 1-23. ↑
23. Amorim Neto, O. “The Impact of Civilians on Defense Policy in New Democracies: The Case of Brazil”. Latin American Politics and Society 61, no. 3: 2019: 1-28; Duarte, Rubens de S. “Trajetória Sinuosa: Surgimento De Uma Dimensão Pública Na Formulação Da Política De Defesa No Brasil?”. Dados 65 (4): e20210075, 2022. ↑
24. Vasconcellos, C. A. R. “A sociedade brasileira e a Defesa Nacional: uma aproximação após a criação do Ministério da Defesa.” In Desafios Gerenciais de Defesa, Rio de Janeiro, 2012: 1-23. ↑
25. InfoCAPES. “Pró-Defesa entra na quarta edição com investimento de R$ 6,6 milhões”. InfoCAPES, 5 March 2019. https://www.gov.br/capes/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/infocapes/infocapes-edicao-Mar 5, 2019; Agência Gov. “Abertas as inscrições para projetos sobre Defesa Nacional.” Agência Gov, 3 January 2024. https://agenciagov.ebc.com.br/noticias/202401/abertas-as-inscricoes-para-projetos-sobre-defesanacional ↑
26. Albuquerque, E. S. “A (geo) política de defesa brasileira.” Revista de geopolítica, 1(1), 2016: 46-59. ↑
27. Barcelos, M. A. dos S. “A implementação da estratégia nacional de defesa, 2008-2013.” FGV, 2014. Retrieved from http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/handle/10438/11829 ↑
28. Marques, Adriana A. and Jacintho Maia Neto. “Brazil’s National Defence Strategy, Defence Diplomacyand Management of Strategic Resources.” Defence Diplomacy & National Security National Security Strategy Strategy, April 2020: 17. https://af77305b-83ae-4652-be9e-daa5e1e5aec2.usrfiles.com/ugd/.https://af77305b-83ae-4652-be9e-daa5e1e5aec2.usrfiles.com/ugd/.af7730_2800b5337bc2406186ae22741d0e1e9a.pdf ↑
29. Brick, E. S., and Fonseca Junior, P. “PROSUB: uma política pública de defesa voltada para a criação de instrumentos de dissuasão”. Revista Escola Guerra Naval, Rio de Janeiro 24.1, 2018: 178-207. https://defesa.uff.br/. https://defesa.uff.br/wp-content/uploads/sites/342/2020/11/649-1587-1-SM-Prosub_-Brick_Fonseca.pdf ↑
30. Dos Santos, L. W. “Política de defesa nacional do Brasil: uma política de Estado ou de governo?” Revista Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa, 5(2), 2018. https://doi.org/10.26792/rbed.v5n2.2018.75114 ↑
31. Law 12.598. “Establishes special rules for procurement, contracting and the development of defense products and systems”; provides for incentive rules for the strategic defense area; amends Law No. 12,249, of June 11, 2010; and enacts other provisions. Brazil: March 21, 2012. https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/l12598.htm ↑
32. Gonçalves, H. L. M. B. L. “A criação do Comando Militar do Norte na Amazônia Oriental: uma questão geoestratégica.” Doutrina Militar Terrestre em revista, v4(9), 2016. ↑
33. Dos Santos, L. W. “Política de defesa nacional do Brasil: uma política de Estado ou de governo?” Revista Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa, 5(2), 2018. ↑
34. Balza, G. “Brasil é o grande alvo dos EUA”, diz jornalista que obteve documentos de Snowden. Uol Notícias, September 4, 2013. https://noticias.uol.com.br/internacional/ultimas-noticias/2013/09/04/brasil-eo-grande-alvo-dos-eua-diz-jornalista-que-obteve-documentos-de-snowden.htm. ↑
35. Press Release. “Bugging Brazil.” WikiLeaks, July 4, 2015. https://wikileaks.org/nsabrazil/press.br-pt.html. ↑
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37. Duarte, Rubens de S. “Trajetória Sinuosa: Surgimento de uma Dimensão Pública na Formulação da Política de Defesa no Brasil?”. Dados 65 (4): e20210075, 2022. ↑
38. Agência Senado. “Novas diretrizes para a defesa nacional já estão em vigor.” Agência Senado, December 20, 2018. https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2018/12/20/novas-diretrizes-para-a-defesanacional-ja-estao-em-vigor ↑
39. Acácio, Igor. “The Politics of Military Deployments for Public Security”. Thesis (Ph.D. in Political Science), Riverside, CA: University of California, Riverside: 2022. ↑
40. Giesteira, L. F., Matos, P. D. O., and Ferreira, T. B. “A defesa nacional e os programas estratégicos de defesa no PPA 2016-2019.” IPEA: Textos Para Discussão, 2021. ↑
41. Simoes, Gustavo de Frota, and Guimarães, Luísa Vaz. “O PREPARO E EMPREGO MILITAR NA CRISE MIGRATÓRIA VENEZUELANA NO BRASIL”. Boletim De Conjuntura (BOCA) 15 (45). Boa Vista, 2023: 749-74. ↑
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43. Amorim Neto, O. “The Impact of Civilians on Defense Policy in New Democracies: The Case of Brazil”. Latin American Politics and Society 61, no. 3 :2019, 1-28; Lima, R. C., Silva, P. F., and Rudzit, G. No power vacuum: national security neglect and the defence sector in Brazil. Defence Studies, 21(1): 2020, 84-106; Duarte, Rubens de S. “Trajetória Sinuosa: Surgimento de uma Dimensão Pública na Formulação da Política de Defesa no Brasil?”. Dados 65 (4): e20210075, 2022. ↑
44. Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. “Itamaraty terá de explicar recusa em vender ambulâncias blindadas à Ucrânia.” Portal de la Camara de Diputados do Brasil, August 9, 2023. https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividadelegislativa/comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/credn/noticias/itamaraty-tera-de-explicar-recusa-em-vender-ambulancias-blindadas-a-ucrania ↑
45. Marques, Adriana A and Maia Neto, Jacintho. “Brazil’s National Defence Strategy, Defence Diplomacy and Management of Strategic Resources”. Defence Diplomacy & National Security Strategy, April 20, 2020. https://scholar.google.com.br/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=J_kxgtIAAAAAAJ&citation_for_view=J_kxgtIAAAAJ:W7OEmFMy1HYC ↑
46. Marques, Adriana A. and Jacintho Maia Neto. “Brazil’s National Defence Strategy, Defence Diplomacy and Management of Strategic Resources.” Defence Diplomacy & National Security National Security Strategy Strategy, April 2020, 18-19. https://af77305b-83ae-4652-be9e-daa5e1e5aec2.usrfiles.com/ugd/af7730_2800b5337bc2406186ae22741d0e1e9a.pdf ↑
47. Brazil. “Política Nacional de Defesa.” Governo do Brasil, 2020. https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/. https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/copy_of_estado-e-defesa/pnd_end_congressonacional_22_07_2020.pdf ↑
48. Teixeira Júnior, Augusto W. M. “Priorização, Capacidades Militares e Defesa no Brasil: uma análise à luz da guerra russo-ucrania”. Revista Geopolitica v. 14, nº 2, p. 1-15, April – June 2020. http://www.revistageopolitica.com.br/index.php/revistageopolitica/article/viewFile/459/342. ↑
49. Giesteira, L. F., Matos, P. D. O., and Ferreira, T. B. “A defesa nacional e os programas estratégicos de defesa no PPA 2016-2019.” IPEA: Textos Para Discussão, 2021. https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/cd65c823-cb5c-4e34-b2a0-e0c6c1cac941/content ↑
50. Brick, E. S. “Análise crítica dos documentos de alto nível da defesa do Brasil”. PND, END e LBDN, 2020. https://defesa.uff.br/2020/08/17/analise-critica-da-pnd-end-e-lbdn-versao-2020/ ↑
51. As mentioned by ASPLAN/MD representatives in an interview conducted in conjunction with Professor Karina Furtado Rodrigues and Professor Ana Luiza de Bravo e Paiva in November 2022, in Brasilia. ↑
52. Teixeira Júnior, Augusto W. M. “Priorização, Capacidades Militares e Defesa no Brasil: uma análise à luz da guerra russo-ucrania”. Revista Geopolitica v. 14, nº 2, p. 1-15, April – June 2020. http://www.revistageopolitica.com.br/index.php/revistageopolitica/article/viewFile/459/342 ↑
53. Ibid. ↑
54. Goldoni, L. R. F. F., Rodrigues, K. F., and Medeiros, B. P. “What is the Future of Brazil’s Cybersecurity Governance?” Cadernos Gestão Pública e Cidadania, 29, e90972, 2024. https://doi.org/10.12660/cgpc.v29.90972.85588 ↑
55. Lima, R. C., Silva, P. F., and Rudzit, G. “No power vacuum: national security neglect and the defence sector in Brazil.” Defence Studies, 21(1), 2020, 2020, 84-106; Maia Neto, J. “A dinâmica dos documentos de Defesa brasileiros.” In: Panel 11 – Políticas e Governança de Defesa. Brasília: XI Encontro Brasileiro de Administração Pública, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e7hKsMpw4cg; Figueiredo, E. L. “Estudos Estratégicos como área de conhecimento científico.” Revista Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa, 2(2), 2015. ↑
56. Lima, R. C., Silva, P. F., and Rudzit, G. “No power vacuum: national security neglect and the defense sector in Brazil.” Defence Studies, 21(1), 2020: 84-106. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2020.1848425; Rodrigues, K. F. 2022. Transparency and Civil-Military Relations: assessing civilian access to military records in Brazil and Mexico (1981-2012). Amorim Neto (Org). New studies on civil-military relations and defense policy in Brazil. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV. ↑
57. Ministry of Defense of Brazil. “Ministério da Defesa convoca sociedade para contribuir com a Política Nacional de Defesa e Estratégia Nacional de Defesa”. Ministério da Defesa do Brasil, March 5, 2024. https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/noticias/ministerio-da-defesa-convoca-sociedade-paracontribuir-com-a-politica-nacional-de-defesa-e-estrategia-nacional-de-defesa ↑
58. Duarte, Rubens de S. “Trajetória Sinuosa: Surgimento de uma Dimensão Pública na Formulação daPolítica de Defesa no Brasil?”. Dados 65 (4): e20210075, 2022. ↑
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