“There are two ways to conquer and enslave a nation. One is by the sword. The other is by debt.”
John Adams, president of the United States of America.

Summary

The economic growth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is undeniable and so is its global influence. The loans and investments that the PRC has been making in various countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean are causing concern among important international players such as the United States because, if the governments of these countries depend excessively on Chinese funds, their political and economic decisions may be strongly influenced by this Asian giant. Within the framework of this growing rivalry, the PRC has become Peru’s main trading partner and although Chinese investments in this South American country are smaller than those made by other countries, they are particularly significant as they are concentrated in strategic sectors such as mining, electricity and infrastructure; something of which the Peruvian State must be aware in order to minimize the associated risks. Undoubtedly, PRC investments in Peru will be positive to the extent that they take advantage of these opportunities and avoid the problems and mistakes already experienced in other countries.

Keywords: People’s Republic of China, Peru, Chinese investments, Belt and Road initiative, Chancay mega port.

Introduction

In just two decades, the economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) went from representing 3% of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002 to representing 18% in 2022. In the same period of time, trade between the PRC and the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region increased 25-fold, from US$12 billion in 2000 to US$315 billion in 2020. Undoubtedly, the PRC intends to expand its influence at the global level and establish an international trade less dependent on the dollar and the financial system led by the United States (US). For this reason, the PRC has been developing its own payment system and establishing more trade agreements in yuan to strengthen the importance of this currency in the global market.

Although the PRC’s defense budget is the second largest in the world, its real power comes from finance, economy and technology. Aware of this reality, the PRC has been banking on global economic penetration through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to co-opt global logistics routes in order to gain economic and political influence in the international arena. Since its launch in 2013, the BRI has surpassed $1 trillion in cumulative participation, involving more than a hundred countries and international organizations, with which the PRC has signed cooperation agreements. A decade later, BRI has expanded to Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, developing infrastructure, thereby generating strong doses of concern in countries such as the US.

In this sense, this article analyzes the impact of the growing financial and commercial influence of the PRC, both in Latin America and particularly in Peru. To this end, it initially describes the financial actions that the PRC has been implementing in order to position its currency in international markets and reduce the marked influence of the dollar in global trade. It then examines the development and impact of the BRI in Europe, Asia and Africa, providing some examples of Chinese investments made under this initiative, as well as the problems and challenges faced by some of the recipient countries. In addition, it discusses the PRC’s clear political decision to strengthen relations with the LAC region not only through trade, investment and financial cooperation, but also through culture and politics. Finally, the importance of existing trade relations between the PRC and Peru is analyzed, as well as the impact of Chinese investments in Peru, mainly in sectors such as mining, electricity and infrastructure. With these actions, the PRC is laying the foundations for a new world order more favorable to its interests and global aspirations.

A New World Order in Development

In September 2022, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, aboard the destroyer USS Howard, anchored in Japan, stated that “China is undermining key elements in the international order based on rules.”

^[1] when referring to the rules of a world order established precisely in the US during the Bretton Woods summit in July 1944, where bankers, diplomats, politicians and economists from 44 countries developed a new framework to guarantee the stability of the monetary system and finance the reconstruction of the countries affected by World War II.^[2] Among the measures that led to the change in that geopolitical paradigm were the establishment of an exchange system based on the dollar, but linked to gold (at a rate of 35 dollars per ounce of gold, because the US owned three quarters of the world’s gold supply), as well as the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which is part of today’s World Bank Group (WBG).^[3]

With these measures, the U.S. succeeded not only in displacing the pound sterling after 130 years of hegemony and establishing the dollar as the world’s exchange currency, but also in creating and leading two geo-economic instruments of global power: the IMF (which monitors the world economy and its member countries, lends to countries facing balance of payments problems, and provides practical assistance to members) and the WBG (which provides financing, policy advice and technical assistance to governments facing balance of payments problems, and provides practical assistance to members), lends to countries facing balance of payments problems, and provides practical assistance to members) and the WBG (which provides financing, policy advice and technical assistance to developing country governments),^[4] reasserting its political and economic power.^[5]

However, 27 years later, in the midst of the Vietnam War and in the face of the severe crisis facing the U.S. due to its high deficits, U.S. President Richard Nixon devalued the dollar and declared on August 15, 1971, the inconvertibility of the dollar into gold.^[6] Finally, in 1973, Nixon ended the fixed exchange rate; thus, the Federal Reserve did not need to maintain a stable relationship between banknotes and metal.^[7]

From that moment on, the dollar became a purely fiduciary currency, a word that comes from the Latin root fiducia, meaning faith or trust. In other words, the dollar currently has no physical backing and is based on the faith of the international community in the proper functioning of the US economic system.^[8] However, other powers such as China and Russia are seeking to establish a new world economic order, less dependent on the dollar and the US-led financial system.

In this regard, in 2002, the PRC economy accounted for 3% of the world’s GDP and had less than 1% of the world’s patent applications filed.^[9] However, two decades later, in 2022, its economy already represented 1 8 % of the world GDP^[10] and had almost 47% of the patent applications filed worldwide,^[11] being the Chinese company Huawei the global leader in technology patents in telecommunications and digital transformation.^[12] Undoubtedly, these data show that the PRC is making a great geo-economic breakthrough, facing commercially and financially the US.

Whereas the Society for Worldwide Interbank and Financial Communications (SWIFT) is an international cooperative organization that offers a financial messaging platform to its user community (some 11,000 financial and corporate entities in more than 200 countries) and abides by international sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the European Union (EU), both Russia and the PRC have created their own payment systems to prevent the threat of these sanctions.^[13]

On the one hand, Russia, after annexing the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in 2014 and in view of its possible exclusion from SWIFT, developed – through the Central Bank of Russia – its own payment system, the SPFS, which connects more than 400 Russian institutions, mostly banks, but by the end of 2021 connected 23 banks in Armenia, Belarus, Germany, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Switzerland.^[14] On the other hand, in 2015 and with the backing of the People’s Bank of China, the PRC launched the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) to internationalize the use of the renminbi (the PRC’s official currency, whose basic unit is the yuan). As of September 2023, CIPS already covered more than 4,300 banking institutions in 182 countries and regions around the world.^[15] In fact, there are plans to integrate the Russian SPFS with the Chinese CIPS.^[16] In the last year, Russia has resorted to trading in yuan due to Western sanctions on its exports, imports and energy trade, prompted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.^[17]

In doing so, the PRC seeks to dismantle the current economic order and establish more yuan trade agreements to increase the relevance of the yuan in world markets and challenge the dominance of the U.S. dollar in international trade.^[18] In this regard, in March 2023, Chinese state-owned oil and gas giant CNOOC and French giant TotalEnergies completed the first liquefied natural gas (LNG) transaction in the market with payment in yuan of nearly

55,000 tons of LNG imported from the United Arab Emirates.^[19] Also, in November 2023, the PRC and Saudi Arabia entered into a swap agreement (a currency exchange between two countries that acts as a contingent loan between central banks) worth approximately $7 billion. Such an agreement carries significant symbolic weight as Saudi Arabia is the world’s leading oil exporter.^[20]

Additionally, in April 2023, it became known that Bangladesh will make a first payment in yuan to Russia equivalent to 300 million dollars for the construction of the Rooppur nuclear power plant, a project backed 90% by a loan from the Russian government, which will cost 12.55 billion dollars and will employ 2,500 technicians during its construction.550 million and will employ 2,500 technicians from the Russian State Nuclear Energy Corporation Rosatom during its construction.^[21] Currently, the Chinese central bank has 29 active swap agreements, which exceed 4 trillion yuan.^[22]

In this context, the PRC has also shown its intention to achieve a greater presence of the yuan in Latin America, after becoming a key trading partner and an important source of financing for some countries in the region. On the one hand, in 2015, the PRC and Chile signed investment and currency exchange agreements, and announced the opening of the first yuan clearing bank in the region.^[23] On the other hand, in March 2023, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the signing of a memorandum of cooperation with Brazil that will help promote bilateral trade and investment in yuan. To this end, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the Brazilian bank BBM agreed to reduce the costs of commercial transactions with direct exchange between the real and the yuan, enabling the Brazilian entity to join CIPS.^[24] Likewise, in April 2023, the Argentine Minister of Economy, Sergio Massa, announced the activation of the swap with China, which allows the payment with yuan of more than US$ 1,040 million corresponding to imports from China.1.04 billion dollars corresponding to imports from China.^[25] Likewise, in July 2023, the Bolivian Minister of Economy, Marcelo Montenegro, reported that in only two months, financial operations for 278 million yuan had been concluded, with a forecast of an increase in the use of this currency after the export of Bolivian lithium carbonate.^[26]

It should be noted that the Chinese companies CTL (Contemporary Amperex Technology) and Citic Guoan, as well as the Russian company Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of Rosatom, have committed to invest almost US$2 billion in Bolivia to produce 50,000 tons of lithium carbonate per year starting on 2025.^[27]

However, it should be pointed out that, despite the recognized advance of the Chinese currency in world trade, this currency is still far from becoming the most widely used currency in international transactions, since the yuan currently represents only 2.7% of the market, compared to 41% of the US dollar.^[28] Aware of this reality, the PRC has been promoting other mechanisms in order to make progress in both the political and economic spheres worldwide.

The New Silk Road

Although China increased its defense budget by 7.2% in 2023, making it the second largest in the world after the US,^[29] today, the PRC’s real power lies in finance, economy and technology. In that sense, the PRC has been betting on a global economic penetration through the New Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); an international infrastructure project (maritime, land and digital) that Chinese President Xi Jinping launched in 2013 to connect the country with Asia and the rest of the world with the purpose of gaining economic and political influence at a global level.^[30] Since its inception, the BRI has surpassed $1 trillion in cumulative participation, while the PRC has signed more than 200 cooperation agreements with 152 countries and 32 international organizations.^[31] A decade later, the BRI has expanded to Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, facing criticism and challenges.

In Europe, for example, in 2015, the Government of Montenegro closed a deal with the state-owned China Communications Construction Company for the construction of the first 41 kilometers of a 153-kilometer highway intended to cross from south to north the country. For the execution of this work, Montenegro agreed to a loan of about $1 billion from Exim Bank, also Chinese state-owned.^[32] Following accusations of corruption and bribery, the project is two years behind schedule and the current government of Montenegro faces the great risk of defaulting on the loan installments since in case of default the contract stipulates that the country must give up sovereignty over certain parts of its territory, following an arbitration procedure that would take place in China, following Chinese laws.^[33] Many Western countries have criticized Montenegro’s decision and have warned about the consequences of what they call the diplomacy of the debt trap, an alleged Chinese strategy to make use of its economic power and in case countries are unable to pay, seize their assets.^[34] Something that the PRC has rejected, stating that credit and financing practices, in the context of the BRI, are based on international standards, also used by other countries.^[35]

A year later, in 2016, the Chinese state-owned giant COSCO Shipping Corporation acquired 67% of the share capital of the Greek port of Piraeus, the largest logistics hub for the distribution of goods in Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean, for the amount of 368.5 million euros (about 396 million dollars). An operation that could generate revenues of up to 1.5 billion euros (about 1.613 billion dollars) to the Greek public coffers, due to a dividend and an annual commission that COSCO will pay for the 36-year concession to operate the port’s infrastructure.^[36]

Recently, in May 2023, the German government announced that it will allow 24.9% of a terminal in the port of Hamburg to be sold to COSCO. It should be noted that the Chinese company had intended to acquire 35% of this terminal; however, these aspirations had to be limited to 24.9%, since this reduction allows the head of the German government, Olaf Scholz, to personally approve the sale without going through the Council of Ministers, where liberals and environmentalists could have blocked the operation if the percentage sold had exceeded 25%, considering that the port of Hamburg is of strategic importance for German industry and one of the most important in Europe.^[37] Undoubtedly, the loans and investments in infrastructure that the PRC has been making in Europe have generated criticism and concern among the member countries of the European Community, as well as from the US, since the more such assets China has in Europe, the greater its influence in that region.^[38]

However, advancing BRI in Europe is no easy task. In December 2023, four years after becoming the only G7 country to sign up to the PRC infrastructure project, Italy formally withdrew from this project, due to frustration over unfulfilled promises and Italian strategic reassessment. Of the €20 billion (about $21.5 billion) in business expected in 2019, little or nothing has come to Italy, with the PRC benefiting the most. Since that date, Italian exports to China increased from €14.5 billion to €18.5 billion, while Chinese exports to Italy increased from €33.5 billion to €50.9 billion.^[39]

In Asia, to cite a few examples, in October 2023, Indonesia inaugurated the first high-speed train in Southeast Asia, which was partly financed by the PRC through loans and connects the capital Jakarta with the city of Bandung (about 140 kilometers). After four years of delay and an additional cost of $1.2 billion, this work was built by PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China (a joint venture company created in 2015 between an Indonesian state-owned company and a Chinese consortium), at a cost of US$7.27 billion.^[40]

In this sense, the PRC has become the main creditor of several countries in the region, generating debts that are difficult to pay. In this regard, in 2010, Sri Lanka agreed to a loan from the PRC to build the port of Hambantota, on the condition that the work would be carried out by China Harbour Engineering Company. However, in the face of default on the debt repayment, in December 2017, Sri Lanka had to cede the operation of Hambantota to China for 99 years for $1.12 billion.^[41] The construction and ceding of this port to the PRC has raised concerns not only about the bribes that were allegedly given to Sri Lankan officials and politicians in exchange for their support for the project, but also about the military use that the port could be put to.^[42] Although the port lease agreement excludes military use of the site by the PRC, Western countries point out that the Sri Lankan government may be pressured to allow it as it is still heavily indebted to China.^[43] In 2022, Sri Lanka declared bankruptcy, with the PRC being its largest creditor with almost 52% of its total debt.^[44]

In Africa, the situation is not very different. In recent decades, the PRC has become the main economic partner of this region. The trade exchange between the two grew from $1 billion in the year 1992 to more than $100 billion in the year 2008, estimating that by the year 2035 this figure could reach $300 billion.^[45] It is therefore not surprising that Xi Jinping’s first official visit as head of state, both in the year 2013 and on his re-election in the year 2018, was to Africa. However, the PRC is not only the region’s main trading partner, but also one of its main lenders. Africa accumulates a debt of $153 billion to the PRC, which between 2000 and 2019 has granted 1,143 loans to African governments.^[46]

Chinese investments in Africa are significant; for example, of the 231 commercial ports in Africa, 51 have been built by Chinese companies. Likewise, the PRC has built 10,000 kilometers of railways in this continent.^[47]

But why is China so interested in Africa? The answer is very simple. On the one hand, the PRC needs hydrocarbons and mineral resources to continue its industrialization and growth process, having an excess of capital that it wishes to invest abroad. On the other hand, the African states possess a large amount of natural resources, lacking the capital and infrastructure to boost their growth.^[48] Therefore, a commercial and political relationship of mutual need and interest is generated. A clear example of this type of bilateral relationship is shown in what is known as the Angola model a formula in which the PRC offers financial assistance in the form of credits and infrastructure construction in exchange for natural resources. In 2002, after decades of violence and civil war, Angola had achieved some stability and required financing to develop. In this context, the PRC approached the country, offering loans in exchange for considerable amounts of oil. Angola is the African country that not only has the second largest oil reserves on the continent, but also the one that has received the largest Chinese loans, some $42.6 billion between 2000 and 2019.^[49] However, these development opportunities are held back by various economic and political factors in African states, including high levels of corruption, making it impossible to reduce poverty and inequality in this region.

The PRC not only builds large power plants, bridges, roads, ports and railways in Africa, but also imports various raw materials from Africa: oil from Sudan and Angola, uranium from Namibia and Niger, cobalt and coltan from the Democratic Republic of Congo, among others.^[50] This close relationship raises concerns in Western countries, such as the USA, because if African governments’ finances are overly dependent on Chinese funds, their political and economic decisions may be strongly influenced by the PRC, in addition to the consequences of what they call the debt trap.

Such is the influence of the PRC in this region that, in August 2017, it inaugurated in Djibouti its first military establishment outside the national territory. This military base – located near the port of Doraleh – occupies an area of 360,000 square meters and has a 600-meter long pier, a heliport, a short runway, warehouses for ammunition and/or armaments, and administrative offices, and can house up to 400 Marines.^[51] Although the establishment of this Chinese military base has aroused controversy for the international community, the truth is that countries such as the US, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Italy also have military bases in that country, due to the fact that the foreign policy led by the Yibouti president Ismail Omar Guelleh, in power since 1999, promotes the concession for the establishment of foreign military bases as a source of income for the public treasury, estimating annual revenues of between 20 and 50 million dollars for each installation.^[52]

The Republic of Djibouti benefits not only from the installation of this Chinese military base, but also from the investments that the PRC has made in various infrastructure works, such as the remodeling of port facilities and the construction of a logistics center. One of these significant projects is the construction of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti high-speed railway line, which connects the 752 kilometers from the Ethiopian capital to the sea through Djibouti.^[53] This important means of transport for cargo and passengers, for which the PRC has invested some US$4 billion, is vital both for the country’s economy and for the development of the country’s economy.4 billion, is vital both for Ethiopia, which lost its access to the sea after Eritrea’s independence, and for Djibouti, since all of Ethiopia’s foreign trade transits through the Yibouti Nagad station, along with goods, raw materials and hydrocarbons from the Central African Republic, Sudan and South Sudan, among others.^[54]

However, China is not the only international player with interests in Africa. By 2022, the EU countries, in order to counter the PRC’s advance in this region, pledged to invest 150 billion euros (about $164 billion) on the African continent until 2027, through an ambitious plan for digital transformation and sustainable development, called Global Gateway.^[55] In fact, this international power struggle is also replicated in other regions such as LAC.

China’s Advance in Latin America and the Caribbean

In the last two decades, trade between the PRC and the LAC region increased 26-fold, from US$12 billion in 2000 to US$315 billion in 2020; it is estimated that by 2035 it will exceed US$700 billion.^[56] The evolution of these figures is not the result of chance, but of a clear political decision by the PRC to expand its influence in this important region. In 2008, the PRC published its first White Paper on policies towards LAC, updated in 2016,^[57] in which it underlines its priorities and growing interest in the region, through a commercial and financial strategy. In this document, the PRC clearly defines its ambitions in trade, industrial investment, financial cooperation, energy and resources cooperation, infrastructure cooperation, as well as manufacturing cooperation.^[58] However, the PRC’s interest in LAC is not only framed in the trade and investment sphere, but also in the political, social and cultural spheres.

For this reason, the PRC is committed to strengthening both bilateral relations with the States of the region and relations with multilateral organizations operating in the region. In 2004, the PRC became a permanent observer member of the Organization of American States (OAS) and, in 2009, it became a non-borrowing member of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), where it invested US$350 million to finance a number of programs in the region.^[59]

Likewise, the formation of the China – Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac) Forum at the end of 2014, with the aim of promoting the development of the Comprehensive Cooperation Association between the PRC and LAC, demonstrates not only the great interest that the Asian giant has in the region, but also the pragmatic way it uses to achieve its objectives.

In this regard, it can be stated that the cooperation framework proposed by the PRC for the region is composed of two important policies. On the one hand, there is the numerical scheme of “1+3+6”, which President Xi Jinping mentioned in 2014, in Brazil, during the BRICS meeting; where “1” refers to a program as a guide for cooperation (i.e. the 2015-2019 Cooperation Plan agreed during the first ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in 2015), “3” refers to the three engines as the driving force of cooperation (trade, investment and financial cooperation) and “6” refers to the six axes as the key points of cooperation (resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, manufacturing, technological and scientific innovation, as well as information technology). On the other hand, there is the “3×3” productive capacity cooperation modality, which Chinese Premier Li Keqiang introduced during his visit to Latin America in May 2015; where the first “3” refers to the three channels to achieve continental interconnection (logistics, electricity and information technology), the second “3” refers to the virtuous interaction that must exist between three important actors (enterprises, society and government) according to the laws of the market, and the third “3” refers to the three financing channels (funds, credits and insurance) in cooperation projects.^[60] It can therefore be said that the PRC has developed a specific policy towards LAC, demonstrating that it is not interested in modifying the pattern in force in the region, nor the form and type of regime of the governments with which it has relations.

Currently, the PRC is not only the largest trading partner of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru;^[61] but also the main recipient of exports from Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Peru, and Uruguay.^[62]

However, despite the growth in trade relations, there are significant differences in the products traded, since while LAC countries export mainly raw materials to China, the PRC exports manufactured and high-tech products to this region, affecting local industries. In addition, the trade relationship between the PRC and LAC is highly concentrated in terms of both goods and geography.^[63] 70% of the goods exported to the PRC are made up of five main products (including soybeans, crude oil and copper), while 90% of these goods are exported by four countries (Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela).^[64] However, although it is possible to mention some general trends applicable to the relationship between the PRC and LAC, the fact is that the relationship developed between the PRC and the countries of the region differs both in terms of the characteristics of each country and the intensity of the links and the impact of Chinese products on their markets.^[65]

In this context, the PRC shows its interest in LAC not only because of the abundant natural resources that this region possesses and the opportunities granted by a market of approximately 500 million inhabitants to accommodate its finished and high-tech products, but also because of its interest in strengthening the principle of one China, given that LAC is home to 8 (Guatemala, Belize, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, The Grenadines and Paraguay) of the 13 States that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In the last decade, due to the growing economic power of the PRC and its refusal to accept having relations with States that recognize Taiwan, countries in the region such as Panama (in 2017), Dominican Republic (in 2018), Nicaragua (in 2021) and Honduras (in 2023) have severed relations with Taiwan and recognized the PRC as the only legitimate government that represents all of China.^[66]

Undoubtedly, China has been well received in most of the countries of the region since, unlike institutions led by the U.S., the PRC’s development financial institutions have not conditioned their loans and investments to the economic policies or democratic guarantees of the recipient countries.^[67] Thus, between 2005 and 2022, the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Ex-Im Bank) have provided more than US$136 billion in loans to LAC countries and state-owned enterprises, with Venezuela (US$60 billion), Brazil (US$31 billion), Ecuador (US$18.2 billion), and Argentina (with $17 billion), the main recipients of these loans.^[68] In this sense, it is not surprising that the PRC is Venezuela’s main creditor, since this Latin American country, despite being in a serious economic, social and political crisis, pays its obligations with oil shipments to China.^[69]

In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), the PRC has invested US$160 billion in LAC between 2000 and 2020, mainly in mergers and acquisitions.^[70] In this regard, in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping, during a meeting with Celac leaders, pledged an investment of US$250 billion in the region over 10 years.^[71] As a result, 22 LAC countries have already signed treaties with the PRC for the BRI.^[72] Although the BRI was launched in 2013, the participation of the LAC region in this initiative was formalized in January 2018, through a communication sent by Xi Jinping himself, within the framework of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the China – Celac Forum.^[73]

In this context, Brazil is the main recipient of Chinese capital in the region; it is estimated that between 2007 and 2021, Chinese investment in Brazil was US$ 70.3 billion in 202 different projects, mainly in the electricity (45.5 %) and oil and gas (30.9 %) sectors.^[74] In 2021 alone, Chinese direct investment in Brazil totaled US$ 5.9 billion in 28 major business projects, with the oil and gas sector receiving 85% of this investment, mainly due to the partnership of the Brazilian oil company Petrobras with the Chinese giants CNODC and CNOOC for the exploitation of fields in very deep waters of the Atlantic off the Brazilian coast.^[75] Other important Chinese investments include the purchase of the Mercedes-Benz plant in the city of Iracemápolis by Great Wall Motors and the acquisition of the Rio Grande do Sul Power Transmission Company by State Grid Corporation, the largest electric power distribution and transmission company in China and the world.^[76]

Additionally, the PRC is one of Argentina’s three main trading partners (with a trade exchange of US$20 billion in 2021) and one of its main investors with different infrastructure, energy and communication projects, among other sectors. One of these projects is the construction of the Ernesto Kirchner and Jorge Cepernic dams in the Argentine province of Santa Cruz, awarded in 2013 to a consortium formed by the Argentine companies Electroingeniería e Hidrocuyo S.A. and the Chinese company Gezhouba Group Corporation. This hydroelectric project that will generate 1,310 MW of energy has a total cost of US$4,714 million, which is being financed by the banks China Development Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited and the Bank of China Limited.^[77] Another of these projects is the construction of a fertilizer plant in Tierra del Fuego with an investment of US$1.25 billion, which includes the improvement of the province’s ports and the construction of a thermal power plant.^[78] Also, in June 2022, the Chinese company Gotion High Tech, one of the world’s leading manufacturer of batteries for electric cars, signed an agreement with the Argentine state-owned company Jujuy Energía y Minería Sociedad del Estado to build two lithium carbonate production plants for electric batteries, with an investment of more than US$12 million.^[79]

Additionally, in 2022, YPF Tec, the business unit of the Argentine company YPF aimed at technological development, and the Chinese mining company Tianqi Lithium signed an agreement for the latter to invest in the exploration, exploitation, production, commercialization and industrialization of lithium in Argentina.^[80]

Within the framework of relations between the PRC and Argentina, the completion of the construction – in 2018 – of the Far Space Station, a ground station belonging to the Chinese National Space Administration, located in the Argentine province of Neuquén, generated not only debates due to the commitment of the Argentine Government not to interrupt or interfere with Chinese activities at the site,^[81] but also suspicions due to its secrecy and the possibilities it offers to the PRC to gather information in the hemisphere.^[82] In November 2021, after months of negotiation, the Chinese government and the government of the province of Neuquén signed an agreement whereby the PRC obtained the right to use the land – rent-free – for 50 years.^[83] In that sense, the Chinese ground stations installed in Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela have also generated U.S. concern since the PRC’s major space technology companies, such as China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, have their roots in the People’s Liberation Army and continue to provide military-related technologies,^[84] so that the data obtained by these ground stations could not only have a civilian use, but also a military use.^[85]

However, it should be noted that all countries operating ground stations in LAC also have these capabilities, so they could use the data obtained under secret conditions, in accordance with their national interests.

On the other hand, one of the first LAC countries with which the PRC established strong trade relations was Chile, with which it reached a trade exchange of US$63.4 billion in 2021, becoming its main trading partner. Among the main products that the PRC exported to Chile, in 2021, were transmission equipment (for US$1.73 billion), computers (for US$1.35 billion) and vehicles (for US$1.23 billion); while among the main products that Chile exported to the PRC, that same year, were copper ore (for US$20 billion), refined copper (for US$6.6 billion) and iron ore (for US$2.25 billion).^[86]

As in other countries in the region, the PRC has been investing primarily in the Chilean electricity and mining sectors. Therefore, it is not surprising that the most important Chinese investments in Chile in recent years have been made by the State Grid Corporation company, by acquiring – in 2020 – the Compañía General de Electricidad S.A. (CGE), the largest distributor in Chile, for about 2.2 billion dollars; as well as acquiring – in 2019 – the company Chilquinta Energía, for more than 2.2 billion dollars. In addition to this, the Chinese company Tianqi Lithium Corporation acquired – in 2018 – 24% of Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile (SQM), for 4,276 million dollars.^[87] According to the Chilean-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, there is also great interest on the part of the PRC in the search for opportunities in the tourism, infrastructure and agribusiness sectors, highlighting the presence of one of the largest wine companies in China: Yantai Changyu Pioneer Wine.^[88]

It should also be noted that by the end of 2022, 21 Chinese companies were operating in Colombia in sectors such as infrastructure, logistics and automotive, among others. As a result, the PRC has been developing 38 projects in that country, with investments exceeding US$2 billion, including the Bogotá Metro.^[89] However, as the PRC’s political and economic diplomacy develops in LAC, so does its cultural diplomacy, as an expression of Chinese soft power. In this context, the Confucius Institutes represent a key instrument of this cultural diplomacy. These institutes were created in 2004 and are financed by the PRC, having expanded to 162 countries with 500 institutes worldwide. In Latin America there are already 41 branches within the university campuses, where Mandarin is taught, summer camps in China and cultural events are financed, as well as scholarships to study in the PRC.^[90] Chinese cultural diplomacy not only strengthens mutual knowledge and understanding between countries, but also complements their political and economic diplomacy, facilitating understanding in socio-cultural terms.

Although the PRC’s economic progress in terms of trade and investment in LAC is significant, the Asian giant still has a long way to go to displace competitors such as the US and the EU in the region. On the one hand, in 2020, PRC-LAC trade, at US$315 billion, accounted for less than one-third of US-EU-LAC trade, of US$955.4 billion; of which US$758 billion correspond to trade between the U.S. and LAC.^[91] On the other hand, between 2000 and 2020, Chinese FDI in LAC – of US$160 billion – only represented 5.74% of total FDI received by LAC countries, compared to the combined FDI of the U.S. and EU that accounted for 70-80% of FDI in LAC.^[92]

Contrary to claims that the PRC is close to exerting a predominant influence over the countries of LAC, the data show that the road is still long. However, compared to other powers, the PRC has shown increased interest in LAC through visible policies, which could turn the region into an area of confrontation in the framework of the strategic competition between the US and the PRC.

In this sense, several analysts point out that LAC could become involved in a second version of the Cold War. However, there are marked differences between the rivalry that Washington maintained with Moscow and the rivalry it now maintains with Beijing, since the latter is not as ideologically charged as the former. On the contrary, the PRC makes use of free trade to expand its influence; the same free trade of which the US has been its main standard-bearer. The same free trade of which the US has been its main standard-bearer.

At present, regardless of the government in power, the geopolitical stance of most Latin American countries with respect to these two great powers responds to their own national interests, aligning with the U.S. in terms of values (human rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity) and with the PRC in terms of economic interests (trade, development and economic sanctions), as evidenced by the 31 resolutions voted in the United Nations General Assembly between 2001 and 2023, in which the U.S. and the PRC voted on the opposite side.^[93]

Undoubtedly, the PRC’s initial involvement in LAC has been an achievement for the Asian giant; however, this does not mean that the road will be easy as it is still encountering resistance in the region, even from its main trading partners. The consequences of Chinese investments in LAC and other regions of the world have begun to show, receiving – in some cases – criticism for their lack of environmental protection, negative impact on the rights of indigenous peoples and lack of transparency.^[94]

Although one of the strengths of U.S. preeminence in LAC is its geographic proximity, the fact is that having its main strategic competitor acting in its backyard does not sit very well with them.^[95] In that sense, the U.S. is aware that the greater the PRC’s economic and cultural involvement in LAC, the greater its capacity to influence political affairs in the region, something that should also be understood by its member countries. Consequently, the growing influence of the PRC in LAC is one more chapter in the current geopolitical rivalry between the two countries, a rivalry that can be sensed in countries like Peru.

China’s Growing Influence in Peru

In 2009, the PRC and Peru signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Two years later, Peruvian exports to the PRC exceeded the amount of exports to the US, positioning it as the main destination. Then, in 2014, the PRC established itself as the main supplier country of goods for Peru, by also surpassing the US, becoming -since that year- its main trading partner.^[96] Recently, in 2022, Peru’s exports to the PRC totaled US$20,791 million (representing 32.9% of total Peruvian exports), while imports from China reached US$15.782 million dollars (representing 26.2% of total Peruvian purchases), so the trade exchange between these two countries was 36,573 million dollars.^[97] In this sense, the trade balance is favorable to Peru since the PRC needs mineral resources to continue its growth and Peru possesses them in large quantities, particularly copper ores and their concentrates.

Despite this important commercial exchange, the PRC is still far from being the main investor in Peru. For example, in 2022, Peru received US$30,202 million in investments from countries such as the United Kingdom, with US$6,340 million (representing 21% of the total amount); followed by Spain, with US$5,228 million (17.3% of the total); Chile, with US$3,583 million (11.9% of the total); USA, with US$ 3,232 million (10.7% of the total); and the Netherlands, with US$ 1,402 million (4.6% of the total); while in the case of the PRC, its investment in Peru was US$ 1,139 million (3.8% of the total), ranking 8th on the list.^[98] It is therefore not surprising that, between 2005 and 2022, the PRC’s development financial institutions granted loans to the Peruvian government (including state-owned enterprises) in the amount of US$50 million, which represents only 0.03% of the total loans that the PRC has provided to LAC countries.^[99]

These figures clearly show that the PRC’s economic progress in Peru is uneven, being the first Peruvian partner in terms of trade, but not in terms of investment. However, Chinese investments in Peru arouse concern not only among international experts and analysts, but also among US officials, Peru’s second largest trading partner and the most influential country in LAC, mainly because these investments are concentrated in strategic sectors such as electricity, mining and infrastructure.

According to Peru’s Supervisory Agency for Investment in Energy and Mining (Osinergmin), electricity consumption increased between 2005 and 2021 at an average annual growth rate of 5.4%, from 20.7 TWh^[100] to 48 TWh in that period.^[101] In fact, investment in the electricity generation, transmission and distribution sector in Peru is directly linked to the mining sector due to its high energy demand. Therefore, in 2017, a consortium led by China Three Gorges Corporation (CTG), the largest hydroelectric company in the world, acquired the Chaglla hydroelectric plant, the third largest hydroelectric plant in Peru (with a capacity of 456 MW), from the Brazilian company Odebrecht for an amount of 1.390 million dollars.^[102] It should be noted that Chaglla is being operated and maintained by Empresa de Generación Huallaga S.A., which belongs to CTG. However, this is not the first investment made by CTG in the Peruvian electricity sector, since, in 2016, as part of the Hydro Global Peru S.A.C consortium, CTG was awarded the construction of the hydroelectric power plant San Gabán III, with an investment of US$438 million, and was granted the concession to develop the electricity generation activity of this hydroelectric power plant (with 205.8 MW of power) for a period of 30 years after commercial operations start, scheduled for 2027.^[103]

Likewise, in 2019, the U.S. company Sempra Energy International Holdings, owner of 83.6% of Luz del Sur S.A.A., announced the sale of its stake to the company China Yangtze Power International (CYPI), controlled by CTG, for US$3.59 billion.^[104] The following year, the Peruvian Institute for the Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property (Indecopi) authorized this purchase, subject to conditions. With this transaction, CTG not only acquired Luz del Sur, the country’s largest electricity company with operations in the southeast area of Lima, but also Inland Energy and nine hydroelectric power plants, as well as Tecsur, specialized in construction services and electrical infrastructure.^[105]

Subsequently, in 2023, the Italian energy group Enel reported that its subsidiary Enel Peru agreed to sell to the China Southern Power Grid International (CSGI) partnership the shares it owns in the electricity distribution and supply company, Enel Distribución Perú (equivalent to 83.15%) and in the advanced energy services company Enel X Perú (equivalent to 100%), for an amount of US$2.9 billion.^[106] This transaction raised the concern of both Indecopi, observing that there would be potential restrictive effects to competition, and of the Peruvian National Society of Industries (SNI), pointing out that with this purchase PRC would be controlling 100% of the electric distribution market in Lima,^[107] but mainly because it was corroborated that CSGI HK is part of the same economic group of Luz del Sur S.A.A. (Luz del Sur), Empresa de Generación Huallaga S.A. (Generación Huallaga), Inland Energy S.A.C. (Inland Energy) and Hydro Global Perú S.A.C. (Hydro Global), ringing risk alarms when Enel Distribución purchases energy to supply its regulated users, located in its concession area, which covers the northern area of Metropolitan Lima, Callao and the provinces of Huaura, Huaral, Barranca and Oyón, belonging to the Lima region.^[108]

Therefore, in February 2024, Indecopi, through the Commission for the Defense of Free Competition (CLC), conditioned this transaction to the compliance of certain rules that Enel Distribución must observe and abide by when it has to contract electric energy to serve its regulated customers.^[109] Despite these regulatory acts by the Peruvian authorities, the fact that a single country – in this case, PRC – controls 100% of the electricity distribution market in Lima, the capital of Peru and a megalopolis that is home to a third of the country’s population, should not cease to be a concern for the Peruvian government.

Regarding Chinese investments in the Peruvian mining sector, in February 2023, the Board of Directors of the Peruvian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce (Capechi) reported that – as of that date – more than 10 Chinese mining companies had invested US$23.1 billion in Peru, highlighting that three of them (MMG Las Bambas, Minera Chinalco Toromocho and Hierro Shougang) have a total investment of US$17.599 billion, contributing 7.6% of Peru’s GDP.^[110] In this context, the highest amounts of Chinese investment in Peruvian mining were recorded between 2012 and 2015, thanks to the development of the Las Bambas copper operation, one of the largest copper mines in the world, operated by MMG Las Bambas, a subsidiary of the Chinese company MMG Limited.^[111]

In this regard, in September 2020, the then Minister of Energy and Mines, Miguel Incháustegui, highlighted that the PRC, besides being Peru’s main trading partner, is one of the largest investors in the mining sector and one of the largest demanders of the metals exported by the country. Likewise, Incháustegui indicated that 23% of the national copper production and 100% of the iron ore production come from mines operated by Chinese companies, with five projects – with an investment of US$ 10,155 million – promoted by PRC mining companies, among them, the Toromocho Mining Unit expansion project (by Minera Chinalco Perú S.A.), the Pampa de Pongo deposit expansion project (by Jinzhao Mining Perú S.A.), the Don Javier project (by Junefield Group S.A.), the Galeno project (by Lumina Copper S.A.C.) and the Rio Blanco project (by Rio Blanco Copper S.A.).

It should be noted that Peru supplies the PRC with 27% of copper concentrates and 19% of zinc concentrates of its total demand.^[112]

However, the investments and activities of Chinese mining companies in Peru have also generated protests and complaints from communities within their areas of influence. In this regard, in 2018, members of the Collective on Chinese Finance and Investment, Human Rights and Environment (CICDHA) shared information and testimonies on four cases of Chinese-owned mining companies in Peru (Las Bambas in Apurímac, Chinalco in Junín, Shougang in Ica and Rio Blanco Copper in Piura), in which human rights, labor and union rights, the right to land and territory, and the right to life and integrity of indigenous and peasant communities near the area where these companies operate are being violated.^[113]

One such case is that of the Las Bambas mine, whose area of direct social influence covers part of two provinces in Apurímac, a region in the south of the country where 40% of its population is poor. However, in order for the copper concentrate from this mine to reach the coast, it must be transported along a 324.5-kilometer road that passes through various communities in three regions (Abancay, Cusco and Arequipa). The problem is that since there is no road prepared for this purpose, in 2014, the Peruvian Government reclassified as a national route what were neighborhood and regional roads, in an accelerated process that did not take into account the population, creating expectations and demands.^[114] In this regard, the demands of the population are diverse and contradictory, from the payment of compensation for environmental damage (dust, vibrations and noise) caused by the passage of a large number of trucks on an unpaved road, to requests to operate the vehicles that provide services to Las Bambas, forming part of the value chain, and jobs at the mine.^[115]

As a result, between 20156and 2022, the company has recorded 400 days of transportation lost due to blockades that communities carried out along the road. For example, in February 2022, the community of Ccapacmarca, in Chumbivilcas, obstructed the road about 100 kilometers from Las Bambas to obtain financial retribution. A month later, the community of Urinsaya, in Espinar, some 250 kilometers from the mine, also blocked the road with the same intentions. It is estimated that each day of blockade is equivalent to US$9.5 million in losses for Las Bambas.^[116] Additionally, the attitude of various actors exacerbates this problem. On the one hand, the absence of the Peruvian State delays the solution to this conflict, to which is – negatively – added the high turnover and lack of training of public officials responsible for managing this problem. On the other hand, the negotiation style of the Chinese-owned MMG does not allow for substantive solutions to be reached since, by giving in on numerous occasions to the pressure of the blockades through the use of indemnities, the protests are further encouraged. Finally, the presence of non-governmental organizations and external advisors, who claim to defend the communities, generate division and aggravate the situation by pursuing different interests.^[117]

Peru has not only signed an FTA with the PRC, but also a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2013, joining the BRI in 2019. Therefore, it is not surprising that, since a few years ago, Chinese companies have begun to show their interest in investing in infrastructure in Peru, particularly in port infrastructure. At the end of 2023, the Private Investment Promotion Agency, ProInversión, and the Peruvian Ministry of Transport and Communications declared of interest the New Port Terminal of San Juan de Marcona project (located in the Ica region), a self-financed private initiative proposed by the Chinese company Terminal Portuario Jinzhao Peru, which contemplates an investment of US$405 million and a concession period of 30 years.^[118] The objective of this important project, whose operation would begin in 2029, is to provide port services to ships and cargo related to the Pampa de Pongo mining project of the Chinese company Jinzhao Mining Perú S.A., as well as to meet the demand of other mining projects located in the southern part of the country.^[119]

After several negotiations, the project for the new port of San Juan de Marcona was awarded in March 2024 to the company Terminal Portuario Jinzhao Perú S.A., which will be in charge of its design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance. This project will not only boost exports and imports in the southern part of the country, boosting the economic and employment generation, but will also benefit the population of Marcona, as this district will receive 3% of the concessionaire’s annual gross revenues, destined to finance infrastructure works in basic services and social programs.^[120] However, the capacity of the Marcona district authorities to effectively manage such revenues is in doubt if they do not receive adequate support from the Central Government.

Currently, China’s most important infrastructure investment in Peru is the Chancay multipurpose port terminal project, the inauguration of which – scheduled for November 2024 – will be attended by the President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, within the framework of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Peru 2024 Summit.^[121] This project, located 80 kilometers north of the city of Lima and with an expected investment of US$3.5 billion, will be executed in stages and will enable the movement of different types of cargo (containerized, general, non-mineral bulk, liquid and rolling) between Asia and the South Pacific of Latin America. The first stage – with an investment of US$1.3 billion – will be developed in an area of 141 hectares and includes the construction of an access road interchange, an entrance complex, an operational port area and a connecting tunnel (1.8 kilometers long) that will link these last two areas.^[122] The Chancay port terminal, privately owned and for public use, is being executed by the company Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Perú S.A., whose majority shareholder is the Chinese company Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Perú S.A., and whose majority shareholder is the Chinese company Cosco Shipping Ports Chancay Perú S.A., whose majority shareholder is the Chinese company Cosco Shipping Ports with 60% of the shares, while the Peruvian company Volcán Compañía Minera owns 40% of the shares.

Certainly, this private investment is significant for Peru as it will not only exceed by 67% the cumulative investments of all port concessions granted in the country in the last two decades,^[123] but will also allow Peru to become a logistic hub in the South Pacific, consolidating cargo from neighboring nations (such as Ecuador, Chile, Brazil and Bolivia) and from inland regions of the country, in order to redistribute it to Asia and Oceania. The port of Chancay will receive large container ships (carrying 18,000 containers) from the Asian region, reducing time and costs in the current maritime trade because the transfer of containers between Peru and the PRC will be reduced from 35 to 23 days. At the beginning of its operations, this port terminal will have an estimated annual capacity of 1.5 million TEU containers (20 feet or 6.25 meters), placing it among the top 10 ports in Latin America and the Caribbean.^[124]

However, the maximum impact of the port of Chancay is not ensured only with its construction. To this end, the Peruvian government, in coordination with the private sector, must coordinate efforts to expedite the execution of key works to improve road and rail connectivity to the port, taking into account the main productive nodes existing in the country and the region.^[125] Likewise, consideration must be given to enabling foreign vessels to carry out maritime cabotage (cargo transportation between ports in the same country).^[126] Another important aspect to consider is the demographic growth in the area of influence of the port of Chancay. In this regard, the Peruvian Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation estimates that the demand for housing will increase fivefold in Chancay and in districts adjacent to the project. However, to date, there are no plans in place to address urban expansion and the demand for services, including water, health, education, and public safety. On the contrary, informality and illegality prevail, as land invasions and land trafficking proliferate, which not only limit the development of urban plans that guarantee access to basic services but are also associated with increasingly violent criminal organizations.^[127]

Only if the Peruvian State is able to effectively and promptly address these issues will it achieve its goal of becoming a logistical hub in the South Pacific, enabling the country’s development, otherwise this will be another lost opportunity.

The Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies has identified the existence of 153 Chinese companies active in Peru, operating in 11 economic sectors in all regions of the country.^[128] However, in recent years, the control that the PRC is gaining over Peru’s critical infrastructure, mainly electricity and ports, has raised concerns among various national and international actors, who consider that the different governments in power in Peru are not sufficiently focused on analyzing the benefits and threats involved in giving the PRC these businesses, which are fundamental for national development.^[129] In this regard, it should be noted that neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the Ministry of Defense are currently involved in the approval process of foreign investments in critical infrastructure in Peru, which is a weakness since their analysis and opinions would serve to minimize the risks involved in this type of investments.

Although any investment in a country’s critical infrastructure must be carefully analyzed, it is necessary to emphasize that Peru, by opening up to international trade, has the opportunity to establish alliances and attract foreign investments that provide common benefits and generate employment and foreign currency. Therefore, it is important to analyze the main aspects related to trade exchange, projects and investment in Peru not only from the PRC, but also from any other country, mainly in the context of a latent and growing global geopolitical rivalry.^[130]

Not all the impacts and results of Peru’s participation in the BRI will be positive, especially if Chinese investments come with the same problems, errors and irregularities that some infrastructure projects have presented in other countries. The Peruvian State should be aware that projects financed with Chinese state loans are not subject to open bidding processes, which could result in unduly increased costs and lower quality of products and services provided by Chinese contractors.^[131] Also, Chinese financing normally involves conditions such as the requirement that Chinese companies be involved in a certain proportion of the project’s contractual work.^[132] In that sense, the Peruvian State should adequately analyze these and other aspects when negotiating loans and investments in the country.

Countries with poor economic management are likely to default on their debt, placing them at a disadvantage or vulnerability. In this regard, it is worth noting the concern shown by the US about the consequences of the alleged strategy that the PRC would be executing to seize critical assets or the political will of countries that cannot pay their debts. Something that the first world power knows very well, considering the words of U.S. President John Adams, who pointed out that “there are two ways to conquer and enslave a nation. One is by the sword. The other is by debt.” What Peru must not allow is to fall into debt diplomacy, neither with the PRC, nor with any other country.

Conclusions

Undoubtedly, the PRC intends to make international trade less dependent on the dollar and the US-led financial system; to this end, it has been establishing more trade agreements in yuan in order to increase the relevance of this currency in world markets. However, this currency is still far from displacing the dollar in international transactions. Aware of this situation, during the last decade, the PRC has been betting on a global economic penetration through the BRI, seeking to expand to other continents. In Africa, for example, the PRC has managed to position itself not only as the region’s largest trading partner, but also its main lender, generating a commercial and political relationship of mutual need and interest.

This situation is causing concern in countries such as the US because, if African governments are overly dependent on Chinese funds, their political and economic decisions may be heavily influenced by the PRC. Unfortunately, the development opportunities offered by these loans and investments are held back by problems in African states, including high rates of misgovernment and corruption.

In addition to focusing on Africa, Europe and Asia, the PRC shows particular interest in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), a region that possesses not only abundant natural resources, but also the largest number of states that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It is therefore not surprising that trade between China and this region has increased 26-fold in the last two decades, being the largest trading partner of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, as well as the main destination of exports from Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Peru and Uruguay. However, the trade relationship between the PRC and LAC is highly concentrated, since only five products account for 70% of the goods exported to China, while 90% of these goods are exported by four countries.

Contrary to popular belief, the PRC still has a long way to go to displace other players such as the US and the EU in the region. In this regard, in 2020, trade between the PRC and LAC accounted for 32% of trade between the US-EU and LAC. Likewise, between 2000 and 2020, PRC FDI in LAC represented only 7% of combined US-EU FDI in the region. However, the PRC’s interest in LAC is not only in the area of trade and investment, but also in the political, social and cultural spheres, demonstrating that it does not wish to change the existing pattern in the region, nor the form and type of regime of the governments with which it has relations.

Although the US continues to be the most influential country in LAC, the fact that it has its main competitor acting in its closest area is a highly disturbing factor. But compared to other powers, the PRC has made its interest in LAC known through visible policies, which could turn the region into an area of confrontation between the U.S. and the PRC. Currently, the position of most LAC countries with respect to these two great powers responds to their own national interests, aligning themselves with the U.S. in terms of values and with the PRC in terms of economic interests.

With respect to Peru, the PRC has established itself as its main trading partner, although it is still far from being its main investor. In 2022, PRC investment in Peru represented only 3.8% of total investments received by Peru. Likewise, between 2005 and 2022, Chinese loans received by the Peruvian government represented only 0.03% of the total loans that the PRC provided to LAC countries. However, Chinese investments in Peru are mainly concentrated in strategic sectors such as mining (due to the great need for raw materials for its industries), electricity (due to the high demand for energy produced by the mining sector) and infrastructure (due to the need to transport commodities to meet the demand of the Chinese domestic market).

On the one hand, in the mining sector, Chinese investments in Peru have not only enabled the growth of the national economy but have also generated protests from the communities located within their areas of influence, as in the case of the Las Bambas mine. On the other hand, in the electricity sector, despite the regulatory acts carried out by the Peruvian authorities, the fact that PRC controls 100% of the electricity distribution market in Lima, its capital, should be a concern for the Peruvian State. Also, in the infrastructure sector, PRC’s investments in port infrastructure stand out, such as the new port terminal in San Juan de Marcona and the multipurpose port terminal in Chancay. The latter project will not only exceed by 57 % the cumulative investments of all port concessions granted in Peru in the last two decades but will also allow it to become a logistics hub in the South Pacific.

To ensure the maximum impact of the port of Chancay, the Peruvian government must expedite the execution of key works to improve road and rail connectivity to the port, taking into account the main productive nodes in Peru and neighboring countries. Likewise, the Peruvian government must formulate and implement plans to address the imminent population growth in the area of influence of the port of Chancay, including the demand for services. In this sense, only if these issues are addressed effectively and promptly will this important port project make the country’s development possible.

The control that the PRC is gaining over Peru’s critical infrastructure has raised the alarm among various stakeholders, who consider that the Peruvian State is not sufficiently aware of the challenges and threats generated by these investments. Therefore, it is necessary to involve the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense in the approval process of foreign investments in critical infrastructure in Peru, since their analysis and opinions will be useful for an adequate decision making and to minimize the existing risks in this type of investments. Finally, PRC investments in Peru will be positive to the extent that the same problems, errors and irregularities presented in other countries are not repeated.

Endnotes:

1. Voz de América. “Kamala Harris Critica a China por Visita a Japón”. Voz de América, 27 de mayo de 2024. https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/kamala-harris-critica-china-visita-japon/6767638.html ↑
2. El Blog Salmon. “A 70 años de Bretton Woods y la dominación global del dólar”. El Blog Salmon, n.d. https://www.elblogsalmon.com/mercados-financieros/a-70-anos-de-bretton-woods-y-la-dominacion-global-del-dolar ↑
3. Mizrahi, Darío. “A 75 años de Bretton Woods, el pacto que diseñó el orden económico global que hoy se está desmoronando”. Infobae América, May 25, 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/2024/05/25/a-75– anos- de-bretton-woods-el-pacto-que-designó-el-orden-economico-global-que-hoy-esta-esta-desmorrono-desmoronando/ ↑
4. World Bank Group. “The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).” World Bank, 2024. https://www.worldbank.org/en/archive/history. ↑
5. Proyecto Bretton Woods. “¿Cuáles son las principales críticas al Banco Mundial y el Fondo Monetario Internacional?” Proyecto Bretton Woods, July 15, 2019. https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/es/2019/07/ what-are-the-major-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-international-monetary-fund/. ↑
6. World Bank Group. “The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).” World Bank, 2024. https://www.worldbank.org/en/archive/history. ↑
7. Mizrahi, Darío. “A 75 años de Bretton Woods, el pacto que diseñó el orden económico global que hoy se está desmoronando”. Infobae América May 25, 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/2024/05/25/a-75– anos- de-bretton-woods-el-pacto-que-designó-el-orden-economico-global-que-hoy-esta-esta-desmorrono-desmoronando/ ↑
8. Redacción Clarín. “¿Cuál es el respaldo del dólar?”. Clarín, September 29, 2018. https://www.clarin. com/economia/respaldo-dolar_0_u0iRzWFLT.html. ↑
9. Fan, Ana. “TRABAJO FIN DE ESTUDIO, GADE, UPCT 2020”. Repositorio UPCT, 2020. https://repositorio. upct.es/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10317/8820/tfg-fan-ana.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. ↑
10. Equipo Singular Bank. “Entorno global: Las economías del mundo en un único gráfico, ¿cuánto aporta cada país al producto mundial bruto (PIB)?”.  Blog SelfBank, April 8, 2022. https://blog.selfbank.es/las-economias-del-mundo-en-un-grafico-cuanto-aporta-cada-pais-al-pib/#:~:text=China%2C%20mantiene%20la%20segunda%20plaza,de%20siderurgia%2C%20electr%C3%B3nica%20y%20rob%C3%B3tica ↑
11. Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual (OMPI). “Datos y cifras de la OMPI sobre PI, edición de 2022”. Wipo 2022. https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/es/wipo-pub-943-2022-es-wipo-ip-facts-and- figures-2022.pdf ↑
12. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. “Huawei es líder global en patentes tecnológicas en telecomunicaciones y transformación digital”. Huawei, Nov. 3, 2020. https://dplnews.com/como-llega-huawei-a-ser-lider- en-patents- in-the-world/ ↑
13. Torres, A. “¿Qué es el sistema SWIFT?”. El Orden Mundial, May 24, 2023. https://elordenmundial. com/what-is-swift-system/ ↑
14. Devonshire-Ellis, Chris. “SPFS – Russia’s Alternative To SWIFT.” Russia Briefing, December 15, 2021. https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/spfs-russia-s-alternative-to-swift.html/ ↑
15. China International Patent System (CIPS). (2024). https://www.cips.com.cn/en/participants/participants_ announcement/50157/index.html. ↑
16. Devonshire-Ellis, Chris. “SPFS – Russia’s Alternative To SWIFT.” Russia Briefing, December 15, 2021. https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/spfs-russia-s-alternative-to-swift.html/ ↑
17. World Energy Trade. “China realiza la primera transacción de GNL en yuanes”. World Energy Trade, May 10, 2024. https://www.worldenergytrade.com/oil-gas/general/china-primera-transaccion-gnl-yuanes ↑
18. Ibid. ↑
19. Ibid. ↑
20. Benzinga Español. “Acuerdo swap de divisas entre China y Arabia Saudita”. Benzinga, November 21, 2023. https://es.benzinga.com/2023/11/21/acuerdo-swap-divisas-china-arabia-saudita/. ↑
21. El Economista. “El acuerdo ‘nuclear’ entre Rusia y Bangladesh se saldará en yuanes: primer aviso para el dólar y EEUU”. El Economista, April 23, 2023. https://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/12233343/04/23/ the-nuclear-agreement- between-russia-and-bangladesh-will-be-settled-in-yuan-first-notice-for-the-dollar-and-us. html. ↑
22. SWI. “China confirma el acuerdo comercial bilateral en yuanes con Brasil”. Swissinfo, March 30, 2023. SWI swissinfo.ch. ↑
23. Benzinga Español. “Acuerdo swap de divisas entre China y Arabia Saudita”. Benzinga, November 21, 2023. https://es.benzinga.com/2023/11/21/acuerdo-swap-divisas-china-arabia-saudita/. ↑
24. BBC Mundo. “Sequía en Argentina: el campo sufre su peor crisis en 60 años”. BBC, May 24, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-55579550 ↑
25. Gobierno Argentino. “Argentina deja de pagar importaciones en dólares y pasa a yuanes”. Argentina. gob.ar, April 25, 2023. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/argentina-deja-de-pagar- importaciones-en– dollars-and-switches-to-yuan. ↑
26. 26 Associated Press. “Bolivia ya comercia en yuanes ante la escasez de dólares”. Voz de América, July 28 28, 2023. https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/bolivia-ya-comercia-en-yuanes-ante-la-escasez-dolares/7201723. html. ↑
27. Ibid. ↑
28. Redacción. “China cierra su primera transacción en yuanes de GNL”. El Periódico de la Energía, March 30, 2023. https://elperiodicodelaenergia.com/china-cierra-primera-transaccion-yuanes-gnl/ ↑
29. DW. “China aumenta en 7,2% su presupuesto de Defensa para 2023”. Deutsche Welle, March 5, 2023. https://www.dw.com/es/china-aumenta-en-72-su-presupuesto-de-defensa-para-2023/a-54888759 ↑
30. Sebastián, Isabel. “¿Qué es la Nueva Ruta de la Seda china?”. El Orden Mundial, December 29, 2022. https://elordenmundial.com/que-es-nueva-ruta-seda-china/ ↑
31. Yeh, Chia-Chun.  “Cumbre Nueva Ruta de la Seda: ¿Tiene éxito el ‘sueño chino’?”. Deutsche Welle, October 17, 2023. https://www.dw.com/es/cumbre-nueva-ruta-de-la-seda-cu%C3%A1n-exitoso-es-el– sue%C3%B1o-chino-de- xi-jinping/a-57125425. ↑
32. Vila, Pol. “La deuda de Montenegro con China, o cómo Pekín puede hacerse con un puerto en Europa”. El Orden Mundial, August 24, 2022. https://elordenmundial.com/deuda-montenegro-china-pekin-puede- port-europe/ ↑
33. Von der Brelie, Hans. “La construcción de una autopista en Montenegro activa las alarmas en la UE y la ciudadanía”. Euronews, May 8, 2021. https://www.euronews.com/tag/montenegro ↑
34. Mundo. “’Trampa de la deuda’: la estrategia de China para expandir su influencia en Europa y que puede llevar a la ruina a Montenegro”. Infobae, May 27^th 2024. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2021/05/08/ debt-trap-the-china-strategy-for-expanding-its-influence-in-europe-and-that-may-bring-ruin-to-montenegro/ ↑
35. “Cómo la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta de China cambió al mundo durante la última década”. Cadena Global de Televisión de China” September 11, 2023. https://espanol.cgtn.com/news/2023-09- 11/1701055472324159729/index.html. ↑
36. “Atenas vende el Puerto de El Pireo al gigante estatal chino COSCO por 368 millones”. Radio y Televisión Española April 8, 2015. https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20150408/atenas-vende-puerto-pireo-gigante-chino– cosco- for-358-million/1333548.shtml. ↑
37. Martín, Idafe. “China pisa fuerte en Europa y compra parte del estratégico puerto alemán de Hamburgo”. Clarín, May 11, 2023. https://www.clarin.com/mundo/china-pisa-fuerte-europa-compra-parte-estrategico– port- german-hamburg_0_twAAzImAhI.html. ↑
38. Ibid. ↑
39. Mundo. “Italia abandonó el proyecto chino de la nueva Ruta de la Seda”. Infobae, December 5, 2023. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2023/12/06/italia-abandono-el-proyecto-chino-de-la-nueva-ruta-de-la-seda/#:~:text=Italia%20se%20retir%C3%B3%20formalmente%20del,el%20mi%C3%A9rcoles%20una%20-fuente%20gubernamental ↑
40. Swissinfo. “Indonesia inaugura primer tren de alta velocidad de la región, parte de la Ruta de la Seda”. Portal suizo de noticias e información multimedia, October 1, 2023. https://reporteasia.com/destacado/2023/10/02/indonesia-inaugura-el-primer-tren-de-alta-velocidad-del-sudeste-asiatico/ ↑
41. ” El caso Sri Lanka, clave para entender por qué los países desarrollados no confían en los créditos chinos”. Infobae, November 14, 2020. https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2020/11/14/el-caso-sri-lanka-clave-para-entender-por-que-los-paises-desarrollados-no-confian-en-los-creditos-chinos/ ↑
42. Ibid. ↑
43. Ibid. ↑
44. Yeh, Chia-Chun. “Cumbre Nueva Ruta de la Seda: ¿Tiene éxito el ‘sueño chino’?”.  Deutsche Welle, October 17, 2023. https://www.dw.com/es/cumbre-nueva-ruta-de-la-seda-cuánto-exitoso-es-el-sueñochino/a-67126426 ↑
45. Ortiz, Patricio. “La imparable ‘colonización’ de África por parte de China”. El País, January 12, 2023. https://elpais.com/videos/2023-01-13/la-imparable-colonizacion-de-africa-por-parte-de-china.html ↑
46. Merino, Álvaro. “Los préstamos de China en África”. El Orden Mundial, March 21, 2022. https:// elordenmundial.com/mapas-y-graficos/prestamos-de-china-africa/ ↑
47. Ortiz, Patricio. “La imparable ‘colonización’ de África por parte de China”. El País, January 12, 2023. https://elpais.com/videos/2023-01-13/la-imparable-colonizacion-de-africa-por-parte-de-china.html ↑
48. Ibid. ↑
49. Merino, Álvaro. “Los préstamos de China en África”. El Orden Mundial, March 21, 2022. https:// elordenmundial.com/mapas-y-graficos/prestamos-de-china-africa/ ↑
50. Ibid. ↑
51. Gómez, María Soledad. “Bases Militares en Djibouti, un enclave geoestratégico”. Geopol21, September 5. 2021. https://geopol21.com/bases-militares-en-djibouti-un-enclave-geoestrategico/ ↑
52. Ibid. ↑
53. Ibid. ↑
54. Ibid. ↑
55. Ortiz, Patricio. “La imparable ‘colonización’ de África por parte de China”. El Paí, January 12, 2023. https://elpais.com/videos/2023-01-13/la-imparable-colonizacion-de-africa-por-parte-de-china.html ↑
56. Hernandez, Bruno. “China-América Latina y el Caribe: inversión, comercio y perspectivas futuras”. China Briefing, November 17, 2023. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-america-latina-y-el-caribe-inversion-comercio-y-perspectivas-futuras/#:~:text=Seg%C3%BAn%20el%20Foro%20Econ%C3%B3mico%20 ↑
57. “Full text of China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean”. The State Council, The People’s Republic of China November 24, 2015. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/11/24/ content_281475499059158.htm. ↑
58. Hernandez, Bruno. “China-América Latina y el Caribe: inversión, comercio y perspectivas futuras”. China Briefing, November 17, 2023. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-america-latina-y-el-caribe-inversion-comercio-y-perspectivas-futuras/#:~:text=Seg%C3%BAn%20el%20Foro%20Econ%C3%B3mico%20 ↑
59. Grefi. “El rol de América Latina y el Caribe en la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta”. Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales Dar, December 2019. https://dar.org.pe/archivos/publicacion/205_informe_grefi.pdf ↑
60. Ibid. ↑
61. Calamur, Krishnadev. “Tillerson to Latin America: Beware of China.” The Atlantic, February 3, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/rex-in-latam/552197/ ↑
62. “A Shifting Trade Landscape in Latin America Favors China and Globalization.” Global Americans, July 10, 2017. https://www.bcg.com/publications/2023/north-america-next-move-shifting-landscape-global– trade. ↑
63. Hernandez, Bruno. “China-América Latina y el Caribe: inversión, comercio y perspectivas futuras”. China Briefing,, November 17, 2023. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-america-latina-y-el-caribeinversion-comercio-y-perspectivas-futuras/#:~:text=Seg%C3%BAn%20el%20Foro%20Econ%C3%B3mico%20 Mundial,millones%20a%20US%24315.000%20millones ↑
64. Ibid. ↑
65. Grefi. “El rol de América Latina y el Caribe en la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta”. Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales Dar, December 2019. https://dar.org.pe/archivos/publicacion/205_informe_grefi.pdf ↑
66. “Honduras rompe relaciones con Taiwán y reconoce ‘una sola China’: qué países mantienen vínculos con el gobierno de Taipei”. BBC News Mundo, March 15, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-americalatina-64969870 ↑
67. De Esperanza, Cristina. “China en América Latina: ¿el inicio de una nueva Guerra Fría?”. El Orden Mundial,, March 10, 2019. https://elordenmundial.com/china-en-america-latina-el-inicio-de-una-nuevaguerra-fria/. ↑
68. Ray, Rebecca, Myers, Margaret and additional authors. “Chinese Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean Database.” Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC.: 2023. https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/. ↑
69. “China llegó para quedarse en Venezuela”. Dialogue Earth, June 23, 2016. https://dialogochino.net/ es/comercio-y-inversiones-es/6895-china-llego-para-quedarse-en-venezuela/. ↑
70. Hernandez, Bruno. “China-América Latina y el Caribe: inversión, comercio y perspectivas futuras”. China Briefing, November 17, 2023. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-america-latina-y-el-caribe-inversion-comercio-y-perspectivas-futuras/#:~:text=Seg%C3%BAn%20el%20Foro%20Econ%C3%B3mico%20 ↑
71. Rajagopalan, Megha. “China’s Xi Woos Latin America with $250 Billion Investments”. Reuters, January 8, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-latam/chinas-xi-woos-latin-america-with-250-billion-investments-idUSKBN0KH06Q20150108/ ↑
72. Gava, Marcos. “La Franja y la Ruta diez años después, poco que festejar”. Latinoamerica21, September 24. of 2023. https://latinoamerica21.com/es/la-franja-y-la-ruta-diez-anos-despues-poco-que-festejar/. ↑
73. Grefi. “El rol de América Latina y el Caribe en la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta”. Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales Dar, December 2019. https://dar.org.pe/archivos/publicacion/205_informe_grefi.pdf ↑
74. “La inversión china en Brasil se triplicó en 2021 y volvió a nivel prepandemia”. Swissinf, August 31, 2022. https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/brasil-inversiones_la-inversi%C3%B3n-china-en-brasil-se-triplic%C3%B3-en-2021-y-volvi%C3%B3-a-nivel-prepandemia/47867278 ↑
75. Ibid. ↑
76. Ibid. ↑
77. Espina, Mariano. “Las tres inversiones millonarias de China en Argentina en los últimos meses”. Bloomberg Línea, August 23, 2022. https://www.bloomberglinea.com/2022/08/23/las-tres-inversiones-millonarias-de-china-en-argentina-en-los-ultimos-meses/ ↑
78. Ibid ↑
79. Ibid. ↑
80. Ibid. ↑
81. “El programa espacial chino en América Latina y la Antártida es una preocupación creciente para el Pentágono”. Infobae, November 22, 2023. https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/11/22/el-programa-espacial-chino-en-america-latina-y-la-antartida-es-una-preocupacion-creciente-para-el-pentagono/ ↑
82. De Esperanza, Cristina. “China en América Latina: ¿el inicio de una nueva Guerra Fría?”. El Orden Mundial, March 10, 2019. https://elordenmundial.com/china-en-america-latina-el-inicio-de-una-nueva-guerra-fria/ ↑
83. Moreno, Naomi. “La controvertida estación espacial de China en la Patagonia”. Universidad de Navarra, 2023. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/la-controvertida-estacion-espacial-de-china– en-la- patagonia. ↑
84. “El programa espacial chino en América Latina y la Antártida es una preocupación creciente para el Pentágono”. Infobae, November 22, 2023. https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/11/22/el-programa-espacial-chino-en-america-latina-y-la-antartida-es-una-preocupacion-creciente-para-el-pentagono/ ↑
85. Moreno, Naomi. “La controvertida estación espacial de China en la Patagonia”. Universidad de Navarra, 2023. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/la-controvertida-estacion-espacial-de-china– en-la- patagonia. ↑
86. “Comercio entre China y Chile”. Observatorio de Complejidad Económica, 2022. https://oec.world/es/ profile/bilateral- country/chn/partner/chl. ↑
87. Donoso M., Déborah. “Brasil, Perú y Chile en el centro de las inversiones chinas en Latinoamérica”. DF Sud, November 30, 2022. https://dfsud.com/america/las-inversiones-chinas-que-se-abren-paso- en- latinoamerica. ↑
88. Ibid. ↑
89. Ibid ↑
90. Moreno, Jaime. “Claves para entender el avance de China en las universidades de Latinoamérica.” Voz de America, March 31, 2022. https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/claves-para-entender-el-avance-de-china-en-las-universidades-de-latinoamerica/6509556.html. ↑
91. Hernandez, Bruno. “China-América Latina y el Caribe: inversión, comercio y perspectivas futuras”. China Briefing, November 17, 2023. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-america-latina-y-el-caribe-inversion-comercio-y-perspectivas-futuras/#:~:text=Seg%C3%BAn%20el%20Foro%20Econ%C3%B3mico%20 ↑
92. Ibid. ↑
93. Talvi, Ernesto. “La geopolítica de América Latina ante la rivalidad EEUU-China: del relato a los datos”. Real Instituto Elcano, February 5, 2024. https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/la-geopolitica-de-america-latina-ante-la-rivalidad-eeuu-china-del-relato-a-los-datos/. ↑
94. De Esperanza, Cristina. “China en América Latina: ¿el inicio de una nueva Guerra Fría?”. El Orden Mundial, March 10, 2019. https://elordenmundial.com/china-en-america-latina-el-inicio-de-una-nueva-guerra-fria/ ↑
95. Ibid ↑
96. “Relación Perú-China: Intercambio comercial, proyectos e inversión extranjera directa”. Comex Perú, October 13, 2023. https://www.comexperu.org.pe/articulo/relacion-peru-china-intercambio-comercial– proyectos- e-inversion-extranjera-directa. ↑
97. Entrevista a investigadores afiliados en Capechi Trade: El creciente comercio entre Perú y China: El aporte del TLC”. Revista Capechi, Centro de Estudios sobre China y Asia Pacífico UP, June 25, 2023. https://cechap.up.edu.pe/noticia/entrevista-a-investigadores-afiliados-en-capechi-trade-el-creciente-comercio- entre-peru-y-china-el-aporte-del-tlc/. ↑
98. “Relación Perú-China: Intercambio comercial, proyectos e inversión extranjera directa”. Comex Perú, October 13, 2023. https://www.comexperu.org.pe/articulo/relacion-peru-china-intercambio-comercial– proyectos- e-inversion-extranjera-directa. ↑
99. Ray, Rebecca and Myers, Margaret. “Chinese Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean Database.” Washington: Inter-American Dialogue: 2023. https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/ ↑
100. Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión en Energía y Minería (Osinergmin). Sitio web oficial de Osinergmin. Accessed May 29, 2024. https://www.gob.pe/osinergmin. ↑
101. Ruiz, Manuel. “El Mercado Eléctrico para clientes libres en el Perú”. Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, March 2023. https://www.bcrp.gob.pe/docs/Publicaciones/Revista-Moneda/moneda-193/ ↑
102. Hidalgo, Erika. ““Actualización: Odebrecht vende hidroeléctrica Chaglla en Perú a consorcio liderado por firmas chinas”. Lex Latin, August 31, 2017. https://lexlatin.com/noticias/actualizacion-odebrecht-vende- hidroelectrica-chaglla-en-peru-consorcio-liderado-por-firmas. ↑
103. Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (SMV). “Información Financiera. 2024. https://www.smv.gob. pe/SIMV/Frm_InformacionFinanciera?data=A70181B50957D74090DCD93C4920AA1D759514EC12 ↑
104. Redacción. “Luz del Sur se vende a China Yangtze Power Co. por US$ 3,590 millones”. Gestión, October 30, 2019. https://gestion.pe/economia/empresas/sempra-luz-del-sur-se-vendio-a-china-yangtze-power-co-noticia/?ref=gesr ↑
105. Rojas, Ingrid. “Perú aprueba la compra de Luz del Sur por China Three Gorges”. Lex Latin, April 23, 2020. https://lexlatin.com/noticias/indecopi-aprueba-compra-distribuidora-electrica-peruana-luz-del-sur- china-three. ↑
106. Efe. “La china CSGI concreta la compra de Enel Perú”. El Comercio, April 10, 2023. https:// elcomercio.pe/economia/peru/enel-vende-su-empresa-de-distribucion-y-suministro-en-peru-a-la-china- csgi- noticia/?ref=ecr. ↑
107. Montesinos, Edwin. “China controla el 100% de la energía en Lima y condiciona al gobierno de Perú”. Infobae, October 4, 2023. https://www.infobae.com/peru/2023/10/03/china-controla-el-100-por-ciento-de– la-energia- de-lima-y-condiciona-al-gobierno-de-peru/. ↑
108. Redacción EC. “Indecopi autoriza la compra de Enel por parte de empresa China Southern Power Grid”. El Comercio, February 5, 2024. https://elcomercio.pe/economia/peru/indecopi-autoriza-la-compra-de-enel- por- parte-de-empresa-empresa-china-southern-power-grid-tarifas-de-luz-distribucion-de-energia-electrica-luz-del- sur-lima-ultimas-noticia/ ↑
109. Ibid. ↑
110. Chacon, Takeshi. “Capechi: Inversión de mineras chinas en Perú supera US$ 23,100 millones”. Rumbo Minero, February 15, 2023. https://www.rumbominero.com/peru/noticias/mineria/capechi-inversion-mineras- chinas-peru-millones/ ↑
111. Minen. “Inversiones chinas en minería suman casi US$ 15 mil millones en los últimos 11 años”. Plataforma digital única del Estado Peruano, September 8, 2020. https://www.gob.pe/institucion/minem/noticias/300881-inversiones-chinas-en-mineria-suman-casi-us-15-mil-millones-en-los-ultimos-11-anos ↑
112. Ibid. ↑
113. Cooper, Shougang. “Perú presenta ante la ONU cuatro casos de violación de DD.HH. de empresas chinas”. RSE Perú, October 18, 2018. https://noticias.rse.pe/peru-presenta-ante-la-onu-cuatro-casos-de-violacion- de-dd-hh-de- empresas-chinas/ ↑
114. León E., Martín. “¿Por qué la mina Las Bambas en Perú está en constante conflicto?”. Diálogo Chino, April 22, 2022. https://www.france24.com/es/20190501-peru-dialogo-campesinos-minera-bambas. ↑
115. Ibid ↑
116. Ibid ↑
117. Ibid. ↑
118. 118 Redacción. “Perú: Declaran de interés proyecto Nuevo Terminal Portuario de San Juan de Marcona”. Portal Portuario, December 20, 2023. https://portalportuario.cl/peru-declaran-de-interes-proyecto- nuevo- terminal-portuario-de-san-juan-de-marcona/ ↑
119. “Pampa de Pongo: grupo chino Zhongrong Xinda quieren poner en producción proyecto de mineral de hierro de US$2.100 millones en 2026”. Energiminas, January 18, 2023. https://energiminas.com/2023/01/18/pampa-de-pongo-grupo-chino-zhongrong-xinda-quieren-poner-en-produccion-proyecto-de-mineral-dehierro-de-us2-100-millones-en-2026/ ↑
120. Agencia Peruana de Noticias (APN). “Estado adjudicó el desarrollo del proyecto ‘Nuevo Terminal Portuario de San Juan de Marcona’”. Plataforma digital única del Estado Peruano, March 25, 2024. https://www.gob.pe/institucion/apn/noticias/925273-estado-adjudicó-el-desarrollo-el-desarrollo-del-proyecto-nuevo-terminal-portuario- de- san-juan-de-marcona. ↑
121. ““Presidente de China realizará visita al Perú”. El Peruano, January 22, 2024. https://www.elperuano.pe/noticia/233973-presidente-de-china-realizara-visita-al-peru#:~:text=21%2F01%2F2024%20El%20 canciller,Pac%C3%ADfico%20(APEC)%20Per%C3%BA%202024 ↑
122. “El Proyecto”. Cosco Shipping, 2024. https://coscochancay.pe/proyecto/ ↑
123. Falen, Jorge. “La inmensidad del Puerto de Chancay”. El Comercio Perú, April 11, 2024. https://elcomercio.pe/ecdata/megapuerto-chancay-radiografia-de-la-inversion-portuaria-con-capital-chino-masimportante-peru-empresas-constructoras-obras-infraestructura-capacidad-portuaria-contenedoreshectareas-especdis-noticia/ ↑
124. Ibid. ↑
125. “Los otros retos del Puerto de Chancay”. Comex, February 15, 2024. https://www.comexperu.org.pe/ articulo/los-otros-retos-del-puerto-de-chancay. ↑
126. Falen, Jorge. “La inmensidad del Puerto de Chancay”. El Comercio Perú, April 11, 2024. https://elcomercio.pe/ecdata/megapuerto-chancay-radiografia-de-la-inversion-portuaria-con-capital-chino-masimportante-peru-empresas-constructoras-obras-infraestructura-capacidad-portuaria-contenedoreshectareas-especdis-noticia/ ↑
127. Pereyra, Gladys. ” “Chancay se proyecta a quintuplicar su población sin planes ni obras terminadas: ¿qué pasa con los planes de expansión?”. El Comercio, April 7, 2024. https://elcomercio.pe/lima/megapuerto-dechancay-se-proyecta-a-quintuplicar-su-poblacion-sin-planes-ni-obras-terminadas-planes-de-expansionurbana-servicios-basicos-economia-ilegal-noticia/?ref=ecr ↑
128. Diario La Tercera de Chile. “Entrevista a Cynthia Sanborn en el diario La Tercera de Chile”. Centro de Estudios sobre China y Asia Pacífico UP, June 24, 2023. https://cechap.up.edu.pe/noticia/entrevista-a-cynthia-sanborn-en-el-diario-la-tercera-de-chile/#:~:text=El%20CECHAP%20ha%20identificado%20y,del%20 ↑
129. Montesinos, Edwin. “Inversión China en Perú supera los 13 mil millones de dólares y se ha convertido en el principal socio comercial”. Infobae, October 10, 2023. https://www.infobae.com/peru/2023/10/08/inversion-china-en-peru-cuanto-y-en-que-sectores-invierte-la-nacion-asiatica-en-el-pais/#:~:text=China%20 ↑
130. “Relación Perú-China: Intercambio comercial, proyectos e inversión extranjera directa”. Comex Perú, October 13, 2023. https://www.comexperu.org.pe/articulo/relacion-peru-china-intercambio-comercial-proyectos-e-inversion-extranjera-directa ↑
131. Simonov, Eugene and Withanage, Hemantha. “Documento informativo sobre la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta”. Friends of The Earth Asia Pacific, October 2020. https://www.foei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/foe-belt-and-road- briefing-EN-WEB.pdf. ↑
132. Mathews, John A. “China’s Long Term Trade And Currency Goals: The Belt & Road Initiative.” The AsiaPacific Journal: Japan Focus, January 1, 2019. https://apjjf.org/2019/01/Mathews ↑