Abstract

This article analyzes the potential strategic retaliation by the Residual Organized Armed Group (GAOR-48) “Comandos de Frontera” in the border area between Colombia and Peru, specifically on the Putumayo River, as a result of an attack on Ecuadorian military personnel. Through the study of current sources and regional references, it is determined that this retreat would strengthen a criminal network in Peruvian territory, supported by alliances with organizations such as “Los Lobos,” “Los Choneros” (Ecuador), the First Capital Command (PCC), Comando Vermelho, and Familia do Norte (FdN) of Brazil, as well as family clans in Peru. The paper argues that this transnational threat compels the Peruvian state to implement public policies aimed at maintaining a constant multisectoral presence in the border region. It also highlights advances in binational cooperation with Colombia, such as the COL-PER operations, and proposes concrete measures in security, development, and governance to counter the expansion of transnational organized crime in this critical area of the Amazon.

Keywords: GAOR-48, Putumayo, transnational crime, security, binational cooperation

Introduction

The Amazonian landscape in the triple border area between Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador, as well as in the Brazilian sector, has become a territory of great geopolitical and criminal complexity. The presence of Residual Organized Armed Groups (GAOR) such as the “Comandos de Frontera” (GAOR-48) and systematic state deficiencies have favored the development of illicit economies that include drug trafficking, illegal mining, human trafficking, and environmental crimes. Recent events, including the ambush of Ecuadorian military personnel attributed to GAOR-48 “Comandos de Frontera” on May 9, 2025, increase warnings about a possible displacement of these structures into Peruvian territory, particularly into the Putumayo region.

Objective

To examine the consequences of the strategic retreat of GAOR-48 “Comandos de Frontera” to the Putumayo River, assessing its implications for Peru’s national security and proposing a multisectoral response by the State based on binational cooperation and sustained territorial presence.

Discussion

Due to its geographical, economic, and political situation, Putumayo is one of the areas of the Amazon most vulnerable to the growth of international organized crime (IOC). This region functions not only as a physical periphery of the Peruvian state, but also as an area of diffuse sovereignty, where illegal networks supply basic state functions and dispute territorial control.

In this context, the strategic withdrawal of GAOR-48 “Comandos de Frontera” to Peruvian territory should be interpreted as part of a broader process of criminal reconfiguration in the Putumayo-Amazonas axis. Pressure from Colombian and Ecuadorian security forces, evidenced by recent clashes and the murder of Ecuadorian soldiers (El País 2025c), has forced these organizations to seek safe havens, turning the Peruvian Putumayo into a corridor for their retreat, reorganization, and logistical expansion (CEEEP 2022).¹

Added to this dynamic is the existence of alliances between GAOR-48 and transnational criminal organizations, such as Comando Vermelho, Primer Comando Capital (PCC), Familia do Norte (Brazil), as well as Ecuadorian gangs such as “Los Choneros” and “Los Lobos.” These groups share economic interests in drug trafficking, illegal mining, and human trafficking, and maintain connections through river routes, family networks, and operational agreements, which give them the flexibility to adapt to scenarios of state pressure and violence.

In the case of Peru, the structural absence of the state in Putumayo is reflected in significant deficiencies in health, education, justice, and police presence.² According to a report prepared by the National Autonomous University of Latin America (UNAL) in 2022, this deficiency translates into the perpetuation of food and social vulnerabilities that armed groups exploit, establishing a logic of “criminal governance” in which these organizations supply basic needs in exchange for loyalty or silence. Local communities, mainly indigenous and rural, are caught in limbo between state neglect and coercion by criminal networks.

In addition, the Amazonian triple border, which is the region where the territorial boundaries of Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador converge, shows a complex interrelationship of illicit economies, in which drug trafficking is intertwined with illegal mining, smuggling, human trafficking, and sexual exploitation, according to recent reports (El País 2024a; Ministry of the Interior 2024). This network represents a challenge to traditional security responses, which are based on isolated operations that lack continuity and inter-institutional coordination.

Progress has been made, such as joint operations between the armed forces and police of Colombia and Peru; however, these initiatives have not yet achieved the institutionalization and multisectoral approach necessary to effectively address the threat.³ It is essential to evolve from a reactive approach to a comprehensive border security and development strategy that considers:

1. Structured binational cooperation, with unified protocols for intelligence, prosecution, and interdiction.
2. A constant multisectoral presence with investment in health, intercultural education, road infrastructure, and connectivity.
3. The strengthening of local capacities, promoting community leadership, intercultural justice, and the participation of peasant patrols.
4. The integration of environmental strategies that protect ecosystems and promote sustainable economic alternatives to illegal mining and logging (El País 2024b).
5. Permanent surveillance of new forms of illicit economies, such as money laundering and the exploitation of crypto assets in the jungle region.

The case of Comando Vermelho, based in the city of Leticia, capital of the Amazonas department in Colombia, and in the neighboring Brazilian city of Tabatinga, both located on the triple border between Colombia, Peru, and Brazil, exemplifies how these criminal structures can transform urban areas into logistics and intimidation centers (El País 2025b). These cities serve as a platform for controlling microtrafficking, illegal mining, and clandestine logging, making it difficult to report crimes and paralyzing local authorities through death threats. The Brazilian experience shows that when organized crime takes root in peripheral areas without institutional counterweights, its eradication can take decades and result in high social costs.

Consequently, the geostrategic projection of these organizations toward the south, including links with mafias on the Peru-Bolivia-Chile border (National Intelligence Service [SNI] 2023), poses a regional threat that transcends national borders. Security in Putumayo represents a regional challenge for Amazonian governance that requires inter-state coordination, international cooperation, and an approach based on respect for human rights.

Conclusions

1. The possible strategic retreat of the Residual Organized Armed Group GAOR-48 “Comandos de Frontera” to the Putumayo River, on the Colombian-Peruvian border, poses a transnational, structural, and multidimensional threat to Peru’s security. This movement should not be interpreted solely as a retreat in the face of military pressure in Colombia or Ecuador; rather, it constitutes a calculated strategy to reconfigure itself in areas where the state presence is weak or scarce, taking advantage of the Amazon’s river routes, the permeability of its borders, and the fragmentation of its institutions.

2. Putumayo is an area of significant strategic value for criminal organizations due to its geographical isolation, low population density, historical lack of state investment, and the existence of family ties related to illicit activities. The region functions as a comprehensive criminal operational base, coordinating logistical, financial, and territorial expansion functions, connected to regional criminal networks such as the PCC, Comando Vermelho, Los Choneros, Los Lobos, and the Familia do Norte.

3. There is evidence of a renewed phase of organized crime in the Amazon, with a hybrid nature—economic, armed, political, and territorial—capable of generating “parallel governance” in vulnerable communities and with close links to illegal markets such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, human trafficking, and environmental crimes. This asymmetric and adaptable threat cannot be addressed exclusively with conventional military forces or reactive responses.

4. Despite advances in bilateral cooperation—including joint operations between Peru and Colombia and the reactivation of the Triple Frontier Roundtable—existing institutional mechanisms are insufficient and fragmented in the face of the corrupting power and coordination of criminal organizations. These strategies need to be institutionalized, binational intelligence systems established, databases shared, and police, prosecutorial, and judicial operations coordinated in real time.

5. There is a critical gap between security and development that undermines the sustainability of any action against organized crime. Without investment in basic infrastructure, connectivity, intercultural public services, bilingual education, territorial justice, and economic alternatives for indigenous and rural communities, the state’s presence will be perceived as sporadic, extractive, or coercive. Security in the region must be based on a prolonged multisectoral presence, with a focus on human rights, social resilience, and environmental protection.

6. The withdrawal of GAOR-48 “Comandos de Frontera” and its regional alliances is expected to lead to a reconfiguration of organized crime in the Amazon, with medium- and long-term consequences for the stability and governability of the Peruvian state. Strategic inaction could facilitate the consolidation of criminal enclaves with the capacity to exercise political veto, social control, and institutional capture, as evidenced in other regions of the continent.

Endnotes

1. UNAL News Agency, “Dependence on supplies threatens food security on the Amazon border,” UNAL Agency, December 29, 2022, https://agenciadenoticias.unal.edu.co.
2. Peruvian Army Center for Strategic Studies (CEEEP), “Putumayo: Back door for drug trafficking in northeastern Peru,” Peruvian Army Center for Strategic Studies (CEEEP), June 16, 2022, https://ceeep.mil.pe/2022/06/16/putumayo-puerta-posterior-del-narcotrafico-en-el-nororiente-peruano.
3. El Colombiano, “This is the struggle unleashed by crop eradication on the Colombian-Peruvian border,” El Colombiano, September 18, 2023, https://www.elcolombiano.com.
4. El País, “Drug traffickers, illegal miners, and dissidents: the triple alliance devastating the Amazon,” El País, December 29, 2024a, https://elpais.com.
5. El País, “Gustavo Galvão, prosecutor in Tabatinga: Environmental crimes in the triple border region between Brazil, Peru, and Colombia are not being punished,” El País, September 27, 2024b, https://elpais.com.
6. El País, “The Border Commandos control drug trafficking from Peru, just meters from the Colombian Navy: I have them right here in front of me, across the river,” El País, February 20, 2025a, https://elpais.com.
7. El País, “The Comando Vermelho, one of Brazil’s main criminal organizations, has established itself in the Colombian-Peruvian Amazon since 2023…,” El País, January 5, 2025b, https://elpais.com.
8. El País, “Eleven Ecuadorian soldiers killed in an ambush by a criminal group near the border with Colombia,” El País América, May 10, 2025c, https://elpais.com/america/2025/05/10.
9. Infobae, “Peruvian Armed Forces confront dissident FARC armed group on the border with Colombia: at least one dead,” Infobae, May 21, 2025, https://www.infobae.com/peru/2025/05/21.
10. InSight Crime, “Challenges in protecting the Amazon triple border region,” InSight Crime, 2023, https://insightcrime.org.
11. Colombian Ministry of the Interior, “Triple Frontier Roundtable reactivated to combat human trafficking and sexual exploitation of minors in the Amazon region,” Ministry of the Interior, July 25, 2024, https://mininterior.gov.co.
12. Ojo Público, “The violent economy of crime expands with armed groups on the border between Peru and Colombia,” Ojo Público, November 12, 2023, https://ojo-publico.com.
13. Datos Pro-Ambi, “Language and culture in the Amazonian triple border, a challenge for education,” Datos – Pro-Ambi, October 8, 2024, https://datosproambi.org.
14. National Society of Industries of Peru (SNI), “Increase in smuggling drives organized crime on the Peru, Bolivia, and Chile border,” SNI, March 27, 2023, https://sni.org.pe.