Summary

The collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024 marked a turning point in Syria’s geopolitical landscape. The fall of the Baathist government generated a power vacuum that led to a strategic reconfiguration of the country, with national and international actors vying for influence. This article analyzes the military and political dynamics following Assad’s departure, with an emphasis on territorial fragmentation, the activity of insurgent groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the Tiger Forces, as well as the role of powers such as Russia, the United States (US), Iran and Turkey. In addition, it examines the political, military and economic challenges of the transitional government, the impact of Assad’s exile in Moscow and the possibility of Syria being divided into zones of control under different spheres of influence. From this context, possible future scenarios and their implications for regional and global stability are assessed.

Keywords: Syria, Bashar al-Assad, geopolitics, political transition, insurgency, international actors, post-conflict reconstruction.

Introduction

Against all odds, after thirteen and a half years of protracted conflict, the Arab Socialist Party (hereafter Ba’ath Party) regime, personified by the dictatorship of Hafez Al Assad (1970-2000) and his son Bashar Al Assad (2000-2024), collapsed in the face of a lightning offensive launched in late October last year. This event marked the end of one of the longest-ruling autocracies in the Middle East and triggered a reconfiguration of the geopolitical balance in the region. This analysis examines the military implications of this event and the strategic perspectives that will define Syria’s future.

The regime of the Al Assad family in Syria has been a widely debated topic in contemporary world politics. For more than half a century, this dynasty, linked to the Alawite minority within Shiism, consolidated absolute control over the country, establishing an authoritarian system that generated internal conflicts, repression and episodes of violence with regional and international impact. Among the most significant events were the Hama massacre in 1982 and the Islamist insurrection initiated in 1976 by the Muslim Brotherhood organization, a reflection of the structural instability of the country under the rule of the Baath Party.

Under Hafez Al Assad, all political opposition was eliminated, civil rights severely restricted and freedom of expression suppressed. These repressive policies continued with the coming to power of his son, Bashar Al Assad, who maintained the same authoritarian line that characterized his father, despite the fact that, at first, his rise generated certain expectations of change due to his youth. He assumed the presidency in June 2000, at the age of 34, after the death of his father.^[1]

The fall of Bashar Al Assad in December 2024 marked a crucial milestone in the history of war-torn Syria. Analyzing the post-departure landscape will not be a simple task, especially when considering its short- and long-term implications both within Syrian territory and in neighboring nations, from Lebanon to Israel, where fears persist of an expansion of the conflict in border areas.

The collapse of the regime left a power vacuum that will require an unprecedented political and social reconstruction process. The transition to a democratic and stable government represents a monumental challenge, conditioned by the legacy of violence and corruption that characterized his mandate. Added to this is the distrust of international actors, such as the European Union (EU) and the US under a new Donald Trump administration, as well as the uncertainty regarding the situation of minorities such as the Kurds and the Druze in the face of an Islamist-oriented transitional administration.^[2]

Military Perspective in Post-Assad Syria

To understand the current situation in Syria, it is essential to analyze the historical roots of the conflict. The Arab Spring, which began in 2011, triggered protests across the country with demands for political reforms and an end to the authoritarian Assad regime. These mobilizations responded, in essence, to the population’s desire to put an end to a kleptocratic government that, for almost 41 years, had systematically repressed any form of dissent. This control was based on the emergency law promulgated by Hafez Al Assad shortly after he took power in a palace coup known as the “Corrective Revolution”, which in 1970 overthrew the regime of Salah Jadid, in power since 1966.^[3] The violent repression of peaceful protests by the Syrian government increased the resistance of the population, leading to a protracted and devastating conflict that has left deep scars on Syrian society. Particularly severe was the repression exercised by the 25th Division of the Syrian Republican Guard, under the command of Maher Al Assad, brother of the president, in cities such as Homs, Dera’a and Aleppo.^[4]

Several factions and actors were involved in the conflict, including the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, secular opposition groups (including the self-styled Free Syrian Army), Kurdish forces (YPJ – YPG) and extremist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, for its acronym in English; ISIS, for its acronym in English: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or the al-Nusra Front (renamed in 2016 as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and, since January 2017, integrated into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham after breaking ties with the Al Qaeda terrorist organization). The international community has also been deeply involved in the conflict, with countries such as Russia, Iran, Turkey and the US supporting different factions for their own strategic interests. The war has had far-reaching implications for regional stability, with neighboring countries such as Lebanon – from where Hezbollah sent fighters in support of the Baathist regime – Jordan and Iraq being directly affected by the cross-border impact of the conflict.^[5]

In addition, the rise of global jihadism must be considered one of the most significant consequences of the war. Extremist groups took advantage of the chaos in Syria to recruit fighters and expand their ideology. Europe was particularly surprised by the steady flow of radicalized young people traveling with the intention of overthrowing the regime of Bashar Al Assad. This situation posed a security threat not only to the region, but internationally, especially after the proclamation of the Global Caliphate by the self-styled “Caliph Ibrahim” (Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, who died in October 2019) at the Al Nuri Mosque in Mosul, Iraq.^[6]

The conflict, which has been going on for almost 14 years, attracted the attention of several regional and international actors with an interest in its outcome. Russia and Iran consolidated themselves as the main allies of the Assad regime, providing it with military assistance essential to its permanence in power. On the opposite side, the US supported the rebels through the Timber Sycamore arms supply program, while Turkey, concerned about the situation in the disputed Hatay region and the strengthening of Kurdish militiamen, also intervened actively. Saudi Arabia, for its part, rejected the permanence of Bashar Al Assad’s regime, due to its secular character and its alignment with Iran, which led it to participate in the conflict with mixed results.^[7]

Military Dynamics in a Multi-front Conflict

The war in Syria has been characterized by its complexity and the involvement of multiple actors with divergent interests and agendas. From clashes between government forces and rebel groups to the fight against extremist organizations such as ISIS, the conflict took on regional dimensions that crossed borders and challenged the traditional structures of warfare. The presence of various armed groups with opposing objectives generated a chaotic environment in which the civilian population was caught between multiple battle fronts, suffering the devastating consequences of a total war. Among the most violent practices were the use of civilians as human shields by the insurgency and the saturation bombing executed by the Syrian air force.^[8]

Since the fall of the regime, as of December 8, 2024, the military situation in Syria presents a number of challenges both domestically and internationally. Rebuilding the country and stabilizing areas devastated by the conflict will require coordinated military and humanitarian efforts, which proved unfeasible during the most critical phases of the war due to the regime-imposed blockade of opposition-controlled areas and internal fighting between Islamist factions such as the Nusra Front and the Islamic State.^[9] The permanence of multiple extremist groups and the fragmentation of power will complicate the search for a sustainable solution. The militarization of the conflict during the post civil unrest phase – until December 2011 – exacerbated tensions and led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the region, with 6.6 million external refugees and more than 5 million internally displaced persons, a figure only surpassed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In this context, international cooperation and diplomacy will be critical to address the challenges in Syria and move towards a peaceful and sustainable resolution of the strife.^[10]

Since the beginning of the civil war in 2011, various Islamist groups have played a determining role in the development of the conflict. These organizations differ in ideology, tactics and objectives, which has contributed to the complexity of the political and military landscape in the country. One of the most influential groups was Jabhat al-Nusra, an Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, which managed to consolidate its presence in several regions and became one of the main opposition forces to the Syrian government. In parallel, ISIS expanded its control in the country, imposing its strict interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia) and documenting its atrocities through its web publication Dabiq.^[11]

As the war dragged on, tensions between Islamist groups intensified. Rivalry between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS led to violent clashes between the two factions, while the fragmentation of the armed opposition led to the emergence of new organizations with diverse agendas. These include Ajnad al-Kavkaz,^[12] made up of fighters from the Caucasus, mainly Chechens, and Jaysh al-Islam, an opposition group led by Zahran Alloush until his elimination by Russia in December 2015. Competition for resources, territory and international backing further exacerbated divisions within the Islamist movement in Syria.

In the midst of this fragmented panorama, 2017 saw the emergence of Hay’at Tahrir al- Sham (HTS), an alliance of several Islamist groups led by Jabhat al-Nusra. This organization broke its ties with the Al Qaeda network, founded by Osama Bin Laden, and attempted to project itself as a movement with a more nationalist approach and contrary to the Baathist Assad regime. HTS sought to consolidate the power of Islamists in northern Syria and compete with other rebel and terrorist factions for territorial control. Its emergence represented an attempt to unify various rebel and jihadist factions in the northwest of the country, particularly in the Idlib region, where it established its main stronghold. Through this merger, HTS sought to entrench its dominance and organize a unified front against Syrian government forces, structured under the renamed Al-Fatah al-Mubin or Military Operations Command.^[13]

Ahmed Al Sharaa (1982), identified by his kunya or nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al- Julani, became the senior leader of HTS and has played a crucial role in its organization and military strategy. With previous experience in al-Qaeda in Iraq during the U.S. occupation (2003-2011), al-Julani has led HTS in its attempt to consolidate control over areas under its influence. Other prominent commanders include Hashim al-Shaykh (1968), known as Abu Jaber Shaykh, who has been involved in planning military operations, and Abu Malek al-Talli, responsible for coordination with other rebel factions in Syria.^[14]

On the other hand, the emergence of ISIS marked a significant milestone in the contemporary history of the Middle East. From its inception, this organization had a profound impact on the region, especially in Syria, where it waged a campaign of terror and violence. ISIS grew stronger in the chaos of the civil war starting in 2011, taking advantage of the weakness of Bashar al-Assad’s government and the discontent of the Sunni population. Eventually, it succeeded in establishing a caliphate in large parts of Iraq and Syria, spreading the conflict to the West, imposing its radical interpretation of Islam and committing atrocities on a large scale.

In Syria, ISIS became a key player in the conflict, taking on both government forces and other rebel groups. Its ability to recruit foreign fighters and finance itself through oil sales gave it a strategic advantage on the battlefield. However, as the U.S.-led international coalition intensified its airstrikes, the organization began to lose territory and power. By 2025, ISIS is expected to have lost much of its control in Syria, although it will likely continue to operate as an insurgent threat. Despite the setbacks suffered, its extremist ideology continues to attract followers and sympathizers both in the region and globally. The reconstruction and stabilization of areas previously controlled by the fundamentalists, initially led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, represent a significant challenge for the transitional Syrian government and the international community.^[15]

The continued presence of jihadist groups in Syria and its neighboring countries poses security challenges both domestically and internationally. The radicalization of individuals through online propaganda and the influence of former ISIS members are threats that require a comprehensive approach. Mitigating their influence will depend on addressing the roots of extremism, rebuilding affected areas, and promoting long- term stability, key elements to ensure a more secure future in Syria and across the region.

The New Syrian Armed Forces After the Fall of Bashar al-Assad

The creation of a centralized Ministry of Defense, headed by Marhaf Abu Qasra, symbolizes the effort to unify and professionalize the armed forces after the collapse of a regime that held power for more than half a century. One of the first steps in this process has been the establishment of “reconciliation centers,” where fighters surrender their weapons and pledge to become part of the new army. However, this effort faces multiple challenges. Tensions between various factions, with divergent loyalties and opposing political visions, hinder the cohesion process.^[16]

The main challenge for the new Syrian armed forces lies in balancing the interests of the different groups within their ranks. For example, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which is predominantly composed of Kurdish fighters, has proposed maintaining a separate military structure within the national army. However, the transitional government has rejected these initiatives, insisting on a consolidated hierarchy under the Ministry of Defense. This position seeks to avoid fragmentation of the country into “mini-armies,” a phenomenon known as “Lebanonization,” despite the risk of alienating key players in the conflict.^[17]

In addition, corruption and distrust among former combatants represent significant obstacles. Many citizens fear that the new armed forces will replicate the repressive practices of the previous regime. To counter these fears, the government has emphasized the need for ethical and professional training to ensure respect for human rights.

One of the main concerns of the society lies in the Islamist ideology of the majority group that took power: HTS, led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani (Ahmed Al Sharaa). The possibility of the establishment of a strictly Islamic-oriented police force, similar to that of Saudi Arabia or even the Morality Police of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, has raised concerns about its impact on secular communities and religious minorities, such as the Druze, Alawites and Kurds. Furthermore, the possible implementation of Sharia raises questions about its compatibility with democratization and pluralism efforts. Although the transitional government has acknowledged that the transition to free and democratic elections, the drafting of a new constitution and the consolidation of a functioning state will take at least five years, doubts remain as to how these processes will be reconciled with the growing influence of Islamist groups.

The success of the new Syrian armed forces will depend on their ability to consolidate themselves as a truly national institution, capable of transcending sectarian and political divisions. The involvement of the international community, through financial support, training programs and diplomatic mediation, will be critical to ensure long-term stability.^[18]

Suhail Al Hassan and the Tiger Forces in the Face of Transitional Governance: Challenges in January 2025

In January 2025, the conflict in Syria remains a complex scenario, where remnants of the former Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAF), led by figures such as Suhail Al Hassan, continue to play a key role in the political and military dynamics. Known as “The Tiger,” Al Hassan commanded the Tiger Forces, an elite unit that was instrumental in the military victories of the Bashar al-Assad regime during the civil war. This unit, renowned for its discipline and effectiveness on the battlefield, specialized in offensive operations, participating in the recovery of strategic cities such as Aleppo, Homs and Idlib.

After the fall of the regime, the Tiger Forces restructured and went underground, in a situation similar to that experienced by the Iraqi Republican Guard after the defeat of Saddam Hussein in April 2003. In this new phase, they not only continued to fight against opposition groups, but also carried out actions to destabilize the new armed forces after December 2024.

Under Al Hassan’s command, these forces developed a high capacity for coordination with international allies, particularly Russia, which provided them with logistical, air and technical support, strengthening their position on the ground.^[19] This collaboration allowed the Tiger Forces to maintain their tactical advantage over their adversaries, including forces aligned with the Transitional Government.

For its part, the Syrian Transitional Government, supported by international actors such as the US and some European countries, seeks to establish an inclusive political framework that transcends the divisions generated by the war.^[20] However, the Tiger Forces and other factions loyal to the defunct Baathist regime pose a serious challenge to this process. Since January 2025, tensions between these forces and the militias linked to the Transitional Government have intensified, especially in regions such as Daraa and the northeast of the country. One of the most important blows against the Baathist insurgency in Syria was the capture of former General Mohammed Kanjo Hassan in the coastal province of Tartus, a former stronghold of Al Assad and home to the only Russian naval base in the Mediterranean, which was evacuated after the fall of the regime.

Bashar al-Assad’s Exile in Moscow: A Milestone in Syrian History

December 8, 2024 marked a turning point in Syria’s contemporary history. On that day, Bashar al-Assad, who had ruled the country since 2000, left Damascus and went into exile in Moscow after rebel forces entered the Syrian capital. The Syrian army’s inability to defend the city, coupled with the loss of popular support and growing international pressure, forced Assad to seek refuge in Russia, his main ally during the civil war.^[21]

Bashar al-Assad’s move to Moscow was facilitated by the Russian government, which justified its decision as a measure to prevent further bloodshed and protect the Syrian president from possible reprisals. Although some reports indicate that Assad initially resisted leaving the country, the imminent fall of Damascus and pressure from his allies led him to accept exile. The Syrian army’s inability to defend the capital, coupled with the loss of popular support and international pressure, forced Bashar al-Assad to seek refuge in Russia, his main ally during the civil war. His move to Moscow was facilitated by the Russian government, which argued the need to avoid further bloodshed and to ensure his safety from possible reprisals.

While some reports indicate that Bashar al-Assad initially resisted leaving the country, the imminent fall of Damascus and pressure from his allies forced him to accept exile. Since his arrival in Moscow, he has kept a low profile, away from the public eye. He has been granted asylum in a secure residence on the outskirts of the Russian capital, under the surveillance of Kremlin security forces.

Although the Russian government has been discreet about his situation, the former leader is known to have held private meetings with senior officials, possibly to discuss Syria’s political future and his own role in exile. As for his family, his wife, Asma al-Assad, and children are also reported to be residing in Moscow, adjusting to a new reality far from the power and luxury they enjoyed in Damascus. The Syrian community in Russia, although small, has shown divided reactions to his arrival: while some consider him a betrayed leader, others see him as the main responsible for the years of conflict and suffering in their country.

Conclusions

The geopolitical context in Syria, following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, poses significant challenges that require a comprehensive and coordinated military, political and humanitarian response. The reconstruction of the country, the stabilization of the affected areas and the search for an inclusive political solution are key factors in moving towards regional peace and security. It is imperative that the international community work together to address the complex issues facing Syria, thus preventing the crisis from dragging on indefinitely. On the other hand, one of the possible scenarios after the end of the war could be the fragmentation of the country into several zones of control, similar to what happened during the worst moments of the first Iraqi civil war (2006-2009). In this context, the formation of an Alawite enclave on the coast, specifically in Latakia and Tartous, backed by Russia; a Kurdish region in the northeast with Western support; zones under Turkish influence in the north; and Sunni areas in the center and south, with the support of the Gulf countries.

Endnotes

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6. A. Tucker-Jones, Daesh: Islamic State’s Holy War (Casemate Publishers, 2018). ↑
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17. G. Nick, Six Scenarios for Pro-Regime Militias in ‘Post-War’ Syria, 2019. ↑
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20. K. Al Khateeb, Perspectives on Transitional Justice in Syria: Voices from Academia, Civil Society, and the Arts (Editor, 2025). ↑
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