Pedro Trujillo Álvarez^[1]

Summary

In his book On War, Clausewitz reflects on what has been called the triad, trilogy or trinity of war. The Prussian presents a broader dimension of confrontation than the specifically military and links three elements: reason, will and passion, materialized in politics, the armed forces (the army) and the citizenry. Thus, it establishes a model, a sort of methodology (which is what we intend to rescue) to analyze conflicts. In this sense, to the extent that there is a convergence between the elements (factors) mentioned, it is easier to achieve success, since the absence of fissures or porosity between them reduces risks and vulnerabilities. On the other hand, by placing each of these three elements at one of the vertices of a triangle, they can be related to each other, which makes it possible to analyze the degree of cohesion and its possible reflection in subsequent political-military action, or even in the national deterrence capacity. Finally, from the second half of the 20th century, the emergence first of the United Nations (UN) and later of other international organizations, some dedicated to security and defense, generated a new space in which it was necessary to encompass the “war triad” (of a state nature) in the new international concert. This brought about a change in the methodology of conflict analysis that is still as valuable today as it was when it was first presented, but in a broader, supra-state and globalized context.

Keywords: Warfare, Clausewitz, triad, methodology, organizations

Introduction

The need to understand war conflicts, their actors and how they interact in each historical moment represents a permanent challenge for scholars and analysts. The triad of war, proposed by Clausewitz, constitutes a methodology that allows addressing the challenge of conflict analysis. Although it is necessary to adapt it to changing times, it is undeniable that the model can be applied to any historical or contemporary period.

This paper is based on the Clausewitzian proposal and aims to show the evolution of this theory in three stages: from its publication until the World Wars; from then until the formation of the UN; and finally, from the end of the 20th century to the present day. In each of these stages, the nation state exercises a monopoly of violence and absolute power, until its initial insertion into an international system (UN) and subsequently into a more complex context that includes a wide range of international actors and organizations of various kinds. In addition to reflecting on the conceptual evolution proposed by Clausewitz and its current validity, a methodology is presented: a relatively simple model for analyzing the international situation, regardless of the time considered. This model offers a space for reflection and develops skills in those conducting analysis, enabling them to address and investigate past conflicts and possible present or future war scenarios.

The War Triad

In Karl von Clausewitz’s well-known book, Of War, the Prussian proposes a “trinity”, a “triad”:

War, therefore, is not only a true chameleon, in that in each particular case it changes its character somewhat, but it is also a strange trinity, if considered as a whole, in relation to the tendencies which predominate in it. This trinity is constituted by the hatred, enmity and primitive violence of its essence, which must be considered as a blind natural impulse, the play of chance and probabilities, which make it a free activity of the spirit, and the subordinate character of a political instrument, which makes it belong to the domain of pure intelligence.

The interpretation made by some authors is that Clausewitz intended, fundamentally, to show that war is not merely a military matter, but a socio-political one, and that in every conflict there are different actors, beyond the “violence” of armies,^[2] such as citizenship and politics. This modifies the traditional human bellicosity, typical of Hobbesian reflections, to the idea that “war is the continuation of politics by other means”.^[3] Cornut (2019) explains it as follows:

Strictly speaking, the triadic notion introduces the need to maintain in balance and control the irrational aspects stemming from the passions that instigate the struggle and that are present in the people, harmonized with the military talent that conducts tactical and strategic operations with professional suitability to minimize the effects of chance, and, in turn, all this contained in the grand design that the policy has foreseen for the conflict, in the form of objectives and goals. Thus, the triad translates into people, army and government.

In the triangle composed of hatred, enmity and violence, one can visualize, concurrently with the first, politics (leadership, reason), citizenship (people, passion) and armies (competition, will). Therefore, in order to achieve triumph, a sort of center of power projection framed within a geometric figure without fissures between the factors located at the vertices must be formed, which has not always occurred throughout history, since each of these has had different weights and preeminence according to the time. That is to say, as long as there is no fracture between citizens who accept the political decisions of their leaders, and an army subordinated to politics -and integrated and supported by the people- the ideal conditions for triumph exist.

Figure 1. Prepared by the author

The Clausewitzian idea is established after the Napoleonic wars and the experience is developed within the framework of the so-called “second generation wars” or “second wave wars”, according to Alvin Toffler. These comprise the conflicts that followed the French Revolution. In this initial context, it is clear that in many countries political and military power tended to be associated and overlap, while the citizenry was under pressure and submissive to an authoritarian system. Thus, it was very difficult to form the aforementioned triad from the point of view of separation of powers and actions necessary for their integration, since everything was practically under absolute power.

Over time, societies have consolidated the current separation between the military, political authority and the citizenry. As political regimes become more legitimate,^[4] and, consequently, are accepted and elected by citizens, it becomes evident that one side of the proposed triangle is optimized through a mutual agreement that reconciles.

If armies are subordinated to political authority and are not questioned by the citizenry, an alliance is formed in which each group assimilates and accepts the other. This dynamic promotes a society with will, understood as the will to win or the capacity to act, a concept that some military doctrines emphasize. At this juncture, the nation generates credibility and reliable deterrence, not necessarily from the point of view of the available military means -that would be another vector to analyze-, but from the point of view of morale, will and prevailing spirit.

In short, this situation allows the concurrence of factors conducive to action, which could be considered an increase in national defense capabilities.

On the other hand, liberal-democratic models give citizens an important and transcendental role, as they cease to be mere spectators to elect their authorities, who manage politics with armies as subordinate, obedient and non-deliberative institutions, at the service of peace, democracy and the defense of sovereignty and constitutional order. The political protagonism of the citizen significantly increases its value with the emergence of social networks and the democratization of information, which makes it possible for anyone to express their opinion, influence and exert pressure. This reinforces the need to reach the suggested trinitarian consensus.

The war triad not only offers a model for analyzing conflicts, but also establishes a national model of deterrence, which depends on the solidity of its construction. This aspect should be a permanent objective of national security policy.

If one considers that war is the continuation of politics by other means, it is clear that a nation capable of showing its opponents a solid scheme that integrates citizenship, politics and the army will have a greater capacity to dissuade them. This effectiveness increases when there are no fissures (porosity) in the relationship between these elements. Building a solid triangle is part of the construction of a national defense system and promotes the need to develop a defense culture that every society must consolidate in order to face security challenges.

The International System

Since 1945, when the UN was established, state autonomy has been inextricably linked to an international system of values, principles and forms of decision-making. Since then, the peaceful settlement of disputes has become the method for resolving conflicts and requires, theoretically, the approval of the international community, represented in a Security Council set up at the end of World War II, whose membership has been questioned over the years.

States cannot take unilateral decisions in matters of armed conflict, except in the exercise of legitimate self-defense, which incorporates into the triad an external phenomenon of approval or consent that is not always easy to manage, given that five powers have the right of veto in the Security Council, regardless of whether there is a sufficient majority among the other members. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 illustrates an example of the porosity of the international community’s circle of approval; although its consent is generally required, it can be excluded from certain decisions emanating from dominant powers.^[5]

Since the end of World War II and, particularly, with the progressive consolidation of democratic systems in the last third of the last century, the triad proposed by Clausewitz acquires a new dimension for analyzing conflicts and debating the possibilities of success in terms of the conformation -without fractures- of the proposed triangle, framed in a global dimension. It is not enough, in any warlike confrontation, for citizens to agree with the decisions of their leaders and for armies to be aligned with politics and united with the people; it is also necessary to have international approval.

The Evolution of the Trinitarian Vertices

The second half of the twentieth century constitutes the period of time in which substantial changes took place in each of the aforementioned vertices. Since Clausewitz’s proposal, the elements of the three vertices have evolved significantly. It is not possible to speak of a single way of reacting of the citizenry, of doing politics or of employing armies, which have also evolved in their forms, methods, doctrines and means.

In the political sphere, different systems have emerged: liberal democracies, populisms, authoritarianisms, and caciquisms, among others. The autocracies and absolutisms of the past, which created a relationship of closeness and interdependence between politics and armies, have given way to democracies that allow for the construction of an optimal triangle based on the legitimacy of the regime.

Citizens have promoted civil society organizations, both nongovernmental and international; they elect their representatives and enjoy a higher level of formal education, which enables them to discern, debate and decide on public affairs. This has facilitated a closer relationship with their leaders. Armies, for their part, have gone from being made up of compulsory conscripts to volunteer, professional and highly qualified soldiers. In addition, they have been incorporated into collective or shared defense structures, which facilitates their use by politicians, who, in turn, have greater citizen support.

In general, each vertex has undergone its own changes, and the “single triangular” model of the 19th century has evolved into a plural and diversified one, with nuances to be considered today. Clausewitz (1999) contemplated in his work: “Each time has its peculiar form of war… each will also have its own theory of war… those who wish to understand war must direct their attentive gaze to the features of the epoch in which they live”.

1. The Army

In the first- and second-generation wars, “order” prevailed, understood as the configuration of military formations that responded to specific tactics directed towards the enemy in order to provoke a confrontation. Rules, discipline and uniforms were subject to strict procedures emanating from the corresponding command.

As firearms evolved, especially artillery, formations between armies became more distant and tactics adapted to the destructive capacity of these weapons. This gave way to the third generation, characterized by the predominance of maneuver, infiltration techniques and lightning operations.

The two world wars generated total mobilization and the universalization of military service, as well as the use of mass armies and national industry in the service of the conflict. At the operational level, movement and maneuver were emphasized. The citizen was more immersed in the conflict because he was “driven” by political power. Vestrynge (1979) asserts that total war is not directed solely against armies, but involves civilian populations, an inevitable and unquestionable reality.

In later generations of warfare, the State ceased to be the sole protagonist. Operations are carried out by limited, agile and highly trained troops, capable of surviving by their own means. Technology is widely used in means of detection and information, as well as in modern forms of energy and remote action. This determines the “importance of the operational level, through the great strategic relevance of tactical actions, while establishing asymmetric conflict as a paradigm” (Fojón, 2006).

In the evolution of the battlefield that characterizes the different generations of warfare, armies have transformed their doctrines, tactics and means. Weapons, increasingly sophisticated and destructive, require more educated and trained soldiers. Decision-making is decentralized and due obedience disappears from military codes, generating a high sense of responsibility in each soldier, who must exercise action on his own principles of action, but more rigid and subject to strict ethical and legal frameworks.

The soldier ceases to “belong to a monolithic whole” acting under a single direction to form part of a “coordinated whole” in a framework of joint and combined action, which highlights responsibility and capability as fundamental pillars in decision making. Armies require much better trained personnel, in line with the technologies of the moment and subject to permanent auditing by a plural and globalized society that receives instant information. The ways of acting demand profound changes, according to the times.

Universal conscription has disappeared in most countries adopting smaller and highly technologized professional models. The link between society and the military, perhaps taken for granted in systems of compulsory conscription, imposes a construction through the political direction of defense, known as national defense culture. It is necessary to “convince” the citizen about the necessity of the use of the armed forces; however, it is easier for him to accept the use of professional military units with “lower social cost” than those formed by universal conscripts.

Nevertheless, many authors consider that the elements of the “trinity” can be identified in any historical period and in non-state realities. Clausewitz’s famous triad (army-government-society) is still valid, although the discussion can focus on its temporal evolution and new forms of struggle. Fojón (2006) reflects it as follows:

It can be deduced from Clausewitz’s work that when he refers to the “trinity” he is referring to elements or forces of a universal character that are present at any historical moment, and not to their concretion in a specific temporal or spatial circumstance.

Although there are thinkers who question the validity of Clausewitz’s theories on the basis of the fourth-generation wars,^[6] it is undeniable that they do so in relation to the classical vision of war, the forms, the role of the States and the military procedures. This may slightly confront certain aspects of the variables of the Trinitarian concept, extended in this work to the circle of international organizations, but not to the need to make it concurrent and effective in order to achieve an optimal center of power projection.

Additionally, it is necessary to include in this analysis, from the perspective of the exercise of power, the use not only of hard power (military), but also of white power (economic, diplomatic, technological, etc.), as forms of modern action attributable to both politics and the armed forces. However, this paper does not address the specific development of these issues.

2. The Policy

Political systems evolved from absolute monarchies and regimes with a certain degree of authoritarianism, in which national security focused on the consolidation of internal power and the defense of the status quo, to more or less consolidated liberal democracies. These are based on clear rules and do not allow the president to use military force without the authorization of a political apparatus that concentrates the power to declare war and sign peace in parliaments, popular representative bodies.

Absolutisms tend to disappear, and decision-making is carried out by majorities of citizens, who have the sovereign power to close the Clausewitzian triad, with the freedom they lacked in the past. Power, traditionally concentrated in politicians, is diluted, and it drifts towards a more active, responsible and supervising citizenship of public affairs. Statocentrism gives way to citizen control of public management, oversight and accountability; except in authoritarian contexts, the use of force requires broad social consensus.

It is worth considering the emergence of the populisms of the 21st century and including them in this reconfiguration of the triad, especially with regard to the reduction of citizen power to the benefit of the political decision-maker, which leads back to a model that was thought to have been overcome. The examples of Russia, Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, Nicaragua point to this retrotraction of the liberal democratic model, which has been essential in the harmonious configuration of the modern trilogy.

3. Citizens

Perhaps of all the vectors, the one that has undergone the most profound transformation is that of citizens. With the emergence of liberal democracies, the establishment of universal suffrage and the recognition of political rights, the citizenry gained a more active role in political life. In other words, the citizen is not only an observer; his participation in political affairs is active and decisive. Through the democratic exercise, they elect the authorities that will set the State’s foreign policy. Therefore, the exercise of the free vote, as the most visible part of a democratic system, will specify whether or not there is a fracture between the vertex of citizens and that of politics.

Social control in all areas – and the military is no exception –^[7] and the empowerment of civil society prevent the use of force at the discretion or whim of the ruler, who is subject to very strict rules, precisely as a shield against traditional coups d’état, which tend to disappear, particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR).

In post-conflict societies, as is the case in Latin America, the harmonization between the military and the citizenry has been more complex than in other regions, due to internal armed conflicts and military actions in the recent past. On the contrary, progress is being made in this direction, as evidenced by reports such as the LATINOBAROMETER monitoring (2023), which shows a significant rejection of military governments. On the other hand, the LAPOP report (2023) reflects the high degree of acceptance of the armed forces, even above the churches, being this institution the one with the highest trust in the hemisphere.^[8]

There is also an important vector to consider in this section: the effect of public opinion. Most citizens have social networks in which they express or generate opinion (public or published),^[9] competing with other traditional forms of media adapted to the digital world. These opinions do not always come from known profiles, which affects the formation of a social opinion that can align or negatively influence the political-military action of the triad. There are countless examples in which pressure from other countries, the concurrence of fake profiles and bots, or the natural opinion of the population have substantially changed the convergence of factors in just a few days.^[10]

The War Triad and the International Order

Since the proposal of the trinity of war by Clausewitz, various events associated with international dynamics, as well as the advance of liberal democracy, the new generations of war and, particularly, technology and public opinion through social networks, have shaped different periods that should be taken into account when analyzing the model to be applied to past conflicts and, especially, to those to come.

The Peace of Westphalia initiated a new world order. Although certain political agreements would henceforth regulate international relations, state sovereignty was at the center of the discussion, and the state held a monopoly on violence. However, despite other efforts, states continued to play an important role in the world order in the exercise of their sovereignty, although they attempted to achieve a certain degree of peace through the balance of power prevailing in Europe until well into the 20th century. This was achieved through the signing of pacts and agreements, as well as the configuration of international institutions. Attempts to establish an international order were diverse and unsuccessful or unsuccessful: the Declaration of Paris (1856), the Hague Conventions (1907), the League of Nations (1919) and the Briand-Kellog Pact (1928), among others.

Certain thinkers considered it immoral for the state to use its power to achieve particular ends and interests,^[11] which partly prompted Wilson Woodrow’s initiative with the League of Nations. The international acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations represented a fundamental milestone in the search for an international order that would accommodate the concept of national sovereignty and the exercise of state power to the new realities.

Later, the creation of the UN in 1945 promoted a post-war international order that substantially modified the international parameters existing up to that time. The fundamental guiding principle of the new organization, which was to settle disputes peacefully, together with the establishment of a Security Council with the right of veto of five predominant powers of the time, formed a new circle of approval around the Clausewitzian state triad. In fact, what before 1945 was debated at the level of nation-states (or in small meetings) progressively came to be discussed in international forums, the UN being the first, though later not the only one, but the most important. ^[12]

Figure 2. Prepared by the author

From that moment on, it was not enough to analyze the relationship between politics, the military and the citizenry, which was the domain of the state. It was imperative to close the international circle or, at least, to make it as porous as possible in order to facilitate the actions of the States. New variables emerged that compromised the independence and autonomy of nations, aspects that would hardly have caught Clausewitz’s attention in the first half of the 19th century. It was necessary to integrate new elements to intervene in conflicts, since it was not feasible to act without the approval of the Security Council and, therefore, of the five veto-wielding world powers in that body.

Many conflicts, especially those in which the great powers did not intervene, required the approval or, at least, the absence of rejection by the international community. However, as has historically been the case, other situations in which the interests of the dominant powers were at stake took place on the sidelines or with the silence of the UN.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the model did not change, but it became more permeable. The UN’s right of veto is not always accepted or respected by the major powers, which consider it necessary to fight against new threats, such as jihadist terrorism, certain independence movements or the Islamic State (ISIS). The United States (US) invaded Iraq without the consent of the UN,^[13] with the aim of preserving national security affected by Al Qaeda attacks. The actions in Afghanistan and, more recently, the conflicts between Israel and Gaza, as well as Russia and Ukraine, can be framed within these warlike conflicts in which the necessary consensus in the international order does not always have the required majorities.

Clausewitz’s model has evolved from a state conception of conflict, which reconciles three elements (politics-citizenship-army), to a post-1945 one that requires consensus (or non-dissent) in the international arena, through the United Nations System. Today, it faces a more complex need for agreements and majorities of international organizations, particularly regional and others related to shared defense, which implies a reduction of state autonomy in its capacity for intervention. States, with the exception of the great powers – and not always – have ceased to be autonomous and leading actors in conflicts; the international order has become more complex and diversified.

The Clausewitz Triad in the 21st Century

The Clausewitzian model of analysis has not changed significantly, although it has become more sophisticated. In the contemporary world, the 19th century triangle is still perfectly valid and international intervention is not usually acceptable without political-citizen approval, provided that national armies are subject to civilian authority and are managed within the legal framework imposed by liberal democracy. Consequently, the first thing to know is whether this consensus exists, which is expressed through opinion polls or surveys on different national realities, and how citizens support or reject this or that intervention depending on the prevailing national political situation.

The media, in addition to an active citizenry, inextricably linked to technology, provide information in real time and are capable of almost instantaneously molding the different sides of the triangle according to the evolution of the situation. Since the so-called Gulf War, the conflict for the recovery of Kuwait (1990-1991), the information dynamic has been a transcendent factor, even in the use of terminology, in order to promote national acceptance (political-citizen) and rejection of the opponent.^[14]

The current conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza illustrate the above. Despite sufficient convergence between politics, citizens and the Ukrainian and Israeli armed forces, it would not be enough if international support were not present. In the case of Ukraine, the West sustains the conflict by building, to a sufficient degree, an international circle in which, evidently, neither the Russian Federation nor the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as other countries allied to those two powers, participate. This porosity does not prevent the necessary degree of consensus to make confrontation possible. Something similar can be observed in Gaza; although, in this case, the progressive international weakening -greater porosity- may lead to the failure or weakening of the Israeli intervention.^[15]

Diplomacy (soft power), as a fundamental element of modern conflicts, is – more than ever – part of the actions that are necessary to align factors in any action.

Application of the Model in Current Conflicts

By analyzing historical conflicts^[16] or present, at the state level and since the second half of the last century in a global context, the model can be applied and the results studied, providing a methodological tool of interest to analysts and decision makers.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine confronts two totally different countries. Although both can be included within the broad conception of democratic countries, it is evident that the Ukrainian army has greater legitimacy, while the Russian army faces questions of authoritarianism and even accusations of criminal actions against political opponents. Both armies have demonstrated different levels of cohesion and degrees of popular acceptance. While the Ukrainian army recruits foreign citizens and volunteers, the Russian army has to resort

to those who question violence and have fled the country to avoid joining the ranks of its armed forces. The citizenry has a majority in favor of defending Ukraine against the Russian-induced invasion.

Figure 3. Prepared by the author

From an international point of view, the Russian invasion has generated rejection and has given rise to various forms of support for Ukraine, such as moral support, provision of means, financial aid, training, among others. The international community has been more favorable to this country and the role of the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) is present in the debates and discussions.

From the above, it is clear, especially in Russia, that, in Ukraine, there is a lack of cohesion between the vertices and a consequent reduction of the “center of power projection”, which has a direct impact on the image of each actor, public opinion, legitimacy, international support and other issues reflected in the various analyses of the confrontation. Figure 3 shows the opinion of the international community (represented in circles), more favorable to Ukraine than to Russia, although with certain porosity, due to the difficulty in reaching consensus on both positions. This porosity could be increased by international action, as a result, for example, of changes in the political leadership of the main world powers.

In the Russian case, it is evident that there is a major discrepancy (red color) that establishes weak links between the political leadership, the citizenry and the armed forces, although the latter are controlled by the government.

On the Ukrainian side, there is a greater solidity that may be diminished (dotted zone between political-citizen vertices) by the approval of the reduction of the minimum recruitment age (from 27 to 25 years old), with the aim of increasing the number of military personnel between 450,000 and 500,000 soldiers. However, this entails a high human and economic cost, as well as a future mortgage of human capital. It is evident that time has been wearing away (and may continue and fracture) that initial solidity between the two elements mentioned above, although the recent offensive in the Kursk area closes part of the gap indicated and improves the assessment.

Conclusions

Clausewitz proposed a simple and easy-to-apply methodology based on the three vertices of an integrated triangle that defines the relationship between politics, the military and the citizenry. With time and historical circumstances, other elements have been added, such as the role of the international community, particularly organizations related to security and defense, and public opinion, as cross-cutting vectors that influence possible alignments.

The analysis of modern conflicts reveals that, although non-state actors appear, the situation does not nullify the validity of the Classwitzian triangle, given that identical concurrence is required to counteract these actions. However, in addition to the national conjunction, the participation of regional and international organizations will be necessary, precisely because conflicts in a globalized world acquire a dimension that goes beyond the sphere of control and sovereignty of States. The breakdown of international agreements can jeopardize legitimacy and generate countervailing forces – external and internal – that can halt action or cause it to fail. From this perspective, Clausewitz is still relevant, and it is precisely this approach that we intend to develop in this reflection.

The change in the ways of waging “war” -procedures, doctrines, means, technology and public (and published) opinion- has reconfigured the traditional idea of conflict from the point of view of execution. It is evident that the form of confrontation has changed, which does not nullify the conceptual theoretical framework (the background) proposed by Clausewitz, in which certain factors, although different in form, require national and international alienation in order to converge successfully.

There was not a Trinitarian war and now it is “anti-Trinitarian”; rather, there continues to be an evolved Trinitarian war in a more complex international context that requires the incorporation of other elements to the analysis.

Endnotes:

1. This paper is the product of discussions with the students of the International Security Seminar (Universidad Francisco Marroquín, Guatemala, March 2024). I thank the students for their collaboration, ideas, suggestions and demonstrated academic ability. ↑
2. Indistinctly, but with identical meaning, the word army(s) and armed forces shall be used. ↑
3. Schmitt, Carl, El concepto de lo político (2009), 62, https://arditiesp.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/schmitt-carl-el-concepto-de-lo-policc81tico-completo.pdf ↑
4. The term “legitimate” is used in the text as “majority acceptance of something or someone”. ↑
5. Porosity is understood as the imperfect closure (non-closure) of the international circle of UN authorization. This occurs because there is usually no consensus in the international community, but rather diverse opinions, even though they may be in the majority. It is recommended reading José María Suárez Serrano, “The role of the United Nations in the Iraq war”, 2018, https://estudiosafricanos.cea.unc.edu.ar/files/05-suarez-serrano-N%C2%B04.pdf ↑
6. Van Creveld, Martin, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). ↑
7. Dávila, M. and Cárcamo Hum, R., “Fuerzas Armadas y su control institucional y administrativo”, Revista de Ciencia Política 59, no. 1 (2020): 103-130. ↑
8. In this regard, we recommend reading Antonio Estella de Noriega, “Confianza institucional en América Latina: un análisis comparado“, https://www.fundacioncarolina.es/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/DT_FC_34.pdf. ↑
9. In this regard, we recommend reading E. Noelle-Neumann, La espiral del silencio. Opinión pública: nuestra piel social (Paidós, 2010), especially in relation to the concepts of public opinion and published opinion. ↑
10. Catalán, M., “Prensa, verdad y terrorismo: la lección política del 14-M”. Open Edition Journal, n.º 2 (2005), https://journals.openedition.org/. ↑
11. Different authors have addressed the subject. We recommend M. Ayuso, “El Estado como sujeto inmoral”, Revista de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso n.º 45 (2015), https://www.scielo.cl/pdf/rdpucv/n45/a11.pdf; we also suggest consulting R. Nieburh, “La inmoralidad de las naciones”, Revista Académica de Relaciones Internacionales, n.º 7 (2007). ↑
12. The creation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) in 1947, an inter-American mutual defense pact, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and the evolution over time of its strategic concept, which has progressively adapted to the evolution of the international scenario to continue to play a leading role in international security, stand out. ↑
13. U.S. President George W. Bush signed the resolution approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives authorizing him to invade Iraq without the approval of the UN. This occurred while the Security Council was preparing to debate the opportunity to issue a new resolution that would include the automatic use of force in the event that Baghdad did not respect its disarmament commitments. ↑
14. Suggested reading is M. Cabrera, Medios de comunicación y medios visuales en los conflictos armados en la posguerra fría (2007),123, https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/531/53101206.pdf. ↑
15. The porosity, minimal in this case, is illustrated by the Security Council’s approval of a resolution calling for a cease-fire during Ramadan. The text, prepared by the 10 non-permanent members of the Council, was adopted with 14 votes in favor and the US abstaining. ↑
16. An interesting example can be found in R. Brieba Milnes, “Clausewitz’s trinity in the revolutionary war”. Revista Marina, no. 6 (2004), https://revistamarina.cl/revistas/2004/6/rbriebam.pdf. ↑