Summary

This article comprehensively analyzes the threats to national security in La Rinconada, Puno, focusing on organized crime, informal and illegal mining, environmental contamination and the public health crisis. In this region, various criminal organizations operate, dedicated to gold trafficking, smuggling and transnational crime, consolidating criminal structures with access to weapons and illicit financing. Their territorial control, based on violence and corruption, not only weakens state authority, but also exploits mine workers and monopolizes the illegal trade in inputs. Moreover, its actions sustain a parallel clandestine economy that finances illicit activities at the national and international levels. In this context, the objective is to understand how the lack of state intervention and the interests of certain groups have allowed this region to become a nucleus of illicit activities that compromise the stability and development of the country. In order to address this problem, it is essential to make the political class, institutions and society as a whole aware of the urgency of generating and implementing a comprehensive national security strategy. This should be capable of dismantling criminal networks and eliminating the links of certain actors with illegal mining, which would allow for a sustainable economic, social and environmental recovery. The methodology employed is based on a qualitative research analysis of phenomenological character that includes visits and interviews in the area, as well as the review of socioeconomic and environmental studies with national and international sources. This leads to the main conclusion that, without comprehensive and sustained state intervention, La Rinconada will consolidate as a stronghold of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), with direct repercussions on national security and governance of the country. Consequently, to avoid this scenario, it is imperative to articulate a strategy that combines security measures, mining formalization and socioeconomic development, ensuring the effective presence of the State and the eradication of the criminal structures that currently dominate the region.

Keywords: national security, TOC, illegal mining, violence, environmental contamination, governance

Introduction

Located in the Puno region, approximately 5,200 meters above sea level, La Rinconada is known as one of the highest inhabited settlements in the world. This population center began to develop in the last decades of the 20th century as an informal mining camp, attracting thousands of Andean migrants in search of work opportunities in gold mining.^[1] This settlement represents a paradigmatic case of informal mining in Peru, characterized by its enormous gold potential, as well as the high levels of precariousness and disorder that surround it; its mineral wealth contrasts with its reputation as a place where informality, labor exploitation and criminality predominate.

However, what began as a temporary settlement soon evolved into a chaotic urban center devoid of basic infrastructure, fueled in part by the high demand for gold and the limited state presence in the region. The history of La Rinconada reflects migration patterns characteristic of Peru’s mining areas, where the promise of quick riches drives entire communities to settle in extremely precarious and informal conditions.^[2] From a sociological perspective, this migration is a response to the lack of economic opportunities in rural areas and the historical postponement of the development of the indigenous and peasant populations of the Peruvian highlands.^[3] As a result, La Rinconada becomes a “survival space” in which illegality and informality are the only means of subsistence, forming a parallel economic system where labor exploitation and insecurity are perceived as “naturalized phenomena”.

La Rinconada is also home to a great ethnic and cultural diversity, composed mainly of migrants of Quechua and Aymara origin, whose cultural practices and Andean worldview, especially with respect to mining, provide a framework for understanding the dynamics that govern the social life of this community.^[4] For many, mining work is imbued with meanings, rituals and beliefs that justify and explain the risk and sacrifice that this activity entails.^[5] These cultural practices, while reinforcing community ties, are threatened by the violence and TOC that have arisen around illegal mining.

Figure 1. Panoramic view of La Rinconada town center

Factors such as the lack of basic infrastructure, the reduced presence of law enforcement, the absence of regulation of mining activities and the territorial control exercised by criminal groups have allowed La Rinconada to remain on the margins of the institutional order.^[6] In this scenario, local and regional authorities have demonstrated a systematic inability to exercise control over the area, allowing the expansion of illicit economies and the consolidation of criminal networks that impose their own power structure. The lack of law enforcement and the impunity with which these groups operate have generated a climate of intimidation and violence, where the local population is the victim of extortion, labor exploitation and forced displacement, further consolidating La Rinconada’s status as a territory outside of state control.

La Rinconada represents a clear example of what some scholars call a “liberated zone,” where the state has lost the capacity to control public order and ensure citizen security. In Gonzales’ words, the expansion of criminal activities and the presence of foreign actors pose a direct threat to national sovereignty and security.^[7] Under this reality, this population center presents a mosaic of social problems that include not only labor exploitation and lack of services, but also a profound environmental crisis derived from the indiscriminate and unregulated use of mercury, which affects the health of the inhabitants and local ecosystems.

Figure 2. Main access road to La Rinconada town center

Through this analysis, the main threats to national security that La Rinconada represents will be addressed, exploring the complex socio-cultural fabric, the implications of its illegality and the impact on the health of the population. It will also examine potential strategies for restoring governance in this region and fostering more secure and sustainable development.

Illegal Mining: An Ecosystem of Parallel Economics and Criminality

Illegal mining has ceased to be a marginal activity and has become a significant parallel industry, operating outside the legal framework and challenging the capacity of government control. Gold mining in this region has attracted thousands of migrants in search of opportunities, consolidating La Rinconada as one of the points with the highest concentration of illegal mining in the country.^[8] This phenomenon has been facilitated by a series of structural factors that demonstrate the weakness of the State in the region. First, the lack of oversight and the absence of operations, due to geographic inaccessibility, have allowed these activities to grow without restrictions. Second, corruption within the entities in charge of mining supervision has generated an environment of impunity, where illegal actors can operate without fear of sanctions. This is compounded by the scarce presence of security forces in the area, which leaves the population exposed to violence from criminal groups that control the extraction and commercialization of gold. Finally, the lack of effective mining formalization programs has led many small-scale miners to continue operating outside the law, perpetuating informality and labor exploitation. According to recent data, mining operations in Puno lack basic labor rights and fiscal regulations.^[9] As a result, a cycle of exploitation, poverty and tax evasion is being perpetuated and naturalized,^[10] feeding an illegal and informal economic system that evades taxes and escapes State control. Thus, political inaction, insufficient institutional infrastructure and permissiveness towards these economies have transformed La Rinconada into a enclave where illegal mining operates without restrictions, entrenching itself as a focus of insecurity and environmental deterioration.

Figure 3. Informal trade activity in La Rinconada

Illegal mining in La Rinconada is the only source of livelihood for its inhabitants.^[11] On the other hand, because it generates quick, unregulated income, it encourages labor exploitation and fosters the rise of organized crime. According to the Dirección Regional de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo (DRTPE), 838,676 people were employed in the area in 2022, of which 90.2% worked informally, meaning that 756,539 individuals worked without access to social benefits and in companies that evaded tax obligations.^[12] A factor that aggravates this situation is the ancestral work system known as “cachorreo”, in which miners work without wages for 28 days, in exchange for the opportunity to keep the extracted ore for two days a month.^[13] Thus, their income depends exclusively on the quantity and quality of the material obtained, which can translate into a significant profit or no remuneration at all. This dynamic reinforces the precariousness of labor, causes extreme dependence of miners on their luck in the extraction of gold and exacerbates tax evasion.

From a strategic perspective, the parallel economy weakens state authority by consolidating a space where the law is replaced by illegal structures and power relations imposed by criminal groups. The lack of government regulation and control allows these illicit activities to shape a system based on exploitation and violence that is beyond the reach of state institutions.^[14] Therefore, La Rinconada’s economy, sustained on illegal mining, creates an environment where violence and exploitation are perceived as common and necessary practices for survival.

The impact of illegal mining transcends the regional economy and has national repercussions. Gold mining is seen by various organized crime groups as an opportunity to expand their criminal operations and extend their networks.^[15] These organizations, some of which include foreign elements, use the profits to traffic weaponry, such as ammunition and explosives, and consolidate their territorial control in the region.^[16] Their presence has not only increased crime rates, but has also generated an illicit economy where related crimes, such as illicit drug trafficking (IDT), human trafficking and contract killings, have taken root in the area. Criminal networks have implemented mechanisms for extortion and quota collection from informal miners, establishing a control system based on violence and intimidation.^[17] In addition, the high concentration of male population in the activities has generated an alarming increase in the trafficking of women and minors for sexual exploitation, favored by the proliferation of unregulated clandestine brothels.

In this situation, illegal mining is a source of financing for these criminal groups, which represents a direct threat to national security. Their actions have eroded governance in the region and have generated fear among local populations, who are forced to leave the area due to the expansion of illegal activities; in this sense, illegal mining not only represents a problem of public order, but an integral threat that compromises social stability, internal security and the sustainability of the country.

From an analytical perspective, it is evident that the lack of state intervention in La Rinconada has favored the establishment of an illegal economy, which continues to drive criminality in the region. Given this situation, it is imperative to first generate and implement a strategy that combines mining formalization with measures to intervene in the local economy to prevent organized crime from taking absolute control of the area.

A comprehensive approach, combining the regulation of mining activity with an inclusive economic development strategy, is essential to dismantle this parallel economy. This would imply the constant and sufficient presence of law enforcement, the creation of formal jobs, the control of taxes to the State and the promotion of economic livelihood alternatives for the population.^[18] At the same time, strengthening border cooperation with neighboring countries is essential to stop the trafficking of mining inputs and the entry of weapons, which are essential to sustain the criminal economy in La Rinconada.

To address this threat in the short term, it is necessary for the State to adopt an active and coordinated stance that includes mining-environmental control and the strengthening of local governance. It is worth reflecting on whether the creation of incentive programs for formalization and the provision of basic services will help reduce dependence on illegal mining.^[19] In this sense, the intervention of governmental entities, in conjunction with international organizations, would be essential to ensure that formalization efforts and control of illegal activities are implemented in a sustainable manner.^[20]

Smuggling and Tax Evasion: An Informal State in Puno

Informality in the Puno region transcends mining, extending to various economic activities that operate outside the legal framework and pose significant threats to development and governance. This informal economy, characterized by smuggling and evasion of taxes, creates a marginal structure that challenges the State’s ability to control and regulate activities in the region.^[21]

Smuggling in Puno is fueled by its proximity to the borders with Bolivia and Chile, where the lack of rigorous controls facilitates the flow of unregulated products such as fuel, food and textiles. According to the Alianza Latinoamericana Anticontrabando (ALAC), almost 60% of illicit products and goods enter through these areas, affecting the formal economy and discouraging local businesses from integrating into the formal economy.^[22] Ismael Rubén Vargas Céspedes, former Minister of the Interior, states that:

It is a criminality that is killing through hired assassins and generates anxiety in the population. We must remember that the perception of insecurity exceeds 80% of the population, so it is important to analyze the role played by these illegal economies in the generation of organized crime and the damage it causes to governance, because its corrosive power affects and undermines our institutions.^[23]

From a strategic perspective, informality and smuggling not only imply a significant economic loss, but also favor the control of economic activity by organized networks, given that the lack of regulation limits the reach of the law. These networks, in many cases associated with criminal groups, find in informality a financing mechanism that facilitates the expansion of their influence in the region.^[24]

These criminal groups take advantage of weak state control and lack of oversight to establish illegal power structures based on corruption and coercion. Through bribery of local officials and intimidation of traders, they ensure the continuity of their illicit operations without repercussions, reinforcing their dominance over the illegal economy. In addition, they impose “quotas” on various informal workers, creating a parallel economic system that facilitates the consolidation of their financing. In a complementary manner, they take advantage of the smuggling networks to launder assets, moving large sums of money without being detected by the supervision and financial intelligence mechanisms.

In this scenario, the informal economy in Puno creates a space conducive to the expansion of actors operating outside the law, which weakens governance and compromises the security of the population.^[25] This dynamic turns the region into a haven for organized crime, facilitating the trafficking of illicit goods, the illegal gold trade and the entry of arms and explosives, which strengthens the criminal structures operating in the area.

Tax evasion is another critical challenge, as reduced tax collection limits the State’s ability to invest in infrastructure, education and health. This situation generates a cycle of distrust in institutions, as citizens perceive a weak state to contain informality and contraband.^[26] Without the necessary revenues, the government faces serious barriers to providing essential services and ensuring a safe and prosperous environment for the population, which in turn is used as an argument and justification for violent social mobilizations led by leaders of radical organizations.

Figure 4. Seizure of contraband merchandise in the province of Huancané

In the medium and long term, the consolidation of this illegal, informal and parallel economy poses significant threats and risks to Puno’s development and stability. Regarding the regional social progress index for the end of 2024, the region registered a gradual improvement, although it continues at low levels of social progress, reaching 51.3 points. In contrast, Moquegua obtained 66.4 points, and Arequipa with 64.6 points; one of the main problems is the high level of informality, which limits its progress.^[27] Therefore, the challenges in this region should focus on guaranteeing essential services such as education, health, potable water and quality sanitation, which requires specific interventions in each sector. Without coordinated, multi-sectoral intervention, these economies are likely to continue to expand, further reducing the effectiveness of governance and undermining national security.

To address this issue, it is essential to strengthen border control and cooperation with Bolivia and Chile, as well as create incentives for local entrepreneurs and traders to integrate into the formal economy.^[28] In a joint effort, the development of basic infrastructure and the formalization of economic activities would help reduce dependence on smuggling and illegality, promoting a stable governance environment in the region.

Crisis of Governance and Absence of the State: Challenges for Security and Law and Order

The lack of an effective state presence in La Rinconada has generated a chaotic and unregulated environment, where crime and lawlessness have become a predominant system. The absence of strong government institutions has led citizens to rely on informal systems and, in many cases, organized groups to meet their basic needs for security and justice.^[29] In this vacuum of authority, criminal gangs have assumed functions that, in a functional state, would correspond to law enforcement and the judicial system.

For example, groups such as “Los Primos” and “Los Perros de Lunar”, two of the most dangerous gangs in the area, impose their own system of “justice”, punishing with extreme violence those who break their rules, as a form of social control and warning. In addition, they have established illegal private security systems, charging mandatory fees to merchants and miners in exchange for “protection”, in a practice that resembles a systematic extortion regime

According to General PNP, Chief of the Puno Police Region, “up to seven criminal gangs are actively operating in the region… these criminal organizations have a strong control in the mining town of La Rinconada, in the province of San Antonio de Putina, and have extended their operations to other areas of the department”.^[30]

Figure 5. Arrest of Narciso Huayta, alleged leader of “Los Perros de Lunar”, during an identity control operation in possession of arms and ammunition

Diario Sin Fronteras, “Juliaca: Detienen al presunto cabecilla de Los Perros de Lunar en La Rinconada”, July 1, 2024, https://diariosinfronteras.com.pe/2024/07/01/juliaca-detienen-al-presunto- cabecilla-de-los-perros-de-lunar-en-la-rinconada/amp/.

This situation generates a context in which trust in the state and its institutions is significantly eroded, giving rise to a power vacuum where organized crime thrives. The shortcomings of law enforcement lead local populations to resort to criminal structures to ensure their security. However, these are not an effective solution, as they reinforce the gangs’ control over the region, consolidating a system of criminal governance where the law is imposed through force and intimidation. In this context, mining operator Edwin Ajahuana states:

“…La Rinconada requires attention from the State after the increase in crime, which leaves at least two or three people dead every day… In Puno we need greater intervention to safeguard the life and integrity of the people because kidnappings in the mining works are frequent… Crime is seen daily, here peace has been lost and people, sometimes, out of necessity, have to expose themselves”.^[31]

Critically, the governance crisis in La Rinconada is a manifestation of broader structural problems in the Puno region. The lack of infrastructure, basic services, quality education and social programs fosters distrust of authorities and reliance on illegal and informal economies. Ancco’s research reveals that villagers in Puno feel that the government does not have the capacity to address their essential needs, which reinforces a sense of abandonment and discontent towards the state.^[32] This insufficient state presence creates an environment conducive for criminal organizations linked to illegal mining to consolidate their power in the region.

Given the scarcity of economic opportunities and the collapse of public services, illegal mining is the only viable source of livelihood for local residents, who are subjected to exploitative labor conditions imposed by criminal networks. In addition, insecurity and limited access to justice allow these groups to act with total impunity, establishing a sinister system in which they control not only the extraction of gold, but also the distribution of inputs, the commercialization of the mineral and the “imposition of norms” through violence and intimidation.

This perception of abandonment not only weakens the legitimacy of institutions; it also undermines efforts to restore law and order in critical areas of the country, such as La Rinconada.^[33] In this scenario, the governance crisis perpetuates informality and, at the same time, facilitates the entrenchment of criminal groups that have turned illegal mining into a key source of financing for broader criminal economies, including arms trafficking, human trafficking and money laundering.

From a strategic point of view, the lack of governance represents a significant national security challenge. When the state fails to exercise its authority in a region, it opens the door for non-state actors, including criminal groups and criminal networks, to occupy that space of power. In La Rinconada, these organizations have taken control of much of the economic and social activity, including illegal mining, informal commerce and unregulated private security.^[34] In this climate, criminal structures are expanding and pose a direct threat to the stability and sovereignty of the country.

 

Going forward, it is clear that without comprehensive and sustainable state intervention, La Rinconada and other areas of Puno and Peru will continue to experience a consolidation of alternative powers to the state. The growth of these illicit organizations and economies responds to multiple interrelated factors. First, the lack of an effective mining formalization policy forces thousands of workers to operate outside the law, which is exploited by criminal groups that establish control networks over the extraction and commercialization of gold. Second, institutional fragility and corruption within the entities in charge of overseeing mining activities allow illegal exploitation to flourish without restrictions, generating a cycle of impunity that reinforces its expansion. Finally, the lack of road infrastructure and connectivity hinders the presence of the State, which favors the operation of illicit economies and the consolidation of organized crime.

To prevent this situation from worsening, the State needs to implement a strategic plan that addresses structural governance problems and promotes the creation of a safe and orderly environment.^[35] This should contemplate the progressive formalization of informal mining through incentives that grant workers labor rights and environmental regulation, reducing their dependence on criminal structures. Likewise, it is essential to establish effective control over the commercialization of gold, applying traceability and supervision mechanisms that prevent the insertion of illegally extracted mineral in the formal market.

Figure 6. Discussion with the mayor of La Rinconada town center

In the long term, a multi-sectoral approach that integrates the presence of security forces, the formalization of economic activities and the development of social programs is critical to regaining the population’s trust in the state and strengthening governance. The installation of citizen attention centers and social service offices in La Rinconada and other vulnerable areas of Puno could be a first step to reestablish state presence and reduce the impact of organized crime. In addition, the establishment of an oversight system articulated with communities and local and regional governments would facilitate the creation of an environment of control and regulation, reinforcing the authority of the State in the region.

TOC Proliferation: Direct Threat to National Security

La Rinconada has evolved into a transnational threat with direct implications for national security. This phenomenon is part of the expansion of the TOC, which has significantly penetrated strategic areas of the country, establishing “criminal franchises” through the control of local gangs and their integration into broader hierarchical structures. The presence of criminal organizations, such as “Los Primos” and “Los Perros de Lunar”,^[36] as well as the participation of foreign actors, including Colombians, Bolivians and Venezuelans, has generated a permanent state of anxiety among the local population. These groups have implemented criminal methods that allow them to expand their influence and strengthen their illicit networks.

Among the main strategies used by the TOC in Latin America is the “gota a gota” loan system,^[37] a usurious practice that financially subjugates merchants and small businessmen by charging exorbitant interest rates backed by threats of violence. Although this modality is not predominant in La Rinconada, its operating logic resembles the collection of “quotas” demanded from informal, illegal and legal miners, merchants and transporters in the area, who must pay in exchange for “protection” to operate without reprisals.

The usurpation and trafficking of land is another recurrent practice in which the TOC illegally occupies mining properties and resells them at high prices, generating violent disputes between groups seeking to consolidate their territorial control.^[38] At the same time, these organizations have extended their influence over the region’s and the country’s prisons, infiltrating prison corruption networks to operate from inside the prisons and coordinate their criminal activities. In addition, they have implemented kidnapping, extortion and contract killings as mechanisms of pressure and social control, ensuring their hegemony in the area.

The expansion of these networks has been facilitated by illegal entry routes into the region, particularly through the triple border between Peru, Bolivia and Brazil, where the lack of effective controls allows the passage of people linked to TOC.^[39] Likewise, the informal corridors that connect Madre de Dios with Puno and the clandestine routes on the border with Bolivia have been used for the trafficking of illegal gold, IDTs, arms, explosives and chemical supplies. The presence of criminal groups linked to the TOC, with access to modern weaponry, represents a risk of extreme violence in the area, where territorial disputes and resource trafficking pose a major threat to the State.^[40]

Other routes used by the TOC include the Moho, Huancané, Juliaca – Tripartito, Ancomarca, Kelluyo, Desaguadero – Desaguadero, Masocruz and Capazo corridors.^[41] Intense smuggling and informal trade on these routes facilitates the mobility of criminal actors without major restrictions, perpetuating an environment conducive to tax evasion and the avoidance of legal controls. According to the National Society of Industries (SNI), 58.8% of contraband entering Peru comes from the borders between Peru, Bolivia and Chile.^[42] This criminal activity, a fundamental part of the TOC, has evolved considerably from the use of “culebras” [convoys of vehicles protected by armed criminals] to new storage and distribution strategies.^[43] According to the National Superintendency of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT), Puno is the main route for smuggled goods entering the country, accounting for 38.7% of the total. It is estimated that in 2023 this customs crime will reach a value of US$232 million.^[44]

The trafficking of illicit goods such as Bolivian fuel, adulterated cigarettes and second-hand clothing causes millions in losses for Peru, while at the same time financing criminal networks. The price disparity between legal and illicit products makes this business highly profitable: while in Lima a pack of cigarettes costs 20 soles, on the Bolivian border ten adulterated packs are sold for only 50 soles, ensuring huge profits for smugglers.^[45] This scenario, aggravated by weak controls in strategic corridors, strengthens the presence of organized crime and expands the illegal economy in the region.

Likewise, the possible influence of former members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), who, after their demobilization in June 2017, and with their dissidents gathered in the Residual Organized Armed Groups (GAOR), could have entered the country, through the Putumayo sector, facilitating the expansion of organized criminal networks in the region.^[46] The persistence of the armed conflict in Colombia, along with the proliferation of drug trafficking and other illicit economies, has allowed the infiltration of individuals linked to organized crime, including former guerrillas and members of criminal structures linked to the GAOR. In addition, the economic and political crisis in Venezuela has generated uncontrolled mass migration, into which criminal organizations such as the “Aragua Train” have inserted themselves, extending their criminal activities transnationally. These elements, in alliance with pre-existing Peruvian gangs, have consolidated a system of territorial control in strategic points of the country, resorting to extreme violence and the use of weapons of war to consolidate their dominance in areas of high criminal interest.

Organized crime operates under strategic objectives that span the political, economic, social and security spheres.^[47] Politically, it seeks to infiltrate and capture institutions to undermine the legitimacy of the state. In the economic sphere, it controls the money laundering chain and resorts to extortion and violence to consolidate its dominance. In the social sphere, it deconstructs the community fabric through terror; and in the security sphere, it establishes itself as the dominant armed force through corruption and intimidation.

From an analytical perspective, organized crime organizations, in the various areas where they operate at the national level, employ “hybrid warfare” strategies to weaken the Peruvian state. They replace authority through the exercise of political, economic and social power, accompanied by systematic violence that consolidates their dominance.^[48] Recent investigations have shown the presence of human trafficking networks in the region, where women and minors, mainly of Bolivian and Venezuelan origin, are captured with false promises of work and later sexually exploited in clandestine mining camps.^[49] This type of organization allows criminal groups to benefit from the cooperation between national and international actors, facilitating the trafficking of arms, people and resources.

A case documented in 2023 by the PNP, in collaboration with the International Criminal Police Organization – INTERPOL (abbreviated as ICPC-INTERPOL), revealed that Peruvian and Bolivian criminal organizations operated together to smuggle weapons and explosives from the Bolivian altiplano, taking advantage of illegal routes.^[50] Similarly, the existence of gold smuggling corridors between Madre de Dios and Bolivia has been identified, where the illegally extracted mineral in La Pampa is traded on international black markets without traceability, financing criminal networks with global reach.^[51]

In economic terms, these organizations have consolidated control mechanisms over the commercialization of gold, ensuring its transit to international markets through intermediaries and front companies, which reinforces the urgent need for a more rigorous and effective regulatory framework.

The presence of foreign criminals intensifies the threat to national security, transforming the region into a focus of the TOC with implications for the stability of the country. Amador Núñez Mamani, president of the Frente de Organizaciones Populares de Puno (FOP) stated that the participation of foreigners in illicit activities, the inadequacy of immigration control and the impunity with which these groups operate have generated indignation among citizens.^[52] This problem not only highlights the fragility of state control on the border, but also the strengthening of criminal networks that operate with total impunity in the region. As a result, La Rinconada has become an epicenter of illegal mining and a key point on the TOC routes, facilitating the transnational trafficking of gold, drugs and arms.

The impact of these groups goes beyond direct violence; their ability to infiltrate public institutions, manipulate political decisions and control illicit economies highlights the urgent need for a comprehensive approach to counter this threat.^[53] In La Rinconada and other areas of the country, illegal mining has become a meeting point for various criminal structures that have woven networks of corruption with local authorities and judicial operators. Through the financing of electoral campaigns and the recruitment of officials, these organizations have managed to influence key decisions that favor the permanence of their criminal structure in the region. An example of this is the modification of the Integral Mining Formalization Registry (REINFO), whose validity has been repeatedly extended, which has affected the fight against illegal mining.^[54]

In addition, the relaxation of the criminalization of Law 32108, which introduces modifications to the Penal Code and other criminal laws regarding organized crime,^[55] constitutes a step backwards in the fight against TOC. From a strategic and national security approach, these modifications weaken the State’s capacity to face threats such as drug trafficking, illegal mining and smuggling, activities that finance criminal networks with international links. Consequently, their promoters are unaware of the evolution of organized crime, which operates through decentralized and flexible structures, while the regulations demand a structural complexity that does not correspond to the operational reality of these mafias. Instead of strengthening the legal framework, ambiguous and restrictive concepts are incorporated that hinder criminal prosecution and promote impunity, despite the fact that the fight against these organizations demands effective legal regulations aligned with international standards.

Figure 7. Tour of La Rinconada with authorities and local residents

 

To address this problem, it is imperative to modify the legal framework and repeal those provisions that limit effective investigation and prosecution, in addition to strengthening penalties for these high-impact crimes. It is also necessary to adopt measures such as the preventive seizure of goods and resources from illicit economies, witness protection and preventive detention, in order to dismantle the criminal networks operating in the area.

The classification of these groups as TOC requires a comprehensive response that combines internal security and international cooperation. In the short term, it is essential to implement joint operations between the PNP, the Armed Forces (Armed Forces) and intelligence agencies to dismantle these criminal networks.^[56] Additionally, the implementation of intelligence operations and the cooperation with the security forces of Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela may prove decisive in tracking down and reducing the influence of these international criminal actors. Cooperation with neighboring countries will be essential to address the complexity of this social phenomenon in the region through a comprehensive and sustained strategy to reestablish state control and ensure a safe environment for the population.

In a prospective context, the intervention in La Rinconada should include a multi- sectoral development strategy that makes it viable for the region to reduce its dependence on illicit activities. This implies generating economic alternatives, strengthening state presence and consolidating a security framework that guarantees territorial control and governance, thus ensuring the country’s stability in the face of growing threats from the TOC.^[57]

Pollution and Public Health Crisis: Environmental and Human Impacts of Illegal and Informal Mining

Mining activity in La Rinconada involves multiple actors and practices, all in search of gold, albeit under different regulatory frameworks and with varying health and environmental impacts. In general terms, four types of mining are identified: legal, artisanal, informal and illegal, each with specific characteristics and differentiated levels of impact.

Legal mining complies with environmental, labor and fiscal regulations established by the State, operating within a supervised framework. However, in La Rinconada its presence is reduced due to insufficient infrastructure and state supervision.^[58]

Artisanal mining, on the other hand, encompasses small-scale operations carried out by individuals or families who exploit mining resources in limited quantities.^[59] Although this practice is traditional and is part of the local economy, in La Rinconada it is often mixed with informal or illegal practices. This is especially the case when polluting methods are used without supervision, which generates an environment conducive to the incursion of criminal networks that control small-scale miners through extortion and mandatory fees to allow them to operate in certain areas.

Informal mining in La Rinconada includes those who extract gold without complying with all required regulations. Although they do not necessarily act against the law, they lack formalization. In this context, the lack of requirements such as environmental permits or licenses excludes them from state control, even though their activity has no criminal intent.^[60] However, this lack of regulation has been exploited by criminal organizations that have set up a system of “mandatory protection”. As a result, miners must pay fees to obtain security or access to extraction areas. In addition, these criminal groups control the distribution of essential inputs, such as mercury and explosives used in mineral processing, imposing their exclusive commercialization through their networks, with overpriced prices and strict conditions. Illegal mining, on the other hand, is characterized by practices that intentionally violate the law, such as mining on unauthorized land, hiring workers without formal contracts, and using highly damaging methods, such as dumping mercury in bodies of water.^[61] In La Rinconada, this activity is particularly destructive, as it contributes significantly to pollution and aggravates the public health crisis in the region.^[62]

At a structural level, the TOC derives financial benefits from illegal mining, while the latter depends on the TOC to sustain its operations. Gold extracted without regulation facilitates money laundering and its commercialization in international markets. In addition, labor exploitation in mining camps is promoted by these networks, which benefit from the lack of state oversight to impose abusive conditions on workers, generating a cycle of economic dependence that strengthens their power in the region.

Mining activity at La Rinconada, regardless of its form, is directly linked to the use of mercury, a highly toxic heavy metal that contaminates soil and water and poses a serious health risk. In this context, exposure to mercury and other toxic chemicals has caused serious public health problems, especially among miners and their families, who have high levels of this metal in their blood.^[63] Therefore, heavy metal contamination in mining communities constitutes one of the greatest health threats in illegal and informal mining areas.

From a strategic approach, this environmental and public health crisis requires a coordinated intervention that not only controls illegal mining practices, but also facilitates the formalization of artisanal and informal miners to mitigate ecological damage. Formalization of mining in La Rinconada would allow for greater control of mercury use and the implementation of safer and more sustainable practices.^[64] It is also essential to strengthen the medical infrastructure and establish health monitoring programs in the region to reduce the damage to the population.

Figure 8. Visit to the facilities of the La Rinconada health center

From a prospective perspective, the absence of a sound environmental and health policy will intensify the crisis in La Rinconada with irreversible consequences for the region. A remediation strategy for contaminated soils, developed in collaboration with international agencies and environmental health specialists, could be an effective remedial measure to avoid a long-term ecological disaster.^[65] Likewise, education and awareness-raising among miners about the harmful effects of mercury are essential to encourage more responsible practices. In this sense, formalization of mining, environmental control and strengthening of the public health system are essential to reduce the negative impact of gold mining and ensure a safe and sustainable environment for present and future generations.

Strategies for the Recovery of La Rinconada and its Insertion in the Rule of Law

Political inaction and the particular interests of certain sectors have hindered the implementation of effective and sustainable measures in this critical area.^[66] It is a priority that the authorities in office, as well as the political actors accused of alleged links and subsidies from illegal mining, promote a state strategy to order and security, eradicating the influence of illicit activities in the governmental sphere.

The intervention in La Rinconada should not respond to isolated decisions or be conditioned by particular conveniences. The relationship of groups linked to illegal mining with the political sphere has undermined the State’s ability to address this problem with determination, maintaining an illegal economy and feeding criminal structures.^[67] Therefore, inaction in the exercise of responsibilities and the protection of interests linked to illegal mining constitute a direct obstacle to national security and should be sanctioned as a crime. The political class must adopt firm and coordinated measures that allow the development and implementation of policies that address, in addition to security, the economic and social growth of the region.

From a strategic perspective, decreeing a state of emergency would be a first step to restore order, the principle of authority and weaken the power of the TOC groups. However, this intervention must be part of a National Security Strategy (NSS) that integrates intelligence work, joint operations and rigorous monitoring to ensure its long-term sustainability. In this way, it will be possible to overcome government inaction and confront the interests of sectors with connections to illegal activities and financing.

Strengthening border control and cooperation with neighboring nations, such as Bolivia and Colombia, are key elements in curbing the transnational trafficking of arms, money and people linked to the TOC.^[68] The signing of bilateral intelligence agreements and the implementation of joint operations would be strategic measures to limit the access of resources to these organizations and dismantle their networks in the Puno region.

Figure 9. Interaction with schoolchildren at IEP 72147 in La Rinconada

The implementation of formalization programs and the creation of incentives for informal mining workers to regularize their status would allow greater control over natural resources and curb the influence of criminal networks. This, in turn, would facilitate the construction of an environment based on governance and sustainable development. Likewise, a strategy oriented towards health and environmental education is indispensable to mitigate the effects on the population and reduce dependence on polluting methods such as the use of mercury.^[69]

Awareness campaigns on the harmful effects of mercury, together with the creation of health infrastructure and the training of specialized professionals, would make it possible to comprehensively address the environmental and health crisis in La Rinconada.

Conclusions

The situation in La Rinconada constitutes a serious threat to Peru’s national security and requires a comprehensive and forceful response. The presence of TOC networks, the expansion of illicit economies, the lack of regulation in mining, environmental contamination and the public health crisis make up a scenario of disorder and violence in which the Peruvian State has progressively lost its capacity for control and authority. Political inaction, coupled with the interests of some groups linked to illegal mining, has hindered efforts to reestablish order and improve the living conditions of the population. This lack of action has allowed La Rinconada to become a bastion of criminality and illicit economy, compromising the security, stability and sustainability of the region.

It is essential to generate a national security strategy that addresses the problem of La Rinconada in a comprehensive manner, from the dismantling of criminal networks to the formalization of economic activities. To this end, it is essential to establish a sustained state presence through permanent control operations that prevent the reappearance of criminal structures and ensure compliance with the law.

The declaration of a state of emergency, the intervention of the Armed Forces and the strengthening of border control are urgent measures to reduce the influence of criminal actors in the area and restore public order. However, this intervention must go beyond a temporary and repressive response, as it requires sustained planning that reinforces governance and includes comprehensive development programs. This implies not only the improvement of infrastructure, quality education and health services, but also the generation of formal economic opportunities to reduce dependence on illegal activities and prevent recidivism.

It is also essential that decision-makers assume their responsibility in the formulation and implementation of policies aimed at eliminating the links between certain groups and illicit economies. The irregular financing of political campaigns, derived from illegal mining, IDT and smuggling, must be investigated and firmly sanctioned, preventing private interests from continuing to condition key state decisions regarding security and development. Transparency and accountability of those who participate in electoral processes are essential to ensure that the interests of the nation prevail over the private benefits of groups linked to illegal mining. Impunity for these actors not only perpetuates the crisis in La Rinconada, but also puts the security and stability of the country at risk.

The Peruvian State faces the challenge of recovering order and authority in La Rinconada through a comprehensive, multisectoral strategy. The generation and implementation of a national security strategy with a short-term focus is essential to eradicate criminal networks, formalize economic activities, establish effective control mechanisms and guarantee the protection of mine workers, who today operate in an environment of extreme vulnerability. Only through sustained commitment and without collusion can La Rinconada be transformed into a safe, prosperous region aligned with the values of justice and respect for the law, promoting a future of stability and development for the country. Failure to implement these measures will not only perpetuate the chaos in La Rinconada, but will set a dangerous precedent for other mining regions in Peru, consolidating a model where criminality and illegality thrive in the absence of the State.

Endnotes

1. Pineda, G. “Historias contadas en Primera Persona” para la Visibilidad del asentamiento minero “La Rinconada”, Puno, Perú (Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Europeía). 2024. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/53368 ↑
2. Rodrígues, L. “Gold, sex and power: the impact of gold mining in the Andean community of La Rinconada, Peru” (PhD thesis, Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande Do Sul). 2024. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/274614 ↑
3. Cant, A. “Tierra sin patrones: Land reform and political change during the military government (1969-1975).” Institute of Peruvian Studies, 2023. ↑
4. Robles, E., Geenen, S., Verbrugge, B.& López, R.: “An in-depth study of informality in global gold production: Peru.” Working papers/University of Antwerp. Institute of Development Policy and Management; Université d’Anvers. Institut de politique et de gestion du développement.-Antwerp (2022). https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docstore/d:irua:13267. ↑
5. León, D. “Festivals and economies in motion: The interrelation of festive culture and the socioeconomic success of the population of the Peruvian Altiplano”. (Doctoral dissertation, Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek Bonn). 2023. https://bonndoc.ulb.uni-bonn.de/xmlui/handle/20.500.11811/10881 ↑
6. Wieland, P. “Mineros de lotería”: Análisis de la informalidad laboral en la minería artesanal de Puno”. Editorial Jurídica Themis. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, First edition. Lima. 2020 ↑
7. Gonzales, R. “El Sistema de Seguridad y Defensa Nacional del Perú y su Repercusión por la Migración Internacional, 2000-2022” (Master’s Thesis – Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejército EPG, Lima). 2024. https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14141/153 ↑
8. Cayo, C. “Vulneración del derecho a la salud por contaminación ambiental de mercurio en el Centro Poblado La Rinconada-2023. 2024”. (Undergraduate thesis, Universidad Privada San Carlos, Puno). 2024. http://repositorio.upsc.edu.pe:8080/handle/UPSC/1090 ↑
9. Chávez, R., Hinojosa, J., Mamani, J., Medina, R. & Flores, V. “Formalization of Artisanal Mining in La Rinconada and its Impact on The Regional Economy, Puno – Peru”. Ciencia Latina Revista Científica Multidisciplinar 7 (4), 2271-92. 2023. https://doi.org/10.37811/cl_rcm.v7i4.7076 ↑
10. Santamaria, N. “Criminal legislation in relation to organized crime in illegal mining and its influence on environmental damage-Puno, 2022. 2023”. (Undergraduate thesis, Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Lima). 2023. https://hdl.handle.net/20 500.11818/7346 ↑
11. Ruiz, L. “Factors that determine the informality of mining workers and the violation of legislative decree No. 1105 in the Rinconada-Ananea population center, 2022.” (Bachelor’s thesis, Universidad Privada San Carlos, Puno). 2023. http://repositorio.upsc.edu.pe/handle/UPSC/575 ↑
12. Regional Directorate of Labor and Employment Promotion. “Situación del empleo informal en el departamento de Puno”, Tríptico N° 1. Setiembre 2022. https://cdn.www.gob.pe/uploads/document/file/5747775/5104747-triptico-n-01-2023-_puno.pdf?v=1706200435#:~:text=En%20el%20departamento%20de%20Puno%2C%20en%20el%20a%C3%B1o%202022%2C%20se,empresas%20que%20evaden%20la%20administraci%C3%B3n ↑
13. Wieland, P. “Mineros de lotería”: Análisis de la informalidad laboral en la minería artesanal de Puno”. Editorial Jurídica Themis. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, First edition. Lima. 2020. ↑
14. Zurita, J. “The challenge of mining formalization in Peru: evaluation of incentives and results”. Chornancap Revista Jurídica (Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Lambayeque), vol. 2, no 1, p. 133-166. 2024. https://doi.org/10.61542/rjch.59 ↑
15. Atencio, D. “Child labor and the violation of the principle of the best interest of the child and adolescent in the La Rinconada mine, Puno 2024.” (Undergraduate thesis, Universidad Privada San Carlos, Puno). 2024. http://repositorio.upsc.edu.pe:8080/handle/UPSC/1060 ↑
16. Ríos, E. “Security cooperation: a strategy to mitigate transnational threats in the Andean countries. 2023”. (Undergraduate thesis, Universidad San Ignacio de Loyola, Lima). 2023. https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14005/13244 ↑
17. Contreras, B. & Serpa, E. “Mujeres Pallaqueras por una vida libre de violencia CEM San Antonio de Putina.” Aurora National Program. Ministerio de la Mujer y Poblaciones Vulnerables, Lima (2016). https://hdl.handle.net/20 500.12702/90 ↑
18. Eduardo, M. “El VRAEM: “Propuesta de Estrategia Para la Mitigación de las Amenazas”. Revista de Ciencia e Investigación en Defensa, 2023″. Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales. Lima. vol. 4, no 2, p. 101-117. 2023. https://doi.org/10.58211/recide.v4i2.115 ↑
19. Escobedo, Feliciano. & Miranda, N. “Globalization-Illegal Mining-Poverty, a Conflictive Relationship in Peru”. C&T Riqchary Journal of Research in Science and Technology, vol. 6, no 1, p. 31-36. Abancay. 2024. https://doi.org/10.57166/riqchary.v6.n1.2024.119 ↑
20. Hancco, F. “Analysis of criminal legislation in relation to organized crime in illegal mining and its impact on environmental damage in the Puno Region (2014-2017)”. Universidad Andina Néstor Cáceres Velásquez. Puno. 2021. https://revistas.uancv.edu.pe/index.php/RCIA/article/view/819 ↑
21. Caldas, J. “Challenges to the State, enforcement and legitimacy. The case of smuggling in the department of Puno.” (Bachelor’s thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Lima). 2023. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/595771297.pdf ↑
22. Valdivia, D. “Economías ilegales: casi el 60% de productos ilícitos en Perú entran por la frontera con Bolivia, revela estudio”. (Infobae, 17 July). 2024. https://www.infobae.com/peru/2024/07/17/economias-ilegales-casi-el-60-de-productos-ilicitos-en-peru-entran-por-la-frontera-con-bolivia-revela-estudio/ ↑
23. Ibid. ↑
24. Ninasivincha, D. “Tratamiento jurídico como crimen organizado del delito de contrabando en el distrito judicial de Puno, 2022. 2023” (Undergraduate thesis, Universidad Cesar Vallejo, Lima). 2023. https://hdl.handle.net/20 500.12692/116685 ↑
25. Caldas, J. “Challenges to the State, enforcement and legitimacy. The case of smuggling in the department of Puno”. Pontifica Universidad Católica del Perú (Undergraduate thesis). Lima. 2023. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/595771297.pdf ↑
26. Apaza, Y. “Social perception of public corruption as a criminal offence threatening the rule of law in Peru: Juliaca 2023. 2024”. (Bachelor’s thesis – Universidad Andina Néstor Cáceres Velásquez, Juliaca). 2024. https://repositorio.uancv.edu.pe/handle/UANCV/2008 ↑
27. COMEX. “Regional Social Progress Index 2024: The pending agenda”. Weekly 1233, Published November 8. 2024. https://www.comexperu.org.pe/articulo/indice-de-progreso-social-regional-2024-la-agenda-pendiente ↑
28. Cont, W., Uesu, E., Pietti, D., Rueda, C., Olivares, H., Álvarez, D., Bondorevsky, D., Cruz, S., Lleras, G., Kairuz Díaz, K., & Chanis, C. “Land border crossings as spaces for regional integration and development”. IDEAL (SCIOTECA, Open Knowledge Space). 2024. https://scioteca. ↑
29. Alda, S, & Rodríguez, G. “Security, corruption and impunity in Latin America. 2021”. (IAEN, Universidad de Posgrado del Estado, Quito). https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/2371 ↑
30. Sin Fronteras, Your regional newspaper. “Siete Bandas delictivas operan en Puno, según jefe de la Región Policial”. Published January 28. Puno. 2025. https://diariosinfronteras.com.pe/2025/01/28/siete-bandas-delictivas-operan-en-puno-segun-el-jefe-de-la-region-policial/ ↑
31. Regional Communication Network. “Puno: At least two or three people are killed daily in La Rinconada due to organized crime and lack of attention from the State”. Published on September 9. Puno. 2024. https://www.rcrperu.com/puno-al-menos-dos-o-tres-personas-son-asesinadas-a-diario-en-la-rinconada-por-la-criminalidad-organizada-y-la-falta-de-atencion-del-estado/ ↑
32. Ancco, R. “Los Conflictos Sociales en la Región Puno y su Efectos en la Seguridad Nacional”. Revista de Ciencia e Investigación en Defensa (Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales, Lima) 2023, vol. 4, no 3, p. 56-67. 2023. https://doi.org/10.58211/recide.v4i3.140 ↑
33. Arias, C. “Socioeconomic Causes of Informal Mining Activity and its Environmental Criminal consequences in Rinconada Puno 2016-2018.” (Doctoral dissertation). Universidad Andina Néstor Cáceres Velásquez. Puno. 2020. http://repositorio.uancv.edu.pe/handle/UANCV/4711 ↑
34. Eduardo, M. “La Imperiosa Necesidad de Modernizar las Fuerzas Armadas del Perú: Un Análisis Estratégico”. Pensamiento Conjunto, (Escuela Superior Conjunta de las Fuerzas Armadas, Lima), vol. 12, no 2, p. 14-14. 2024. https://pensamientoconjunto.com.pe/index.php/PC/article/view/151. ↑
35. Buleje, P. “The Other Pandemic in Peru: Corruption and its Impact on Democracy”. Revista de Ciencia e Investigación en Defensa, (Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales, Lima), vol. 4, no 2, p. 118-151. 2023. https://doi.org/10.58211/recide.v4i2.108 ↑
36. Pachamama Radio. “Puno reinforces fight against criminal gangs and illegal mining”. Published on September 19. Puno, 2024. https://pachamamaradio.org/puno-refuerza-la-lucha-contra-bandas-criminales-y-mineria-ilegal/ ↑
37. Pérez, J. “When violence is too much and work is lacking. Scenarios for young people from urban popular sectors in Latin America.” Ultima década 29.55 (2021): 33-61. https://www.flacso.ac.cr/images/otras-pub/violencia-sobra.pdf ↑
38. Bernedo, A. & Coloma, J. “Incidencia del delito de usurpación y su afectación al derecho de posesión en los pobladores de Puno-2021.” (2022). https://repositorio.ucv.edu.pe/handle/20.500.12692/103486. ↑
39. Dupont, R. & Serrano, J. “A new migration intelligence system for combating cross-border organized crime in Latin America.” Peruvian Journal of International Law 176 (2024): 137-150. https://doi.org/10.38180/rpdi.v74i176.498. https://doi.org/10.38180/rpdi.v74i176.498 ↑
40. Eduardo, M., Rosell, D. & Cruz, E. “Transnational organized crime: 21st century terrorism”. Scientific Journal Security and Development. Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales. Lima. vol. 2, no 2. 2024. https://revistas. ↑
41. National Society of Industries. “Contraband moves more than 349 million dollars through the southern border”. Published on June 23. Lima. 2023. https://sni.org.pe/contrabando-mueve-mas-de-349-millones-de-dolares-por-la-frontera-sur/ ↑
42. Ibid. ↑
43. Los Andes Newspaper. “Smuggling in the Puno region and its new routes”. Published on November 01. Puno. 2024. https://losandes.com.pe/el-contrabando-en-la-region-puno-y-sus-nuevas-rutas/ ↑
44. Report N° 000037-2024-SUNAT/1V3000. Estimation of the level of smuggling in Peru in the year 2023. https://mef.gob.pe/contenidos/tributos/doc/Estimacion_Contrabando_2023.pdf ↑
45. Ibid. ↑
46. Eduardo, M. “Grupos Armados Organizados Residuales y Amenazas Transfronterizas en el Alto Putumayo”. Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre, (Centro de Estudios Estratégicos del Ejército del Perú, Lima), vol. 1, no 2, p. 99-108. 2022. https://doi.org/10.56221/spt.v1i2.15 ↑
47. Villanueva, R. & Reyes, R. “Organized crime in Peru: dynamics and social impacts.” Clío. Journal of History, Human Sciences and Critical Thinking. 9 (2024): 688-710. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14567064 ↑
48. Zavala, J. &; Poma, Pedro. “Innovación De Acciones y Estrategias En La investigación Policial Para Reducir Los Delitos Violentos Cometidos Por Organizaciones Criminales Vinculadas a La minería Ilegal e Informal En Las Jurisdicciones De Pataz, Huamachuco y Quiruvilca-La Libertad, En El Periodo 2018 y 2019”. (Master’s thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Lima). 2022. https://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/items/7d491597-f15a-4691-bfae-cfb725070fb9 ↑
49. Rodrígues, L. “Gold, sex and power: the impact of gold mining in the Andean community of La Rinconada, Peru” (PhD thesis, Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande Do Sul). 2024. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/274614 ↑
50. Infobae. Alert in Peru due to the entry of arms from Bolivia on the eve of a third Seizure of Lima. Published on June 25. Lima. 2023. https://www.infobae.com/peru/2023/06/24/el-contrabando-de-armas-desde-bolivia-alimenta-la-tension-en-peru-a-puertas-de-una-tercera-toma-de-lima/ ↑
51. Mc Cubbin, R. Infobae: Bolivia is the main exporter of illegal gold from Peru: $ 4 billion a year are sent. Published on June 26. Lima. 2024. https://www.infobae.com/peru/2024/06/26/bolivia-es-el-principal-exportador-de-oro-ilegal-del-peru-al-ano-se-envian-4-mil-millones/ ↑
52. Pachamama Radio. Puno asks for answers to insecurity. Published on January 14. Puno, 2025. https://pachamamaradio.org/puno-pide-respuestas-ante-la-inseguridad/ ↑
53. Gonzales, M., Calle, O., Campos, R.& Eduardo, M. “Radicalización Ideológica, Crimen organizado y Seguridad Nacional: La Intervención de las Fuerzas Armadas”. Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre (Centro de Estudios Estratégicos del Ejercito, Lima), vol. 3, no 4, p. 227-241. 2024. https://doi.org/10.56221/spt.v3i4.74 ↑
54. Aybar, C. & and Olivares, A. “Legal analysis of the impact of regulations on mining formalization: A propósito de la perpetua prórroga a los plazos del Registro Integral de Formalización Minera-REINFO.” Universidad ESAN (Academic sufficiency work). Lima. 2024. https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/3952 ↑
55. Chanjan, R. “Apuntes sobre la inconstitucionalidad de la Ley 32108 de crimen organizado”. Ventana Jurídica. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Published on August 29. Lima. 2024. https://facultad-derecho.pucp.edu.pe/ventana-juridica/apuntes-sobre-la-inconstitucionalidad-de-la-ley-32108-de-crimen-organizado/ ↑
56. Eduardo, M., Rosell, D. & Cruz, E. “Transnational organized crime: 21st century terrorism”. Scientific Journal Security and Development. Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales. Lima. vol. 2, no 2. 2024. https://revistas.iigm.caen.edu.pe/index.php/files/article/view/27 ↑
57. Gonzales, M., Calle, O., Campos, R.& Eduardo, M. “Radicalización Ideológica, Crimen organizado y Seguridad Nacional: La Intervención de las Fuerzas Armadas”. Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre (Centro de Estudios Estratégicos del Ejercito, Lima), vol. 3, no 4, p. 227-241. 2024. https://doi.org/10.56221/spt.v3i4.74 ↑
58. Callohuanca, F. “Socio-legal factors and their influence on mining contamination of irrigation irrigation in the communities and/or irrigation committees of the Progreso-Asillo- Azángaro-Puno-2023 Centro Poblado. 2024”. (Bachelor’s thesis, Universidad José Carlos Mariátegui, Moquegua). https://repositorio.ujcm.edu.pe/handle/20.500.12819/2975 ↑
59. Manrique, H. & Sanborn, C. “La minería en el Perú: balance y perspectivas de cinco décadas de investigación”. (Fondo Editorial, Universidad del Pacífico, Lima). 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.21678/978-9972-57-458-0 ↑
60. Valenzuela, G. “The effect of illegal mining in Peru: economic and social impacts”. Revista Lidera, (Pontifica Universidad Católica del Perú, Lima), n° 9, p. 119-120. 2014. https://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/revistalidera/article/download/14760/15341 ↑
61. Eduardo, M. “Operational Capacity of the 6th Brigade of Special Forces in support of the Peruvian National Police during the interdiction of illegal mining in the Pampa sector, Madre de Dios, 2019” (Master’s thesis, Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejército EPG, Lima). 2021. https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14141/199 ↑
62. Trigos, C. “Characterization of public health risk in the artisanal mining town of La Rinconada, Puno-Peru”. Revista De Investigaciones 4 (2). National University of the Altiplano. Puno. 2008. https://doi.org/10.26788/riepg.v4i2.60. ↑
63. Cayo, C. “Vulneración del derecho a la salud por contaminación ambiental de mercurio en el Centro Poblado La Rinconada-2023. 2024”. (Undergraduate thesis, Universidad Privada San Carlos, Puno). 2024. http://repositorio.upsc.edu.pe:8080/handle/UPSC/1090 ↑
64. Loza, A; Ccancapa, Y. “Mercury in a high Andean stream with high impact from artisanal gold mining (La Rinconada, Puno, Peru)”. International journal of environmental pollution, vol. 36, no 1, p. 33-44. 2020. https://doi.org/10.20937/rica.2020.36.53317 ↑
65. Marrugo, J. Mercury in ASM: international evaluation of experiences and lessons learned in the management of mercury contamination in ASM. National and international analysis. (Cartagena de Indias, Bolivar, Colombia: Alpha Editores) 2022. https://repositorio.unicordoba.edu.co/handle/ucordoba/6290 ↑
66. Rosell, D. “Development of vulnerable zones and prevention of social conflicts in Peru”. Revista Científica Seguridad y Desarrollo, vol. 2, no 2. (Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales, Lima). 2024. https://doi.org/10.58211/syd.v2i2.28 ↑
67. Urquiaga, J. “Influencia en la Seguridad Nacional al 2033, de la minería ilegal y el tráfico ilícito de drogas desarrollados en la provincia del Putumayo, frontera amazónica con Colombia”. (Master’s Thesis, Superior School of Naval Warfare, Callao), 2024. https://hdl.handle.net/20 500.12927/336 ↑
68. Eduardo, M. “Propuesta de atención a las amenazas fronterizas en el Alto Putumayo”. Pensamiento Conjunto (Escuela Superior Conjunta de las Fuerzas Armadas, Lima), vol. 10, no 2, p. 14-14. 2022. https://www.pensamientoconjunto.com.pe/index.php/PC/article/view/117 ↑
69. Duque, S., Quintero, M. & Duque, M. “Environmental education in rural communities and the popularization of the right to the conservation of the natural environment: the case of the fishing community in the Ayapel swamp (Colombia)”. Luna Azul, no 39, p. 06-24. 2014. http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=321732142002 ↑