Abstract

This article analyzes the Corío project as a geopolitical asset and critical infrastructure capable of redefining Peru’s position in the South Pacific and strengthening its integration into global value chains. In this context, the objective is to examine, from a qualitative strategic perspective, the scenarios related to its financing, construction, and eventual operation, assessing their implications for the state’s strategic autonomy, economic competitiveness, and the country’s comprehensive security. Furthermore, it is argued that Corío transcends its port dimension and serves as an instrument for Peru’s geopolitical integration into an international landscape characterized by systemic competition among powers, the securitization of logistics chains, and growing geoeconomic volatility. From this perspective, the study examines three prospective scenarios: (i) U.S. financing, conceived as a potential logistical counterweight to China’s projection from Chancay; (ii) Chinese financing that would integrate the infrastructure into the Maritime Silk Road; and (iii) a diversified multipolar framework aimed at preserving strategic autonomy through balanced governance and the participation of the national business community. Methodologically, the research adopts a hermeneutic-prospective approach, grounded in the critical review of verifiable documentary sources and the analytical construction of scenarios. Consequently, the findings indicate that Corío’s future will depend on the formulation of a comprehensive national strategy capable of articulating strategic infrastructure, economic diplomacy, legal security, logistical resilience, and territorial cohesion, as well as establishing institutional safeguards from the project’s pre-operational phase.

Keywords: geopolitics; critical infrastructure; strategic autonomy; global competition; South Pacific; strategic logistics

Introduction

The Corío project (port infrastructure plan), located in Punta de Bombón, Islay Province, Arequipa, is emerging as one of the most significant initiatives for Peru in the 21st century. Its privileged location in the South Pacific and its natural draft of nearly 28 meters, according to technical information available in the preliminary phase, position it among the few port enclaves in South America capable of receiving post-Panamax mega-ships without costly dredging, which, if realized, could establish it as a logistics hub with hemispheric reach.^[1] Since the early 2000s, various regional development proposals have highlighted the need for an alternative port to Callao to help relieve congestion in national logistics chains, leading to the inclusion of the Corío project in regional plans and investment promotion agendas.^[2] At the institutional level, the most recent progress is reflected in two provisions adopted by the National Port Authority (APN): (a) Board Resolution No. 0068-2025-APN-DIR (August 8, 2025), which granted temporary technical port feasibility to the Hub Corío Megapuerto del Sur Consortium to begin preliminary studies; and (b) Resolution No. 0071-2025-APN-DIR (August 11, 2025), which temporarily suspended its effects for the purpose of conducting a cost-benefit analysis aimed at determining the public interest and the most appropriate development model (state-initiated PPP or another modality).^[3]

Likewise, in November 2025, the Private Investment Promotion Agency (PROINVERSIÓN), the Regional Government of Arequipa, and the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) signed an agreement to promote the “Megaport of the Americas – Corío,” marking a political and administrative milestone that reinforces its status as a public policy project in the process of maturation, rather than a strictly private initiative or a regional announcement.^[4]

The recent momentum behind the project responds to a scenario of growing global competition for control of strategic routes in the South Pacific. This dynamic demonstrates that Corío cannot be understood as an isolated infrastructure: it requires strategic leadership that clearly defines national interests, opportunities for international integration, and the risks associated with committing strategic logistics spaces. In theoretical terms, strategic ports are conceived not only as nodes of foreign trade but as national assets whose performance determines territorial resilience, the continuity of supply chains, and the state’s capacity to respond to crises—categories consistent with international academic literature that recognizes ports as “strategic assets” for the resilience and security of their territorial zones of influence.^[5] From this perspective, this analytical category allows for an examination of the Corío case through the lens of national logistics architecture, understood as an asset whose operation directly affects the autonomy, security, and sovereignty of the state; in this sense, the “securitization” of global logistics—driven by rivalries among powers, supply disruptions, and geoeconomic tensions—transforms deep-water ports into instruments of power, resilience, and state maneuverability, beyond their strictly commercial value.

The current situation is further complicated by the launch of the Port of Chancay, financed and operated by Cosco Shipping Ports, which is transforming the dynamics of regional maritime routes. Regardless of projections, recent evidence indicates that Chancay is consolidating operational flows and direct routes linked to Asia–Peru trade, reinforcing its value as a logistics hub and its geoeconomic relevance.^[6] This scenario compels Peru to reconsider its geostrategic position and assess how the development of Corío could help balance its integration into the global maritime trade network.^[7] At the same time, the Callao port hub has begun to activate direct routes from Asia and attract new investments, confirming that logistical competition along the Peruvian coast is already underway and is not merely a prospective scenario; therefore, the decisive issue does not lie in the existence of port competition—which is already established—but in the Peruvian state’s strategic response framework: what governance model it adopts, what safeguards it establishes, and with what logic of sovereign decision-making capacity it guides its port policy.

In terms of projections, the total investment for Corío is estimated to amount to approximately $7 billion, including a multimodal complex with port terminals, logistics zones, intermodal hubs, and associated industrial areas.^[8] At this stage, however, the decisive factor is not only the amount but the project’s “governance design”: who provides the financing, under what control conditions, what access and security regime is established, and what safeguards are in place against risks of regulatory capture, technological dependence, or strategic litigation.^[9] Setting aside its economic magnitude, this megaproject raises fundamental questions about the type of integration Peru should seek in the South Pacific, whether through alignment with a dominant power bloc, the promotion of a multipolar financing scheme that preserves sovereign decision-making capacity, or remaining in a reactive position regarding decisions made by external actors. In light of this, Corío does not arise from improvisation, but rather constitutes the result of cumulative processes of decentralization, regional logistical demands, and a medium-term vision aimed at turning Arequipa into a strategic economic hub. This trajectory rules out interpreting it as a short-term or reactive initiative; at the same time, its strategic viability will depend on Peru’s ability to link port infrastructure with intermodal corridors, legal certainty, maritime control capabilities, and a coherent port foreign policy.

The evolving international context in 2026 reinforces this interpretation. The intensification of crises and conflicts—including the recent escalation of tensions between the United States (U.S.) and Iran and its potential effects on energy flows, maritime insurance, and the stability of the Strait of Hormuz—confirms that regional disruptions can produce systemic effects on routes, logistics costs, and the continuity of supply chains.^[10] Iran is a key player in the global energy architecture, both due to its direct export capacity and its location at one of the most sensitive maritime chokepoints for global trade; any sustained disruption in this corridor could raise maritime transport costs, strain hydrocarbon markets, and reconfigure logistics routes to Asia and Europe.^[11] Consequently, the South Pacific gains greater value as a space for geoeconomic resilience and logistical diversification for intermediate states such as Peru, not only as a trade corridor but also as an alternative platform of relative stability in the face of friction in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

Within this dynamic, the Corío Port Project emerges as a turning point for Peru amid a scenario of global geopolitical reconfiguration. The intensification of strategic competition among major powers, the renewed importance of the South Pacific as a logistics and security hub, and the return of realist approaches in international politics reinforce the geopolitical significance of strategic infrastructure projects located along the Peruvian coast.^[12] Various specialized reports warn that the definition of its financing and management model will have direct effects on regional logistics chains, South American economic integration, and the country’s international positioning. On this basis, Corío ceases to be a conventional port project and becomes part of a dynamic in which logistical decisions acquire strategic implications for the autonomy, international maneuverability, and resilience of the Peruvian state.^[13] Consequently, the project demands a national vision, active diplomacy, and comprehensive planning capable of articulating development, international integration, and the defense of sovereign interests. In this vein, this article proposes a geopolitical and prospective analysis of the strategic scenarios that could define Peru’s future on the geopolitical chessboard of the South Pacific.

The Corío Project as a Geopolitical Pivot in the South Pacific

The South Pacific is today one of the most dynamic and contested areas of international trade. Over the past decade, this region has established itself as a strategic corridor for the transport of raw materials, manufactured goods, and energy products between South America and Asia.^[14] Furthermore, it accounts for a significant proportion of South American exports and the majority of manufactured goods imports that supply the region.^[15] In this context, the location of the Corío port project, with direct access to bi-oceanic corridors connecting Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina, makes this initiative a key component in positioning Peru as a regional logistics hub and, potentially, as a first-rate geostrategic platform. This position is further strengthened by the growing competition for control of intermodal hubs that integrate ports, rail networks, and industrial platforms—currently recognized as critical links within the architecture of global trade.

From a policy-making perspective, Corío was conceived in 2013 as a megaproject aimed at counterbalancing the port centralization centered on Callao. Documents prepared by the GRA and the APN show that its inclusion in logistics development plans is intended to decentralize port capacity and create a sovereign alternative in the southern part of the country. Nevertheless, the realization of this proposal requires overcoming the historical fragmentation between regional planning and national strategic planning, integrating the initiative into a nationwide port policy rather than treating it exclusively as a decentralized effort.

Corío’s geopolitical value takes on greater significance following the commencement of operations at the Port of Chancay, controlled by Chinese capital, which is beginning to alter the regional balance of logistics chains in the South American Pacific. This process consolidates the presence of COSCO Shipping Ports and, with it, that of the PRC as a predominant actor in regional port infrastructure.^[16] In this scenario, Peru must determine whether its strategy will be complementary, competitive, or balancing in relation to that presence. Under this logic, the operation of the Corío Project would allow for the diversification of routes, offer commercial alternatives, and, above all, prevent a single power from concentrating regional logistical control. Rather than replicating capabilities, the goal is to establish a national port system with strategic balance and sovereign governance.

An additional factor of strategic pressure on the initiative compounds this situation. The National Defense Strategy (2026) reaffirms the centrality of competition among powers and the protection of critical infrastructure and supply chains in an environment where logistics and access to maritime hubs are becoming increasingly relevant to security.^[17] Simultaneously, in December 2025, the U.S. Congress formalized the intention to designate Peru as a “Major Non-NATO Ally,”^[18] a decision that heightens the geopolitical sensitivity of major strategic projects along the Peruvian coast without constituting a formal military alliance. Additionally, the World Economic Forum warns of increased geoeconomic volatility, risks associated with supply chains, and competition for critical resources,^[19] factors that heighten the importance of deep-water port facilities with robust governance. This regulatory and strategic framework demonstrates that decisions regarding maritime infrastructure are not neutral in nature but are embedded within dynamics of power and international perception.

From a theoretical-conceptual perspective, ports have ceased to be mere logistics hubs and have become strategic assets within the geopolitics of transportation. The notion of a “strategic port” refers not only to its operational capacity but also to its influence on supply chains, its integration with intermodal networks, and its role in disputes among powers over control of commercial and technological flows.^[20] Consequently, Corío must be analyzed not only for its economic profitability but also for its impact on the regional power architecture and the Peruvian state’s logistical autonomy.

Within this framework, the future of the initiative can be represented by three strategic scenarios that will be examined in greater detail in subsequent sections. The first scenario envisages majority financing from the U.S., which would position Corío as a counterweight to the PRC’s projection from Chancay and reinforce logistics chains under Western standards.^[21] The second scenario involves Chinese financing and operation, integrating the facility into the Maritime Silk Road and expanding Beijing’s presence in the South Pacific.^[22] The third proposes a multipolar or diversified model involving South Korea, Portugal, Morocco, Japan, or other actors,^[23] as well as Middle Eastern countries, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which would grant Peru greater room for negotiation and strategic autonomy. Each alternative presents benefits, risks, and geopolitical constraints that will influence the country’s national projection in the medium and long term. These configurations should not be interpreted as mutually exclusive, but rather as predominant trends within a broader spectrum of strategic negotiation.

Nevertheless, the realization of Corío will not be free from external pressures or attempts at direct or indirect neutralization. Various studies indicate that megaprojects with significant geopolitical implications often face economic blockades, legal disputes, disinformation campaigns, and diplomatic pressure driven by actors whose hegemonic positions are perceived as threatened.^[24] This circumstance makes the initiative a strategic target for containment; therefore, any national planning must consider, from its initial phase, mechanisms for legal, financial, and communications protection.

Given this scenario, the main challenge for Peru is to design a strategy for smart integration into the South Pacific that maximizes the project’s economic benefits without compromising sovereignty or strategic autonomy. This requires coordinating economic diplomacy, port policy, and strategic security under coherent and forward-looking leadership. In this context, the cargo demand study scheduled for November 2025 is a key factor in defining the operational scale, logistics projections, and the most appropriate competitive model.^[25] Its results will guide international negotiations and ensure that decisions regarding Corío align with a comprehensive national strategy that integrates infrastructure, regional integration, and the defense of the country’s interests.

Despite disputes among powers and conflicting interests, Corío offers Peru the opportunity to reposition its geopolitical role in the South Pacific. Its development could integrate the economies of the southern Andes with the most dynamic markets of the Asia-Pacific region, optimize trade routes, attract industrial investment, and promote critical multimodal infrastructure.^[26] However, this potential will only materialize if the state adopts a coherent strategy that combines geopolitical vision, inter-institutional coordination, and the strengthening of national security. Otherwise, it could lead to a functional dependency that limits its transformative capacity and sovereign impact.

Strategic Scenarios for Corío and the South Pacific Geopolitical Landscape

The future of the Corío Port Project revolves around three strategic scenarios capable of defining not only the management model of the megaproject but also Peru’s geopolitical positioning in the South Pacific. The decision regarding which actors will finance, develop, and manage this critical infrastructure will have direct repercussions on regional logistics chains, bioceanic integration, the country’s strategic autonomy, and the national capacity to diversify alliances in a context of growing global competition. Analyzing these scenarios allows us to anticipate the Peruvian state’s actual room for maneuver in the face of systemic pressures.

1. U.S. Financing Scenario: Strategic Counterweight to China

The first scenario contemplates the possibility that the U.S. or companies linked to its strategic sphere will lead the financing and operation of Corío. According to the GRA, exploratory meetings have been held with U.S. investors, presenting the megaproject as a logistics hub designed to connect southern Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina with Pacific trade routes to the U.S.^[27] Under this alternative, Corío could establish itself as a strategic counterweight to the Port of Chancay, currently controlled by COSCO Shipping Ports, which would help prevent the concentration of regional maritime trade under a single operator.^[28]

Furthermore, the U.S. could provide state-of-the-art port technology, logistics interoperability standards, and facilities for hemispheric integration, consistent with the priorities of supply chain resilience and critical infrastructure protection established in the National Defense Strategy 2026. It would also facilitate access to logistics networks with Western standards of financial transparency, regulatory compliance, and port security.

However, this alternative entails significant strategic challenges. Opting for a predominantly U.S.-led financing model would entail reconfiguring diplomatic balances, given that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is Peru’s main trading partner, while the U.S. maintains a significant role as a political, economic, and military ally. In this context, diplomatic and commercial friction could arise if the situation is not managed with pragmatic balance.^[29]

At the same time, it would offer significant advantages: strengthening strategic alliances with Washington, attracting advanced port technology, and coordinating cooperation schemes in maritime security and regional defense, without compromising the Peruvian state’s decision-making autonomy.

Therefore, the viability of this option will depend on Peru’s ability to conduct active, multifaceted diplomacy capable of maintaining constructive relations with both powers, avoiding exclusive alignments, and prioritizing national strategic autonomy. As Robert Evan Ellis, an expert on inter-American relations and assistant professor at the U.S. Army War College, the strategy of “active neutrality” could offer Peru a viable framework for sustaining simultaneous relations with the PRC and the West,^[30] especially in the international context of 2026, characterized by the return of realist approaches and growing competition for strategic logistics hubs,^[31] without compromising its sovereign decision-making capacity regarding projects such as Corío.

Similarly, in January 2026, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) approved a potential sale of approximately $1,500,000 intended to support the relocation of Peru’s main naval base in Callao. This measure is linked to the expansion of the commercial port and to the regional logistical competition associated with the Port of Chancay,^[32] , reinforcing the idea that Peruvian port infrastructure is beginning to be integrated into security and logistical decisions of hemispheric scope. Therefore, this precedent demonstrates that the port dimension and the strategic-military dimension are beginning to intertwine in the international perception of Peru.

2. Chinese Financing Landscape: Consolidation of the Maritime Silk Road

This approach posits that the PRC, through conglomerates such as Cosco Shipping Ports, will lead the financing and operation of Corío, integrating it into its global strategy for the Belt and Road Initiative. According to the Observatory of the National Center for Strategic Planning (CEPLAN), the PRC has invested more than $3.6 million in the Port of Chancay, positioning it as a large-scale logistics hub that reinforces its control over trade flows in the South American Pacific and consolidates its influence over South America’s main export routes to Asian markets.^[33] If Corío were to join this network, Beijing would consolidate its maritime influence in the region and strengthen its negotiating power over strategic export routes for minerals, gas, agribusiness, and manufactured goods. This would create a logistics hub under Chinese leadership along the Peruvian coast.

Such an alternative, however, poses complex challenges to Peru’s strategic autonomy. Simultaneous control of Chancay and Corío by Chinese capital could create structural dependency, limiting the diversification of trading partners and reducing the scope for balancing diplomatic relations. Furthermore, various studies argue that Chinese megaprojects in port infrastructure often generate cycles of technological dependency and financial conditioning that hinder sovereign renegotiation.^[34]

Added to this is the growing concern over the presence of large Chinese vessels operating near the Peruvian coastline, often associated with predatory or illegal fishing practices, affecting hydrobiological resources and weakening the state’s capacity to exercise effective control over its maritime domain. Therefore, these types of activities not only erode the country’s economic and environmental sovereignty but may also facilitate illicit transnational networks linked to wildlife trafficking, tax evasion, or labor exploitation on the high seas. In this regard, the challenge lies not only in the origin of capital but in the design of contractual and regulatory frameworks that guarantee operational sovereignty, transparency, and effective state control.

This situation could place Peru at the center of direct geopolitical competition, forcing the state to manage conflicting pressures from its main trading partners and powers with divergent agendas, in which territorial and maritime sovereignty will be tested by external interests. At this point, it is crucial to establish principles of strategic port governance, defined by international standards, that protect national logistics assets from the exclusive control of foreign powers.^[35] Consequently, the priority must be to preserve national decision-making capacity over critical infrastructure, regardless of the source of funding.

3. Multipolar Financing Scenario: Diversification and Strategic Autonomy

This model envisages a diversified financing scheme, with the participation of countries such as South Korea, Portugal, and European or Asian consortia. This approach seeks to maximize the Peruvian state’s bargaining power by avoiding excessive concentrations of power and influence.^[36] Likewise, this scheme could incorporate emerging actors from the Middle East, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, or Saudi Arabia, interested in port, energy, and logistics investments in Latin America, which would broaden the geoeconomic range of strategic partners. Under this logic, Corío could develop as a port with shared governance, capable of attracting advanced port technology, fostering knowledge transfer, and establishing special economic zones aimed at boosting industrialization in southern Peru.

The multipolar model offers Peru the greatest strategic autonomy, allowing it to balance relations with different power blocs and reduce its exposure to hegemonic conflicts.^[37] Even so, it represents the most complex scenario to implement, as it requires strong political leadership, active economic diplomacy, and the implementation of a competitive regulatory framework that builds trust among investors from diverse backgrounds. Furthermore, this model could face direct resistance from powers seeking to consolidate their influence in the South Pacific, which would compel the state to legally protect the project, strengthen its international negotiation capabilities, and safeguard sovereign control over its coastline and maritime spaces.^[38] Therefore, it requires strong institutions, legal stability, and a coherent foreign policy that supports strategic diversification.

Beyond the financing alternatives and management models analyzed, the Port of Corío stands as a pivotal point in the global competition for control of South Pacific logistics routes; its potential to alter commercial and strategic balances makes the megaproject a sensitive asset for major international actors.^[39] Regardless of the prevailing scenario, the project will inevitably be embedded in dynamics of systemic competition; consequently, the challenge for Peru will not consist solely of choosing who will finance or manage the port, but rather of defining how to protect its strategic decisions, in order to ensure that they align with a comprehensive national strategy, consistent with the principles of strategic autonomy, cooperative security, and a governance model for critical logistics infrastructure that preserves the State’s decision-making sovereignty.

Conflicting Interests and Risks of Neutralization

The Corío port project is emerging as a strategic geopolitical asset for Peru and the region, due to its location at the heart of the South Pacific and its potential to reshape international logistics routes. Its development places it at the center of global competition for control of maritime trade, especially in a scenario where the port of Chancay operates as part of the Maritime Silk Road. In this context, Corío emerges as a geostrategic pivot that will inevitably impact established interests within the region, involving both state and corporate actors, which could trigger power realignments, disputes over influence, and geoeconomic containment strategies. Consequently, its progress will not be interpreted solely as an economic phenomenon, but as a strategic factor within the regional balance of power.

The project could face direct and indirect pressures aimed at restricting or slowing its development. These could take the form of diplomatic actions, regulatory or financial restrictions, international litigation, or disinformation campaigns designed to influence public discourse—patterns often observed in scenarios where ports and logistics chains become strategic assets in geopolitical competition.^[40] Similarly, internal processes—such as regulatory delays, conflicts of jurisdiction, or political fragmentation—could arise that, even without explicit intent, end up favoring external agendas. These situations stem from the logic of preserving spheres of influence, controlling strategic logistics hubs, and limiting new state autonomies in areas considered sensitive by certain international actors.

Faced with this scenario, the Peruvian state must implement a comprehensive institutional protection framework that integrates active diplomacy, strategic intelligence, legal certainty, and inter-institutional coordination among the private sector, public entities, and the Armed Forces. This approach aligns with contemporary guidelines for critical infrastructure protection adopted by actors such as the United States, the European Union (EU), and NATO, where civil, economic, and security dimensions converge. In this vein, it is essential to develop anticipatory capabilities aimed at identifying hybrid risks—legal, financial, cyber, or communications-related—before they escalate into full-blown crises. Only by consolidating these capabilities will it be possible to protect the project and ensure that Corío is developed in accordance with criteria aligned with long-term national interests.

To systematize the main factors that could hinder the project’s implementation and guide strategic responses from the State, Table 1 presents the most relevant risks associated with geopolitical competition for logistics hubs in the South Pacific, along with recommended institutional measures to mitigate their potential effects.

Table 1. Strategic risks associated with the development of the Port of Corío and mitigation measures

Category	Type of risk	Description	Potential actors	Recommended strategic actions
Direct risks	Diplomatic pressure	Attempts to politically influence the project’s financing model or governance framework	U.S., PRC, and other regional powers	Active and multifaceted diplomacy; diversification of alliances; strategic positioning of Peru within APEC, the AP, and hemispheric security forums.
	Financial blockades	Restriction or increased cost of access to international financing for deterrent or competitive purposes.	Multilateral banks, economic blocs, global financial actors	Mixed and multipolar financing schemes; strengthening of national financial structuring capabilities; incorporation of contractual protection clauses.
	International litigation	Initiation of legal or arbitration disputes aimed at delaying, increasing the cost of, or imposing conditions on the project’s implementation.	Competitor companies, state actors, shipping consortia	Legal safeguards from the planning stage; contracts with sovereignty and balanced governance clauses; ongoing support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy and Finance
	Targeted disinformation	Information operations aimed at eroding the project’s public legitimacy or generating social conflict	Media operators, pressure groups, geopolitical actors	National strategic communication strategy; informational transparency; early engagement with communities; specialized monitoring of media and social networks.
Indirect risks	Internal regulatory conflicts	Regulatory misalignment or overlapping jurisdictions that slow down strategic decision-making	Congress, regional and local governments, regulatory agencies	Special regulatory framework for strategic projects; state-regional coordination; regulatory simplification with constitutional oversight
	Induced social mobilization	Elicitation of social conflict with an impact on the project’s legitimacy and timeline	Social organizations, economic lobbies, external actors	Local awareness programs; tangible benefits for local communities; early participatory mechanisms and structured dialogue
	Political fragmentation	Lack of political consensus that undermines national strategic coherence	Parliamentary groups, domestic political actors	Development of a state policy for strategic megaprojects; multiparty agreements; coordination with academia and strategic centers
	Deliberate delays	Technical or administrative delays that affect the project’s implementation or credibility	Regulatory agencies, institutional operators	Strategic oversight by the National Legislative Assembly (APN) and the Comptroller General of the Republic; a one-stop shop for critical approvals; appointment of managers with national authority.

Source: Prepared by the author.

Internal and Regional Strategic Benefits of the Port of Corío Project

The development of Corío represents a major geostrategic opportunity to position Peru as a logistics hub for the South Pacific and as an interoceanic gateway with bi-oceanic reach. Its location on the coast of Arequipa would enable the consolidation of multimodal logistics corridors capable of connecting the coast with the highlands and the Amazon region, which would facilitate access to the markets of Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. According to sectoral projections, Corío could initially handle more than two million TEUs annually, with a potential for expansion to up to six million in the long term—^[41] , in a contemporary international context characterized by the securitization of logistics chains, competition among major powers, and the return of realist approaches in international politics. In this sense, this projection should not be interpreted solely in terms of volume, but as an expression of Peru’s capacity to strategically position itself within high-value-added trade flows.

Domestically, the economic impact would be significant, especially in the south of the country. According to preliminary estimates by the GRA, the launch of the megaproject could generate more than 50,000 direct and indirect jobs during the construction phase, as well as progressively consolidate an industrial and logistics hub capable of boosting key sectors, including mining, agribusiness, fishing, and manufacturing.^[42] This process could stimulate the attraction of foreign direct investment, increase the value added of domestic production, and promote the creation of special economic zones that integrate productive activities with technological innovation.^[43] Similarly, the development of associated logistics platforms would help reduce domestic transportation costs by eliminating one of the main barriers limiting the country’s structural competitiveness. Within this framework, Corío could compete with high-performance ports in the region, such as San Antonio and Valparaíso. Beyond this competition, its fundamental impact would lie in closing the logistics gap in the southern Andes and promoting national economic decentralization.

At the regional level, Corío could become a strategic logistics hub for the Central Bioceanic Railway Corridor, a project aimed at connecting the Brazilian Atlantic with the Peruvian Pacific. According to estimates released by the Peruvian Association of Shipping Agents (APAM), this infrastructure could reduce freight transport times between Asia and South America by up to 40%, which would generate logistics savings of billions of dollars annually.^[44] This new connectivity scheme could position Peru as a natural gateway for exports of lithium, gas, copper, soybeans, and grains from Brazil, Bolivia, and Argentina,^[45] increasing its relevance in global value chains and promoting the creation of integrated logistics platforms that foster productive complementarity and coordinated integration into international markets. In the context of the global energy transition, the supply of critical minerals—such as copper and lithium—is taking on growing strategic importance, reinforcing the geoeconomic value of Peru’s southern coast as an export hub for strategic resources.

The construction of the Port of Corío will require complementary investments in critical infrastructure to enhance its development and competitiveness. To this end, it will be necessary to strengthen land, rail, and energy connectivity in order to link the port with the main production hubs in the south and with regional logistics platforms.^[46] This process would help close historical gaps in logistics and transportation, which have limited the economic integration of the southern Andes, and would facilitate Peru’s more efficient integration into international markets. Likewise, these investments could generate a multiplier effect on the national economy, drive the creation of technology and industrial parks focused on high-value-added sectors, and stimulate productive innovation. Therefore, the key will not lie solely in the construction of the port, but in the development of a coherent, integrated, and competitive logistics-industrial ecosystem.

Conversely, capitalizing on these benefits requires a comprehensive vision that incorporates the dimensions of national security and strategic defense. Growing competition for maritime routes and hubs increases Peru’s exposure to hybrid risks, such as sabotage, industrial espionage, disinformation campaigns, or covert diplomatic pressure.^[47] In this context, Corío must be considered critical infrastructure, which would entail establishing a special national security and protection regime, involving the Armed Forces, the Peruvian National Police (PNP), and the National Intelligence Directorate (DINI), in coordination with civilian entities and business actors. Comprehensive protection of the project must be based on a preventive and coordinated framework, aimed at ensuring operational continuity and institutional stability, without overemphasizing the military dimension.

Furthermore, the development of Corío should be viewed as a project aimed at strengthening territorial cohesion and human development. Its implementation could reshape the economic structure of southern Peru by integrating Puno, Cusco, Arequipa, Moquegua, and Tacna into a regional logistics-industrial system.^[48] However, this progress will not be sustainable unless accompanied by public policies focused on education, technical training, and the strengthening of human capital. In this regard, the Voluntary Military Service (SMV) and dual training programs between the government and the business sector could play a strategic role by offering young people training opportunities in logistics, industrial maintenance, and port technologies.^[49] In this way, Corío would not only generate wealth but also contribute to strengthening citizenship, national identity, and social cohesion around a project of common interest. Ultimately, the strategic sustainability of the megaproject will depend on its ability to generate lasting human capabilities and not merely physical infrastructure.

Strategic Contribution: Measures to Consolidate Corío’s Geopolitical Role

The development of the Corío port project cannot be limited to the construction of maritime infrastructure; it must be integrated into a long-term strategic decision-making process, the origins of which date back to the pre-investment studies promoted by the GRA, which subsequently evolved into greater institutional coordination with the APN and other government agencies. Under this strategic logic, Corío must be conceived as part of a comprehensive national policy capable of coordinating foreign policy, defense, economic development, and social cohesion. According to the Economic Research Center of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP), the megaproject is intended to be classified as critical infrastructure, given its regional scope and potential impact on international logistics chains.^[50] This condition requires the State to assume a leading role in defining strategic objectives, preventing fragmented or short-sighted decisions from compromising long-term national interests. Hence, the initiative must be elevated to the level of State Policy, with intertemporal planning and continuity beyond government cycles.

In the realm of foreign policy, Peru must adopt an active, pragmatic, and multifaceted diplomatic approach, aimed at preserving strategic autonomy vis-à-vis competing powers, without relinquishing the benefits derived from intelligent economic integration. From Alfred Thayer Mahan’s classical perspective, ports serve as instruments of power projection in times of peace, by linking maritime trade, naval presence, and the state’s strategic capacity.^[51]

From this perspective, the South Pacific basin is consolidating as the main axis of Peru’s commercial projection, accounting for approximately 67% of the country’s foreign trade in 2023. In that same year, China and the U.S. remained Peru’s main trading partners, together accounting for 49% of the country’s total trade and around 73% of trade with the economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.^[52] This bloc, which accounts for nearly 47% of global trade and whose intraregional trade amounts to approximately 70%, offers a significant strategic platform for positioning Peru as a logistics hub in the Pacific.^[53]

This level of interdependence necessitates the design of an international integration strategy that avoids unilateral dependencies, promotes diversified alliances, and incorporates emerging strategic partners such as South Korea, Portugal, Morocco, or Japan. Various authors have noted that, in a multipolar and competitive international order, middle-power states can expand their strategic maneuvering room by diversifying alliances and strengthening their own logistical and technological capabilities.^[54]

To this end, the construction of the Port of Corío must be accompanied by agreements on technological cooperation, capacity transfer, and the adoption of international port governance standards, enabling Peru to integrate into global logistics chains without compromising its sovereignty or strategic autonomy. Along the same lines, selective alliances with Middle Eastern actors—such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—should be considered, as these countries have intensified their presence in port and logistics investments in Latin America.^[55] Given these premises, this degree of interdependence requires a strategy that avoids rigid alignments, fosters diversified alliances, and preserves the Peruvian state’s decision-making autonomy.

The protection of critical infrastructure constitutes another central strategic priority. In scenarios of hegemonic competition, megaprojects such as Corío can become targets of direct or indirect neutralization strategies, which include diplomatic pressure, financial blockades, arbitration disputes, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns. Cases such as the port of Piraeus (Greece) or the port of Djibouti, contested by Chinese, Emirati, and Western interests, demonstrate how powers employ hybrid tools to influence the governance of strategic logistics hubs and expand their spheres of influence.^[56]

To avoid similar vulnerabilities, Peru should establish a National Strategic Infrastructure Protection System, under civilian leadership and with inter-institutional coordination, which integrates defense, internal security, and intelligence capabilities within a clear and coherent regulatory framework. This framework would ensure sovereign control and operational resilience of critical assets by incorporating advanced surveillance technologies, applied cybersecurity systems, and crisis management protocols in hybrid environments. This system should be aligned with a national science, technology, and innovation strategy focused on developing domestic capabilities in logistics protection, port cybersecurity, and strategic maritime control.

The success of Corío will also depend on strengthening the State’s internal capabilities and the national productive fabric. The megaproject should be promoted in parallel with the creation of special economic zones focused on high-value-added industries, advanced logistics, and technological innovation.^[57] Research by the University of the Pacific Research Center (CIUP) indicates that the modernization of technical education, specialized training, and effective coordination between the government, the private sector, and academia are essential conditions for transforming export dynamism into sustainable and diversified competitiveness.^[58] To this end, it is essential to invest in specialized human capital, modernize technical and vocational education, and promote dual training programs linked to the needs of the productive sector. Within this framework, the SMV could play a significant role by training young people with technical skills in logistics, industrial maintenance, and port technologies, aligning national defense objectives with economic development goals. In this way, it would be possible to integrate security and development under a single strategic vector, simultaneously strengthening productive capacities and the social foundation of national defense.

Under this strategic approach, the consolidation of Corío requires effective alignment between the public and private sectors that transcends particular interests and positions national security as the guiding principle of investment.^[59] The business sector must not only participate in the financing and operation of the port but also in strengthening associated industrial capabilities, protecting strategic assets, and promoting an environment of responsible governance.^[60] According to estimates compiled by port development specialists, an infrastructure of this nature could handle up to 100 million tons of cargo annually, generating a structural economic impact for the southern part of the country and consolidating Peru as one of the main logistics hubs in the South American Pacific. Its design as an integrated multimodal platform—linking industrial, rail, logistics, and urban zones—would boost regional and international trade while enhancing the country’s geoeconomic integration into the Asia-Pacific region.^[61] Therefore, for this potential to materialize, it will be essential to establish a stable, transparent, and competitive regulatory framework that prevents sectoral capture and preserves the project’s sovereign governance.

Conclusions

The Corío Port project goes beyond the realm of port development and represents a geopolitical and strategic decision of the utmost importance for Peru. Its development will define the country’s position in the South Pacific over the coming decades, at a time when global trade, critical logistics chains, and the projection of maritime power are undergoing a rapid process of reconfiguration. The true decisive factor will not be the physical scale of the project, but rather the clarity of the strategic vision underpinning it and the government’s ability to align economic, diplomatic, and security interests under a principle of decision-making autonomy.

Corío represents a window of opportunity for Peru to transition from a role as a passive recipient of global geo-economic dynamics to that of an actor capable of designing and steering its sovereign integration into international logistics networks. This requires recognizing that the South Pacific is no longer a neutral space but has become a stage for systemic competition and strategic friction between hegemonic blocs. In this context, decisions postponed today could shape national sovereignty and control over strategic assets for generations to come. Without a coherent forward-looking strategy, the country risks being subordinated within an externally defined regional architecture; conversely, a pragmatic multipolar policy could consolidate Peru as a balancing actor with autonomous negotiating capacity.

At the same time, the economic and logistical benefits that Corío could generate will only be sustainable if accompanied by internal structural transformations, both at the territorial and social levels. This implies closing historical infrastructure gaps, strengthening multidimensional security, and developing highly specialized human capital capable of capitalizing on opportunities for industrialization, innovation, and technology transfer. Corío’s strategic vision should not be limited to the movement of goods but must serve as a hub for national integration, aimed at bringing peripheral territories together, reducing disparities, and generating inclusive prosperity with a productive base. If the project is not accompanied by internal structural reforms, the megaproject could result in a logistics hub with limited national reach, which would reduce its transformative impact.

Likewise, Corío poses a deeper challenge: rethinking the concept of sovereignty in the 21st century from a comprehensive and operational perspective. In a context of complex interdependence, where critical infrastructure and control over maritime, logistical, and cyber space determine states’ actual capacity to project power and ensure their autonomy, sovereignty is defended not only through borders but also through strategic infrastructure, logistical control, sovereign technology, and institutional resilience. Recent volatility in key energy regions—such as the Middle East—demonstrates that regional disruptions can immediately alter global trade flows, reinforcing the need for intermediate states to develop resilient and diversified logistics hubs. In this vein, the protection of strategic assets such as Corío also requires the sustained strengthening of the Armed Forces, equipping them with effective operational, technological, and deterrent capabilities against hybrid threats, external pressures, or attempts to interfere with areas critical to national security. Consequently, the construction of Corío must be integrated into a national security and development strategy that coordinates diplomacy, economic regulation, defense, and social cohesion under unified strategic leadership.

The challenge lies not only in building a port, but in consolidating a sovereign geopolitical position capable of projecting Peru as a relevant, autonomous, and respected actor in the configuration of the South Pacific and global trade routes in the coming decades. Corío, more than just infrastructure, constitutes a structural decision regarding the type of international role Peru wishes to assume in an increasingly competitive and unstable global order.

Acknowledgments

The author expresses his special gratitude to Solange Araujo Contreras, a graduate in International Relations with a minor in Law and International Security, for her valuable work as a research assistant, particularly in the processing, systematization, and specialized handling of information, whose contribution strengthened the academic rigor, methodological consistency, and overall quality of this study.

Endnotes

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