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Relations between The Middle East and Latin America

This text was originally published in the book Latin America in the New Global Geopolitics.

Summary

At first glance, Arab and Muslim countries have little in common with those of Latin America. However, for several decades, bilateral relations have been forged in different areas. Latin America represents a region of great opportunities, and It therefore arouses the interest of important global players. Due to its geographical remoteness and cultural differences, it could be said that this region is ripe land for the countries of the Middle East. However, the presence of communities of Arab origin confers on Latin America a privileged position for the development of relations and the implementation of links.

Keywords: Latin America, anti-imperialism, security, Middle East, terrorism.

Introduction

It is rare that the Arab-Muslim world is related to Latin America. For this reason, this article highlights the different points that link both regions, with special emphasis on Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. But, before addressing the current period, it is important to give a brief overview of what this relationship has meant.

Since the end of the 19th century, there has been an increase in the Arab and Muslim presence in Latin America. These were the Turks coming from the Ottoman Empire, mainly from Greater Syria (Syria and Lebanon) and Palestine. In some cases, entire villages made the journey to the other side of the pond. The first waves of Turks, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were mostly composed of Christians fleeing the Ottoman Empire and, to a lesser extent, Shiites who undertook the journey for the same reasons.

At that time, countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina experienced a significant migratory movement, as more than a quarter of a million Syrian Ottomans and Syrians were migrating to the Americas, corresponding to 20% of the population of Greater Syria,[1] giving rise to important Latin Arab or Arab Latin American communities, also known as Mahjar. Although it is true that in the mid-19th century Khedive Ismail sent a battalion of Sudanese to fight in Mexico,[2] it was not until the mid-20th century that bilateral relations between Muslim and Latin American countries were forged and developed, and a more significant Muslim emigration was observed in the region.

Nasser, leader of pan-Arabism and emblematic figure of the non-aligned cause (see anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle), was the main driver and promoter of relations between the two regions. His influence can be seen in political leaders throughout the region, such as Omar Torrijos (Panama), Fidel Castro (Cuba), Juan Domingo Perón (Argentina) and, more recently, Hugo Chávez (Venezuela).

Historical Perspective

Nasser’s Role. In the early 1950s, the image of Gamal Abdel Nasser became a reference for many intellectuals and political leaders in search of a revolutionary and supportive model. Although at that time, other leaders also emerged who aroused some enthusiasm, such as Mohamed Naguib in Egypt and Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria.

In the late 1950s, Latin American revolutionaries declared (regardless of cultural differences, the complexity of regional and local politics, and realities or priorities) that they were united with the Arab (see African and Asian) world by a common colonialist experience and a firm determination to fight the injustices of the world order. In the case of Latin America, the relatively large Arab diaspora present played a key role in influencing public opinion regarding Middle East policy and rapprochement between the two regions.

The Cuban Revolution. At that time, the Cuban example was the most representative case of such rapprochement. Fidel Castro’s ambition was for Cuba to be recognized as a nation within the nascent bloc of Afro-Asian nations, of which Egyptian President Nasser had become the undisputed leader. Undoubtedly, nationalist intellectuals were closely following the political events that took place in Egypt in the 1950s.

Cuba and the Afro-Asian Bloc. Cuban revolutionary leaders were aware of the importance that the new world emerging from the decolonization struggles in Africa, the Middle East and Asia could have on the development of international events. They therefore strove to make it possible to include their revolution in the nascent Afro-Asian bloc of newly independent anti-colonial nations and sought diplomatic recognition from Nasser. Inscribing Cuba in the growing Afro-Asian movement would be fundamental in defining the international character of the revolution. The country would later proudly proclaim itself Afrolatino.[3]

Egypt and Cuba. Six short months after Castro’s seizure of power, a delegation headed by Ernesto Guevara arrived in Egypt in June 1959. The country had become an obligatory place of pilgrimage for all national liberation movements. The Cubans knew they needed Egyptian diplomatic support to give more visibility and recognition to their struggle.

The meeting with the Raïs[4] was not as successful as expected. The Castroist project was much more radical than the Nasserist one – which was described as “”mental attitude […] eclectic, empiric, radical and also conservative[5] -; thus, Nasser had qualified the Cuban revolutionaries as “theatrical bandits, but not true revolutionaries”.[6] Despite these discrepancies, the Egyptian leader recognized Cuba as the only anti-colonial and anti-imperialist nation in Latin America. This recognition allowed Cuba to achieve its goal and become a participant in the emerging Afro-Asian bloc. Proof of this was the invitation by the Egyptian government for Cuba to attend the next Afro-Asian Congress.[7]

The American-Afro-Asian Dream, and the UN’s Role. A few months later, Cuban intellectual Walterio Carbonell called for the development of a Cuban foreign policy fully committed to the creation of an American-Afro-Asian bloc.[8] When in 1950 Castro decided to attend the inaugural session of the XV General Assembly of the United Nations (UN), his intention was not only to turn the UN into a forum to echo the Cuban revolution, but also to speak on behalf of the people of all sub-developed nations.[9]

The Cubans would fight for the success of that revolutionary ideal, starting with the aid and support they gave to the Algerian revolutionary brothers, as well as to other revolutionary struggles in various African countries. The role of Egypt, which had become an important center through which arms and fighters transited to reach their final destinations,[10] was strengthened. Later, in 1955, a Tricontinental conference was held in Havana, bringing together revolutionary movements from Africa, Asia and Latin America, from which the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America would emerge.

The Argentinian Case. Various Argentine social and political sectors saw parallels between the anti-imperialist struggles in the Arab world and in Latin America. Although with different and sometimes opposing agendas, these groups learned and deployed the language of nonalignment and South-South solidarity in the escalation of the Cold War. In the Argentine case, prominent members of the communities of Arab origin,[11] anti-imperialists, state actors and Perón himself, tried to mediate and foster these tricontinental solidarities.[12] Streams of public opinion and political positions were appearing among Latin Americans of all stripes who wanted to see an Arab reflection in their own situation. Argentina made clear efforts to cultivate strong diplomatic relations with many Middle Eastern nations, particularly Egypt.

The Argentine case is interesting because since the rise of the Turkish immigration in the nineteenth century, the country had a vibrant set of press organs, among others, of and for Middle Eastern collectives. Such publications usually focused on news about Argentine politics and current affairs, as well as the Motherland.[13] This identification with the Egyptian cause was shown in different ways in the press, such as the emphatic comparisons between Argentine and Egyptian leaders or the juxtaposition of Egyptian and Argentine events with titles like Egypt already has its own Perón.[14]

The Argentine community of Arab origin paid particular attention to the Egyptian revolution and its consequences. This was because they considered, like Cuba, that they were part of a broader movement of citizens and statesmen who recognized Latin America, Africa and Asia as regions of the world with a common history and destiny.

A few years earlier, there was an endorsement by the Arab-Argentine media of the Palestinian cause. The abstention of Buenos Aires in the UN vote on the partition of Palestine was perceived as a sign of pro-Arab inclination and a rapprochement of the Palestinian question with other anti-imperialist liberation struggles.[15] Almost a decade later, the Suez Canal crisis triggered a movement of sympathy and support in several countries of the region, and allowed the re-launching of the discourse on the common anti-imperialist struggle.[16]

Sandinistas and Palestinian Groups. In the early 1970s, the Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua found support within different Palestinian groups in Jordan and Lebanon, where they received military training. As a result, the Sandinista government became the strongest supporter of the Palestinian cause in Latin America.

The origin of relations between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Sandinistas dates back to 1955, when Fidel Castro organized the Tricontinental. 500 delegates from radical leftist groups, including representatives of the PLO,[17] met to formulate a global revolutionary strategy to combat American imperialism. An agreement was also signed between the PLO and the Sandinista guerrillas that provided for the training of Sandinista troops in Lebanon.[18]

In 1981, PLO leader Yasser Arafat declared that they had contacts with all the revolutionary movements in the world, mentioning El Salvador[19] and Nicaragua. In fact, in 1980, a group of Salvadoran leftist revolutionaries underwent combat training in a Fatah camp in Lebanon.[20]

Panama and the Canals. When news of the Suez crisis in 1955 reached the other side of the Atlantic, countries like Brazil expressed their support for the Arab country.[21] Soon, support for Egypt evolved into a general call for the emergence of a nationalist leader within the Latin American armed forces to follow in Nasser’s footsteps and lead his country to political and economic independence, while setting his nation on a path of solid economic development and social progress. Obviously, the nationalization of the Suez Canal had an important echo in Panama.[22] However, it was not until 20 years later, that the Panamanian process culminated with General Omar Torrijos, who negotiated an agreement with the United States (U.S.) in 1977, restoring the sovereignty of the Panama Canal.

The Venezuelan Case

After having given an overview of the historical background of the relations between the two regions, the following is the most recent situation, being the Venezuelan case the clearest link for this chronological transition, as it is the Latin American country that best represents this rapprochement with the Arab and Muslim world.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the then president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, proclaimed himself another Arab and identified himself as part of a revolutionary continuum that emerged with Nasser in Egypt, followed by Fidel Castro in Cuba, Gaddafi in Libya and culminating with his Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela.[23] Chavez went so far as to say that every Venezuelan was a soldier of the PLO comparing Yasser Arafat, who died in 2004, to Jesus Christ.[24] In his own words, his government was a Nasserist regime insofar as it had “a social project, even socialist if you will, a Panamerican ideology, meaning Bolivarian, and an anti-imperialist stance.[25]

Committed to an alliance of Latin American and Arab nations, Chavez was an enthusiastic supporter of both the South American – Arab Countries Summit (ASPA) meetings and the reactivation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In 2005, during the first ASPA Summit held in Brazil, Chavez reminded his audience that the way to build a solid relationship between the two continents and a strong alliance between the peoples of the South would be to follow Nasser’s path: “I am very Nasserist, I would’ve loved to be serving my Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser”.[26] Nasser’s image would be a constant throughout his 14 years in power.

The Venezuelan leader generally opposed Israel and U.S. policy in the Middle East. During a visit to Syria, Chavez urged Arab peoples to “retake the flag of Pan Arabism, retake the flag of Arab unity, retake the flag of Arab dignity”.[27]

Positions on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not part of the topic, it is important to mention it because, to a certain extent, it influences relations with some Latin American countries. In an effort to show their autonomy in foreign policy or in their anti-imperialist struggle, several left-wing Latin American countries show their counter-hegemonic positions, supporting Palestine and avoiding condemnation of the Iranian and Syrian regimes.[28] This position contrasts with the policy adopted in previous decades, when – in 1948 – the US imposed an arms embargo on the nascent USSR. The US imposed an arms embargo on the nascent Hebrew state and Latin American states such as Argentina (which had abstained from voting in the UN for the partition of Palestine), Chile, Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama facilitated the shipment of arms to Israel.[29]

Since the Six-Day War in 1957, relations between Israel and several Latin American countries have been drifting apart and even deteriorating. This trend was accentuated after the Kippur War in 1973.[30] With the exception of a few countries, relations with Israel have been improving since the 1990s,[31] but the conflict in the Gaza Strip between 2008 and 2009 triggered a wave of condemnation of the Israeli military offensive in Latin America.[32] More recently, the vast majority of Latin American countries (with the notable exception of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela) condemned the attack committed by Hamas on October 7, 2023. Subsequently, several Bolivarian countries have taken very critical positions towards Israel.[33]

Iranian Influence in the Region

Of the Muslim countries, Iran has undoubtedly had the strongest presence in Latin America. Due to political sympathies with several regimes in the region (whose geographical proximity to the US, the Great Satan, is an asset) or the presence of an important Shiite community, the Islamic Republic of Iran has managed to establish privileged relations and an important network of influence in Latin America. Moreover, it allows it, together with its policy of broader openness towards the Global South, to counter the consequences of the imposed sanctions.

The recent integration of Iran into the BRICS (economic, political and social alliance initially composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) allows Tehran to acquire greater visibility and to get closer to Latin America, developing new ties with Brazil. In Latin America, Iran’s area of influence extends mainly in countries with revolutionary and anti-imperialist tendencies, which are part of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (also known as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas or ALBA).

Iran’s rapprochement and positioning in this region is strategically more important than ever, considering the current arm-wrestling match it is maintaining with the US in the conflict resulting from the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas on Israel. In addition, the fact that Iran has positioned itself as a defender of the Palestinian people gives it a very high sympathy in several Latin American countries and peoples. In this sense, the main countries with which Iran maintains a privileged relationship will be discussed below.

Brazil. Iran is not only satisfied with establishing and maintaining relations with the Bolivarian countries, but also with other countries in the region whose ideological sympathies have revolutionary anti-imperialism in common. Therefore, being based on ideological harmony, such alliances tend to evolve according to the profile of power. This is the case of Brazil, which after the return of President Lula da Silva, in 2023, authorized the mooring of two Iranian warships, the I.R.I.S. Makran and the I.R.I.S. Dena, in Brazilian ports after having announced its intention to transit the Panama Canal.[34]

Bolivia. One of the most recent examples of Iranian-Bolivian cooperation dates back to July 2023, when both nations signed a bilateral defense agreement.[35] In the official statements, mention is made of the fact that both countries are revolutionaries[36] and that the Andean country showed interest in obtaining Iranian drone technology.[37] This episode is the fruit of 15 years of rapprochement between the two countries, dating back to 2007 and 2008, when they signed a strategic agreement that would seal the beginning of privileged relations that have been developing in several areas,[38] among others, defense.

Cuba. Despite having revolutionary and anti-imperialist ideologies, cooperation between Cuba and Iran has always been very weak and limited to bilateral agreements. In mid-2023, several Iranian officials, including the President, Ebrahim Raisi, and the Minister of Defense, Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani, traveled to Havana and signed six cooperation agreements in various fields. In December of the same year, the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs traveled to Tehran, signing agreements in sectors such as agriculture, medicine, mining and energy.[39]

Venezuela. Undoubtedly, Venezuela is the main course of Persian presence and cooperation in the region, due to the importance of oil and logistical, military, agricultural, Industrial, and energy support provided by Iran for more than a decade now. Support that has been extended for a period of 20 years, through the subscription of a roadmap of cooperation, in 2022.[40]

It is worth mentioning that, at the end of the Chávez era, besides the more than 50 joint ventures, almost a hundred Iranian companies were operating in Venezuela, all within the framework of the 270 memorandums of understanding signed between both countries.[41] The direct flights between Caracas, Damascus and Teheran, established in the mid 2000’s and later interrupted, were recently resumed.[42] In fact, in mid-2022, an event took place that did not go unnoticed internationally. A Boeing Cargo aircraft, formerly owned by the Iranian company Maham Air and sold to the Venezuelan company Emtrasur Cargo, was forced to land in Argentina for refueling. Argentine authorities blocked the plane to investigate whether the 17-person Iranian-Venezuelan crew members were traveling for commercial reasons or had any connection to international terrorism.[43] The aircraft remained on the ground until February 2024, when it was finally transferred to the U.S.[44] In retaliation, in mid-March 2024, the Venezuelan government decided to close its airspace to Argentina.[45]

In June 2023, the Iranian president toured Latin American countries. One of the main reasons for the trip was to increase trade between Venezuela and Iran. The two leaders signed 25 agreements, in sectors ranging from education and healthcare to mining. Additionally, another priority is to develop technological cooperation between the two countries and, in general, to improve the economic, political, and scientific cooperation” between Iran, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba.[46] At the agricultural level, the most recent example is the cession to Iran of one million hectares of arable land.[47]

But the two countries cooperate in other domains as well. Venezuela reached an agreement with Iran to import oil in exchange for gold, resulting in an active back- and-forth between air (Mahan Air for gold transport) and sea (tankers of the National Iranian Oil Company).[48] It is estimated that approximately 1.5 million barrels of oil arrived in Venezuela, in exchange for nine tons of gold valued at almost 500 million dollars. However, Iran is not the only country to receive Venezuelan gold. In a program of gold for food, it is suspected that Turkey also received Venezuelan gold, officially to refine it, which it then sold to Emirati and Turkish companies.[49]

In September 2023, it was revealed that Venezuela, Syria and Iran signed a tripartite memorandum for the construction of a new refinery with a capacity of 140,000 barrels in the Syrian city of Homs.[50] In addition, Iran intervened in the repair of the Palito refinery in Venezuela[51] and, in general, in the supply of oil.

In 2021, the U.S. suspected that the two Iranian ships (Makram and Sahand) that sailed for the Atlantic might be carrying weapons for Venezuela.[52] However, after publicly denouncing it, these ships never arrived at their destination. Also, according to a Pentagon report, members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force were present in Venezuela. Without explicitly naming Venezuela, the report stated that members of the Quds Forces abroad were stationed in Iranian embassies, charities and Shiite religious and cultural institutions.[53] More recently, the U.S. Secretary of State stated that the Trump administration believed that Hezbollah maintained active cells in Venezuela.[54] In this regard, Venezuelan politician Juan Guaidó stated that Chávez had provided Venezuelan passports to Iranian citizens, Syrians and members of Hezbollah or other militias, facilitating their entry into Latin America.[55]

In the military field, Iran confirmed – in 2012 – the supply of drones to Venezuela,[56] that this country has been progressively adapting and incorporating.[57] In 2013, a U.S. report assured that both countries were cooperating in intelligence matters[58], and it is believed that also in training for the Venezuelan naval special forces.[59] During a naval parade in Venezuela in July 2023, the participation of Iranian-made missile boats of the Zolfaghar class, equipped with Nasr-1 anti-ship missiles, was observed.[60]

Based on the soft power, since 2005, Iran has doubled its diplomatic presence in Latin America, both in terms of embassies and diplomatic personnel. As part of this strategy, Tehran has strengthened the presence of cultural attachés within their missions, cultural or religious centers, as has been the case of the attack against the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires, in 1994, in which the Iranian cultural attaché, Mohsen Rabbani, was accused of being the mastermind of the attack. Likewise, it is worth mentioning the will of indoctrination carried out by Tehran, which translates into a greater presence of schools, cultural centers (which offer scholarships to candidates who want to study in Iran) and mosques for preaching, as well as modern means of communication to influence Latin American public opinion (the television channel HispanTV, the YouTube Channel Baiatullah[61] or the news agency Ahlul Bait, available in 24 languages).[62]

Undoubtedly, one of the key figures in this presence is Tarek al-Aissami (of Syrian and Lebanese origin), who was Venezuela’s Vice President and Minister of Petroleum until the purge that took place in March 2023 due to the disappearance of 3 billion dollars from Venezuelan oil,[63] and on whom the US offered a reward of 10 million dollars to facilitate his capture.[64] In addition, as shown by the case of Lebanese-Venezuelan businessmen Majed and Khaled Khalil Majzoub (relatives of former Lebanese Finance Minister Ali Hassan Khalil, who was recently sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control for his material support to Hezbollah and other corruption charges), this network also extends to Bolivia, benefiting from the preferential trade agreements that the Evo Morales regime granted them in Bolivia.[65]

Argentina. Everything points to the fact that it was the Lebanese Shiite militia supported by Tehran, Hezbollah, which was behind the attacks committed in Buenos Aires against the Israeli embassy in 1992 and the AMIA Jewish community center in 1994 (114 fatalities in total and hundreds of wounded), through a cell that operated from the region of the three borders (Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina) and is still active in that area.[66] This has significantly hindered, even for Peronist governments, the relationship between Iran and Argentina. The death in suspicious circumstances of Alberto Nisman, the Argentine prosecutor in charge of the investigation (in which he pointed to Hezbollah), put another brake on an eventual rapprochement.[67]

Since the AMIA attack, Hezbollah’s External Security Organization or Unit 910 responsible for its extraterritorial operations, has transformed itself into a terrorist network in Latin America, getting involved with drug trafficking.[68] It has successfully co-opted many families of Lebanese origin, mainly present in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela, which is a success considering that a high percentage of Lebanon’s gross domestic product comes from remittances.[69] In fact, there are several clans that due to the nationalities of their leaders and some members (combination, on the one hand, of Lebanese or Syrian nationality, and on the other hand, of Venezuelan, Bolivian or Colombian in most cases), as well as by their actions (money laundering, drug and arms trafficking, through triangular operations with logistical air bridges between Venezuela, Syria and Iran, etc.) represent the links between the two regions. This is the case of the Saleh, Nassereddine and Rada clans.[70]

At the end of December 2023, coinciding with the Maccabees Games, a Pan-American sporting event that brings together some 4,000 Jewish athletes and was being held in the Argentine capital, three alleged Syrian and Lebanese terrorists were arrested in Buenos Aires, one of whom held Venezuelan and Colombian passports.[71] Hezbollah is also still very active in the Tri-Border region.[72] According to Paraguayan authorities, drug traffickers are linked – in one way or another – to Hezbollah.[73]

Latin America: New El Dorado for Investors from Gulf States

In parallel to geopolitical relations, the attractiveness of Latin American countries for investment from the Persian Gulf should be highlighted. In fact, the last Annual Investment Meeting 2023, which was held in Abu Dhabi, included a forum with a regional focus dedicated to Latin America and the Caribbean.[74] Likewise, in 2019, the Global Business Forum for Latin America took place in Panama, organized by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). This event resulted in the publication of a report that reviews trade and investment trends between the two regions, identifying opportunities and recommending policies.[75]

The fourth and last ASPA Summit was held in Saudi Arabia to commemorate its tenth anniversary. As can be seen in the Riyadh Declaration, it is a forum not only with a strong political component[76] (strengthening diplomatic relations and facilitating the opening of new chancelleries), but also with a strong economic and commercial component, facilitating exchanges between the two regions.[77] In order to gain more autonomy through diversification, Brazil has been one of the first to explore and develop new political partnerships[78] and new markets.[79]

For several reasons, in the economic relations between the two regions, the main investors are the Gulf countries. The first reason is financial (they have significant means to invest), the second is geopolitical (they are interested in settling in this region because of its proximity to the US and diversifying their economic partners, opening and developing new markets) and the third is access to scarce resources in their own countries (minerals, agricultural, etc.). Although trade exchanges are relatively scarce, the main trading partner is undoubtedly the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Its exports to Latin American countries accounted for almost a third of total bilateral exports in 2019. Emirati imports from Latin America accounted for 46 % 5 billion dollars) of the total imports of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, from this region.[80] Brazil has become an important trading partner of Saudi Arabia, exporting poultry, corn and sugar, among others.[81]

The agri-food sector is of paramount importance for consolidating food security in the Gulf countries and has become a significant area of cooperation between the two regions. In fact, between the years 2005 and 2015, agricultural exports from Latin America to GCC countries nearly doubled.[82] In 2013, Brazil supplied more than three-quarters of Saudi imports of poultry and sugar.[83]

Like Iran, several Gulf investment funds have invested in agri-food companies but have also shown increasing interest in acquiring agricultural land in Latin America. In 2011, Al Gharrafa Investment, an affiliate of the Qatari sovereign wealth fund and based in the Cayman Islands, increased its stake in Adecoagro, a George Soros-backed farmland company[84] and based in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, becoming – today – its largest shareholder.[85]

In the same year, the largest dairy company in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia’s Almarai, acquired Luxembourg’s Fondomonte, which at the time operated farms in Argentina. Starting in 2012, Fondomonte expanded significantly in the U.S., particularly in Arizona for alfalfa farming (requiring high water consumption as it is a highly arid area), which will later be used as a nutritious feed for livestock in Saudi Arabia.[86] Fondomonte has been able to take advantage of the somewhat lax laws on water usage by foreign companies in the state of Arizona (U.S. companies are subject to much stricter regulations) and an active lobbying campaign.

In 2006, DP World, an Emirati company and the world’s third largest port operator, invested US$1 billion in the port of Callao, Peru’s main port, whose capacity exceeded 1.5 million teu (Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit, corresponding to the cargo capacity of a standard 20-foot container) in 2022. Additionally, DP World Callao is developing a port expansion project through a new US$350 million investment. This initiative, called Bicentennial Port,[87] aims to increase the port’s annual transfer capacity to 2.7 million teu.[88]

However, unlike China (which became a member of the IDB in 2009),[89] this type of foreign direct investment remains rare in Latin America from the Gulf countries. Undoubtedly, regional leaders would like to see Gulf sovereign wealth funds channeled into projects such as the one they concluded with China in early 2013, which contributes close to $2 billion to a new regional investment fund in partnership with the IDB, showing that infrastructure projects are one of China’s foreign policy priorities.[90] Even if the amount were small, the participation of Gulf States in such a multilateral mechanism would be welcomed by Latin American countries. However, there is no indication that these countries are interested in this less profitable type of investment. Therefore, other Latin American countries such as Panama[91] and Paraguay[92] are seeking to develop trade with the countries of the Persian Gulf.

Turkey

We do not know whether, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated, Muslim navigators beat Christopher Columbus in his Atlantic crossing,[93] but we do know that President Erdoğan has initiated and developed important ties between Turkey and several Latin American countries. Applying his doctrine of strategic depth (driven by former Turkish Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu) and betting on a multidimensional foreign policy, diversification and expansion towards new markets and partners, Turkey has gone from being a regional power to becoming a global stakeholder. Thus, Latin America has become a priority for this country, which already has 17 embassies in this region, with 15 Latin American countries having embassies in Ankara. Turkey is an observer member of the Central American Integration System, the Pacific Alliance, the Latin American and Caribbean Parliament,[94] of the Organization of American States, the Caribbean Community and the Rio Group.[95] Between 2010 and 2018, Turkish imports increased from less than US$3.5 billion to US$8.5 billion, while exports doubled to US$3.2 billion.[96]

Turkey has not only expanded its influence but has also diversified its fields of production or exploitation, such as energy, new technologies, and defense. The development of the Turkish arms and defense industry has made an important quantitative leap[97] and has aroused the interest of Latin American countries.[98]

Because of his Palestinian origins, the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele (whose father converted to Islam and served as an imam), represents an interesting example to mention. In January 2022, taking advantage of his tour in the region, which would also take him to UAE, he signed with his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan a series of agreements in the fields of economy, defense and technology. This rapprochement with Ankara coincides with a significant growth of Turkish private investment in Latin America.[99]

Culture. It should be noted that the expansion of the Arab-Muslim culture responds to the interest of several Muslim countries in spreading certain cultural and religious values. However, in this field, as in the political one, the case of Latin America, as a region, is particular due to the important presence of communities of Arab origin,[100] which makes it a privileged market. Recently, the presence in Latin America of the Anadolu News Agency, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, the Turkish Maarif Foundation and the Yunus Emre Institute is developing, making it a privileged market. Recently, the presence in Latin America of Anadolu News Agency, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, Turkish Maarif Foundation and Yunus Emre Institute is developing.

Soap Operas and their Habibis. Turkish audiovisual production is important and uses this soft power, exporting its television series. In fact, Turkey is already the world’s second largest exporter of television series after the United States.[101]

On the one hand, Turkey develops series that could be described as Ottomanist (as is the case with the Sultan series on Suleiman the Magnificent), whose main objective is to enhance the grandeur of the era of Ottoman power, which came to dominate much of the eastern and southern Mediterranean, extending from the gates of Vienna to Algeria, passing through the western and eastern coastal areas of the Arabian Peninsula. Turkey, on the other hand, produces series set in the present day. One of the goals of these series is to transmit the vision of a conservative society (traditional patriarchal system, kisses to the Pater Familias, strong family nucleus, importance of the religious factor, proscription of the class struggle, gender and national understanding for the benefit of the dominant class, etc.), in line with the ideology of the ruling Justice and Development Party.[102] In addition, these series are subject to strict censorship control by the Turkish High Council of Radio and Television.[103]

However, another important goal is to normalize the figure of the young Muslim, attractive prince charming, the habibi (wanted or loved).[104] The desired effect is to promote, through these soap operas that spread cultural stereotypes widely accepted in a conservative culture such as Latin America, a cultural rapprochement between both regions and to give a positive vision of Turkish culture, of the Muslim religion and of the Muslim man. This propaganda, which is one more element of the Turkish strategy to position itself in the region, has contributed to rethink the country’s image and has encouraged, for example, travel and relations with Turkish men and, therefore, conversions to Islam. For various reasons, women are the most sensitive to such soap operas, being the most likely to convert to Islam.[105]

Trade. Trade relations between Latin America and Turkey have developed exponentially in the last two decades. This can be seen in the trade balances, the signing of free trade agreements between Turkey and several Latin American countries,[106] and the establishment of new air routes (Turkish Airlines, FTA, etc.). In order to diversify and increase their exports of agri-food products, countries such as Brazil and Mexico are developing the production of halal certified foods,[107] that comply with the dictates of the Sharia.

Venezuela. In 2019, following an increase in trade exchanges between the two countries, US sources have warned that part of the Venezuelan gold received by Turkey to be refined (worth almost $900 million in 2018), could – in reality – be headed to Iran. Once refined, the gold is supposed to be returned to Venezuela, although there is no record of any re-export. For Western governments, Turkey has become the biggest cause for concern in this regard.[108]

Conclusions

From areas as diverse as the audiovisual sector, the agri-food sector (including the halal industry), mining and the arms industry, Latin America presents a myriad of opportunities that several countries have known how to use or have been doing so. Taking advantage of its geographic proximity to the U.S., as well as its high volatility and instability in the political and security fields, the region has become the target of groups and countries that perceive it as a place of opportunities to develop activities related to terrorism and/or drug trafficking.[109]

At the level of international geopolitics, there is an acceleration of the game of alliances and positioning by actors who, from the West, can be considered as second- rate. We are also witnessing the creation of links between countries of the so-called Global South that might seem the most unlikely. These new links, which are often perceived as artificial, are largely reminiscent of the rapprochement that took place in the mid-20th century between Latin American countries and the so-called Afro-Asian bloc.

Paradoxically, one could say that Nasser’s greatest posthumous success and the perennialization of his policy is being seen in Latin America. The Raïs was the first to perceive the important potential of an alliance with these countries, since the fact of obtaining votes from Latin American countries in the UN represented – for the export of his policy – a guarantee of easily achievable success. These were about twenty countries that were easy to convince and whose support, in many cases, had already been won.

Arab socialism has survived little after the demise of the Egyptian leader. After the 1973 war, the Umma – the community of believers in Islam (including non-Arab Muslims) – has gained greater advantages than Arab nationalism. Nasser was not only the forerunner and promoter of rapprochement with Latin America, but also the one who paved the way for the Muslim countries that currently maintain privileged relations with countries in that region. For some decades now, certain Arab-Muslim countries have been taking advantage of this dynamic to develop relations in Latin America, and it is very likely that these ties will continue to be strengthened.

Endnotes

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  3. Vélez, Federico. “Latin American Revolutionaries and the Arab World: From the Suez Canal to the Arab Spring”. London: Routledge, 2016: 28. https://www.routledge.com/Latin-American-Revolutionaries-and-the-Arab-World-From-the-Suez-Canal-to-the-Arab-Spring/Velez/p/book/9781032927787?srsltid=AfmBOooJgjCI2d_nP9djUm54zJbxShHhPhCBnVxUeUnJ4Gp6d5GEqwFW ↑
  4. En algunos países árabes, jefe del Estado. ↑
  5. Khalidi, Walid. “Political Trends in the Fertile Crescent”. En The Middle East in Transition, Ed. Walter Z. Laqueur, 121-128. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1958: 125. ↑
  6. Heikal, Mohammed. 1973. The Cairo Documents. New York: Doubleday & Company, 343, citado por Vélez, Federico. Latin American Revolutionaries and the Arab World: From the Suez Canal to the Arab Spring. London: Routledge, 2016: 29. https://www.routledge.com/Latin-American-Revolutionaries-and-the-Arab-World-From-the-Suez-Canal-to-the-Arab-Spring/Velez/p/book/9781032927787?srsltid=AfmBOooJgjCI2d_nP9djUm54zJbxShHhPhCBnVxUeUnJ4Gp6d5GEqwFW ↑
  7. Revolución. “Invitada Cuba al Congreso Islámico”. (Havana), 27 de junio de 1959: 10. ↑
  8. Carbonell, Walterio. “Congreso mundial de países subdesarrollados.” Revolución. Havana, 5 diciembre 1959: 2, citado en Vélez, Federico. 2016. Latin American Revolutionaries and the Arab World: From the Suez Canal to the Arab Spring. London: Routledge, 36. ↑
  9. New York Times. “Havana Protests”. 15 de septiembre de 1960; Vélez, Federico. 2016. Latin American Revolutionaries and the Arab World: From the Suez Canal to the Arab Spring. London: Routledge, 38. ↑
  10. Vélez, Federico. “Latin American Revolutionaries and the Arab World: From the Suez Canal to the Arab Spring”. London: Routledge, 2016: 51. https://www.routledge.com/Latin-American-Revolutionaries-and-the-Arab-World-From-the-Suez-Canal-to-the-Arab-Spring/Velez/p/book/9781032927787?srsltid=AfmBOooJgjCI2d_nP9djUm54zJbxShHhPhCBnVxUeUnJ4Gp6d5GEqwFW ↑
  11. Balloffet, Lily Pearl. Argentina in the Global Middle East. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020. ↑
  12. Véase Balloffet, Lily Pearl. “Argentine and Egyptian History Entangled: From Perón to Nasser”. Journal of Latin American Studies 50, no. 3, 2017: 549–77. https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/418F5388A58D5D72E463111D63EFA705/S0022216X17001171a.pdf/div-class-title-argentine-and-egyptian-history-entangled-from-peron-to-nasser-div.pdf. ↑
  13. Ibid. ↑
  14. Baaclini, Najib. “Naguib, visto por un viejo amigo: ‘Egipto tiene ya su Perón’”. El Eco de Oriente, 2, 24 de febrero de 1953, citado por Balloffet, Lily Pearl. 2017. “Argentine and Egyptian History Entangled: From Perón to Nasser”. Journal of Latin American Studies 50, no. 3: 549–77. https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/418F5388A58D5D72E463111D63EFA705/S0022216X17001171a.pdf/div-class-title-argentine-and-egyptian-history-entangled-from-peron-to-nasser-div.pdf. ↑
  15. Ibid., 559. ↑
  16. Ibid., 571. ↑
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