This article was initially published in the Revista Seguridad y Poder Terrestre
Vol 3, N°4, October – December, 2024,

Summary

This article analyzes the impact of ideological radicalization and its convergence with Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) on national security in Peru. Through a descriptive and analytical methodology, it examines the areas most affected by these phenomena, assessing how radical groups and organized crime affect governance and compromise state control over key territories. It concludes that this convergence increases threats to internal security, requiring strategic intervention by the state. Although internal security is primarily a police task, the intervention of the Armed Forces (Armed Forces) is essential in situations where the magnitude of the threat exceeds police capabilities. Finally, the need for a comprehensive strategy that combines security efforts with socioeconomic development to mitigate the effects of radicalization, as well as to guarantee and strengthen the country’s long-term stability, especially in the most vulnerable regions, is highlighted.

Keywords: Ideological radicalization, State, TOC, National Security, Armed Forces, socioeconomic development, governance.

Introduction

In recent years, various radical political-ideological currents have emerged as disruptive forces, challenging the stability of States at the global level. In the specific context of Peru, these currents have given rise to the emergence of radical groups that seek to destabilize the State under the guise of supposed social demands. In most cases, they resort to violence as their main tool to bring about changes in power structures. Taking advantage of the absence of the state in certain areas, they have instrumentalized illicit activities such as illicit drug trafficking (IDT), illegal mining and smuggling, which further intensifies the perception of insecurity. The informality that characterizes these regions not only contributes to opposition to development projects, but also facilitates the incursion of the TOC, aggravating the crisis and weakening governance. Although internal security is a primary mission of the Peruvian National Police (PNP), the magnitude of threats has sometimes required the intervention of the Armed Forces, especially in situations where police capacities are insufficient. This article examines the fundamental participation of the Armed Forces in confronting these asymmetric threats, ranging from terrorism to organized crime, and how they have had to adapt to these new challenges.

Radicalization and its Threat to National Security in Peru

The emergence of radical groups in Peru is based on a social framework of inequality, marginality and institutional weakness. These groups emerge from political-ideological currents that promote confrontation as a means to achieve their objectives, specifically in areas where the presence of the government, as a component of the state, is scarce, becoming fertile ground for recruiting followers and promoting their agendas.^[1] The lack of access to basic services, job opportunities and legitimate political representation fuels animosity towards the State and facilitates a process of alienation of marginalized sectors of the population.

It is a social constant that, in certain regions of Peru where radical groups operate, the population shows a marked absence of a sense of national belonging. Instead, regionalisms and ethnic identities prevail, used as a basis for deepening the existing gap between these communities and the diverse populations of the State.^[2] This situation hinders social cohesion, fosters distrust and weakens the State’s capacity to implement inclusive and effective public policies. The strengthening of local identities, to the detriment of a shared national identity, exacerbates distrust of state institutions, perpetuating a cycle of marginalization and conflict that further undermines social cohesion and fuels radicalization.

The leaders of these groups, who call themselves “self-convened social fighters”, manipulate and mobilize the masses for personal or group interests. Under the pretext of defending legitimate social demands, they resort to violence to achieve their political objectives,^[3] taking advantage of the vulnerability and often the ignorance of the communities. A considerable part of them are involved in corruption cases and act subsidized by actors linked to the TOC, seeking to perpetuate their control over the communities and undermining the legitimacy of the State.^[4] In this context, they oppose the forces of order, including the Armed Forces, as these represent an obstacle to their objective of imposing chaos and disorder. They use their political ideology to adopt a position of victimization and allege violations of their rights. This narrative collides with public opinion; some consider military actions as necessary to maintain social order, while others perceive them as an unjust imposition of state power.

It is essential to understand how radical groups develop their activities in areas where the presence of the state is inadequate or deficient.^[5] These are often financed through informal and illegal activities outside the law, such as smuggling, illegal mining and TID.^[6] The interconnection between illicit activities and radicalization strengthens their operational capacity, providing them with economic resources to continue their subversive agendas.

Another relevant aspect is the social protection and economic support that some political and local authorities give them, in order to avoid questioning, recall processes or protests in the face of errors or shortcomings in their management. For this purpose, they employ a series of mechanisms such as the use of people oriented to carry out support activities, known as “portables”, and groups called “shock forces”; this modality of extortion is disguised as a “contribution in favor of the people’s struggle”.

Likewise, inertia, indifference, fear of reprisals and corruption on the part of certain representatives of the National Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPFN), prevent the opening of prosecutorial investigations;^[7] because these radical operators are generally locals, which demonstrates a position of power and impunity in the face of their actions.^[8] An in-depth analysis of these collaboration networks can identify sources of funding for precise and effective interventions to dismantle these alliances and reduce their operational capacity.

The Impact of Radical Groups on Development and National Security

The activities of radical groups in Peru negatively affect socioeconomic development and national security, as they do not only incite violence and instability in the areas where they operate; they also hinder progress efforts and cause social upheaval and conflict.^[9] It is therefore evident that these groups not only generate violence, but also contribute to economic stagnation by sabotaging the implementation of public policies and, on repeated occasions, paralyzing economic activities in regions that are strategic for the country.

The so-called “autoconvocados” share a discourse and narrative of disunity and disaffection towards the government.^[10] At this juncture, the violence and intimidation promoted by these groups drives away investment and negatively impacts the business climate in the areas under their control, which translates into reduced economic opportunities and stagnates local development. Radical actions, such as road blockades and the seizure of critical facilities and infrastructure, not only cause immediate economic losses, but also have long-term effects, reducing the competitiveness of the affected regions, damaging their image and hindering their development.

The presence of radicalism hinders the State’s efforts to promote works and development in these areas. Insecurity and the constant threat of violence hinder the implementation of effective public policies and the provision of basic services, such as education, health and infrastructure.^[11] The attempted violence has weakened local institutions and eroded the capacity of the State, reinforcing the cycle of marginalization and pushing more people towards radicalism.

The relationship between political ideology and the State’s attempts to establish a presence and promote development in various regions reveals the complexity of social and cultural dynamics. Particularly in areas with a history of historical conflict and absence of the state, these interventions are often perceived as transgressions of their rights and local autonomy.

Violence generates a devastating economic and social impact, due to the interruption of productive activities and the increase in security costs,^[12] which deteriorates the quality of life of the affected populations. At the national level, these illicit actions have a serious impact on the economy and national identity.^[13] Prospectively, if the State does not act decisively to control and eradicate the influence of these radical groups, the impact on economic development could be even more severe. As regions affected by violence continue to lose investment and development opportunities, the cost of economic recovery will be increasingly higher.

The lack of cohesion between state and non-state actors weakens development efforts and makes their presence and leadership invisible, making it necessary to strengthen alliances between government, civil society and the private sector.^[14] Only by empowering legally recognized community leaders and encouraging their participation in decision-making can the negative influence of delay and stagnation be reversed.^[15] Without a unified strategy that promotes cooperation to formalize economic activities and strengthen institutions, efforts to combat these problems will remain insufficient.

Convergence between Radical Groups and the TOC

The presence of these groups is related to violence and destabilization of the state, strengthened by their connection to organized crime.^[16] Radicals find in the TOC a strategic ally to finance, escalate and expand their activities. Similarly, organized crime uses these groups as instruments to generate chaos and disorder, taking advantage of their mobilization capacity to divert efforts and avoid control by the forces of law and order.^[17] It is notorious that the convergence between these actors is neither casual nor spontaneous; it responds to the need of both to maximize their resources and seek impunity for their actions.

Through economic subsidies, organized crime recruits leaders and members of radical groups as security agents, advance operators and informants for their illicit activities, which range from smuggling and illegal mining to IDT and other related crimes. The symbiosis between radical actors and the TOC allows criminality to expand in areas where state control is weak, such as the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro River Valley (VRAEM),^[18] where criminals dedicated to the TID and armed groups of the Shining Path Terrorist Organization (self-styled Militarized Communist Party of Peru Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-Maoist mainly Xiist (MPCP- MLMPM) collaborate to consolidate their operations, strengthening criminal structures and creating a vicious circle of violence and illegality.

Current policies to combat organized crime in Peru are deficient and, on several occasions, ineffective in neutralizing the resources and activities of radical groups, due to the lack of a comprehensive approach and limited internal coordination.^[19] Although international cooperation and bilateral treaties have the potential to be beneficial, their effective implementation is irregular, which affects the intelligence cycle and the execution of strategies.^[20] In this context, the State adopts a reactive approach to this convergence, prioritizing military response without addressing the structural roots of the problem.^[21] TID, like other illicit activities, provides the financial resources that allow radical groups to sustain their operational capacity. However, the lack of a comprehensive strategy that combines security efforts with economic development and social cohesion has allowed this criminal alliance to continue to strengthen.

Without decisive action, these alliances will continue to erode state control and weaken local institutions, hindering development in the most affected regions. Improving coordination and strengthening law enforcement institutions to confront the convergence between radical groups and organized crime is a priority. This will require enhancing military and intelligence capabilities, as well as involving local communities in order to consolidate the social fabric and prevent radical groups from continuing to recruit new members.

The Peruvian State facing the Threat of Radical Groups

The emergence and activity of violence pose significant challenges for the State and its institutions.^[22] While there are efforts to address this threat, a number of obstacles persist that hinder an effective and sustainable response. The State’s inability to articulate law enforcement operators and ensure public security is compromised by a lack of human, logistical and financial resources,^[23] as well as corruption and infiltration of state institutions by TOC agents, which undermines the effectiveness of security and justice measures.^[24] This complexity and multidimensionality of the threat requires a comprehensive and coordinated response from the State. The absence of a comprehensive strategy has allowed radical groups to continue operating in the most vulnerable areas.^[25]

Another important challenge lies in the cooperation and coordination between different state agencies and levels of government.^[26] Deficiencies in the effective articulation between these entities can hinder the early identification and neutralization of threats posed by radical groups.^[27] From a strategic approach, the State must move towards a more inclusive and cohesive governance model, in which security is addressed not in isolation, but in conjunction with the economic and social development of the affected regions. However, the absence of a comprehensive strategy has deepened disaffection towards the State in impacted communities, where distrust towards institutions has allowed radical groups to present themselves as an alternative to channel such resentment.

Strengthening the Peruvian state’s response implies implementing institutional reforms that improve the capacities of security agencies, especially by strengthening the intelligence community. In addition, it is crucial to optimize international cooperation and bilateral treaties that would enhance the fight against TOC, dismantling its sources of financing to weaken violent groups. The legitimacy of the State will be a determining factor in this fight, since without the trust of the citizenry, any security effort will be perceived as a repressive imposition.

This comprehensive strategy must ensure an effective response that includes prevention policies aimed at addressing inequality and social exclusion in the most remote and vulnerable areas of the country. The challenge is twofold: to contain violence and, at the same time, to strengthen institutional presence in the most vulnerable regions.

The Armed Forces as a Guarantee of National Security and State Stability

Given the growth of these threats, the Armed Forces play a central role in maintaining national security and the stability of the State.^[28] Their intervention is essential to counteract all types of threats and preserve internal order. Although the internal security mission corresponds mainly to the PNP, the Armed Forces act in situations where the capacities of the police institution have been exceeded, prior declaration of a state of emergency, assuming a complementary role when the magnitude of the threat demands it.^[29]

It is important to emphasize that, in the performance of military actions, collateral damage to the civilian population must be avoided.^[30] Harmony with the community is essential for the effective execution of its functions.

It is essential that the Armed Forces have high quality field intelligence to confront radical organizations, especially those linked to the TOC that threaten social order and national security. This intelligence must provide accurate and timely information, allowing the Armed Forces to make informed and strategic decisions in the fight against these groups.^[31]

Inter-institutional cooperation between the Armed Forces, the PNP and intelligence agencies is crucial to guarantee the effectiveness of security operations.^[32] Coordination and information flow between these entities is key to anticipate movements, identify leaders and dismantle support networks, thus achieving more effective operations with less risk for the civilian population.

The need for human, technological and material resources is vital for the Armed Forces to effectively fulfill their strategic roles in national defense. In areas of high poverty, military service can be seen as an opportunity to improve the economic situation,^[33] despite ideological tensions and coercion by radical groups. However, the lack of an adequate economic incentive could motivate young people to engage in illicit activities such as smuggling, illegal mining, TID, among others. Therefore, it is imperative that voluntary military service promotes social inclusion, offering alternatives and opportunities that discourage young people from opting for illegal activities.

It is essential that the Armed Forces are adequately prepared and equipped to face the various threats affecting the country.^[34] This includes not only the capacity to respond to emergency situations, but also the ability to prevent and neutralize possible attacks by new forms of terrorism or other forms of violence.^[35] Additionally, they must work in close coordination with other state agencies and law enforcement agencies to ensure a comprehensive and effective response to threats. Interagency cooperation is essential to maximize available resources and ensure the effectiveness of security operations.

Conclusions

Radicalization in Peru has flourished due to the action of agents with ideology contrary to the correct conception of the nation state, as well as the existence of social contradictions and institutional weaknesses, which has allowed radical groups to mobilize marginalized sectors and put the stability of the state at risk. Without a comprehensive strategy that addresses both the violence and the structural causes that fuel this phenomenon, the situation will continue to escalate, further compromising social cohesion and governance.

The convergence between radical groups and the TOC has intensified the threat, weakening state control over strategic territories and making security interventions more difficult. This strategic alliance has allowed both actors to strengthen their influence in key regions, requiring a coordinated response that combines intelligence, security and development efforts with a long-term approach to dismantle these criminal networks.

The Armed Forces, as a pillar of national security, must adapt to the new asymmetric threats and strengthen their cooperation with other State institutions. Its role should not be oriented only to the defense of the territory, but to internal operations that respect fundamental rights and protect the civilian population.

Only through genuine political will and intention that combines security, development and social cohesion will the Peruvian State be able to regain control of the affected regions, dismantle the influence of radical groups and maintain stability.

Endnotes:

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